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Abstract 
We live in a time in which ‘mental health’ problems have been described as the ‘epidemic’ of 
gravest concern. The incidence of ‘mental health’ problems is increasing year-on-year, yet 
we remain fixed on one course of action with a psychopharmacology trajectory of 
understanding and treatment; this being the basis of our psychiatric system and the default 
medical encounter, it too readily insists upon all forms of psychic suffering being reduced to 
chemical imbalances within the brain. 
It is against this backdrop that I introduce the potential and necessity for a return to the 
theory of R.D. Laing. Laing was a psychiatrist whose most prominent mark was made in the 
1960s. With an unwavering commitment to establish more humane treatment for those 
diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’, he developed a philosophical method of enquiry grounded in 
existential-phenomenology. Through this methodological lens, Laing argued that 
‘intelligibility’ of experience could be revealed within even the most psychotic of patients. It is 
only with intelligibility that a true knowledge of persons can be gained, and help given. Laing 
provides us with a theory to challenge the all-compassing dominance that psychiatry wields 
upon the self, allowing us to consider how psychiatric discourse affects society beyond 
diagnosis, and think differently about what constitutes ‘mental illness’ and diagnosis.  
This thesis clarifies and develops Laing’s theory from 1960 to 1970, offering a contrasting 
reading to the modular format frequently represented within secondary sources and 
producing instead a unified framework. Emphasising and reworking the concept of 
‘ontological insecurity’ as a logical, but painful, existential response to dysfunctional 
interpersonal dynamics within our worldly immersion. Supported further by his lesser 
appreciated concept of ‘self-consciousness’, a political application is developed that 
highlights the potential value of Laing’s theory as a means of understanding our current 
‘mental health’ situation. In the process of conducting this re-evaluation, scientism is drawn 
into focus. Extending beyond the clinical encounter and placed within the interpersonal 
dynamics of everyday existence, it is proposed that western culture is increasingly allowing 
itself to be defined within a scientific paradigm that incurs a collective existential degradation. 
This is a significant source for ontological insecurity and thus contributes to the experience 
of psychic suffering.  
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Part 1. Introduction 
R.D. Laing’s theory was developed in the 1960s: a time of intensity and change within the 
political and medical world. Politically, people were marching for a more equal society. In 
contrast, psychiatry was increasingly developing and implementing medical ‘treatments’ that 
denied basic civil liberties. Laing brought these two worlds together. Armed with an 
existential-phenomenological methodology, he aimed to humanise psychiatric treatment and 
establish respect for those caught in its grasp.  
Whilst some would like to disregard Laing as a relic of a time that no longer holds relevance, 
the evidence suggests that the trajectory of politics and psychiatry, the conditions that 
brought him to prominence, have only intensified. Even more worryingly, for all the 
technological and biochemical development, ‘mental illness’ diagnoses are higher than ever: 
an ‘epidemic’ of grave concern within contemporary culture. The question posed in this 
research is whether Laing’s theory is capable of traversing this timeline and offering much 
needed insight into this dire situation.  
This contrapuntal reading of R.D. Laing analyses his publications between 1960 – 1970 
through a 21st century lens and within a contemporary context.  
Contrapuntal reading is thus theorized as an act of (re)reading, of making space for 
narratives and subjectivities that have no room in canonical texts specifically around 
lines of supposed historical fact. (Pande, 2018, p. 106) 
Contrapuntal readings are more familiar in works of colonialism and race; the familiarity of 
this application lies with Edward Said (2003). This research intends to (re)read Laing’s 
theory which was developed in the 1960s and make space for it to be considered within a 
21st century, neoliberal, western context.  
Laing’s theory was contentious when it arrived, and this has amplified since. As is evident in 
many secondary sources, efforts are seemingly committed to justify the value of either side 
of the polemic: Laing as a renegade of a bygone era or a revolutionary overlooked to our 
detriment. The consequence of this argument is that the very essence of his theory becomes 
lost; furthermore, his theory becomes static, framed within the influence of longstanding 
interpretations that preserve his perceived irrelevance.  
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This thesis will be focussed through a concept analysis methodology, undertaking a close 
reading of Laing’s written work, supported where necessary with reference to influences he 
directly acknowledges. Resulting from the voluminous readings of Laing, from different 
positions and agendas, multiple theoretical structures and readings have been imposed on 
Laing’s theory. The deconstruction of each concept may appear descriptive, but each 
chapter involves a stripping away of these multiple readings, a process that does not intend 
to dismiss these multifarious readings, but rather consider their value afresh with direct 
reference to Laing’s original texts. Through this process of excavation, I intend to reveal a 
philosophical core to Laing’s theory, enabling an argument to be reached for a political 
causation of ontological insecurity. Many of the chapters and concepts developed in this 
process operate as independent frameworks that can be drawn into future discussions to 
consider an application of specific elements of Laing’s theory.  
The ultimate destination of this thesis is to assemble these concepts within a totality, 
demonstrating their capacity to be read as a singular, unified, Laingian framework. Applied in 
contrast to current canonical texts, exemplified by the psychiatric paradigm, and the cultural 
narratives that this medical discourse helps inform, a space will be created for a Laingian 
framework to be considered. This will be focussed toward appreciating a political cause of 
ontological insecurity, considering how this may offer insight into the current ‘mental health’ 
situation. Applying Laing’s theory toward causation incurs an emphasis on, what can be 
simplistically represented at this early stage as, individual components of the inner or outer 
world. This approach facilitates a thorough analysis of ontological insecurity and its cause; 
however, it must not detract from an appreciation for the structural interrelation and balance 
of inner/outer experiences for a sense of ontologically security to be achieved.  
The terms of ontological insecurity and psychic suffering contained within the title will be 
unpacked as this research develops but require positioning from the outset to ensure a base 
understanding.  
Ontological insecurity is a concept developed by Laing, defined as a description of 
experience and this stands in opposition to a diagnosis of ‘illness’. Ontological insecurity is 
an existential position whereby ‘the ordinary circumstances of living threaten his low 
threshold of security’ (Laing, 1960, p. 42). The descriptive quality of this definition was 
grounded in the social intelligibility Laing’s research revealed from three locations: the family, 
the clinical, and the political. Working across these locations, this procedure is frequently 
represented in secondary sources in a fragmented and atomised format. However, this 
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thesis will propose justification for the process underpinning ontological insecurity to be 
structured into a totalising meta-Laingian theory.  
With specific attention to the development of process within this theory, the contentious 
proposition of cause is discussed. This is highly controversial because Laing rejected the 
insinuation that his theory dealt with aetiology or causation of ‘mental illness’ (Mullan, 1995). 
However, this thesis will offer that his protestations do not negate a process of causation that 
incurs psychic suffering, understood as an experiential state rather than a psychiatric 
disorder. This plays directly into Laing’s theory of interpersonal dynamics, with misaligned 
communication patterns between self and other, creating ‘spirals’ and ‘knots’ within the 
construction of phantasy. The phantasy construct will be discussed later as the content of 
the ego (see Chapter 7, Self-Formation: Ego). However, the proposition for a process of 
formation of spirals and knots enables a causal link between ontological insecurity and the 
experience of psychic suffering to provide insight into the current increasing incidence of 
‘mental illness’ diagnosis. 
Laing offers a critique of the ‘mental illness’ model, but crucially without dismissing the notion 
that ‘mental illness’ can exist. Rather, it is a critique of the over-representation of illness 
diagnosis within western society, when in reality the experience of the individual sufferer is 
often more accurately a reflection of ontological insecurity. Developing the link between 
psychic suffering and ontological insecurity contributes further to a unique interpretation of 
Laing’s theory and strengthens the potential for application in contemporary culture. 
Although providing a theory to resist the authority and dominance of the terms ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘mental health’ within contemporary culture, these terms are currently the most 
established point of reference within everyday language. ‘Mental illness’ (and ‘mental 
disorder’) at its limit is understood herein broadly as a diagnosis identifying a defective 
organism, a medical / psychiatric abnormality within an individual, this being represented 
most strongly as a chemical imbalance within the brain. ‘Mental health’ is a broader term 
which can be used to describe a positive state of mind, or the field that encapsulates both 
positive (‘mental health’) and negative (‘mental illness’) states. Laing’s theory operates within 
this field, but this thesis tries to pull away from this discourse that ultimately leads to an 
understanding of the self as organism, but an inevitable slippage occurs when needing to 
position what I describe as ‘psychic suffering’ within a contemporary context. For these 
reasons, each of these terms will be encapsulated within inverted commas (‘mental illness’ / 
‘mental health’) to indicate their contested status; the preferred terminology here will be that 
of ‘psychic suffering’.  
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A significant limitation is acknowledged in that Laing commits no attention to the analysis of 
power relations, thus incurring blind spots with regard to race, class, gender, sexuality etc. 
This thesis briefly engages with gender and class, but because its concern is with Laing’s 
general philosophical framework and the possibility of a philosophically-driven approach to 
psychic suffering, it does not deal in detail with his failure to consider the central identity 
concerns that were gradually emerging in the period under consideration. Without dismissing 
the implications of these blind spots, they fall outside Laing’s philosophical focus which was 
applied to the constant existential forces within the everyday that inhibit our existence, or 
more accurately, cause ontological insecurity. This ontological focus is maintained in this 
thesis with recognition of its limitation and the potential for future research to address this 
with the attention it deserves.  
As we now move into Part 1, Introduction, several aspects will be drawn into focus to provide 
a contextual backdrop for this entire thesis. This section will outline the methodological 
approach to this research, it will explore the contemporary ‘mental health’ system with 
reference to Laing’s contrasting theoretic approach, a definition and description of modern 
psychiatry will be discussed to position the rationale underpinning Laing’s theory, and will 




1. Methodology  
Research Aim:  
The aim of this research is to a) re-evaluate the theory of R.D. Laing, and b) apply the 
concepts identified to contemporary culture. Long-standing interpretations continue to define 
Laing’s theory and their accuracy relies upon a continuation of themes sustained in 
secondary sources. This thesis will return to Laing’s theory as the bedrock to deconstruct 
and analyse concepts at the point of origin before reforming them as a totalising theory. The 
application of this new interpretation will be focussed upon the ‘mental health’ situation in 
contemporary culture.  
Through this reading of Laing’s theory, (re)applied to current existence, it will be argued that 
the discourse by which we now understand ourselves and others is amplifying ontological 
insecurity thus lowering our resilience to cope with the hazards associated with everyday 
existence; this is reflected in the increasing incidence of ‘mental illness’ diagnosis.  
Methodological Design:  
A methodology is the lens through which the totality of all research is focused; developing a 
clear and structurally sound methodological lens enables a thorough re-evaluation of Laing’s 
theory, ensuring loyalty to his theoretical intent, justifying reliability and validity for potentially 
all findings, including those that may have been overlooked, obscured, misplaced or 
forgotten. As will be shown, contemporary representations of Laing are heavily influenced by 
longstanding secondary sources and criticisms of Laing’s theoretical vagueness. A strong 
methodology is vital for understanding Laing’s intentions and exploring how the theory can 
be applied to our current situation.  
Many accounts of Laing’s theory reproduce major concepts as independent and isolated 
structural elements. The pervasiveness of this atomised representation, I must admit, 
(mis)shaped my own interpretation of Laing for a sustained period. Following a chronological 
approach, I was drawn to The Divided Self with a broad interest in what I initially determined 
was ‘mental health’; this was followed by Sanity, Madness and the Family, and rounded off 
with The Politics of Experience. These three books are widely recommended as the 
backbone to Laing’s theory: a psychiatric encounter (Clinical), the family-nexus (Familial) 
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and a political context (Political). These appeared as three sites of investigation whereby 
Laing’s methodology is applied and his findings organised.  
At this point, I started to engage with secondary texts, many of which utilised Siegler et al.’s 
(1969) ‘models of madness’ framework: a universal framework detailing seven different 
approaches to the analysis of schizophrenia. Increasingly, these locational characteristics, 
the primary characteristics I had identified within Laing’s theory, not only started to reveal a 
more definitive atomised structure adopted by previous writers, but the boundaries of these 
contexts became accentuated and reinforced as individual theoretical frameworks. My initial 
identification of three locational characteristics was being absorbed and concretised into a 
modular structure that reverberated throughout secondary sources with varying opacity, the 
clinical, familial and political finding a prepared and well-established home within the ‘models 
of madness’ within the conspiratorial, psychoanalytic, and psychedelic models respectively. 
The question which began to emerge was whether this absorption of ideas was through 
compatibility or the seduction of perceived authority? Either way, the atomised format, its 
rigid boundaries and the belief that each location then provides a further demarcation for an 
application of separate theories (including different theories of ontological insecurity), started 
to dominate and define my own analytic framework. To what extent had others followed this 
momentum, contributing to its perceived authority? Furthermore, were other theories equally 
as pervasive in constructing Laing’s theory? 
Philosophical Analysis 
Philosophical analysis is also known under the term ‘conceptual analysis’ and this may be a 
more useful description for the intent underpinning its application in this research. 
‘Conceptual analysis’ is frequently used within medical research as a means of ensuring 
dense theory translates into accurate practice. Complex, theory-laden concepts are 
deconstructed, ensuring each of the compositional parts is identified, clarified and their 
implementation as a whole is understood and therefore executed correctly (Dominguez-Rué, 
2019).  
The method of conceptual analysis tends to approach […] a problem by breaking 
down the key concepts pertaining to the problem and seeing how they interact. 
(Drake, 2018, p. 109) 
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Consideration of Laing’s theory is hindered by several significant ‘problems’ which are 
perceived to exist within the theoretical structure he produces during his first stage of 
publishing. The importance of these ‘problems’, of which an accusation of theoretical 
contradiction is a main contributor, rests frequently on an unquestioned assumption of the 
reliability of established secondary sources, rather that Laing’s own words. This is something 
that caused me concern.     
In response to this concern, this thesis conducts a concept analysis of Laing’s theory, 
focussing on his written work foremost, supported where necessary with reference to his 
philosophic influences, and carefully extracting the analytic detail developed in secondary 
sources without automatically accepting their wider structural implications. The aim is to 
develop an accurate representation of Laing’s theory, reflecting the structure he intended, 
and interacting in a structure he designed, rather than follow representations that have 
established themselves to such an extent they are maintained in secondary sources without 
critical enquiry as to their origin or accuracy.  
My research is restricted to Laing’s written, published work between 1960 – 1970. This 
period will be referred to as ‘Laing’s first phase of publishing’ and is chosen due to the 
thematic connectedness of each text. This period produced a series of highly interrelated 
texts, each of which contributes to the development of a theory that extends through the 
individual, into the family-nexus, and beyond into the political realm, a trajectory of thought 
that inevitably implicates psychiatric services. 
Each chapter will analyse different concepts present within this first phase, extracting 
information from all relevant texts. Highlighting the specific concepts which play a 
substantive role in his theoretical framework, each concept will be deconstructed through a 
philosophical lens. Secondary sources provide a further valuable source of insight but will be 
included with caution ensuring that their value is warranted with a fresh critical evaluation.  
Through this close reading of Laing and his influences, a master principle is argued that 
each of these components work cohesively, interacting as a totalising framework.  
This totalising framework, reflected most profoundly through the concept of ‘ontological 
insecurity’, will be drawn into a political context, amplifying the contrapuntal reading of 
Laing’s theory within contemporary culture and considering the potential of his theory to add 
value. The notion of the political is used in a Laingian sense, which will be discussed in detail 
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but can be positioned from the outset as the potential for a macro application of theory: a 
widening focus that encapsulates society and culture. 
This thesis will build toward the claim that Laing develops a theory that reveals a primary 
cause of psychic suffering related to our politically contextualised existence. It will be argued 
that the discourse by which we now understand ourselves and others is amplifying 
ontological insecurity thus lowering our resilience to cope with the hazards associated with 
everyday existence as reflected in the increasing incidence of ‘mental health’ diagnosis.  
Background and Rationale for this design:  
Laing remained loyal to the capability of philosophy to gain the truest form of knowledge into 
all questions about what it means to be a person. This thesis echoes that premise, 
continuing with philosophical enquiry as methodology. This is not continued out of nostalgia 
for Laing’s intentions, but in recognition that a concept analysis complements Laing’s 
methodology. This will be to an advantage as each of the concepts are drawn together in 
application to a contemporary context, ensuring continuity and compatibility as Laing’s own 




Structure of the Thesis 
Part 1: Introduction  
Overview of the main theme to be discussed and developed throughout this thesis.   
 Chapter 1. Methodology  
The outline, methodological design, philosophical analysis and rationale for this 
methodological design are detailed, providing the lens by which this research will be 
focussed in order to ensure the greatest clarity and accuracy of findings.  
Chapter 2. Why Now?  
Establishing the rationale behind this research, this chapter identifies the current 
need for new and innovative ways to approach ‘mental health’ in response to the 
escalating incidence of ‘mental illness’ diagnosis. This introduction places the 
potential for Laing within a contemporary medical context and also gestures towards 
the barriers that impede such consideration.  
Chapter 3. The Dividing Character 
Creating a division between his personal and written persona, Ronnie and Laing 
respectively, the contribution of Laing’s personality (Ronnie) to the mythology is 
explored. Several primary controversies exist within the narrative of Laing’s career 
that continue to present a significant barrier to his relevance, both then and now. It is 
argued that these prominent controversies exist beyond the confines of his written 
word. Through these critiques and controversies, the intended focus applied to his 
writings is refined, justifying a research parameter centred on written publications 
only between 1960 – 1970, The Divided Self to Knots, respectively.  
Chapter 4. Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance 
Laing positioned his theory against the prevailing discourse of psychiatry. In this 
chapter we contextualise the rationale and value of this position. Four contexts are 
discussed: a history of modern psychiatry, voices of resistance in Laing’s era, 
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modern psychiatry post-Laing, and finally, the potential for Laing within the service-
user movement.  
Part 2: The Return to Philosophy 
Falling within the primary parameter of existentialism, Laing’s methodology embraces the 
totality of experience. In Part 2, this methodological approach is deconstructed into two 
components: an existential-phenomenological methodology, and a theory of self-formation. 
Although presented in a structure that is not contained within his writing, this reinterpretation 
and alternative representation does not distort the tenets of Laing’s theory; rather, it enables 
finer details of the mechanisms and operation of process to be identified building a more 
substantial Laingian methodological framework. It is from the foundation built in Part 2 that 
the contexts of Laing’s research are re-evaluated in relation to the political problem of 
‘mental illness’, offering greater insights from the intelligibility he gained.  
Chapter 5. A Laingian Methodology  
This chapter unpicks and outlines a clear existential-phenomenological framework 
that underpins the entirety of Laing’s work. A definitive methodology for approaching 
the self will be achieved through deconstructing and evaluating the unique 
contribution of both existentialism and phenomenology, before reassembling them 
into their collaborative and singular form, demonstrating their continuing structural 
presence throughout Laing’s theory.  
Chapter 6. Self-Formation  
Developing the existential basis of Laing’s methodology, primary components of the 
self are highlighted. These include the premise of a totalising ego and a non-
unconscious consciousness. Overlapping with either component is the development 
of the construct of phantasy. Although all of the elements obtained are present within 
Laing’s theory, this chapter highlights and amplifies the components of the self 
construct in our daily existence complementing the methodological approach 
developed in the previous chapter. 
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Part 3. Ontological Insecurity  
Delving deep into Laing’s theory of ontological insecurity and identifying forgotten and 
overlooked components within this framework, Part 3. will consider its application to psychic 
suffering and thus its ability to translate in some capacity to discourses of ‘mental health’ 
beyond the realm of schizophrenia and medicine. This is the realisation of rupture within 
being-in-the-world. The concept of ontological insecurity as a premise of psychic suffering, 
existing outwith diagnosis of ‘mental illness’ and disorders, and yet also having application to 
these, is outlined. Emphasising a detriment to relatedness (with one’s self and others) as a 
consequence of the rupture, a theoretical platform is developed that allows a changing 
application of ontological insecurity to be contained within a single framework. Self-
consciousness, a sleeping concept that gains little attention after The Divided Self, becomes 
a key component in stabilising this potential for consistency rather than conflict. The 
proposal here is that ontological insecurity is a cause of a lack of relatedness.  
Chapter 7. An Empirical Concept  
This builds the base framework of ontological insecurity developing its structure with 
reference to direct and indirect influences named by Laing. Two specific components 
to be clarified are the notion of this being existentially informed but not existential in 
the traditional form. The second component will outline the perceived changing 
application for ontological insecurity between the family and political context.   
Chapter 8. As a Totality  
This chapter challenges the notion of a changing application for ontological 
insecurity. Approached firstly through an analysis of concepts of normality, the 
primary focus will then draw into contention the frequently repeated atomised 
representation of Laing’s theory as a collection of models. This broader atomised 
conversation will consider whether Laing himself intended his theory to be 
considered as a totality or as a modulated structure; this has implications for 
continuity in the application of ontological insecurity. In the next section, the concept 
of self-consciousness will be woven with ontological insecurity to enable greater 
cogency to this concept when it is applied throughout the family and political context.  
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Chapter 9. Self-Consciousness 
Ontological insecurity becomes reframed with reference to self-consciousness. This 
development opens up the concept of ontological insecurity for more substantial 
analysis, enabling a more nuanced interrelatedness of inner and outer worlds to be 
considered, providing the groundwork for process or cause to be explored, and helps 
mitigate the perceived conflictual application of ontological insecurity in the contexts 
of the family and the political.  
Chapter 10. Psychic Suffering 
Having developed the framework of ontological insecurity and offered a 
reinterpretation, justifying the structural importance of greater appreciation of the 
concept of self-consciousness, this chapter contextualises the potential for this 
framework to benefit current discussions of ‘mental health’ as an inclusive concept 
that addresses psychic suffering beyond the limitation of diagnosis, further 
illuminating a pathway to consider a process of causation.  
Part 4. A Political Process 
Three locational characteristics reveal themselves within Laing’s theory: the family, the 
clinical, and the political. This has contributed significantly to atomised perspectives of 
Laing’s theory. Negotiating the temptation to follow this well-established format, Part 3 
focusses on the political content within Laing’s theory, outlining its intention to be addressed 
as a totality. The aim of this chapter is to outline a rationale to draw on concepts from the 
family and the clinical, and to develop a structurally sound framework that holds relevance 
within a contemporary political setting.  
Chapter 11. The Political  
This chapter discusses Laing’s credentials to be considered as political thinker. The 
political aspect of Laing’s theory is frequently regarded as a separate, disconnected 
and contradictory framework to that developed within the family. Developing Laing’s 
political framework, I consider the integrity of alternative applications of ontological 
insecurity utilised during this stage. It will explore his relationship to counterculture, 
the new-Left, and considered the limits of his contribution to political theory. More 
specifically, it defines what is meant by ‘political’ within Laing’s theory and how a 
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thematic fit with the counterculture is developed through Laing’s philosophic 
methodology. The political actions of Ronnie bled into his theoretical writing and its 
reception more so than any other. In addressing these specific controversies and 
critiques, the substance of Laing’s writings become more vivid and a clearer 
framework is outlined.  
Chapter 12. Interpersonal World 
Laing’s theory of interpersonal dynamics was introduced within his focus upon the 
family context. In the atomised format, this has led to it being contained and limited to 
the parameters of this context. In this chapter I argue that Laing’s research on the 
family and the theory this produced was never intended to be constrained. This 
justifies an opening for Laing’s extensive theory on interpersonal dynamics and 
interpersonal perception to be extended into the political realm. Addressing the family 
context, feminist critiques of Laing are discussed as a means of considering whether 
his theory is limited to this domain.  
Chapter 13. Ontological Discontinuity  
Analysing the political as site that continues the operations of the interpersonal world, 
this chapter considers the discourse of scientism: an aspect more synonymous with 
Laing’s focus on the clinical context. The absorption of scientistic terminology as the 
most accurate means of explaining and understanding the person, in all forms, is 
outlined as causing a severe existential degradation. The inability to relate to others 
(and one’s self) through the medium of scientistic discourse is determined as a cause 
of ontological discontinuity and thus ontological insecurity. Pulling all strands from 
this thesis together, an argument will be presented that the discourse by which we 
now understand ourselves and others is amplifying ontological insecurity and thus 
lowering our resilience to cope with the hazards associated with everyday existence. 
Concluding Remarks  
Illustrated with assistance from Sartre’s play, Huis Clos, the collective experience for 
ontological insecurity that encapsulates western, neoliberal, contemporary existence is 
summarised. Moving through the cause of ontological insecurity, we find ourselves 
considering what is missing and how this might be (re)engaged. The necessity for a space of 
‘self-reflection’ within a conception of self is explored.  
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Coda: Laing and the COVID-19 Fallout 
During the process of writing this thesis, a global pandemic has changed the world 
landscape as we know it. Although COVID-19 is a respiratory virus, the mitigating actions 
which have been taken to prevent its spread have caused significant mental health 
concerns. In this section I reaffirm some of Laing’s primary concepts as a valuable source of 




2. Why Now? 
In this chapter, I introduce Laing’s theory into the contemporary landscape of ‘mental health’, 
specifically and directly extrapolating his methodological approach, developed in the 1960s, 
into the current domain. This serves to highlight immediate compatibilities and limitations 
before we delve into a more thorough philosophical analysis of his theory, including the 
component parts of this methodology in Part 2.   
Desperate times call for desperate measures  
The critical situation of western ‘mental health’ has been sensationally defined as the 
‘epidemic’ of gravest concern facing modern existence (Whitaker, 2011). The UK National 
Health Service (NHS) provides a stark picture to accompany this, outlining an alarming 
incidence of ‘mental health’ diagnosis, with year-on-year increase, and most crucially 
admitting that this situation is beyond the management of current treatment strategies 
(England.nhs.uk, 2016). However, regardless of increasing incidence and insufficient means 
of support, western health providers remain fixed in their loyalty to the dominant 
psychopharmacology regime – a belief that ‘mental illnesses’ are caused by biochemical 
deficiencies inside the brain with drug ‘therapy’ as the go-to response for treatment (Rose, 
2019).  
Whether the current ‘mental health’ situation constitutes an ‘epidemic’ is debatable. 
Numerous commentators suggest a multitude of interwoven professional factors are 
contributing to overdiagnosis within the psychiatric field (see Paris, 2015; Frances, 2013; 
Rose, 2019). A critical point within this thesis is identified by Rose (2019), suggesting in 
addition that changing attitudes and increasing emotional literacy by the sufferer are 
affecting the expression of psychic experience within the western world, with this potentially 
translating into increased diagnosis rates. Collectively, these sources advise caution toward 
what can be understood as an ‘epidemic ’,  stating that diagnosis is not necessarily reflecting 
‘illness’ per se. What can be said with some authority is that the public is reaching out to 
medical and therapeutic services for help with its mental state and that psychopharmacology 
is not necessarily managing this demand. 
Psychopharmacology is a well-worn path, a journey started in the 1940s with the discovery 
of antipsychotic drugs and subtly modified to accommodate expanding diagnosis categories 
in the decades since (Gitlin, 1990). The disheartening reality is that substantiated and viable 
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questions are increasingly being levelled about the efficacy of this approach, specifically the 
actual benefit to the sufferer of the psychiatric reliance on drug treatment. Joanna Moncrief 
(2008) is a highly vocal critic of the efficacy of psychiatric drug treatment, going as far as to 
call it a ‘dangerous fraud’. Rose (2019), whilst cautious about the long-term benefits, states 
that drugs, in some cases, may have some benefit in the short-term. I find myself leaning 
towards Rose’s assertion, that psychiatric drugs can play an important role in providing 
respite and distance from the causes of psychic suffering, a lifeline in what can be 
overwhelming and immediate suffering. Short-term drugs may provide a window of 
opportunity, to revalue and mitigate the ‘real’ source of our anguish (which Laing would 
argue locates more frequently in worldly existence, and not as a result of a defective 
organism – this perspective of psychiatry is discussed in the following chapter). 
Unfortunately, chemical intervention is too readily the default solution and prolonged use 
dominates current treatment strategies. One could say, cynically, drugs are not used as an 
opportunity to gain control of an unhealthy environment but rather they become the means to 
manage our participation within it.  
The commitment to this approach not only continues to concretise psychopharmacology as 
the only respectable framework within psychiatric care but it appears to testify that 
availability, self-sponsored ‘efficacy’ and a narrow understanding of cost efficiency are the 
primary factors influencing investment, research and treatment, rather than the actual benefit 
to those who suffer (Bentall, 2009; Rose, 2019).  
In the spring of 2017, several newspapers dramatically reported on the return of 
Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) as a recognised treatment strategy within the NHS; this 
was supposedly under ethically approved and very specific conditions such as resistant 
schizophrenia and depression, where all previous measures have not succeeded long-term 
(Baghai and Möller, 2008). This highlighted the controversy associated with a treatment 
process that involves ‘anaesthetising the patient and passing electricity through the brain to 
induce seizure’ (The Guardian, 2017). The efficacy of this method is widely contested but 
even if it is effective in symptom reduction, it is universally agreed that no-one really knows 
how it works. Developed in the 1930s, it fell from grace in the late 1960s and early 1970s as 
vocal opposition became louder, deeming its use inhumane and torturous (Shorter and 
Healy 2007). The reintroduction of ECT does little to suggest innovative thinking but it could 
also be read as a distress signal, urgently telling us that alternative treatment strategies 
need to be identified. Its resurgence is alarming and a cause for concern. 
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In light of this ‘desperate time’, for some, however, the suggestion of a return to R.D. Laing, 
a psychiatrist most prominent in the 1960s, is a desperate measure too far (Lieberman and 
Ogas, 2015). I argue that it is against this backdrop that Laing has never been more 
necessary and valuable.  
The temptation when discussing R.D. Laing is to be drawn into scandal and myth, accounts 
re-telling and detailing the antics associated with the personality ‘Ronnie’ but which also, 
tragically, increasingly permeated his professional practice. Hype and sensationalism 
overwhelm and too readily displace any concerted attempt at an application of his theory 
(Bark, 2009). This chapter will avoid this temptation and focus on Laing’s theory; the pitfalls 
of personality will be addressed in Chapter 3, The Dividing Character. Now we will ask how 
Laing’s theory can aid our understanding of ‘mental illness’ and influence diagnoses. If, in 
the process, perceptions of Laing, specifically his theory, change – this would be a welcome 
by-product.  
The DSM Mind 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) is a classification of mental disorders with associated criteria 
designed to facilitate more reliable diagnoses of these disorders. With successive 
editions over the past 60 years, it has become a standard reference for clinical 
practice in the mental health field. (DSM-V, 2013, p. xii) 
The desire to classify and categorise ‘mental illnesses’ and ‘disorders’ (nosology) has 
existed in a variety of forms for the past 2,000 years. The most recent and detailed is the 
DSM, currently in its fifth edition (DSM-V). The DSM came to fruition in the early 1950s, 
developing together with the increasing influence of psychopharmacology1 and as a 
response to perceived shortcomings of the ICD-6. The ICD-6 was the 6th revision of the 
International Cause of Death published in 1948 by the World Health Organisation (WHO); 
this was the first revision to include a classification of ‘mental disorders’ (it also changed the 
name of the ICD to International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of 
Death). Although the DSM and ICD were different,  
 
1 Lithium was the drug that propelled this change. The medicinal impact of lithium gained attention during the 
1940s and following research, was introduced to the NHS in the 1950s (Gitlin, 1990). 
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It is important to realise there is a lot of convergence between the two international 
systems of diagnosis, and that it is also possible to convert the diagnoses of one 
system into another. (Tryer, 2014, p. 283) 
Depending on geographic location, one will typically encounter the ICD or the DSM manual; 
however, the underlying premise for both systems is to provide a comprehensive nosology 
for ‘mental illness’ and ‘disorders’. In something of a role reversal, although the ICD is 
produced by the WHO, since 1980 and the publication of DSM-III, it is the DSM that has 
progressively asserted itself as the global standard reference for clinical practice regarding 
the health of the western mind (Tryer, 2014; Watters, 2010: Blashfield et al., 2014).2 DSM-V 
is the most recent and advanced manual at the time of writing this chapter. 
The cultural importance gained from a diagnosis resulting in a recognised categorisation 
from within the DSM has significant implications, enabling an individual to have potentially 
unseen and debilitating psychological experiences socially and legally recognised. This 
enables a series of interventions to be actioned, designed to assist in the management of 
symptoms and promote a better standard of life for the suffering person (Frances, 2013; 
Rose, 2019). However, standardisation, the principal component of psychopharmacology 
that enables more reliable diagnoses — argued here as the primary tenet of nosology – 
serves as one of the major stumbling blocks to the integrity of this entire approach and ability 
to help those suffering. As I develop this thesis, further threads stemming from this desire to 
standardise are shown to impact increasingly upon the wellbeing of the individual. Ultimately, 
it will be proposed that the scientific underpinning of nosology and therefore DSM, ICD, 
Research Domain Criteria (this will be discussed below) etc all enact an existential 
degradation upon persons.  
The standardisation of the medicalised subject is a theme explored at length in Watters’ 
(2010) Crazy Like Us: The Globalisation of the Western Mind. With vivid examples, Watters 
demonstrates how the DSM framework is applied beyond its intended western demographic 
and the severe consequences that follow. Existing culturally specific alternatives in treatment 
and understanding, that to a westerner would fit within a framework of ‘mental health’, have 
been, and are being, displaced as psychopharmacology increases its presence and 
 
2 Although the NHS (nhs.uk. 2012) state ‘clinicians in the UK predominantly use the ICD-10 system to diagnose 
mental disorders, while the DSM classification system is mostly used for research purposes’, the conspicuous 
use of the term ‘predominantly’ is an important caveat. As reported by Tryer (2014), the global influence of the 
DSM imbues it with perceived authority and as such creates a ‘general belief that it is in some way “more 
accurate”‘. 
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dominance on the global stage. The tragedy is that ‘mental health’ outcomes in these 
different geographic locations are no better, in fact possibly worse, as a result of this medical 
imperialism caused by an attempt at a standardisation of the subject (Mills, 2014; Watters, 
2010). 
The flashpoint of this globalisation occurred in 1980 with the publication of DSM-III (Regier et 
al., 2013). The timing of this is of great importance. Responding to critical research, DSM-III 
moved away from the previous theory-laden psychodynamic foundation of DSM-I/II (a time 
when the ICD possibly had a greater foothold within global psychiatry) and developed a 
symptom checklist built on logical empiricism to accompany disorder description.  
The guiding aim of logical empiricism was to establish a sharp separation between 
observational or descriptive statements and statements of theory. (Fulford and 
Sartorius, 2009, p. 30) 
This shift toward the empirically observable was in no small part influenced by the early 
advances happening in neuroscience at this time (Rose, 2019); politically; it marked the 
intensification in capitalist principles resulting in the evolution to its neoliberalism form: a 
seismic change in the characteristics of the politico-economic ideology that stimulated 
geographic expansion. The relationship between ideological conditions and medical science 
may not seem immediately relevant; however, Althusser’s Generalities Theory explains how 
ideology and science work hand in hand to create a self-reifying process, producing a closed 
loop that mutually qualifies their value-authority and integrity (Ferretter, 2006). To borrow a 
term from Haraway (1991), they produce a ‘god-trick’: by increasing scientific detail, pursued 
in the interest of a specific ideological direction, a knowledge base is produced. The trick is 
that the ideological bias inherent within the process and classification of findings is 
presented as being neutral, and therefore an absolute authority within the body of 
knowledge, an essence of existence and a step closer to the language of God. DSM-V is the 
most current and arguably globally influential diagnostic manual and it is a prime example of 
a ‘god trick’ where science and ideology combine, working together and facilitating the 
globalisation of the psychopharmacological approach, undertaking a modern-day psychiatric 
crusade by preaching the wonder of western thought, in all its guises, to an international 
audience – neutralising its inherent western bias and proclaiming its knowledge to be 
absolute. Frances (2013, p. xii) refers to DSM-III, in a manner applicable also to subsequent 
editions, as the ‘bible’ of psychiatry.  
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Unfortunately, the DSM’s increasing application as a standard for a global subject, steeped 
in the colonising assertion that the western mind is the only mind, would appear to be failing. 
Subsequent research has failed to evidence any benefit to indigenous cultures or those 
directly suffering and, in actuality, the opposite appears true – causing problems where none 
previously existed (Mills, 2014; Watters, 2010). However, its increasing geographic 
application further contributes to the god trick, concretising the (self-qualifying) authority of 
the entire psychopharmacological approach. Despite numerous internal controversies (see 
Houchin et al, 2012; Krueger, 2012; Pai and North, 2017; Hartlage et al., 2014), the 
publication of DSM-V showed no signs of arresting or changing course with regard to the 
standardisation of a global subject or its application of medical imperialism.  
The next question is, then, how does the DSM, particularly its fifth edition, fare beyond the 
grave concerns of a colonising standard reference, where it retains focus on its intended 
target audience, that of the western mind?  
Numerous commentators raise significant concerns about the inconsistencies that surround 
diagnostic reliability (see Leader, 2011; Morrall, 2017; Rose, 2019) and, responding to this 
critique, each successive DSM edition has developed the breadth and/or depth of 
classification criteria.3  
Each new edition of the DSM has included more categories of disorder, seemingly 
endlessly expanding the kinds of conditions that are amenable to psychiatric 
classification and intervention. (Rose, 2019, p. 7) 
It is the susceptibility of this manual to subjective interpretation that has encouraged 
increasing detail to be added to each DSM but as Leader (2011, p.115) outlines, the process 
of diagnosis is only becoming harder as a result of this action: ‘The current vogue for the 
endless cataloguing of symptoms makes proper diagnosis more and more difficult’. The 
desire to produce a standardised diagnosis is ultimately resulting in a dearth of information 
that remains just as open to subjective interpretation, and as the number of categories 
increase and the definitions of these categories extend, a wider net of disorders is created. 
Unfortunately, the wider the net, the greater the catch.  
 
3 A slight reduction in categories is present in DSM-V compared to DSM-IV with several categories being 
amalgamated. 
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The Post-DSM Mind 
It is not an exaggeration to say that being a teenager in late capitalist Britain is now 
close to being reclassified as a sickness. (Fisher, 2009, p. 21)  
Fisher (2009) highlights the implications of the extension of diagnostic categorisation, stating 
that even the normal experiences of teenage existence can be incorrectly subsumed within 
the categorisation criteria. The most recent edition of DSM-V, produced after Fisher’s 
observations and no doubt responding to other such criticisms, increased the detail and 
checklist criteria within each category. However, further concern is raised for the investment 
strategy underpinning the National Institute for Mental Health in the DSM – (in)directly 
affecting the entire outlook toward neurobiological responsibility. As discussed below, this is 
a further demonstration of how the pursuit of psychopharmacology is concretised through 
DSM-V without securing diagnostic reliability.  
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) – an American (but globally influential) 
research centre that spearheads the psychopharmacological approach and is heavily 
involved with the American Psychiatric Association and therefore the DSM – has produced 
an independent diagnostic process called Research Domain Criteria (RDoC). This 
encourages all future research from 2013 to bypass a diagnostic process that accepts 
corruption through subjective interpretation, instead moving toward a tangible empirical 
scientific process: an ‘objective’ standard of diagnosis. Although the DSM retains central 
importance within the RDoC by providing the criteria for ‘mental disorders’, research is to be 
driven forward with a neurobiological impetus (Clark et al., 2017). Defined as a research 
focused tool, as Tryer (2014) states, the ambition for the RDoC is that neurobiological 
correlates will underpin the future qualification for DSM diagnosis itself (possibly for the 
RDoC to consume and replace the DSM entirely) and efforts are already moving toward this 
end.  
Highly problematically, there is no data at this time to support the correlation of neurobiology 
with mental disorders.   
We cannot, then, conclude that structural brain imagining demonstrates that 
psychiatric disorders are brain disorders […] We are no closer to making the link 
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between genetic sequences, molecular events, patterns of neural activity and mental 
states. (Rose, 2019, pp. 109 and 113 – 114)4 
Rose points out that, on leaving his role as NIMH Director in 2013, Thomas Insel admitted 
that the trajectory of scientific advancement during his tenure, characterised by the pursuit of 
pure biomarkers, had made no discernible difference to those who actually experience and 
suffer from ‘mental illness’. Rose, along with numerous other commentators (see Paris, 
2015; Frances, 2013), is nevertheless not opposed to the potential for neurobiology to 
contribute toward the understanding of ‘mental health’ but encourages patience in reaching 
this point, even more so regarding diagnosis. The consensus would appear to be that the 
science does not yet match the ambition; therefore, we need to curtail our confidence in 
neurobiology alone and invest more thoroughly in refining the existing DSM paradigm. There 
is, however, a single underlying theme that unites all the research: a rejection by modern 
psychiatry of ‘its long-standing psychosocial perspective’ (Paris, 2015, p. xii). 
Paris (2015) and Frances (2013) state that we need to remember that the DSM is a part of a 
biopsychosocial framework and not forget the vitally important psychosocial dimension. 
Rose (2019, p. 189) advises us to ‘begin research with the person in their social milieu’. 
Whether in the laboratory or the consultancy room, wariness is needed toward the 
omnipotence of the bio component, its consequential displacement of any consideration 
toward the individual’s circumstances and its drastically reductive process of standardisation 
that increasingly divorces the subject from their contextual existence. But it is easy to see 
why this occurs. Even if formally DSM-V remains within a biopsychosocial model, in reality, 
investment in research and treatment is dominated by a trajectory of thought that 
increasingly isolates the person from their environment, attributing ‘mental illness’ to brain 
diseases and broadcasting ‘chemical imbalances’ as the primary key to understanding 
causation and cure.  
In the face of overwhelming neuroscientific and neurobiological authority within the 
psychiatric field, how do we re-engage with the psychosocial and to what avail? 
 
4 Dementias (Alzheimer, Parkinson diseases) are an exception showing diagnostic consistency with neuroscience 
results (Rose, 2019).  
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Navigating the neoliberal mindscape  
Laing’s philosophical approach can be instrumental in re-attuning our attention to what can 
be considered a psychosocial footing within the ‘mental health’ arena and, furthermore, a 
means of resisting the increasing influence of logical empiricism within the DSM which is 
causing so many issues. To realise this potential requires acknowledging Laing’s divisive 
character and negotiating the voluminous scandalous and mythological representations that 
divert focus from his theory and detract from its application in contemporary culture. We will 
invest more time into this aspect in Chapter 3, The Dividing Character. It is important to 
acknowledge a major criticism produced by Juliet Mitchell (1974) from the outset. Mitchell 
stated that the seductive qualities of Laing’s poetic form and language often disguise the fact 
that a lack of rigorous structure is present in his theory, and nowhere is this more evident 
than with his science of persons – the very foundation of the claim we might make for 
Laing’s counter-cultural relevance in the current DSM structured medical world. 
Application in the contemporary setting, therefore, needs to respond to such criticisms and 
return to his catalogue of published works, possibly seeking further clarity where needed. 
Only then do we have the tools to move forward with a Laingian application. Nevertheless, 
criticisms such as Mitchell’s provide the opportunity to drive forward Laing’s theory, 
developing a more specific application in contemporary culture and, in turn, enabling a more 
accurate appraisal of his contribution. Responding to Mitchell’s observation, this thesis does 
not suggest or continue that a ‘science of persons’ was achieved by Laing. Instead, through 
a concept analysis methodology that begins in Part 2: The Return to Philosophy, I focus on 
the structural underpinning of Laing’s theory, with specific attention to his own existential-
phenomenological methodology, defaulting to Laing’s source of origin where ambiguity 
remains present.  
This application of Laing’s theory provides some leverage to consider the current limitations 
of DSM-V, the increasing reliance placed on logical empiricism and the continuing 
prevalence of the psychopharmacological approach. Standing in complete contrast to the 
pursuit of standardisation, and its resultant reduction of the subject, Laing reminds us of the 
context of the sufferer, the uniqueness of individual experience and the value of social 
intelligibility.  
The frustrating realisation is that many of the concerns voiced by contemporary critics of 
psychiatry mirror those made by Laing, yet he remains unnamed and unacknowledged.  
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 [W]hen you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail […] drug treatment for every 
patient is rationalised by the overuse of existing diagnostic categories. (Paris, 2015, 
p.  5)   
It is good to know and use the DSM definitions, but not to reify or worship them. 
(Frances, 2013, p. 21)  
These two brief examples echo Laing’s concern over the determinism incurred by the initial 
way we see a thing and the reductive distance that is inflicted by placing the DSM (or 
whatever scientific manual comes next and constructs our psychiatric words) before the 
patient’s own experience. This does not necessarily mean doing away with the DSM in its 
entirety,5 but we need to place the patient first and this means embracing their being-in-the-
world. 
The application of purely biological models has done great harm to psychiatry, 
downgrading the importance of psychosocial factors. (Bracken et al., 2012, cited in 
Paris, 2015, p. 61) 
Laing was hostile to alternative discipline names,6 remaining loyal to the tradition of 
philosophy that he found more than capable of wrestling with the timeless interest for 
understanding of the self. But times have changed, and the either/or debate is now more 
dominant than ever, incurring a cleavage and resulting in the DSM-V and 
psychopharmacological approach. Laing’s philosophically inclined theory provides us with 
the means to embrace and re-engage with the psychosocial, by drawing attention to exactly 
what is being lost and forgotten and by reminding us of the entirety of forces that act upon 
the person.   
Whether a product of actual illness or over-diagnosis, the current ‘mental health’ ‘epidemic’ 
would be more readily addressed if we heeded this advice. To diagnose more reliably, we 
need to understand psychic suffering more thoroughly. And this starts from Laing’s 
existential-phenomenological methodology, a potentially powerful key to developing truly an 
 
5 As per the radical propositions of Timimi (2013): a current advocate, vocal within the Campaign to Abolish 
Psychiatric Diagnosis Systems such as ICD and DSM (CAPSID). 
6 ‘We have an already shattered Humpty Dumpty who cannot be put back together again by any number of 
hyphenated or compound words: psycho-physical, psycho-somatic, psycho-biological, psycho-pathological 
psycho-social etc., etc’. (Laing, 1960, p. 23) 
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understanding of the self without destroying it through reductive, objective science: a science 
of persons.  
The Relevance of Laing 
It is in the context of these highly politicised debates that Laing’s early critique of the 
depersonalising tendency of psychiatric diagnosis comes alive once again. 
As a psychiatrist, I run into a major difficulty at the outset: how can I go straight to the 
patients if the psychiatric words at my disposal keep the patient at a distance from 
me? How can one demonstrate the general human relevance and significance of the 
patient’s condition if the words one has to use are specifically described to isolate 
and circumscribe the meaning of the patient’s life to a particular clinical entity? 
(Laing, 1960, p. 18) 
Laing’s comment is simple yet profound:  
The initial way we see a thing determines all our subsequent dealings with it. (Laing, 
1960, p. 20) 
Problematically, through approaching the sufferer’s experience pre-armed with a 
standardised medicalised framework (psychiatric words), a bias is immediately incurred that 
insists on interpreting a person’s experience to fit, appease and complement a clinical 
framework. 
Laing stated that ‘our experience of another entails a particular interpretation of his 
behaviour’ (Laing et al., 1966, p. 15). The medical system and its discourse hold a pervasive 
power base within contemporary culture and its structural influence extends beyond the 
consultation room and, as highlighted by Rose (2019, p. 3), shapes ‘the very experience of 
living’ for us all. It is little wonder that within its own direct hub of power, the psychiatrist 
applies this medicalised frame of reference with authority and the patient can too readily 
accept this without question.7 It is this powerful discourse that determines exactly how the 
 
7 There is evidence of patients resisting this power dynamic ( see Chapter 4, Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance) 
however this remains unusual and is even less possible at the immediate point of contact with psychiatric 
services (see Morrison, 2005). 
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sufferer will be interpreted and instils a distance between patient and professional. In 
contrast, Laing’s position asserted the singularity and intelligibility of the human subject. 
My thesis is limited to the contention that the theory of man as person loses its way if 
it falls into an account of man as a machine or man as an organismic system of it-
processes. (Laing, 1960, p. 23)  
To think of ‘man as a machine’ is to reduce a person to compositional parts: a body removed 
from environment, a brain isolated from body, a neuropathway detached from the brain – the 
means for ‘achieving’ the standardisation discussed previously, epitomised currently through 
DSM-V, and even more so with the likely extended application of RDoC in the future.  
The resistance Laing held toward the early inclinations of psychopharmacology within the 
clinical psychiatric approach is attributed to his pre-medical education received at 
Hutchesons’ Grammar School, an institute that nurtured and encouraged philosophical 
thought (Laing, A., 1994).  
[Ronnie] saw the empirical world through the eyes of a dedicated, albeit confused 
philosopher. Philosophy was, he thought, in opposition to medicine. (Laing, A. 1994, 
p. 34). 
In contrast to his more scientifically grounded peers at medical school (and beyond), Laing’s 
initial exposure to existentialism and phenomenology continued to determine all his dealings 
with the empirical world, contrasting significantly with the discourses of medicine that 
imposed a very different way of seeing the subject. It was this theoretical position that 
encouraged Laing to declare a necessity for a science of persons to be developed.   
The science of persons is the study of human beings that begins from a relationship 
with the other as person and proceeds to an account of the other still as a person. 
(Laing, 1960, p. 21) 
Laing’s revolutionary approach inverted the established relationship of authority by 
empowering the experience of the suffering person over that of the status assumed by the 
medical professional. This new approach involved two significant and interrelated changes 
that quashed any notion of standardisation, unsettling established ideas governing the 
understanding of psychic suffering. These were firstly, ‘to set all particular experiences within 
the context of his whole being-in-the-world’ (Laing cited in Collier, 1977, p.17) and secondly, 
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drawing on Wittgenstein in order to assert that ‘the thought is the language’ (Laing, 1960, p. 
19).  
No matter how unconventional and unorthodox the presentation, Laing stated that the words 
spoken by the sufferer (not the psychiatric words forcibly applied to the sufferer’s 
experience) portray an actual account of their ‘feelings and actions’ (Laing, 1960, p. 31). 
Understood in their whole experience, their being-in-the-world, the patient rightfully retains a 
valued identity as a person and not simply a machine, or an organismic system of it-
processes (or a sequence of chemical activity within the brain mapped against a set of 
arbitrary labels in a DSM manual). A science of persons would therefore guide the medical 
professional to engage with ‘the experiential-gestalts’ of the suffering person; to view, in their 
connection, the arrangement of parts within a moment, ‘seeing the world through another 
person’s eyes’ (Collier, 1977, p. 23). What Laing offered was a polemic against 
standardisation: to drop all preconceived ideas structured by psychiatric words and to 
instead accept and value the sufferer’s frame of reference (thought as language), embracing 
the entirety of their interpretation of experience, their world. Only with this change in 
approach could any real understanding be gained of the subject. But one major hurdle stood 
in the way of engaging with this alternative approach: a hurdle that is more prominent and 
problematic than ever before.   
People feel they have to translate ‘subjective’ events into ‘objective’ terms in order to 
be scientific. (Laing, 1967, p. 102) 
The attempt to translate human experience into an objective value framework – i.e., 
empirical observations inherent within the DSM and even more so with the neuroscientific 
focus of the RDoC – was perceived as a standardising process of violence that corrupts the 
inherently subjective quality that defines existence. This was a continuation of Laing’s 
criticism of the medical tendency to reduce an individual to mechanistic components, as it 
was through this procedure that an objective analysis was claimed. The reduction to 
constituent parts alongside the conversion of subjective to objective, dehumanised the 
subject meaning that any real understanding was lost. For Laing, understanding the subject 
properly was essential to understanding psychic suffering and this required accepting the 
being-in-the-world, embracing that a person exists within a context, a brain within a person. 
It is the resistance to standardisation through accepting the unique experience that comes 
from the context of his whole being-in-the-world (including the person in their social milieu) 




Howarth-Williams (1977, p. 174) argues that intelligibility is the ‘central, unifying concept in 
Laing’s work’, operating on multitudinous levels and being a prime component in Laing’s 
theoretical opposition to the reductionism of biological psychiatry. This is demonstrated most 
influentially in Laing and Esterson’s 1964 publication Sanity, Madness and the Family. This 
book, containing 11 case studies, set about testing the hypothesis laid out in The Divided 
Self that, with the application of an existential-phenomenological methodology, intelligibility 
would be found in the previously incoherent language of those diagnosed as 
‘schizophrenic’.8 Consequentially, this questioned whether ‘schizophrenia' was an ‘illness’ at 
all. 
We have tried in each single instance to answer the question: to what extent is the 
experience and behaviour of that person, who has already begun a career as a 
diagnosed ‘schizophrenic ’patient, intelligible in the light of the praxis and process of 
his or her family nexus. (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 27) 
Applying a theoretical framework embodying existential-phenomenology (the base 
methodology for his intended science of persons), this research proved that intelligible 
content could be revealed within schizophrenese babble9 and this in turn evidenced that the 
symptoms experienced by the sufferer were directly relatable to the context of their world. 
This was not simply a brain illness; it was an intelligible response to the most tragic of 
circumstances, with consequences exacerbated by the subsequent process of being 
absorbed into the psychiatric system and defined as a patient. 
Laing accepted that each patient demonstrated a set of clinical attributes falling outside 
‘normal’ experience and used the term ‘ontological insecurity’ to explain and differentiate 
their experience. He defended this as being unlike a negatively constructing label (i.e., 
‘schizophrenia’) by claiming that it was nothing more than an accurate description of 
experience (Guy Thompson, 2015). This defence is often used to counter Szasz’s (2009, p. 
 
8 8 Agreeing with Laing that schizophrenia was not a disease or illness but retaining ‘psychiatric words’ for what 
appears to be ease of understanding, the American critic of psychiatry Theodore Lidz (1972, p.154) stated that 
what we call schizophrenia is the ‘essential mental disorder’, an experience that exists at the absolute extreme. 
Its understanding would therefore facilitate insight into all other experiences of psychic suffering. 
9 Lidz was also an advocate of social conditions in the development of schizophrenia, emphasising the role of 
the family with his research, beginning in the 1940s. The intelligibility of the sufferer’s language was not an 
overt consideration for him until after reviewing Laing’s work (see Lidz and Lidz, 1949; Lidz, 1972 for this 
changing dynamic). 
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51) critique that Laing’s work still invested in the ‘power of diagnosis’ by reinforcing the 
binary between those with ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ and simply renamed this 
binary as ontologically secure / insecure. However, Laing refused to accept a diagnosis and 
subsequent illness label of ‘schizophrenia’ stating that this was an example of experience 
being held accountable, force-fitted, to a medical discourse resulting in a loss of 
understanding. Without denying, ignoring, or minimising the painful experience of suffering, 
Laing and Esterson (1964) proposed that by revealing intelligibility they had achieved a 
better knowledge base and understanding of the person’s experience. In other words, they 
had achieved a more accurate diagnosis, only made possible because they approached the 
sufferer with a clean slate, avoiding the psychiatric words that construct the 
psychopharmacological framework and through that define the patient.  
With statements such as a ‘mental health’ and ‘epidemic’ being used to describe conditions 
within western culture, and serious concerns being raised toward the efficacy for the 
dominant forms of diagnosis and treatment, questioning whether these forms address the 
issue or feed it, the time is ripe to consider alternative means of tending to this issue. The 
time is ripe to conduct a re-examination of Laing’s theory.  
Laing offers a theory, or at the very least several concepts, that allow a revolutionary 
approach to understanding ‘mental health’. What he demonstrated through studying 
‘schizophrenics’ extends to all ‘mental illness’; any consideration of social intelligibility with 
regard to psychic suffering is superseded by the pursuit and dominance of the logical 
empiricism that defines the DSM and ICD. Furthermore, social intelligibility does not 
appease our cultural need for objective scientific authority to validate our suffering.   
The conditions that brought Laing to prominence have not subsided, they have intensified. 
The static representation of Laing’s theory from the 1960s and influential historic secondary 
sources, even within a background noise of controversy and criticisms for a lack of structural 
clarity, retain potential. Over the course of the following chapters, we refine focus to a 
Laingian framework, with reference to these controversies and criticism.  
The most relevant concepts will be deconstructed, analysed and ultimately composed into a 
single, totalising theory that can be applied to the macro issue for understanding our current 
predicament. Honouring the foundation and staple characteristics of his theory, this could 
possibly clarify the ambiguity of his existing contribution to ‘mental health’ but, more 
importantly, has the potential to produce valuable insights beyond the limitations of the DSM, 
capable of truly helping those experiencing psychic suffering. From the research highlighted, 
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all the signals suggest that this is a viable investment to address our current desperate time, 
a desperate measure to the existing order, but also a potentially valuable and welcomed 
resource to those in need.   
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3. The Dividing Character 
‘Short of anything criminal, what could be so dire as to ostracise such humane and person-
centred thinking from consideration within this situation we find ourselves?’ This was the 
question posed to me by a friend having read the previous chapter. The inference being that 
Laing’s potential seems evident for consideration, so why does he remain a mental-health-
pariah within mainstream medicine and psychiatry? The mental health landscape has 
changed since Laing’s day, the ‘brain revolution’ epitomised by the RDoC testament to that 
fact, but this does not undo or negate the potential of Laing’s theory which was already 
resisting that specific trajectory of ‘progression’. My answer is therefore that we need to 
remember that Laing was a highly controversial character and even his name brings about 
passionate and divisive responses. This chapter will outline some of the main events within 
Laing’s career that gravitate toward the involvement of his personality rather than his theory. 
In illuminating these events, it is my hope they can be negotiated more effectively in the 
future, enabling focus to be held more easily on his writing.  
Laing’s legacy to psychiatry and mental health professionals is both vast and 
ambiguous. (Burston, 1996, p. 238)  
The question of Laing’s relevance, which directly impacts his perceived potential in 
contemporary application, arises periodically since his most productive time in the 1960s (for 
example, Howarth-Williams, 1977; Burston, 1996; Guy Thompson, 2015). As recognised in 
Burston’s quotation, whilst his legacy is ‘vast’, a decisive outcome is far from conclusive. 
Existing research presents a conflictual terrain, at once supportive and dismissive, neither 
position necessarily correlating with the polemical opinion they may hold towards his 
character. Some feel his impact was minimal, others believe his work significantly shaped 
the process of psychiatric medicine.   
Everyone in contemporary psychiatry owes something to R.D. Laing. (Clare, 199210) 
Laing has not influenced in any appreciable way either psychiatrists, or 
psychoanalysts, or the wider net of theoreticians. (Kotowicz, 1997, p. 110)  
 
10 Interview with Laing, In the Psychiatrist’s Chair, BBC Radio 4, (original interview with Laing 1985) 
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Kotowicz and Clare provide two clear examples of this conundrum, illuminating a concern 
associated with all research but particularly pertinent with the hyper-critical response to 
Laing. Whom do we believe when each position provides a well evidenced pathway to justify 
their ultimate decision? These existing accounts provide no further clarity for a declaration of 
allegiance or support. Therefore, a different approach needs to be employed. 
It would be extremely unusual to find a mental health professional who claimed to be 
applying a Laingian approach in his/her daily work. (Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p. 
88) 
A serious consideration must be directed toward the questionable aspects of Ronnie’s 
personality with regard to the contemporary response to legacy. As Coppock and Hopton’s 
(2000) quotation above outlines, one would be hard pressed to find medical professionals 
openly declaring that they are operating within a Laingian theoretical framework and the 
negative characteristics and behaviours which manifest in scandal and mythology must play 
a part in this.11 In some ways, Laing has become his own worst enemy. He admitted to 
wanting to be acknowledged as a respected psychiatrist and academic, yet without the 
Professorship he desperately sought from Glasgow University, and no structured Laingian 
theory to speak of (Mullan, 1995), his own behaviour must be factored into this outcome. 
Challenging the medical profession, and all authority systems in general, was never going to 
endear him to the gatekeepers but the notoriety of his antics have been instrumental in 
negatively contributing to his credibility as both a practitioner and unfortunately, as a theorist. 
Addressing this balance in the PhD thesis ‘Descandalising Laing ’,  Bark (2009) concludes 
that Laing has a substantial theory frequently dismissed, due to an inability to look beyond 
his behaviour often transmuted in mythology. Laing’s theory is therefore open to 
misinterpretation and inaccurate criticism. Bark’s meta-analysis presents a strong argument 
for Laing’s relevance, for his influence within the ‘mental health’ arena, and most importantly, 
the continued credibility of his theory. Bark outlines that the attention directed towards the 
all-consuming antics surrounding his personality, in a wealth of secondary accounts, 
dominates to such an extent that ultimately, and incorrectly, it detracts from the positive 
impact of his work and theory.  
 
11 Niche organisations such as the Philadelphia Association and Arbours Association acknowledge Laing’s 
influence at their inception, but they stop short of declaring themselves operating with adherence to a Laingian 
framework.   
 37 
This has been particularly noticeable when introducing Laing as my theoretical focus, in the 
action of a subtle change in title by which others, on several occasions, have readdressed 
my research. My formal introduction has sometimes shifted to the more familiar, personal, 
nickname of ‘Ronnie ’,  a process I have not experienced or witnessed in any other theorist. It 
appeared that those affiliated with Laing frequently addressed him affectionately as ‘Ronnie’ 
to demarcate themselves from the less engaged. There was also something further in this 
affiliation: it somehow embraced Laing’s personal qualities which extended beyond the 
purely theoretical. The suggestion underpinning this shift appeared to be that my own use of 
‘Laing’ was an indication of naivety, not having established myself with the in-crowd and a 
consequence of not understanding Laingian theory. 
As tempting as it was to affiliate myself with the term ‘Ronnie’ in order to broadcast a depth 
of reading and substantiate a claim for respect within this theoretical domain, to embrace this 
personal nickname that Laing encouraged to chosen others, I doubled-down on this 
conscious and deliberate act as a way of resisting the pull toward this established group. I 
never met R.D. Laing, I was never asked to call him ‘Ronnie’ directly and, more so, my only 
connection to his career is through his published work as R.D. Laing. As my involvement, 
understanding and familiarity with Laing’s body of work developed, the ‘Ronnie’ and ‘R.D. 
Laing’ distinction seemed to assist in identifying two very significant aspects of his legacy: 
his personality (Ronnie) and his theory (Laing). I suggest this division helps to illuminate why 
Laing is overlooked or cast to one side, ignoring a significant resource that could be so 
beneficial to our approach to ‘mental health’ in contemporary culture. 
In a truly Laingian fashion, it must be remembered that Laing is neither one nor the other: 
both are one within his totality. This enforced and plastic format is aimed to better forewarn 
and prepare the reader for criticisms that are often levelled at Laing with respect to each 
theoretical component that will be discussed in the later sections, assisting in promoting the 
relevance and value of his theoretical integrity. The intent behind this approach, utilising a 
concept of a split existence (not dissimilar to Laing’s own concept), is to qualify an inversion 
of the common trajectory of theory that, as Bark (2009) states, gravitates toward mythology 
and scandal. Through illuminating the main aspects and characteristics which culminate in 
these sensationalised and dramatic accounts, largely accountable to his personality and too 
often dominating focus, a justification to bring to the fore the often-overlooked importance 
and centrality of theory underpinning Laing’s career will be developed. Focussing primarily 




I really got close to him on a personal level. That’s also when I began to call him 
“Ronnie”, following the example of his friends. (Capra, 2015, p. 41) 
It seems strange to hear Capra, a respected physicist, write with such schoolboy affection of 
another academic, even more of someone outside his own theoretical field. But Ronnie 
appeared to have this effect. Capra (2015, p. 41) writes with an intended distance and a 
measure of mockery of the ‘friends and disciples’ at Laing’s side, yet his quotation 
demonstrates that being able to call him ‘Ronnie’, as did his friends, carried with it a desired 
status: he was accepted, part of the elusive in-crowd, connected to the man beyond the 
textbooks.  
We start to understand this effect more with insight into Laing’s seemingly normal behaviour 
in everyday life during his heyday. Speaking to a fellow shopper in Kings Road, Chelsea, as 
he waited once again for the assistant to bring him a correct pair of sandals, Ronnie joked 
that, ‘I suppose I could go barefoot but I’m a doctor, you see, and there are some people that 
might think it odd’ (Mezan, 2015, p. 13). Already a qualified and published psychiatrist, the 
shopper in question, Peter Mezan, was a fan who recognised him immediately. Ronnie 
notoriously was not simply a name on a book: he was a figure who existed in a real and 
tangible way, equally at home (and frequently, equally found) in the hipster hangouts and 
pubs as he would be at his Kingsley Hall residence (Burston, 1996). He not only spoke to the 
uber-cool collective of 1960s counterculture, he practised what he preached, he was there. 
Even from this brief encounter in the shoe shop, we see his charismatic capacity and 
willingness to playfully juxtapose his professional status and disdain towards its symbolic 
authority (Crossley, 1998).  
Reflecting the liberal attitudes of the sixties generation, he was also no stranger to drug 
experimentation. Whether personal or professional, his interest in LSD as a form of therapy 
and personal growth became folklore. The ‘Acid-Marxist’ was a name used equally to rebuke 
or embrace him; either way, it affiliated him further with the growing under-ground and 
counterculture movements (Mullan, 1995). As tempting as it is to be drawn into Laing’s 
attitudes toward the psychedelic experience and drug use, this is a rabbit warren that takes 
us further and further from our focus. Suffice to say, his personal and professional interest in 
mind-altering drugs endeared him further to the alternative culture of this time.  
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Laing is always described as charismatic, cultured, and confident, renowned for his 
exceptional ability to connect with another; whether individually, in a group, or lecturing to a 
crowd, those who discuss this experience talk about his ability to captivate. Documentary 
films, Did you used to be R.D. Laing (1989), All Divided Selves (2012) and the fictionalised 
account of his time in Kingsley Hall, Mad to be Normal (2017), all stress the magnetic and 
hypnotic effect he had, emphasising it to such an extent that they seem to paint him as a 
messianic figure. Whether this seemingly excessive representation is an intentional means 
to ridicule the myth that surrounds the person or a genuine effort to portray the adulation 
within the accounts retold, either way, both attest to the notoriety of his performance, and 
how his interpersonal ability was adored and revered. 
Always woven within the narrative is the sub-theme of the struggling and tortured artist, the 
musician, exorcising his demons at the piano and losing himself and his troubles as he 
played (Mezan, 2015). Kirsner’s (2015) use of the poignant title of Nietzsche’s book ‘Human, 
all too human’ to describe Laing’s struggles with the complexities of life and theory is well 
founded. Once again, these difficulties further endeared him to his followers, his artistic soul 
enhancing his growing iconic status. He even released a music album, Life Before Death 
(1976).12 
Tragically, as the flipside to this narrative and accompanying the music as a consistent 
presence, alcohol never seemed to be far from his person. The more affectionate pieces will 
discuss the ‘glass of cognac’ deftly being handled as he held court in the evening (Capra, 
2015, p. 41) but all too often the films and secondary accounts tell a darker and more 
destructive story. Always capable of overindulgence, as his career progressed some form of 
substance became his faithful companion, his uninvited ‘plus 1’ (Guy Thompson, 2015). In a 
podcast recorded during a Birkbeck conference, Sanity, Madness and the Family / Family 
Life: An Urgent Retrospective (2015), Lucy Johnstone discusses how Laing excused himself 
at the beginning of a lecture, returning 20 minutes later clearly ‘worse for wear’ (notably, she 
retains the formality of ‘Laing’ and distinguishes her interest in his theory from the man 
himself). Laing was defiant about the impact and severity of his drinking, demonstrated when 
he defended himself against an accusation of being intoxicated during an interview with Gay 
Byrne, not with denial but rather questioning the interviewer’s closed perspective to alcohol 
(All Divided Selves, 2012). But eventually not even his charisma and sharp mind could out-
manoeuvre his substance reliance (abuse). Although cleared of any and all wrongdoing, 
accusations of intoxication and misbehaviour during professional practice contributed to him 
 
12 Available to listen to online at rdlaing-lifebeforedeath.com/listen/index.html 
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being struck off the medical register in 1987 (a detail difficult to locate in texts – but recorded 
by his son, Adrian Laing in the biography, R.D. Laing: A Life, 2006). Even Guy Thompson 
(2015), a long standing and loyal friend of Ronnie, acknowledged the increasingly negative 
impact drinking came to have:  
[on] many occasions during the last decade of his life he showed up for public 
lectures (always well attended) inebriated, arrogant, and rude. (Guy Thompson, 
2015, p. 1)  
The darker side to his character was not purely restricted to the alcohol either (however, I 
would suggest the two were frequently related), dually described as,  
painfully provocative and delighted in upsetting his followers’ most cherished 
assumptions about themselves, sometimes to shattering effect. (Guy Thompson, 
2015, p. 2)  
Ronnie knew he had a theoretical mind capable of performing in the most demanding of 
gladiatorial arenas but like a cat playing with a mouse, sometimes he would choose to toy 
with his audience merely to demonstrate his might. Capra (2015) talks about being on the 
receiving end of such an exchange and the ostracised, isolated feeling it gave. However, 
with a complexity befitting Ronnie’s character, with a sly wink and whisper in Capra’s ear, 
Ronnie tells him this is not an attack but a theatrical performance for the benefit of an 
unwitting audience; he thanks him for participation and asks if he is comfortable to continue. 
Whilst the intricacy of Ronnie’s approach is difficult to fathom, so too is the delight and 
honour with which Capra seems to cow to Ronnie’s whim. Those who revered him suggest 
that this method was a means of ensuring he constantly disrupted the potential for scientific 
dogma. However, it also seems to indulge his narcissistic delight in intellectual superiority 
(Guy Thompson, 2015). Whether used to knock down, embrace, or coerce, his ability to 
connect to the other is time and again demonstrated – hence the ability to cut so deep.  
Within this darker and more tragic aspect to his personality, in a poignant and ironic twist of 
life imitating art, for all the emphasis Laing seemingly placed on the family for promoting 
‘mental health’ and wellbeing, some of his own children found this to be his greatest 
limitation, particularly those from his first marriage. In an interview with the Guardian (2008), 
his son Adrian (fifth child, first wife), when asked what it was like having R.D. Laing as a 
father, responded: ‘a crock of shit’. The inference is that he improved with age (Laing, A, 
2006).  
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Ronnie remained professionally active until his sudden death aged 61 in 1989. However, the 
difficult aspects of his character increasingly permeated his professional practice and career 
(Guy Thompson, 2015). In addition, his theory changed focus and the charisma, charm, 
intensity and uniqueness once so acute became less and less evident. Nonetheless, the 
legacy of his work in the 1960s and the cult icon status he achieved continued to sell out 
auditoriums providing him with a chalice, perhaps a poisoned one, which continued to 
secure him financially (Guy Thompson, 2015; Crossley, 1998; Sedgwick, 1982; Kotowicz, 
1997). 
Mullan described Laing as capable of being a ‘seductive saint or the devil’ (cited in The 
Independent, 2008). This quotation succinctly captures the polarities described with Laing’s 
character; the exaggerated terms saint and devil emphasise the associated excitement and 
sensationalism which support the conditions that Bark (2009) stated led to mythology and 
scandal.  
The epicentre of scandal and mythology is frequently directed toward his time with Kingsley 
Hall, arguably the personification and climax of Ronnie’s career performance: a place where 
his personality and theory are infused in practice. To appreciate the impact of Kingsley Hall 
on Ronnie (or vice versa), if that can be truly done, one must first appreciate the foundation 
bricks of the Antipsychiatry Movement and Philadelphia Association upon which it was built. 
It is on this pathway that Laing’s theory starts to become more visible.  
Antipsychiatry  
[A]ntipsychiatry, the informally constituted British group, [is] best known through the 
work of R.D. Laing. (Brown. 1973, p. 60)  
The movement which controversially became known as ‘antipsychiatry’13 formed throughout 
the early 1960s with a collective of 6 individuals. In the first wave, it was Laing, Esterson and 
Cooper and, as momentum gathered, post 1965, Redler, Schatzman, and Berke were 
introduced to the mix (Burston, 1996). Each of these qualified psychiatrists united under a 
common premise and ethos, galvanised within the teachings of Laing’s The Divided Self, to 
 
13  None of the members but Cooper endorsed the name ‘antipsychiatry’ (Coppock and Hopton, 2000; Mullan, 
1995). Laing vehemently rejected the term, stating that their (the working collective’s) aim was not ‘anti’ 
psychiatry, it wasn’t to dissolve and destroy psychiatry, but rather, it was to reform and refocus its practices, to 
empower the experience of the sufferer. This was ultimately the cause of the demise of Laing and Cooper’s 
already fractious relationship (du Plock, cited in Dryden, 1996). 
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reconsider what constitutes madness and sanity and question the social control function that 
the role of psychiatry performs. Unlike previous criticism of madness and the medical 
profession, this movement came about at a time when the psychiatric profession was well 
established, holding a stable and authoritative place within culture. However, the integrity of 
this professional strong-hold was tested significantly when, unlike previous criticism which 
were directed toward a specific or singular procedure or treatment, the Antipsychiatry 
Movement produced a targeted attack on the entirety of their organisation and worse still, 
staging this attack from within the very ranks of the organisation (Crossley, 1998).  
Whilst the Antipsychiatry Movement focused on the ‘mental health’ arena, to greater or 
lesser degrees depending on which member was speaking, common to their theory was the 
belief that causation of ‘mental illness’ and responsibility for the brutal forms of treatment 
which exacerbated the intensity of symptoms, lay in the very foundation of our political 
conditions14 (Cooper, 1967; Laing, 1967; Barnes and Berke, 1970). The connection and 
involvement with the counterculture scene and politics increased the visibility and impact of 
the Antipsychiatry Movement within wider society; however, this came at a cost. As the 
counterculture faded into the memories of the late 1960s early 1970s, so did the perceived 
transformative potential and validity of the Antipsychiatry Movement (Coppock and Hopton, 
2000).  
Whilst antipsychiatry constituted six principal members, the point to emphasise is that Laing 
and The Divided Self were the nucleus to this movement. But this movement needed traction 
in the ‘real world’. 
Philadelphia Association  
Under the lead instruction of Laing, a charitable organisation named the Philadelphia 
Association (PA) was successfully registered in April 1965 (Howarth-Williams, 1977) and it 
was this charitable status that was key to allowing its theoretical premise of what was 
becoming antipsychiatry to progress. 
Laing created with several colleagues a charitable body, The Philadelphia 
Association, to give a new community legal grounding. Free from the rules of the 
 
14 The political content and controversy of Laing’s theory is addressed in Part 4: A Political Process. 
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medical profession, Laing and his colleagues could set up the project according to 
their own vision. (Kotowicz, 1997, p. 75) 
The seven founder members of the PA (Laing, Esterson, Cooper, Briskin, Blake, Cunnold, 
Sigal) varied in profession. They were psychiatrists, social workers, psychotherapists, artists 
and writers but they were all united under a single premise, the tenets of the yet unnamed 
and developing Antipsychiatry Movement but with a broader belief in creating something 
better for society (Coppock and Hopton, 2000). It was this belief in a better society and the 
fact it came from a breadth of professional diversity that helped cultivate a thematic fit with 
the counterculture. Although existing in some capacity prior, it was through this organisation 
(and more specifically, Kingsley Hall) that Redler, Schatzman and Berke, formed with Laing, 
Esterson, and Cooper to create a more discernible Antipsychiatry Movement (Burston, 
1996).   
The aim of the PA was to create experimental communities, in multi-occupancy houses, 
allowing individuals suffering mental turmoil, particularly those diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’, 
to endure the natural process of madness in a safe and supportive environment without 
forcibly being subjected to medical intervention (Coppock and Hopton, 2000). Another way 
of looking at their aim is that it was intended to provide an environment free from the political 
/ existential conditions which gave rise to, and reified, symptoms and behaviour which 
became diagnosed as illness. 
Laing was undoubtedly pivotal in the development and manifestation of the Antipsychiatry 
Movement and the organisation of the PA but it is impossible to fully appreciate or 
understand either without consideration of the experimental communities they ran.15 This is 
demonstrated most dramatically, perhaps excessively, through the Kingsley Hall residence: 
the jewel in the crown of the Antipsychiatry Movement and the most infamous community 
under the administration of the PA. Kingsley Hall embodies all that the Antipsychiatry 
Movement was during this period; it illuminates the operation and tensions within the PA, 
and places Ronnie firmly in the spotlight.   
 
15 At a seminar conducted at UCL (2017), Dr A. Chapman recounted a conversation with Leon Redler, a surviving 
member of the Antipsychiatry Movement, where he was corrected that it was not a ‘therapeutic’ community 
but an ‘experimental’ community. The insistence on using ‘therapeutic’ on the PA website may be seen as an 
indicator of their changing, less radical ethos. Respecting Redler’s account from his direct experience, and its 




Laing was the impetus behind the Kingsley Hall experiment…which established a 
place where people could come and work out their emotional problems in a free16 
community setting. (Brown, 1973, p. 62) 
Implementing the experimental aims of the PA for treatment of those typically diagnosed 
‘schizophrenic ’,  Laing also used the premises to conduct special events, maintaining the 
prominence of the Antipsychiatry Movement (and himself) with all things counterculture, 
hosting public seminars by David Mercer, Francis Huxley and, perhaps narcissistically, 
himself. It was also highly utilised in the organisation of the Dialectics of Liberation 
Conference 1967.17 Laing created an inner-city commune, embracing the humanism so 
prevalent within 1960s culture and responding to the criticism of capitalist culture and 
medicine. Vibrant with culture and politics, it is no wonder it became a hive of activity, 
attracting the attention of celebrities, activists, and academics alike (Burston, 1996).  
Laing discusses this time as being founded on principles which on reflection echo optimistic 
sentiments of anarchist theory. He talks about a place free from domination and hierarchy, 
depicting an image of a community steered by all where evening meals were the focal point 
and important matters from the day were discussed. Nightly gatherings (or endless parties, 
as Showalter, 1987, negatively perceived them) where spirits were kept high enabling 
residents to be engaged and connected (Mullan, 1995), were another reason that it attracted 
attention from celebrity friends (and negative attention from annoyed local residents and 
critical bystanders). However, Laing’s intent and memory are not necessarily the most 
accurate depiction of the situation.  
As momentum gathered within this already chaotic and disorganised community, Kingsley 
Hall seemed to mimic the lost island depicted by Golding’s (1954) Lord of the Flies. Against 
and without the support of his founding colleagues, Laing’s ethos and theory shifted towards 
the ‘psychotic voyage’ associated with his Transcendental Experience theory, professing 
that the psychotic process could be a gateway to a new dimension of enlightenment. Laing 
 
16 I think it necessary to address this notion of ‘free’, so as not to create or allow misdirection from the outset; 
all therapists worked on a voluntary basis (Burston, 1996) but this was a fee-for-service arrangement (Sedgwick, 
1982). Even though the fee was a collective responsibility and not for profit (Schatzman cited in Boyers and 
Orrill, 1971), there was still a cost implication.  
17 The importance of this event is addressed in Chapter 11, The Political.   
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seized absolute control through charisma, theoretic might and intimidation: qualities he held 
in abundance.  
Clancy Sigal was the first member of the PA to leave, becoming disillusioned with Laing’s 
growing mysticism, self-absorption and dictatorial approach. Sigal’s resentment came to light 
in his 1976 book Zone of the Interior. Whilst stated as fiction,18 it is widely regarded as a 
parody, a caricature, of the actual events which unfolded during his time at Kingsley Hall and 
in Laing’s company. Willie Last and Ronnie Laing, Kingsley Hall and Meditation Manor, and 
the PA and Clare Council, are virtually inseparable (Burston, 1996). Gordon (1972, p. 64) 
refers to Laing as the ‘Knight of Kingsley Hall’ and, as with all good sarcastic quips, the 
intended humour of this comment is captured in its proximity to the reality. Fused with his 
growing guru-celebrity status within the counterculture, these accounts seem to support this 
image. This certainly rings true with the way Mary Barnes, in her account as a resident in 
this community, paints her picture of Laing (Barnes and Berke, 1970). Laing’s prominent role 
was divisive and his move towards mysticism – the psychotic voyage – compounded that 
notion. 
Within Kingsley Hall, utopian optimism was descending into dystopian reality. Any sense of 
structure, particularly at the request or suggestion of the other resident psychiatrist Esterson, 
was met with increasingly greater friction and hostility. Esterson, whilst accepting or more 
flexible towards the growing mysticism than other colleagues, was so perturbed by Laing’s 
drug use, whether argued as therapeutic or not, and the increasingly disordered state within 
the community, that he questioned Laing’s approach. This did not go down well, ultimately 
resulting in a scuffle with punches thrown and Esterson withdrawing from the PA in 1968 (his 
colleague Churchill joining him soon after). The proclaimed organic, non-hierarchical 
structure fundamental to Laing’s vision of Kingsley Hall had changed.  
Being the skilled politician that he was, Laing was playing favourites within the house, 
shifting his attention between individuals depending on what advantage they provided and 
what support he personally required. Residents were trying to outdo each other in the 
madness stakes, one-upmanship, feeling as if only those at the far reaches of the spectrum 
were gaining much sought-after attention (Burston, 1996). A former resident, Francis Gillet, 
stayed at Kingsley Hall between 1966 – 70 and during an interview with the Guardian 
newspaper (2012) stated:  
 
18 A detail Clancy admits in the 2005 preface as protection against legal repercussions and libel. 
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Ronnie said, "Go mad, young man", and I did. I took him at his word, and I went as 
mad as I possibly could, and at no time did he try and stop me. 
Those who opposed Ronnie were shunned but, likewise, those who supported him were 
often sharply curtailed for being sycophantic (Burston, 1996): a desperately unfavourable 
characteristic in Laing’s eyes (Guy Thompson, 2015). Laing’s physical position at the head 
of the table no longer seemed organic or innocent, his dictatorial approach was coming more 
strongly into focus. Short of residents chanting ‘Kill the pig’ and stealing Esterson’s glasses 
(as per the climatic scenes of Lord of the Flies), the house seemed to be somewhat out of 
control and so did Laing. The house was becoming divided with a situation Burston (1996) 
describes as being like sibling rivalry. Added to this, any organised and structured form of 
therapy was drifting by the wayside – argued as being coercive towards adopting more 
typical or socially acceptable behaviour (Crossley, 1998). We can see where the collective 
conditions begin to support Redler’s insistence that this was experimental, rather than a 
therapeutic community. 
Despite his unpredictable style of leadership, Laing’s charismatic presence had been 
vital to sustaining the fragile sense of cohesion that united this motley group of 
people. (Burston, 1996, p. 87)  
After a relatively short period, Laing vacated Kingsley Hall in December 1966 and moved 
into a private residence with his new partner, Jutta Werner. At this point he undertook a 
more supervisory role at Kingsley Hall, delegating responsibility to Berke, Schatzman and 
Redler: three members who were gaining recognition within the Antipsychiatry Movement 
and importantly, were supportive of Laing’s Transcendental Experience approach (Burston, 
1996). Whilst Laing claimed that he maintained an active and full participation with the PA 
and Kingsley Hall after his departure (Mullan, 1995), Burston (1996) questions this, stating 
that his role fundamentally became about listening to the woes of the ‘over-taxed’ therapists, 
being more than prepared to send them back into the fray armed with nothing more than a 
pep talk (a skill, he was more than adept at). Laing admits that he no longer possessed the 
stamina to give Kingsley Hall the commitment it required and, as he faded, so seemingly did 
the sense of cohesion within the community and brotherhood (Mullan, 1995).  
The importance of Kingsley Hall to the PA and Antipsychiatry Movement cannot be over 
emphasised. Effectively, it was only a rented property for the PA, leased for a relatively short 
duration of 5 years in what is now a 52-year lifespan, but it remains a fundamental part of its 
legacy. The PA has moved forward since this community, evolving and learning 
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(significantly) from this period, but it still retains a proud affiliation with Laing and the brave, 
bold experimental community that took place here. For the Antipsychiatry Movement, 
Kingsley Hall remains the focal point by which it is explained, understood and critically 
evaluated.  
More than any other member, it is Laing who is associated with Kingsley Hall, and Kingsley 
Hall with Laing. And reflections on Laing, newspaper articles, films, and certain secondary 
sources, direct so much focus towards Kingsley Hall that Ronnie comes to dominate the 
entire representation and reflection of his theory. The sensationalism of his antics – the LSD, 
the alcoholism and the celebrity parties including bare-chested Indian wrestling with Sean 
Connery no-less (Paton, 2015) – is easier and more tempting for accounts to focus on than it 
is to rest on the substance of his theory and practice. 
The book about Kingsley Hall is the one book we should regret Laing never wrote. 
(Kotowicz, 1997, p. 87).  
Brown (1973, p. 65) speaks of a ‘certain utopianism that cannot be translated into words’ 
regarding Kingsley Hall and whilst this offers some justification for Laing’s lack of writing on 
it, it fails to account fully for it. In Laing’s transcripts with Mullan (1995), the underlying 
momentum seems more viably burnout and loss of interest. Pickering (2015) outlines that 
even though a prolific writer, Laing was fonder of the performance than the written format 
and for this reason, secondary sources provide vital insight into his undocumented practice: 
most prominently, his practice at Kingsley Hall.  
In the absence of this book, however, rumours, scandal and mythology run rife. Clancy 
Sigal’s 1976 story Zone of the Interior and the recent film Mad to be Normal (2017) become 
examples of the fictionalised reference points by which we claim an understanding of Ronnie 
and for many, his theory (unfortunately). Whether written during the 1960s, 1970s or since, 
secondary texts and theoretical responses seem to amplify a polemical position, adulation or 
attack. And the volume of attention becomes directed toward justifying him as a saint or the 
devil. Snippets of insight can be gained through interviews, articles and chapters directly 
involving Laing but these remain brief at best; I would argue that all they reliably evidence is 
that Laing was a divisive character. It is easy to see why ‘mental health’ professionals would 
distance themselves from him.  
Ronnie was the person to create the necessary hype around his theory, generating the 
gravitational force which consolidated the organisations, brotherhoods, and persuaded 
 48 
external bodies to invest.19 Conversely, no-one would deny he was a flawed individual and 
his professional conduct requires more than a little re-evaluation. However, the substance 
that brought him to prominence, which provided the springboard for the Antipsychiatry 
Movement, the backbone for the PA and the inspiration for Kingsley Hall, was R.D Laing’s 
work as a theoretician. Ronnie provided the ultimate ringmaster to this theory, stirring up 
energy, interest and support with his intoxicating manner. But unfortunately, this was a 
double-edged sword, also being the reason for a question mark placed over his 
professionalism and therefore the respectability of the theory. Laing possessed flaws and 
genius in spades and my own opinion is that neither aspect cancels out the other. Ronnie 
was a powerful personality and this personality was instrumental to the success of his 
theory. But his personality cannot be considered the representation of his theory – and 
unfortunately, too easily this reduction is made.   
The different tack employed in this thesis, that aims to reconsider the potential for Laing in 
our current ‘mental health’ crisis, is to invert the trajectory of attention that gravitates toward 
his personality and the associated scandal and mythology, prioritising his written word and 
developing a contrapuntal reading for now. However, this is far from a simple and 
straightforward description of theory. If Ronnie caused controversy in person, his theory, 
reaching a far wider audience, was operating on a different level.  
R.D. Laing  
I now had a life out there as R.D. Laing. It was a completely other frame of reference. 
(Laing 1988, cited in Mullan, 1995, p. 337) 
The perception of a duality to his existence was not lost on Laing, with him reflecting on the 
theorist R.D. Laing as a separate reference to the person he felt he was (whether the person 
‘he felt’ was the ‘Ronnie’ depicted by others and addressed previously would be an 
investigation worthy of his 1966 publication Interpersonal Perception but suffice to say that 
he, ‘Ronnie’ or not, thought of R.D. Laing the theorist as a separate entity to his self). I now 
continue this divided character theme with a synopsis of R.D. Laing the published theorist, 
providing a distinction from his ‘Ronnie’ persona and a foundation justifying his writing as the 
 
19 It was ultimately Muriel Lester (joint owner of Kingsley Hall) and her direct support for Laing, which swung the 
balance towards the PA and allowed them to take charge of Kingsley Hall for a symbolic lease of £1 per annum 
(Burston, 1996). 
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source by which to focus the primary theme: the cause of psychic suffering in the current 
context.   
Fourteen books were authored and co-authored by R.D. Laing: eight published in the first 
phase of his career (1960 – 70) and the remaining six in the second (1976 – 85). A high 
publishing activity with journal articles, edited chapters and forewords was also maintained 
throughout yet the most significant attention is always directed to the New Left Review 
(NLR), not for its content but the perceived political intent underpinning his decision to 
publish with this New-Left format.20  
1960 – 1970 is undoubtedly the most popular period, both from a sales and impact 
perspective (Crossley, 1998). This first publication phase marked the most active and 
productive era of Laing’s career, publishing more works and to greater critical acclaim than 
any other time. This time saw the publication of: The Divided Self (1960); Self and Others 
(1961); Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964 – with A. Esterson); Reason and Violence: A 
Decade of Sartre's Philosophy (1964 – with D. Cooper); Interpersonal Perception: A Theory 
and a Method of Research (1966 – with H. Phillipson and A. Lee); The Politics of Experience 
and the Bird of Paradise (1967); The Politics of the Family and Other Essays (1969) and 
Knots (1970).  
Starting with The Divided Self, Laing’s first solo effort which was published in book format 
and widely regarded as his seminal piece, is the foundation on which all his subsequent 
books were built (specifically within the first phase of publications) and viewed as the 
unifying text within the Antipsychiatry Movement (Burston, 1996; Sedgwick, 1982; Mullan, 
1995, Kotowicz, 1997; Coppock and Hopton, 2000). In short, this text epitomises R.D. Laing. 
For this reason, although not his actual first publication, it marks the inception of R.D. Laing 
the published entity and will continue to play a pivotal role in developing a Laingian theory in 
the following chapters. This demarcates the beginning of Laing’s first phase of publishing: a 
phase that encapsulates the working duration of the Kingsley Hall community (1965 – 70), a 
political involvement with the counterculture and ends with publication of Knots (1970). Such 
was the furore surrounding Laing during this period that when he published The Politics of 
Experience and The Bird of Paradise,21 and Knots, they became best sellers through 
anticipation alone (Crossley, 1998). This was a time of hype and activity, personality 
propelling his theory and vice versa, but it was also an era of greater cohesion and focus 
 
20 See Appendix 1 for a chronology of publications.  
21 This is more commonly referred to as The Politics of Experience and will be addressed as such moving forward. 
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within his application. His early work focussed on the experience of the sufferer in a variety 
of contexts (medical, familial and political). This is widely regarded as his career-defining era 
(Sedgwick, 1982; Kotowicz, 1997; Crossley, 1998).  
The second phase to his career follows the publication of Knots and begins with his 
sabbatical in 1971 – 72 when Laing journeyed to Ceylon22 and India to pursue his interest in 
yoga and meditative practices. This hiatus finished with a series of publications in 1976. His 
return was defined by a significant change in his theoretical focus, retaining an undercurrent 
of ‘mental health’; the interpersonal context was replaced with intrauterine experiences – 
how experiences from conception to birth impact on lasting ‘mental health’ (Kotowicz, 1997). 
Laing reflected in later interviews that although his approach had changed, he felt the 
ultimate focus of ‘mental health’ had been retained throughout (Mullan, 1995). Unfortunately, 
this sentiment was not echoed by his readers and for all but the most hard-line supporters, 
this shift was perhaps a step too far (Sedgwick, 1982). That is not to say that his writings 
post 1976 were devoid of quality or completely divorced from his previous works: threads of 
consistency are evident throughout the entirety of Laing’s body of work (Burston, 1996). But 
post 1976, his books no longer held that same connection with contemporary culture. 
Certainly, the thematic fit between Laing with the counterculture, connecting ‘mental health’ 
with the wider political infrastructure, had dissolved (Crossley, 1998; Kotowicz, 1997; Guy 
Thompson, 2015).23  
It is the first phase of publishing, between 1960 – 70, that provides the parameters to this 
research, deemed to be the most insightful, focussed, and valuable. The second phase is 
not dismissed but addressed sparingly to emphasise and develop clarity to this earlier work.  
Addressing R.D. Laing’s theory in isolation from his personality ‘Ronnie’, the writing being 
separate from the writer, is aimed at negotiating much of the scandal and mythology 
associated with Laing’s reception. However, as we explore and analyse the published 
identity of R.D. Laing the divisive nature of his theory is bought into focus – we begin to see 
that it was not just ‘Ronnie’ that was a polemical character. Unlike the hearsay and 
(potentially) distorted recounts of Ronnie’s behaviour, staying focussed to his written word 
provides a fixed point to anchor this analysis.  
 
22 Ceylon is the colonial name still in use at the time of Laing’s visit, now known as Sri Lanka.  
23 One could cynically question whether this was a further calculated act. Laing’s relevance seemingly being tied 
with the counterculture, as the counterculture faded maybe the intrauterine focus was his own attempt at a 
professional rebirth.  
 51 
On occasion, his writing is also subject to scandal and mythology: some warranted and 
some incurred through vagueness, or rather perceived vagueness, which enables 
controversy to be injected into his theory. Much of this can be discussed and even mitigated 
with reference to his entire body of theory; however, where justified gaps remain, they 
subsequently invite question and a further analysis of Laing’s theoretical influences is 
required. Laing is famous for the extensive nature of his reading and grasp of theories and 
an analysis of his influences risks falling into another deep and eclectic rabbit warren. This 
will not be purely an analysis of Laing’s philosophic influences (amongst many other texts 
Howarth-Williams, 1977; Collier, 1977, and Beveridge, 2011, provide an extensive view of 
this) as this thesis is tasked with addressing the influences that enable us to identify the 
operational framework of his theory which can exist in a structural way and be applied to the 
experience of psychic suffering in our current situation.  
Before we progress into Part 2 and start to develop and understanding for Laing’s theortical 
framework, Chapter 4, Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance explores the rationale underpinning 




4. Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance  
[T]he theory of man as person loses its way if it falls into an account of man as a 
machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes. (Laing, 1960, p. 23)  
The rationale underpinning Laing’s theory is outlined in the above quotation, with Laing 
proposing that modern psychiatry is founded upon an epistemology that determines persons 
as a ‘machine’ or ‘an organismic system of it-processes’. This proposition is paramount for 
developing the central argument throughout this thesis that modern psychiatry, and its 
cultural influence, is responsible for enacting existential violence upon those its discourse 
comes to define, furthermore qualifying the value of Laing’s alternative theoretical framework 
to provide a solution.    
The definition of modern psychiatry that supports this proposition was outlined in the 
previous chapter but remained unchallenged. Instead it provided a fixed point by which to 
juxtapose the potential need to reconsider Laing’s theory. In this chapter, we explore the 
vision of modern psychiatry that Laing uses to qualify his proposition across four intersecting 
contexts: Modern Psychiatry and Laing, Voices of Resistance, Modern Psychiatry Post-
Laing, and Service User Movement.  
Modern psychiatry is defined in this chapter though an exploration of influential thinkers 
between the turn of the 19th century and 20th century, with Philippe Pinel and Emil Kraepelin 
presented as the most significant shapers of the epistemological landscape of ‘mental 
illness’. Highlighting the central epistemological thread within the development of modern 
psychiatry, a question is posed as to whether Laing’s proposition is revolutionary within the 
history of modern psychiatry. 
Surrounding Laing’s first phase of publishing, several notable theorists also voiced criticism 
and resistance toward modern psychiatry. Many of these voices are used throughout this 
thesis to contrast with Laing’s theory and define his theoretical structure. However, 
collectively they also depict a landscape of critical thought within and against modern 
psychiatry which erupted at this juncture. The question explored here is whether Laing’s 
proposition made a unique contribution.   
Post-Laing two methods have established themselves as the primary treatment arms of 
modern psychiatry and contributed significantly to its governing epistemological structure: 
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talking therapy and drug interventions. Each of these treatment strategies were in application 
prior to Laing’s arrival; however, focussing primarily on their contribution to modern 
psychiatry since the 1960s, we ask whether Laing’s ideas retain continuing value.  
The final section draws the service user movement into discussion, considering how their 
influence and authority within the contemporary mental health scene affects the usefulness 
of Laing’s primary proposition. This movement differs from previous sections in that it 
approaches mental health treatment from the perspective of those typically referred to as 
‘patients’. As a movement that has increasingly established itself since Laing and occupying 
a structural position within policy making initiatives, it provides a context through which to 
consider how Laing’s proposition complements or contrasts with the contemporary scene. 
Modern Psychiatry and Laing 
This section provides a brief overview of the development of modern psychiatry, focussing 
from an inception point with Philippe Pinel’s treatment of those that would now be deemed 
‘mentally ill’ to Emil Kraepelin’s consolidation of a psychiatric discourse. These figures do not 
provide an absolute point of origin, or an end of psychiatric history, but rather punctuate key 
moments that consolidate the trajectory of modern psychiatry. This selective history 
emphasises a central backbone of modern psychiatry and provides a contextual backdrop by 
which to consider the justification for Laing to assert that psychiatry was detrimentally 
defining man as a machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes. 
The term ‘psychiatry’ was first used by Johann Christian Reil in 1808 to define the growing 
medical scientific approach to matters of insanity (Chase, 2018). Rallying against the chains 
and dungeons synonymous with the ‘supernatural, diabolical or divine’ medieval treatment of 
madness (Porter, 2002, p. 123), Pinel (1801) published A Treatise on Insanity, a pivotal 
influence at the turn of the 19th century that argued for the greater efficacy and necessary 
morality in the humane treatment of those who would now be deemed ‘mentally ill’. Half a 
century later Daniel Hack Tuke (1854) published Moral Management of the Insane, which 
strengthened the values of this approach further. Collectively these influence carried across 
the Atlantic with Dorthea Dix inspired by their work (Chase, 2018); humane treatment was 
taking hold within the treatment of madness. 
Although advocating humane treatment, the respective approaches of Pinel and Tuke 
differed significantly, highlighting a theoretic cleavage that has long dominated approaches 
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to ‘mental illness’, a cleavage that has existed prior to, throughout, and post the transition to 
modern psychiatry.  
The debate about the mind versus brain is a recurrent theme in the history of 
psychiatry. It began with Plato and Hippocrates, continued into the nineteenth 
century, and remains with us today. (Chase, 2018, p. 34) 
Pinel and Tuke are two exemplars of this question: where do we locate the experience of 
psychic suffering, within the mind (Plato and Tuke) or the body/brain (Hippocrates and 
Pinel)? This binary isn’t quite as simple as it may appear and as we progress, a more 
complex dynamic for each position becomes apparent. Tuke’s (1854) moralistic rationale 
located psychic suffering within the mind and retained a religious component with 
undertones of a soul. Pinel (1801), in contrast, held causation to occur as a result of bodily 
illness; he didn’t dismiss the notion of a mind, but rather located the mind as a constituent 
component of the body. These approaches fall on opposing sides of this longstanding divide: 
mind versus brain, or more accurately, a mind independent of body versus a mind intricately 
bound with body. 
Both were instrumental for introducing humane treatment into the world of ‘mental illness’, 
but it is Pinel whose influence becomes paramount in the history books, and this provides 
the first waypoint in our journey through modern psychiatry.   
Pinel’s influence and authority is accounted to his development of clinical observation for the 
study of ‘mental illness’. Mirroring a medical methodology, Chase (2018) outlines that this 
approach developed a more organised, even reliable and accurate, understanding for those 
deemed ‘mentally ill’. He was far from the first to offer a classification and diagnostic 
criteria,24 but Pinel’s definitions of ‘mania, melancholia, dementia and idiocy’ (Chase, 2018, 
p. 29), became a benchmark in defining and identifying different types of psychiatric 
illnesses.  
A subtlety that resonates within Pinel’s reception is the cross fertilisation of a medicalised 
approach and humane treatment, which seemed to propel the perceived authority of modern 
psychiatry. However, an important caveat exists to this implied connection; unlike Tuke, 
Pinel was not opposed to the more draconian measures that were previously commonplace, 
but rather he believed the more medieval methods should only be followed once the humane 
 
24 As discussed in Chapter 2, Why Now, ‘nosology’ extends back thousands of years. 
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avenues were first exhausted (Chase, 2018). Pinel’s ethos was unquestionably governed by 
perceived treatment efficacy, over and above any notion of ethical responsibility. I suggest 
this subtle yet definitive characteristic continues to reverberate beneath the surface of 
modern psychiatry. Disturbance of the mind is located in the illness of bodily organs; treating 
it as such promotes an ethical treatment of suffering and persons. Likewise, in reverse, 
ethical treatment becomes the lubrication by which a scientific medicalisation asserts itself 
upon an epistemology of the self.  
Jumping ahead to the mid 19th century, a sudden, unexpected, and unexplained increase in 
the reported incidence of ‘mental illness’ affected Europe and the US.25 In the face of 
increased demand placed upon facility admissions, the pioneering work of Pinel began to 
waver and older methods started to return. Wilhelm Griesinger, a German psychiatrist, 
however, was an important force in resisting this and maintaining Pinel’s trajectory. In Mental 
Pathology and Therapeutics (1845) Griesinger reaffirmed – and progressed – the need for 
psychiatry to be pursued under humane ethics and with equal scientific rigour to any other 
matter addressed within medicine. Advocating and developing a structured, empirical, 
scientific, medical, investigative methodology for ‘mental illness’, Griesinger’s approach was 
instrumental for connecting and isolating the brain as the organ responsible for ‘mental 
illness’ (Chase, 2018). 
Griesinger’s early insights into this neuroscientific domain were crude and ultimately 
incorrect, but his hypothesis of the brain housing the mind, was a monumental event in the 
trajectory of psychiatry, and a significant driver for concretising the organismic origin for 
‘mental illness’ (Morrall, 2017). Griesinger’s (1856) publication, and wider theory, reads as 
an intensification and amplification of Pinel’s earlier work; wrapped within a cocoon of 
humane treatment, the intensification of empirical scientific principles in the approach to 
‘mental illness’ gathered momentum. But like Pinel, although his work is couched in the 
frequently repeated attribution of humane treatment, we see the same lack of ethical duty. 
Humane treatment was engaged with as a pragmatic and calculated approach, enacted for 
better treatment outcomes but the more draconian methods remained in his arsenal (Morrall, 
2017).26 
At the turn of the 20th century, the forefather of modern psychiatry, regarded by many as the 
most important psychiatrist to have ever lived, is introduced, Emil Kraepelin (Beveridge, 
 
25 Foucault will add a different theory to this ‘unexplained’ event later. 
26 This is not the extent of Griesinger’s contribution to psychiatry. As we will see shortly, a social responsibility 
and consideration within ‘mental illness’ was engaged.  
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2011). Fully invested in the biological cause for all major ‘mental disorders’, Kraepelin 
recognised that before biological aetiology could be pursued within science, a standardised 
classification system needed to be employed (Morrall, 2017).  
In 1904 Kraepelin published Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry. This collected work provided a 
framework for psychiatrists, and all practitioners in this field, to justify and undertake clinical 
investigation of psychiatric subjects and thus enable a ‘concretising’ of the nuances of 
experience that constitute ‘mental illness’ and ‘disorder’. Taking what was previously 
deemed speculative and broad assertions with little solid evidential grounding, Kraepelin’s 
work established a standardisation and expansion of diagnostic categories through empirical 
observations (Chase, 2018). 
Kraepelin’s ideas concerning neuro-pathology have much in common with biological 
research into causation and pharmacological treatments of the late-twentieth century 
onward. (Morrall, 2017, p. 54) 
Kraepelin’s (1904) dedication to clinical investigation and his creation of an early diagnostic 
criterion can be seen as the defining moment within modern psychiatry, a critical moment 
within the treatment of ‘mental illness’ that remains with us today. Kraepelin effectively 
sketched a blueprint for what would become the DSM and ICD. Whilst there is no suggestion 
that his work marked the end of history for the scientific medicalisation of ‘mental illness’, his 
theory crystalised and clarified the trajectory of influences such as Pinel and Griesinger and 
provided a clear roadmap to be followed.  
Given the high esteem that Kraepelin’s work held within the development of the medicalised 
scientistic approach to ‘mental illness’ that defines modern psychiatry, it is little wonder that 
Laing (1960) had an extensive critique to level at Kraepelin’s depersonalising, positivist 
methodology and the detrimental impact this had upon the psychiatric field he was operating 
within.27 But of importance for this chapter, Kraepelin is presented by Laing (and several 
other historians of psychiatry – see Chase, 2018; Porter, 2002; Beveridge, 2011) as the 
major player responsible for collating the insights of earlier psychiatrists and gelling their 
theories into a cohesive framework, concretising an epistemological trajectory that 
determines persons as a ‘machine’ or ‘an organismic system of it-processes’. Against this 
 
27 Chapter 5, A Laingian Methodology analyses the contrast of Laing’s methodology to the discourse of modern 
psychiatry. For a specific comparison and critique between Laing and Kraepelin, see Beveridge, A. (2011) 
Portrait of the Psychiatrist as a Young Man: The Early Writing and Work of R.D. Laing, 1927 – 1960.  
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backdrop, to borrow the highly contentious term coined by David Cooper, Laing’s theory was 
truly ‘antipsychiatry’.  
However, although each figure contributes to a picture that illustrates a scientific evolution 
that defines the backbone of modern psychiatry, increasingly focussing upon an organic 
concept of ‘mental illness’ located within the brain, it is achieved through a selective 
emphasis on events, psychiatrists, and their contributions. Whilst I argue that this remains an 
accurate representation of the central line of discourse within modern psychiatry upon 
Laing’s arrival (and continuing beyond), to position Laing’s theory more accurately, we need 
to consider the wider, fuller picture. And this includes acknowledging the contributions of 
psychological and sociological theory within the psychiatric field. 
From the emphasis of influences so far, the longstanding battle between Hippocrates and 
Plato is seemingly resolved; by the turn of the 20th century, let alone by the time Laing 
produced his seminal text, The Divided Self, in 1960, the mind had become fully embedded 
within the brain, Hippocrates seemingly the victor. But this ignores a major influence 
developing in parallel with Kraepelin that also had a significant impact on the shape of 
modern psychiatry.  
Rejecting the dogmatic medicalised scientific charge, Sigmund Freud contributed an 
alternative approach to ‘mental illness’. Much like the developments within the biological 
domain, Freud was building on an existing foundation. In the late 18th century, Franz Anton 
argued for a psychologised approach that attributed madness to blockages in the flow of 
animal magnetism between persons (Porter, 2002), a century later Jean-Martin Charcot, 
Freud’s mentor, a neurologist was developing hypnosis in this same field (Morrall, 2017).28 
Freud’s influence, more so than his predecessors, was paramount in resisting an unrelenting 
consumption of ‘mental illness’ within biological psychiatry and its collapsing of the 
brain/mind into a singular entity (Chase, 2018). Freud’s psychological approach ensured the 
mind remained firmly in contention for psychiatry, until the development of, and exclusion of 
psychoanalytic thought from, the DSM 3 in 1980. 29  
 
28 Both of these approaches are discussed with an element of derision, even mockery, in the sources addressed, 
an outcome perhaps for the perceived greater authority we find ourselves invested in the biological trajectory. 
29 The influence of psychoanalytic theory significantly deteriorated with the publication of the DSM-III in 1980, 
this change is referenced in Chapter 2, Why Now.  
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If we are to present Laing’s philosophical approach as psychological, as per Freud – the 
influence of Freud being strongly felt within The Divided Self – and the role that the Freudian 
notion of an inner world plays within Laing’s theory of self, we must also recognise its 
sizeable theoretical departures. The intricacies of these theoretical differences are woven 
throughout this thesis, but the impact of the social order, specifically within psychiatry’s 
context, requires attention. The social, much as the psychological, has an integral part to 
play in the development of modern psychiatry. Laing (1966) criticised psychoanalysis for the 
absence of any discernible social component and emphasised the importance of social 
factors with equal vigour to psychological ones; but he cannot be considered the pioneer of 
social analysis within modern psychiatry.  
This social thread can be identified for hundreds of years (Porter, 1987; 2002) but to anchor 
its relevance firmly within the framework for modern psychiatry, it is worth returning to 
Wilhelm Griesinger. Whilst instrumental in developing an organic premise for ‘mental illness’ 
and instigating the medical focus on the brain, Griesinger also acknowledges the 
significance of the interplay of the individual within society for the aetiology of ‘mental illness’ 
(Morrall, 2017). The brain might have been the ultimate location where ‘mental illness’ was 
believed to reside, but the role of society in causing brain illness retained value and 
importance in his research. 
In the mid-20th century, Harry Stack Sullivan continued the fight for greater social 
consideration in mainstream psychiatry and controversially rejected the increasingly 
neurological trajectory developing.30 
Sullivan had maintained that the close relationship between psychiatry and neurology 
was a false one, that it was a misalliance. The proper subject for psychiatry was 
disturbances in living, manifest by disturbances in interpersonal relationships. 
(Beveridge, 2011, p. 92)   
The similarities between Sullivan and Laing come to the fore in this quote,31 but the point to 
take is that Sullivan, a prominent psychiatrist,32 was clearly distancing himself from 
diagnostic classification and its attempts to correlate neurobiological concepts as a means of 
 
30 Laing references Sullivan’s work directly in The Politics of Experience. In this title he critiques Sullivan for not 
respecting or valuing the insight of the psychotic with sufficient value.  
31 Beveridge (2011, p. 93) continuing that ‘Sullivan anticipated, if not directly influenced, many of Laing’s key 
ideas’.  
32 His involvement with the American Psychiatric Association (APA) committee, is testament to the respect his 
theory wielded within the psychiatric profession. 
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understanding ‘mental illness’ and was instead advocating the significance of negative 
experiences that occur within the social environment (Beveridge, 2011). Reaching across 
the Atlantic, Pearce and Haigh (2017) state that the seeds of social psychiatry (sown by 
psychiatrists such as Sullivan), saw rapid growth in the 1950 – 1970s and since then figures 
such as Laurence Hartmann have continued to fight for greater consideration of social 
factors within the discourse of psychiatry. 
An accurate picture of modern psychiatry needs to include the acceptance and 
establishment of approaches counter to the prevailing neurobiological dominance. Sullivan 
highlighted the need for social theory to be considered within psychiatry, and furthermore, 
Freud established a structural place for psychoanalytic concepts within psychiatry.33 
However, although these influences are evidently present, with the benefit of hindsight, we 
know that these alternate approaches have been unsuccessful in changing the course of 
mainstream psychiatry. Modern psychiatry remains increasingly biologically reductive.   
When Laing’s theory arrived on the scene, psychological and social concepts were not 
absent from modern psychiatry, but the wheels set in motion by Pinel, more so with 
Griesinger, and concretised by Kraepelin were coming to fruition. Modern psychiatry saw 
‘mental illness’ as a product of the brain and the array of treatment strategies administered 
most frequently and commonly reinforce this premise. The battle within psychiatry was 
clearly being dominated by the Hippocratic camp, but as Freud’s and Sullivan’s input 
evidence, aspects of Plato’s argument were still in the fight and the debate about the mind 
versus brain remained alive.34  
Laing was, in fact, participating in a long tradition of debate about the nature of 
mental disturbance … between the belief that madness is a result of brain disease 
and the belief that it is a psychological or spiritual problem. (Beveridge, 2011, p. 64)  
Laing’s relevance in the 1960s is not that he was the first to voice rejection of the reduction 
of the person to a machine or a collective of it-processes, as this was long encapsulated 
within the brain versus the mind debate, but rather he appears to appreciate its importance 
 
33 Harry Stack Sullivan and Lawrence Hartmann were both psychoanalytic practitioners. 
34 Chase (2018) depicts Kraepelin’s focus with a different emphasis to those in the other sources addressed 
here. He states that Kraepelin ‘bought into Griesinger’s argument that mental illnesses must, somehow, be 
brain illnesses, but he doubted that neuroanatomy could provide all the answers…. consequently, he thought a 
lot about the mind … he thought much less about either the soul … or the brain’ (Chase, 2018, p. 79). Presented 
within a context that science could not yet reach the lofty ambition of psychiatry, even within Kraepelin’s work 
alone we see that the debate for the mind versus the brain was alive.  
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at a pivotal moment, revitalising the need to reopen this discussion. The 1950s and 1960s 
were a consolidating moment in the history of modern psychiatry, the scientistic means of 
understanding the self fusing with the development of the DSM / ICD35 becoming a cultural 
anchor to standardise and universalise psychiatry, and the people caught in its grasp. The 
discourse of modern psychiatry may not have been perfectly refined, but the writing was on 
the wall, and Laing seems to have been one of those who noticed. Modern psychiatry was 
consolidating its position as the absolute authority over the self. 
Voices of Resistance 
Pausing for a moment to take stock of Laing’s arrival, Peter Sedgwick (1982, p. 3) states that 
during the 1960s and 1970s a revolutionary move was witnessed within and against 
psychiatry by several ‘ideological celebrities’. Stating that Laing was one of many arguing for 
change and revisionist thinking, he highlights Goffman, Foucault, and Szasz as other voices 
of importance. Extending this further, I suggest that the inclusion of Bateson, Scheff36 and 
Barton from this era also contribute further to a basis by which to contextualise Laing’s 
contribution to, and against, psychiatry.  
Many of the theorists, the ideological celebrities discussed in this section, provide a contrast 
to clarify the structure of a Laingian theory. However, each are landmarks themselves within 
a landscape of resistant voices that present critical thought toward the authority of psychiatry 
over the self. This section does not frame their theory through a Laingian lens, but offers 
brief insight into their main concepts, collectively mapping an ideological terrain of critical 
thought.  
Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961)  
Mental illness is a myth. Psychiatrists are not concerned with mental illnesses and 
their treatments. In actual practice they deal with personal, social and ethical 
problems in living. (Szasz, 1961, p. 262) 
Szasz produced a theory that challenged the structure of modern psychiatry. Publishing 
widely in books and articles, across a career spanning 60 years, he maintained a consistent 
 
35 This is discussed in Chapter 2, Why Now. 
36 No less because Bateson is acknowledged frequently and Scheff also gains recognition within this era directly 
by Laing (see The Politics of Experience). 
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focus, delving deeper to support and strengthen a critique of the treatment of mental illness. 
Creswell (2008) states that the theoretical pillars that supported the entirety of his work, 
demonstrated profoundly in The Myth of Mental Illness, involved challenging the 
epistemology and ethics of modern psychiatry.  
Szasz’s epistemological challenge refused to accept that ‘mental illness’ existed. Echoing 
the title of his seminal text, he stated that ‘mental illness’ was not a ‘fact of nature’ but a 
‘man-made “myth”’ (Porter, 2002, p. 1). It was proposed that the rationale for the creation of 
this myth was to control and coerce society into accepting prescribed moral norms (a 
premise shared with Foucault as we will see later). A central unifying theme underpinning his 
entire body of work, is that the term ‘mental illness’ is an oxymoron. Illness refers to 
something with a discernible (neuro)biological marker, but mind refers to an element of 
existence beyond a definitive bodily location. The term mental illness therefore becomes a 
metaphorical term referencing metaphorical forms (Morrall, 2017). Szasz was not opposed 
to the possibility of mental illnesses having a neurological origin, nor was he opposed to 
research driven toward this focus, but he said that without evidence, these experiences 
remained a matter of the mind, a problem of living rather than bodily illness (Szasz, 1960), 
an identification of aberrant behaviour (Moncrieff, 2008). There is a close proximity with 
Laing’s position here – both questioning the notion that such a thing as ‘mental illness’ 
existed, qualifying this assertion on the lack of biological evidence available. This 
commonality can mistakenly lead to suggestions of more general compatibility. But, leading 
us into our next theoretical pillar, Szasz argued that we should not differentiate those 
identified, incorrectly, as ‘mentally ill’, and he accused Laing of continuing to promulgate a 
theory that maintained a process of othering these people. The intricacy of this will be drawn 
upon later within the thesis.  
The ethical challenge Szasz levelled at psychiatry must be positioned firstly in the 
knowledge that he was not against psychiatry (reinforcing his absolute rejection of the term 
‘antipsychiatry’); rather he advocated the need for revision of its entire theoretical structure. 
Without a concretised location of biological illness within the brain, psychiatry needed to rid 
itself of the perceived need to be contained and recognised as an epistemological value 
authority within the natural sciences and instead respond to its true focus as a social science 
that attended to problems in living (Creswell, 2008). 
Negating biological determinism and affirming the role of environmental factors in a person’s 
experience of ‘mental illness’, Szasz argued that freedom of will and moral responsibility 
remained with the individual. This highlighted the ethical dilemma that modern psychiatry 
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failed; psychiatry should not possess the power and authority to compel patients to receive 
treatment, and this was Szasz’s rationale to separate the state and psychiatry (Bentall, 
2009).37 Respecting the sufferer’s autonomy, Szasz stated that the patient had the right to 
opt in or out of psychiatric engagement. Stressing this point further, Rose (2019, p. 174) 
states that from a Szaszian libertarian position ‘those who clung to their illness label were 
malingerers who should take responsibility for their own problems in living’.  
Szasz and Laing were both highly vocal critics of the abuses that modern psychiatry inflicted 
through forced treatment methods. However, where Laing campaigned to eradicate many of 
these treatment strategies from use, Szasz wanted to ensure that their application was only 
administered with the consent of the person involved. For Szasz, empowering the individual 
to take responsibility for their decisions was fundamental.   
Often discussed within the same context, Szasz and Laing were psychiatrists, both vocal for 
the need of revisionist thinking for the profession of psychiatry, and as highlighted in the brief 
examples of epistemology and ethics, although similar in certain respects, their theories 
interacted with significant friction (Bentall, 2009). This friction provides useful critical insights 
into Laing’s theory and will be developed through this thesis, but we must recognise that 
Szasz’s theory warrants independent recognition.  
Scheff, Residual Deviance (1966)  
Echoing the base premise of labelling theory developed in the late 1950s and continuing to 
operate under its name,38 Scheff developed and modified its application to mental illness 
(Scheid and Brown, 2010). A primary component of this development was the identification 
of ‘residual deviance’. Scheff (1966) stated that certain norms within a culture, norms 
learned and engrained throughout our most formative years, become absolute – taken for 
granted. These norms are later defined as a ‘residual category’ or rules:  
If people reacting to an offense exhaust the conventional categories that might define 
it (e.g., theft, prostitution, and drunkenness), yet are certain that an offense has been 
committed, they may resort to this residual category. (Scheff, 1970, p. 15) 
 
37 This feeds into the further belief that mental illness could not be used in mitigation for criminal activity 
(Bentall, 2009) 
38 For instance, Sheff, T (1974) The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness. American Sociological Review. Vol.39 (3), 
pp. 444 – 452. 
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Deviance from this residual category of norms is termed ‘residual deviance’ and relates to 
behaviours that unsettle more fundamental, unspoken agreements of normality, rules of 
normality which ensure security of comfort for those involved in a social encounter and 
context:  
The typical norm governing decency or reality, therefore, literally “goes without 
saying,” and its violations unthinkable for most of its members. (Scheff, 1966, p. 55) 
Scheff states that violation of these residual rules is easily identifiable – behaviours that fall 
outside the parameters of an essential (sociologically determined) ‘norm’.  But, without a 
clear category to be arranged into, unlike ‘crime, perversion, drunkenness, and bad 
manners’ (Scheff, 1966, p. 55) – categories depicted in Becker’s (1963) labelling theory, 
residual deviance falls into the fuzzy and blurred label of ‘mental illness’. More than a 
standard label, mental illness creates a messy and unpredictable framework, preventing 
consistent codification (a point that further highlights the lack of objective reality to 
psychiatric discourse).  
The most pronounced example of residual deviance, with clear violation of unspoken 
residual rules, occurs in those deemed schizophrenic. Reinforcing schizophrenia as the 
exemplar of ideological determined categorisation (and therefore its cultural and historical 
inconsistency) Scheff (1970) argues, 
[The] vagueness of the concept of schizophrenia suggests that it may serve as the 
residue of residues. (Scheff, 1970, p. 17) 
Schizophrenia once again is presented beyond a deficit model of mental illness, furthermore 
as a social construct. Scheff therefore produces a sociological theory encompassing the 
cause and lived experience of mental illness. Mental illness, exemplified in the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, is the product of deviating from, and continuing to exist beyond, socially 
prescribed norms. The judgement received for this deviance is enforced not only by society 
collectively, but by the individual themselves; I have crossed the lines of what is deemed 
acceptable, normal. The links between Scheff and Laing are not as tightly interwoven as with 
Szasz, but a thematic resemblance remains; mental illness is dependent upon culturally 
defined parameters of normality and not evidence of bodily illness.  
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Erving Goffman, Total Institutions ([1957]1961) 
A TOTAL institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a 
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable 
period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 11) 
Developing the article, ‘Total Institutions’ between its earliest presentation in1957 and its 
most prominent publication in 1961, Asylums, Erving Goffman, one of the century’s most 
revered sociological researchers, drew attention to how ‘total institutions’ shaped a sense of 
identity. He listed several examples of these institutions: care homes, prisons, military bases, 
spiritual retreats, but for our purposes its impact resonated most significantly with the 
residential psychiatric ward. A total institution, fused with the universal qualities of authority, 
control and inflexibility, was described as enacting a ‘mortification of the self’. The psychiatric 
ward being a total institution par excellence, ensures that what Goffman calls a ‘mortification’ 
process is enacted upon the patient (inmate).  
On an initial level, Goffman’s sociological insights for the total institution perform an 
intensified account of Becker’s Labelling Theory. However, whilst the environmental 
conditions certainly do amplify the severity of the label assigned, this is only part of the 
mortification process. The mortification of the self that occurs within a total environment 
involves two processes: a killing of the pre-diagnosed, pre-detained (sectioned) self, and 
secondly a re-birth defined by the psychiatric diagnosis / label. 
[The patient] begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and 
profanations of self. His self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 24) 
With a weakened or even destroyed sense of self, the subsequent step of assigning an 
adapted, socially acceptable, identity can occur – conforming to self-stigmatisation, a 
negative master status label is acquired. Musicki (2018), writing in Mad in America, states 
that the relevance of this theory remains as pertinent in the 21st century as it did in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.  
Laing and Goffman produce distinct theories, but a thematic overlap can be seen. Goffman 
is referenced by Laing in both The Divided Self (1960) and The Politics of Experience 
(1967). In the latter title, he goes beyond a general appreciation for his sociological 
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underpinning of mental illness, and acknowledges the credibility of Goffman’s research to 
identify the direct relationship between the context and behaviour of the person diagnosed.39 
Both appreciated the consequence a psychiatric diagnosis imposed upon identity, but where 
Goffman located this in the intensified occurrence within a total institution, armed with the 
same diagnosis / label Laing alluded to society itself being capable of systematically 
enacting an existential mortification of the self.  
Russell Barton, Institutional Neurosis (1959) 
Where Goffman provided a theory that compounded affects overlapping with labelling theory 
within the detrimental environmental conditions of the total institution, Russell Barton’s 
(1959) Institutional Neurosis, focussed on the latter in isolation.  
Institutional neurosis occurs when the original purposes of an institution are ignored, 
displaced by or subordinated to increasing preoccupation with the rituals or symbols 
of administration or wealth of that institution. (Barton, 1959, p. 75) 
Barton stated that the conditions of living in a psychiatric ward caused a form of mental 
illness. Reflecting the title of his book, he stated that institutional neurosis, was the product 
of a lack of nurturing within the ward environment, severed connections from the outside 
world – including losing friends and personal possessions – brutal and dominant staff, 
enforced idleness, overzealous drug medication, all accumulating into a general 
deterioration in perceptions of one’s own life prospects. The resultant mental illness echoed 
these conditions:  
This is a disease characterised by apathy, a lack of initiative, loss of interest, 
especially in things of an impersonal nature, submissiveness, apparent inability to 
make plans for the future, lack of individuality, and sometimes a characteristic 
posture and gait. (Barton, 1959, p. 76) 
Gregory Bateson, Palo Alto Group (1956 >) 
Gregory Bateson, more so than any other voice of resistance included in this chapter, plays 
a direct and structural role within Laing’s theory (this is addressed in detail in Chapter 12, 
 
39 In the 2017 Aldinetransaction Edition of Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates, Helmreich’s new introduction reaffirms the connection for Goffman and Laing, highlighting their 
similar aims to revolutionise our understanding of mental illness. 
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Interpersonal World). Bateson was the founding member of the Palo Alto group who were 
responsible for renewed thinking into psychotherapy. Drawing together eclectic research in 
cybernetics, zoology and anthropology, Bateson turned attention to the psychiatric field, and 
here made a significant impact (Bulle, 2008; Charlton, 2010). Focussing again on the most 
intense of psychiatric ‘disorders’, schizophrenia, Bateson and his research colleagues, 
stated that: 
[The schizophrenic] must live in a universe where the sequences of events are such 
that his unconventional communications habits will be in some sense appropriate. 
(Bateson et al., 1956, p. 253) 
The premise was simple, the ‘unconventional communication habits’ of the schizophrenic 
must make sense in their own world. Their hypothesis was ‘to identify key aspects of the 
communicational and interactional pattern in relation to which the schizophrenic’s own style 
of communication had been developed’ (Jones, 2012, p. 123). The primary communicational 
and interactional pattern identified is Bateson’s seminal contribution, the ‘double bind’ theory. 
The double bind describes a series of events, repetitively unfolding within an individual’s 
experiential context, creating a situation where they are damned if they do and damned if 
they don’t, they are caught within a reoccurring, emotionally charged, series of catch 22 
situations (Bateson et al., 1956).40 
Bateson’s theory preceded Laing and has been widely influential. Laing’s theory shares a 
heavy engagement with patterns of communication in interpersonal dynamics, and as with 
the others influenced by Bateson, Laing references Bateson directly, specifically the double 
bind theory, and this will be discussed throughout this thesis.  
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation (1965) 
Bookending our ‘ideological celebrities’, Michel Foucault provides a significant departure 
from the other voices of resistance discussed so far. If an argument can be made that Laing 
is the most well-known critic of psychiatry, Jones (2020, p. 24) states that ‘Foucault is 
perhaps the most influential critic of psychiatry’.  
 
40 it can’t be a coincidence that Hellier’s (1961) fictional book, Catch 22, was published shortly after Bateson’s 
double-bind gained such attention. 
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Madness and Civilisation41 was published in 1961 and an English translation in 1965.42 
Although Foucault’s focus on psychiatry was short-lived, this text being its primary instance, 
the essence of his insights reverberates through the entirety of his works and remain keenly 
felt in application to mental illness (Sheridan, 1980).  
We must try to return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which 
madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division 
itself. (Foucault, 1965, p. ix)  
Leaving aside the glaring contrast to Laing, in terminology if nothing else, Foucault’s 
comment in the preface provides the context by which his theory of psychiatry is formed. 
Through an historical analysis, Foucault passes by many of the same key influential thinkers 
(Pinel, Tuke, etc.,) used in the development of modern psychiatry earlier, and establishes a 
significantly different perspective to the rationale underpinning its formation.  
Foucault’s investigation examines a period that predates our own, but the turn of the 18th 
century retains emphasis as a crystalising moment in the role of modern psychiatry. 
Contradicting the trajectory of thought thus far, Foucault states that it is not science and 
humane treatment that stimulated the consolidation of modern psychiatry (Sheridan, 1980), 
but the necessity to seize ‘freedom and control’ through ‘knowledge and power’ (Rorty, 2002, 
p. 3). 
The reason for segregating the mad and other ‘social deviants’ from the rest of the 
population … was not … to do with a humanitarian concern … or medical attention … 
it was so these social deviants could be better controlled by the state. (Morrall, 2017, 
p. 32) 
Where once madness ebbed and flowed, undifferentiated within society,43 at the start of the 
Enlightenment and becoming more focussed at the time of Pinel and Tuke, madness was 
met with a distinct cleavage; there were those that were mad and those that were not. He 
argues that this was not the product of scientific progress as the trajectory of modern 
 
41 Its French title, Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie á l’âge Classique. 
42 An abridged version was published in French, 1963 and in English, 1967. The English title, A History of 
Madness. 
43 Those that were deemed mad were not always accepted and were often shunned from the community, 
driven into alternate means of existence. However, neither was madness deemed an absolute condition or 
reserved to certain individuals within the community, it could affect anyone, for a bout or a lifetime (Sheridan, 
1980). 
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psychiatry would have us believe, but rather an opportunity for the ‘tyranny of reason’ to 
preside over social deviance (Sheridan, 1980, p.12). Modern psychiatry established itself as 
an ideological tool to enforce ‘rational thought and behaviour from people’ (Jones, 2020, p. 
25), a means to ensure that civilisation would accept the rule of ‘reason’, a definition that 
favoured the powerful, and a demonstration that those who failed to engage in this practice 
could, and would, be punished. 
What we call psychiatric practice is a certain moral tactic contemporary with the end 
of the eighteenth century, preserved in the rites of asylum life, and overlaid by the 
myths of positivism. (Foucault, 1965, p. 276) 
The ‘fuzziness of psychiatric episteme’ (p. 34) provided the perfect discourse to ensure that 
‘the moral threat of the mad to the emerging bourgeoisie’ (Morrall, 2017, p. 64) could be 
controlled and the stratification of the emerging capitalist societies would be protected. In the 
process of dissecting madness and constructing its experience into ever more detailed 
categories of mental illness, the positivist charge which propelled modern psychiatry, 
tightened its grip as the perceived authority which instructs on rational modes of 
thinking/being. The ability to enforce this rational thought upon society, whilst most profound 
in psychiatry’s power to confine those deemed deviant – a power that remains today with the 
legal authority to section patients against their will, Sheridan (1980) also outlines how this 
ideology was reinforced through treatment strategies, including psychological therapy. (The 
ideological component of talking therapy will be discussed in the subsequent section 
primarily through the theory of Rose, however it should be remembered that Rose declares 
his Foucauldian influence throughout his works.)   
In his interviews with Mullan (1995, p. 204), although stating that he was the first to translate 
and publish Madness and Civilisation (World of Man series) with Tavistock Publications, 
Laing continued that ‘nothing I’ve written has been particularly influenced by Foucault’s 
sensibility’.44 For Foucault, much like Szasz, the function of social control inherent within 
modern psychiatry is a major propellant to his work, and this also reverberates throughout 
Laing’s theory.  
Ultimately, Foucault’s theory has proved greater in influence and longevity than Laing’s. 
Foucault’s impact can be attributed to its enduring political relevance (Parker, 2014) and the 
 
44 Laing adds a caveat to this statement that Foucault’s writing on the panopticon influenced his work in The 
Voice of Experience (1982). This book falls outside the research parameters of this thesis. 
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compounding nature of his theory – retaining theoretic continuity in applications with different 
social phenomena; his theory changed focus, but the insights gained in each of these areas 
continued to complement and positively reinvest in the overall theoretical structure of his 
work, this being highly evident in application to mental illness (Sheridan, 1980). These 
qualities are often perceived to be lacking in Laing (see Chapter 3, The Dividing Character). 
Arguably, Foucault’s analysis of psychiatry, the reason it came to be and the function it 
serves, remain as applicable to contemporary society as they did when they were published 
in 1961 (as Foucauldians such as Rose, 2019, continue to demonstrate).   
Each of the voices of resistance in this section help to illustrate a landscape of critical 
thought within and against psychiatry. Their individual positions may derive from different 
vantages, but they converge on the necessity to reconsider what constitutes mental illness, 
how we help those affected, and the role that psychiatry plays in their support and treatment 
– and oppression. Laing is shown in this section not to be the epicentre of critical thought on 
mental illness but, rather, one of several notable and influential theorists active during this 
time of consolidating psychiatric power (the formation of the DSM / ICD, increased 
neurobiological research, and the infancy of antipsychotic drugs etc). Laing’s theory overlaps 
and utilises aspects from these alternative theories, but likewise it remains independent and 
unique, as do the others. As this thesis develops, the individual qualification and uniqueness 
of Laing’s theory, against this backdrop of resistant voices, becomes more apparent and 
refined. What can be said is that the proposition of the mechanisation of the self, although 
compatible with aspects from several other thinkers, remains primarily and most vocally 
announced by Laing.  
Psychiatry Post Laing  
Looking beyond Laing’s arrival in the 1960s, two primary and contrasting means of treatment 
have dominated modern psychiatry, drug and talking therapy. In this section we do not focus 
on the efficacy of each treatment but how these contrasting interventions contribute to a 
theory of self, and without getting ahead of ourselves, promulgate a single, common 
trajectory within modern psychiatry.  
The Drug Revolution 
The drug revolution benefitted psychiatry in many ways: ideologically, professionally 
and financially. (Davies, 2013, p. 214) 
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As with most aspects of modern psychiatry, pinning down an exact moment that a drug 
revolution began is contestable. Drugs have been used in differing capacities for hundreds, if 
not thousands, of years, but we see a significant moment occurring within the vicinity of 
Laing’s arrival and continuing since.  
Joanna Moncrieff (2008) states that the 1960s marked a distinct shift in the ethos 
underpinning drug administration with mental illness, a shift that punctuated the beginnings 
of a drug revolution. Gitlin (1990) locates this earlier in the 1940s by highlighting the role of 
lithium research and development in first phase antipsychotics (neuroleptics) medication. 
Nonetheless, Gitlin and Moncrieff’s research support and converge with each other, outlining 
that drugs were previously seen as a means of mitigating the symptoms of mental illness, 
but following an intensified research, development, and administration process, drugs have 
been increasingly presented as possessing the capability to cure mental illness itself 
(Moncrieff, 2008).  
The drug revolution gained further momentum in the 1990s with the development of SSRIs 
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors), specifically targeting the treatment of depression. 
Instrumental in evolving the drug response from uplifting to curing, SSRIs negated many of 
the side effects associated with antipsychotics, particularly synonymous with the earlier 
phases, and became the poster-drug that ‘evidenced’ mental illness as caused by chemical 
imbalances within the brain, and therefore qualifying drugs as the golden ticket to rectifying 
this biochemical fault (Davies, 2013). 
The trajectory and intensity of drug research, and the voracity of treatment application, has 
developed in tandem with the intensification of neuroscientific research. This relationship has 
been instrumental in accelerating and concretising the brain as the focus of modern 
psychiatry (one could propose a realisation of Griesinger’s work). However, there is 
something of an anomaly with this relationship and the support they provide to each other 
(and the broader focus of modern psychiatry). To appreciate this anomaly, we must briefly 
venture into the efficacy underpinning drug treatment.  
It’s important to note that, as with antidepressants, there is no research confirming 
that antipsychotics fix any known brain abnormality or that they ‘rebalance’ brain 
chemistry to some optimal level. (Davies, 2013, p. 288) 
There is a clear discrepancy, contradiction even, at work here. Neurological research has 
failed to provide any conclusive evidence to support the notion that mental illness is caused 
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by chemical imbalances. Furthermore, the treatment of mental illness under this hypothesis 
of psychopharmacology is equally questionable. Rose (2019) states that short-term drug 
treatment may have some benefit, and Davies (2013) acknowledges this with antipsychotic 
drugs specifically – however both question the efficacy of prolonged use. Davies (2013) 
takes this further to state that drugs may even damage long-term mental health. Moncrief 
(2008) is perhaps the most direct in her book title, The Myth of the Chemical Cure, 
continuing that any benefits associated with drug treatment are derived from misdirection, 
positive results more likely a placebo effect (and / or a manipulation of subtle variables) and 
not rebalancing chemical imbalances.  
With the question of efficacy hanging over drug treatment, why is psychiatry so invested in 
its use? This brings us back to the quote introducing this section, whether we align with a 
positive or negative efficacy of drug treatment, the benefits of the drug revolution are 
unquestionably ideological, professional, and financial. ‘Big Pharma’ is the term given to the 
corporate propulsion of psychopharmacology, an external influence within modern psychiatry 
that performs a cyclic process underpinning and driving the drug treatment approach. 
Pharmaceutical companies not only design and distribute medical drugs, but they also 
finance the research which evidences their efficacy; a conflict of interest at best, a means to 
enact bias at worse, either way medication prescription has the potential to be guided by 
profit margins rather than health achievement. This influence also affects our political 
landscape, Big Pharma being both a product of, and an influence for, the neoliberal agenda 
– contributing to and reinforcing the individualisation of society. Through its influence ‘mental 
illness’ is scientifically pursued as an individual responsibility – or rather, any responsibility or 
even consideration attributed to the political structuring of society is nullified (see Davies, 
2013; Moncrieff, 2008; Bentall, 2009; Fisher, 2009; Watters, 2010); a consequence vividly 
illuminated in Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism (2009). As discussed earlier, an instance of 
the god-trick, fusing science and ideology within the structure of psychiatry.  
The point to emphasise is that the drug revolution has bolstered the ideology that mental 
illness is an illness, located in brain chemistry. Thus, the drug revolution is also the brain 
revolution. Professionally it provides perceived scientific rigour and authority to psychiatry. 
And financially, the profits attained as a result are staggering. All these benefits are 
achieved, even though the evidence to support efficacy is sketchy, if not corrupt. 
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Talking Therapy 
Various forms of psychotherapy predated psychoanalysis, but Sigmund Freud’s 
work offered a new form of therapeutic ‘talking cure’, which arguably shaped all 
subsequent forms of psychotherapy. (Marks, 2020, p. 79) 
Discussion of the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis has been limited to its contribution 
in the DSM I and II so far, however we must not overlook its importance as a therapeutic 
treatment. In the following chapters aspects of many psychoanalytic concepts are discussed 
to position Laing’s theory, but the emphasis here is specifically on two other talking 
therapies: the humanistic approach and cognitive therapy. Involvement for psychoanalysis, 
as a treatment for mental illness, started to dip as these other approaches established 
themselves. Marks (2020, p. 86) states that the fall from favour for psychoanalysis as a 
treatment intervention within mainstream psychiatry45 was due to a multitude of factors such 
as indefinite timeframes, cost implications, and perhaps most pertinently, the perception that 
its philosophical framework lacked a ‘scientific and experimental approach’. Without 
mentioning Kraepelin, Marks is essentially stating that psychoanalysis wasn’t falling in-line 
with the increasing medically scientific paradigm that modern psychiatry was set upon. 
Presented with competition from other talking therapies which better reflected these values, 
psychoanalysis lost its prestigious position.  
The humanistic tradition is exemplified by the work of Carl Rogers. Originally termed non-
directive therapy, as Rogers refined his therapeutic theory, it became known as the Person 
Centred Approach (PCA). The underlying hypothesis was that:  
Individuals have within themselves vast resources for self-understanding and for 
altering their self-concepts, basic attitudes, and self-directed behaviour; these 
resources can be tapped if a definable climate of facilitative psychological attitudes 
can be provided. (Rogers, 1980, p. 115) 
Rogers believed that a ‘self-actualising’ tendency, something akin to an innate drive, 
propelled an individual to fulfil the potential permitted within their environment. Promoting 
relationships of equality between therapist and client, and the creation of a therapeutic 
encounter embodying three core conditions, unconditional positive regard, congruence, and 
 
45 This statement does not reflect or include those undertaking psychoanalysis as a private therapeutic 
endeavour. 
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empathy, the PCA theorised that the individual could grow within the therapeutic encounter 
to overcome the causes of their mental distress (Merry, 1995).  
Following mainstream success within the broader treatment of mental illness from the 1960s, 
Rogers’ and PCA’s fate became reminiscent of psychoanalysis before it: 
lack of enthusiasm for empirical trials among the person-centred community had 
resulted in it being less influential in socialised healthcare and insurance-based 
services than cognitive and behavioural approaches. (Marks, 2020, p. 93) 
Modern psychiatry would appear to have reinforced its parameters for medicalised, 
scientistic, principles, by again clearing another nonconforming obstacle from its path. 
Although falling from favour within mainstream psychiatry, the fundamental tenets within 
PCA of optimism, client focus and environmental determinants, has had a wider influence, 
affecting policies beyond the clinic to promote mental health. This is particularly evident 
within the service user movement, which will be addressed shortly. Laing’s existential-
phenomenological theory is distinct from PCA; however, rejecting the biologised account of 
mental illness and promoting a client centred approach provides a point of intersect for both 
of these theories, and this commonality may establish a pathway by which Laing’s theory 
can (re)gain a footing within approaches to contemporary mental illness. 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is unquestionably the cornerstone of talking therapy 
within contemporary mental health treatment in the UK. The origin of CBT is located by 
Marks (2020) most directly in Behavioural Therapy (although acknowledging that some 
argue for roots as far back as 3rd century Stoicism). Emerging in the 1950s, building upon 
the classical conditioning of Ivan Pavlov,46 B.F. Skinner researched operant conditioning, the 
ability to modify behaviours by giving and/or withholding punishment and reward.  
For Skinner, it was important to focus attention on environmental factors because 
they can be directly observed and, if possible, changed, whereas internal conditions 
cannot be observed and altered directly. (Merry, 1995, p. 5) 
The development of the behavioural approach was positively received for many reasons. 
Focussing on the empirically observable, it played to the clinical process that Kraepelin 
established as a foundational component to psychiatry; furthermore, it advocated specific 
 
46 Conditioning dogs to salivate at the sound of a bell by associating the sound of the bell with food.  
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timeframes to achieve (perceived) scientific evidential outcomes. A significant departure 
from modern psychiatry, however, was that the mind (and so the brain), was deemed 
unimportant in the process of shaping behaviours that linked to psychic suffering.47 
Introducing the mind into this approach was the key to CBT establishing itself favourably 
within the structure of modern psychiatry.  
With a primary focus originally on the treatment of depression (and stretching far beyond in 
the current treatment landscape, NICE, 2011)  
[CBTs48] understanding of emotional disorders was built around the idea that 
depressive or anxious states were caused by a flaw in thought processing. (Marks, 
2020, p. 88) 
Beck and Ellis’s merger of cognitive approaches developed through the 1960s and 1970s, 
theorising the self as a computer; when the operating system is faulty, illness is experienced, 
the key to rectifying this fault, is to remap the operating system, the mind, through therapist 
led learning and conditioning.  
The main focus in CBT is eliciting the client’s appraisal of the events that trigger 
anxiety, and then changing the underlying faulty belief that is assumed to be 
maintaining the problem. (Clarke, 2020, p. 297) 
Starting with the person’s belief system, their cognitive processes, CBT emphasised the 
relationship an initial appraisal event had on determining detrimental ‘emotions, physical 
reactions and behaviours’ (Clarke, 2020, p. 295). Although initially focussed on anxiety, the 
formula of CBT is now extended to a far broader application in mental illness. Remapping of 
mental processes became the key to resolving mental illness, the mind was therefore 
brought back into focus, but couched within a mechanised discourse. 
CBT harnessed the empirically observable research techniques demonstrated within 
behavioural techniques, and by engaging fully with the NHS’s ‘gold standard’ of randomised 
 
47 Marks (2020) also notes that associations of Behavioural Therapy (and this continues to affect perceptions of 
CBT also) with brainwashing and coercion detrimentally affected its reputation. This is particularly important 
with its history of aversion therapy in homosexual conversion. 
48 This excerpt refers directly to the developers of CBT; Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis.  
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control research evidence, CBT asserted itself as the primary therapeutic approach within 
modern psychiatry.  
In 2008 the NHS implemented the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies program 
(IAPT). IAPT was proposed as one of the most ambitious initiatives within modern 
psychiatry, a commitment to provide sufficient resources to ensure that depression and 
anxiety (primarily, but not limited to) would not be consumed by psychopharmacology. This 
was not a rejection of the psychopharmacological approach, but rather a triage approach to 
mental illness; first, talking therapies would be prescribed and where unsuccessful, or more 
intense suffering experienced (suggesting a more ‘effective’ treatment required), 
psychopharmacological intervention – drug treatment – would be pursued in tandem or take 
over. 
Connected to the IAPT, the NICE (2011) Clinical Guidance document [CG123], section 1.2 
outlines that ‘a stepped-care model is used to organise the provision of services and to help 
people with common ‘mental disorders’. I will return to this quote in a moment, but looking at 
this stepped-care model, each of the named disorders draws on PCA and CBT (CBT most 
heavily) or, as highlighted by Marks (2020, p. 89), therapies that ‘take shelter under the 
umbrella’ of these approaches. The IAPT initiative is advertised as a positive development 
within 21st century mental health care (NICE, 2011); regarding questions posed for the help / 
harm dilemma of drug treatment, talking therapy reignites the pursuit for humane treatment. 
To a certain degree it also keeps the mind versus brain debate alive, this being more acute 
with the underlying theoretical premise of PCA rather than the computer mapping ethos for 
the brain within CBT.  
However, although an alternative to drug treatment, the outcome isn’t nearly as distinct with 
regards to the overarching theory for how we perceive the person, relating to Laing’s initial 
proposition.  
An influential critique of talking therapy and psychology more broadly is offered by Nikolas 
Rose (1985) in The Psychological Complex. Reverberating with a Foucauldian basis 
throughout, Rose states that psychology is limited in its ability to offer an original contribution 
to mental health because it allowed itself to be seduced and shaped by the perceived 
authority of scientific empiricism.  
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It was through attempts to diagnose, conceptualise and regulate pathologies of 
conduct that psychological knowledge and expertise first began to establish its claims 
for scientific credibility. (Rose, 1985, p. 226) 
Rose (1985) continues that the qualification of ‘scientistic credibility’ is baseless when the 
evidence of pathology is not defined by organistic illness but determined by culturally and 
historically prescribed norms.  
Health, for the psychology of the individual, is not so much life in the silence of the 
organs as life in the silence of the authorities. (Rose, 1985, p. 231) 
In a subsequent publication, Inventing Our Selves (1996), Rose extends the parameters of 
this theory to emphasise inclusion of psychiatry, psychotherapy, social psychiatry, and 
psychiatric nursing etc, under the term ‘psy-complex’. Through the multitudinous influences 
of a ‘psy-complex’ the self has become individualised, and thus shaped within the political 
powers which permeate within ‘psy’ discourse, whether they are through talking therapy, 
psychopharmacology, or any other ‘psy’ permutation.49 Encapsulating this strand of thought 
within the field of psychology, Parker (2014, p. 60) states:  
What psychology refuses to do is to step back and notice how its description of us as 
cognitive behavioural mechanisms is actually a function of capitalist society. (Italics 
added) 
Resonating with Foucauldian undertones, illustrated profoundly in the work of Rose (1985, 
1996, 2019), Parker (2014) starts to tie several components of this chapter together. He 
reaffirms the notion that ‘psy’(chiatry) was developed for social control and emphasises that 
what constitutes mental illness within psychology is no more than a politically prescribed set 
of ideologically desirable norms – which the scientistic aims of psychology have incurred a 
blindness toward. Furthermore, by determining ‘us as cognitive behavioural mechanisms’, 
deviance from the these politically prescribed norms, defined as ‘mental illness’, can be 
determined as an individual’s faulty operating system, a mind that is in need of remapping, 
much like a computer. ‘Psy’chiatry is the ultimate authority on what is normal and 
 
49 Throughout this thesis psychiatry has been used to encapsulate all services that operate within the 
medicalised approach and response to mental illness, therefore already encapsulating the breadth of 
permutations Rose connects under the ‘psy’ term. 
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acceptable, and ‘psy’chology possesses the ability to correct those that fall outwith these 
parameters. 
From a Laingian perspective, it might be argued therefore that this kind of talking therapy is 
no different than psychopharmacology, only packaged within a more humane wrapper.  
Talking therapy and IAPT are presented as beacons of hope within psychiatry, and in certain 
respects, they are. The potential harm of drug treatment is certainly lessened in the 
therapeutic realm.50 But like Rose, I believe an unquestioning faith in the good of talking 
therapy to be misdirected. The question that must be posed is whether talking therapies 
negate Laing’s (1960, p. 23) proposition against psychiatry that determines ‘man as a 
machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes’. This relates directly to the mind 
versus brain debate, the inference being that modern psychiatry’s emphasis on the brain is 
responsible for this reductive understanding of the self. However, fitting within a 
psychologising structure that views people as cognitive behavioural mechanisms, these 
talking therapies also contribute to the detrimental and reductive view of the self, specifically 
from a CBT position, but also within the wider premise of enforcing ideologically determined 
parameters of normality, ergo ‘mental health’. 
The greatest concern I have is that although talking therapies and the IAPT are designed to 
provide an alternative, reaching these services still requires passing through the medicalised 
system to access their service. This may be in the form of a telephone interview, and 
whether or not the person on the other end is a medical professional or not. As stated in the 
NICE (2011) guidance, IAPT is designed to ‘organise the provision of services and to help 
people with common mental health disorders’ (italics added) – so experiences are framed 
within a scientistic medicalised referential standard from the first point of contact. Even the 
stepped-care model is categorised as per the DSM / ICD diagnostic format.  
How then has the drug revolution and talking therapy post-Laing affected the value of his 
proposition? The drug revolution has undoubtably reinforced and concretised the reductive 
theory of a person as machine or an organismic system of it-processes; essentially a brain. 
Talking therapy unfortunately passes through the same process before such treatment can 
be undertaken (IAPT), and the monopoly of CBT and its therapeutic derivatives, incurs a 
similar, perhaps not quite so drastic, reductive theory of self. If we can negotiate this 
 
50 See Jarrett (2008) outlines a series of occasions whereby psychological and psychotherapeutic interventions 
can add further harm to those seeking help from their services.   
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medicalised framing that occurs from the outset of any engagement within mental health 
services, then perhaps the PCA is the approach that is least reductive in its theory of self – 
and this leads us directly into our final section, Service User Movement, a movement with a 
close relationship to the roots of Rogerian PCA.  
Service User Movement 
Taking their cue in the 1960s from the various civil rights and liberation movements, and 
overlapping with several influences, including the voices of resistance detailed before, gave 
rise to what has become the ‘service user movement’. The seeds of a service user 
movement have long existed but nourished by the activism and critical thinking of the 1960s 
and connecting with the ethos of Rogers’ Person Centred Approach (Marks, 2020), and 
aspects of Thomas Szasz’s theory (Rose, 2019), an informal ‘organisation’ developed as 
patients gravitated toward its banner.  
The service-user movement is not one unified group of activists. It is a collective 
name for a multitude of groups and individuals who have, over the years, tried to 
improve care and treatment towards those who have become too distressed or 
overwhelmed to function. (Lomani, 2020, pp. 50 – 51) 
As the name suggests, the service user movement was created by, and for, those at the 
receiving end of psychiatry. Differing names are favoured by different factions and groups of 
the movement, but the essence of their message was ultimately the same – to empower 
those most maligned within the psychiatric system, providing a platform for their silenced 
voices to be heard and respected.  
In the 1980s the service user movement gathered significant momentum. Armed with 
renewed interest in the writings of Foucault, the publication of Discipline and Punish (1977) – 
specifically its work on surveillance and control resonating with the existing support service 
user groups had already found in Madness and Civilisation – felt all the more relevant as a 
drastic political shift (capitalism to neoliberalism) was developing within 1980’s British society 
(Parker, 2014). Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government simultaneously cut funding 
for mental health with one hand and established community-based mental health teams with 
the other. Those dependent on the resources of mental health care were facing an 
unprecedented time of change and reduced provision. The destruction of mental health 
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services was enormous, and the service user movement responded but could never do so 
on the scale required.  
[T]he voice of the patient began to achieve a certain limited legitimacy: no longer 
merely heard as a symptom, provided it was expressed rationally and constructively 
and without too much passion, the voices of users of psychiatric services now were 
seen as essential elements in the management of a mental health system. (Rose, 
2019, p.158) 
The service user movement was not a single, linear, unified group, and their separate cells 
responded to the development of the 1980s in disparate ways, and this reinforced a 
structural, internal division; those that wanted to ‘improve existing mental health services’ – 
working with psychiatry, and ‘those who wish to dismantle these services’ – working against 
psychiatry (Lomani, 2020, p. 52). The argument over which side to fall on continues to affect 
the structure of the service user movement.  
Working with psychiatry has led to important changes in policy and areas of activism being 
formally integrated into the system (Peer Support, etc). However, this close relationship 
always risks ‘assimilation and co-option’, the radical nature of the movement becomes 
sterilised and subsequently neutralised within the dominant force of the system, in this case 
psychiatry (Lomani, 2020). Burstow (2014, p. 43) reminds us that ‘psychiatry only has the 
power it does because it is an extension of the state, is part of the apparatus of the state’; a 
reminder of Foucault and Rose’s warning that the system of psychiatry should never be 
underestimated, hence those that refuse to work with and actively choose to work against 
psychiatry. 
Testifying to the success and respect achieved by the service user movement through this 
period and building prominently since 1996, we are now at stage that policy level 
engagement is required with these groups throughout the mental health arena. Ensuring 
engagement with those they aim to help is a pre-requisite to achieve any funding request 
(see INVOLVE, 2012). Whilst this is a positive, we must consider the potential for 
assimilation and co-option to distort any radical potential, and this is why there are groups 
that continue to advocate the necessity to operate against psychiatry.  
Lomani (2020) offers personal insight into the catch 22 of the against psychiatry camp within 
21st century UK culture. Rejecting psychiatric diagnosis, deeming its scientific authority as 
baseless, a position reflected in many service user movement groups, Lomani states that 
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after the financial crisis of 2008, austerity measures had a significant impact on those who 
relied on support to manage their psychic suffering. The problem was, as the government 
purse strings were tightened on mental health services, the parameters by which one was 
deemed eligible for support became more restricted – and a registered diagnosis of ‘mental 
illness’ or disorder became non-negotiable to access support.  
Whilst not framed within a Foucauldian lens, post-2008 seems to have been a perfect 
opportunity for the government to refine the mechanism that created the cleavage between 
those who are good citizens and those that are not. A chance to recapture the stragglers 
attempting to escape the rightful and scientific determination of psychiatry and as such, 
define their resistance and deviance as belonging to those with a mechanical or organismic 
system defect within their brain. But the fight goes on, and the multitudinous factions of the 
service user movement refuse to go away, challenging those ‘norms’ enforced upon them, 
and advocating the value of their own experience to inform better practice.   
Service-user researchers tend to value lived experience over traditional academic 
research values such as positivism, objectivity and neutrality. This poses a threat to 
mainstream academia and inevitably disrupts the status quo within these settings. 
(Lomani, 2020, p. 63) 
In the previous sections the proposition underpinning Laing’s theory is presented as 
refreshing the longstanding brain versus the mind debate at a pivotal moment in the 
evolution of modern psychiatry, articulating a unique voice within a crowd of contemporaries; 
and arguably retaining value in today’s psychiatry as during the 1960s. However, the 
achievements of the service user movement provide a different context and consideration for 
Laing’s work, to ask whether Laing’s proposition complements or contrasts with the broad 
ethos of the service user movement.  
My immediate reaction is to passionately advocate Laing’s theory as a potential ally of the 
service user movement. The notion of ‘experts by experience’ is a key element of their 
movement and this ethos rings equally as true with Laing’s theory, reverberating most 
prominently within The Politics of Experience (1967) and undertaking a central part in the 
structural organisation of the experimental community, Kingsley Hall.  
We respect the voyager, the explorer, the climber, the spaceman. It makes far more 
sense to me as a valid project – indeed, as a desperately urgently required project of 
our time, to explore the inner space and time of consciousness. (Laing, 1967, p. 105)  
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The aim of abdicating professional / patient status at the door of Kingsley Hall is a romantic 
thought but fails to really account for the ingrained social constructs Becker’s Labelling 
theory draws to attention or indeed the reality of Kingsley Hall. Furthermore, however well-
meant was Laing’s intention to recognise and elevate the premise of previous sufferers to 
the role of experiential guides, although his work and theory was developed apparently 
within a shared and mutually respectful dynamic, I see no acknowledgement or recognition 
of the part played by these people: their names certainly do not adorn the spines of his 
books. In practice we can say that Laing failed to share the limelight. His theory rendered the 
voice of the insane ‘intelligible’, but he continued to speak on their behalf. This lack of 
empowerment stands in contrast with the aims of the service user movement.  
If we direct attention to the theory and not the person however, a potential connection could 
exist with specific aspects of the service user movement.  
The psychiatric user / survivor movement has offered a more fundamental challenge 
to the power of psychiatry, not only because of the criticisms that it, along with many 
others, has made of the claims to objective knowledge of ‘mental disorder’ and 
effective treatments for it, not only because of its well-founded criticisms of the actual 
practices of care experienced by those living under a psychiatric diagnosis, but also 
because of its articulation of alternative forms of knowledge of mental distress, linked 
to alternative modes of intervention and support for those experiencing profound 
crisis in their lives. (Rose, 2019, p. 172) 
This extended quote is important because it captures in summary many of the principal 
components uniting the breadth of the service user movement. It also highlights that within 
certain quarters, particularly those groups that operate against psychiatry, campaigns are 
present to create a new episteme of psychiatry, alternative forms of knowledge beyond a 
deficit model of mental health. The desire to consider a whole new episteme of psychic 
suffering is something to which Laing’s theory could be a useful ally.   
The overarching message within this aspect of the movement mirrors Laing’s proposition: 
the discourse of psychiatry, its positivist, empirical scientistic parameters, enacts a violence 
upon those it comes to define. Psychiatry, for Laing as well as the service user movement, 
has indeed come to define persons as a ‘machine or man as an organismic system of it-
processes’ (Laing, 1960, p. 23). For those pursuing a new discourse that avoids these 
established pitfalls, Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology and its rationale to 
embrace the experience of the sufferer, could be an asset.  
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What becomes apparent from the discussion in this chapter is the continuing relevance of 
the proposition that Laing asserts to underpin his theory, the statement that psychiatry ‘falls 
into an account of man as a machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes’ 
(Laing, 1960, p. 23). Whilst it may not be unique within the history of the mind versus the 
brain debate, Laing realised its importance and drew attention to it at a critical juncture within 
the evolution of psychiatry. Furthermore, he provided a methodology to avoid its damaging 
consequence. With the trajectory of psychiatry continuing to reaffirm and concretise this 
perspective toward a theory of self, and the service user movement actively seeking means 
of reconsidering the epistemology of ‘mental illness’, the existential-phenomenological theory 
Laing advocates may prove useful. Considering this possibility is part of the concern of this 
thesis.  
Summary 
Part 1. Introduction has prepared the ground to move forward with an in-depth analysis of 
Laing’s theory, establishing areas of compatibility and contrast that exist within contemporary 
culture as well as highlighting prominent causes responsible for the controversy that 
misdirects approaches to his theory. It has identified a function for Laing within contemporary 
culture and modern psychiatry, the pressing necessity to consider alternate means of 
addressing ‘mental health’ as well as removing unnecessary debris from our path in 
differentiating Laing’s personality from his written theory. Collectively, this has prepared the 
ground to begin the construction of a Laingian framework. We now move into Part 2: The 
Return to Philosophy; this is where the methodology of this thesis is applied in detail and a 
conceptual analysis begins, identifying the building blocks of theory as they are developed 




Part 2. The Return to Philosophy 
In the following two chapters, we apply a concept analysis to Laing’s use of existential-
phenomenology, creating a framework for his methodology (Chapter 5, A Laingian 
Methodology) and self-formation (Chapter 6, Self-Formation). These chapters develop a 
series of concepts that produce the foundation for theory application moving forward. Laing 
does not represent his theory in this format; however, presenting it in this way makes it 
possible to address criticisms, develop structural integrity and draw out a theory of self and 
examine in detail existential-phenomenology: the philosophy that encapsulates all of Laing’s 
work.  
Two critiques play a substantial role in the format for the entirety of Part 2: Sedgwick’s 
(1982) accusation that Laing’s theory suffered from structural instability and Mitchell’s (1974) 
claim that beyond the poetic form and prose, a defined theoretic structure is absent. 
Sedgwick argued that Laing’s theory collapsed once any one aspect was pursued in detail. I 
argue that structural integrity, in any form, is compromised when any one variable is overly 
stressed, especially if this is not an anticipated force and the structure is not designed to 
cater to its load.  
These critical perspectives have been instrumental in the selection of a concept analysis 
methodology in this thesis. In analysing the concepts that construct Laing’s theory within 
each of these chapters, this research will respond to Mitchell’s demand for greater 
theoretical clarity and develop and reinforce Sedgwick’s requirement for increased structural 
integrity. Addressing both critiques, a methodological framework and theory of self-formation 
will be designed using his theory; where necessary, this includes revisiting his influences, 
constructed to fulfil Laing’s overarching premise as succinctly stated by Howarth-Williams 
(1977) as intelligibility. Through this methodological process, I establish and interweave 
concepts within a Laingian theory capable of withholding integrity when its design purpose is 
identified and subsequently honoured. 
Before delving into these structural aspects in the next two chapters, I want first to reinforce 
the justification for Laing’s theory to be considered as a return to philosophy, specifically to 
existential-phenomenology. This inevitably intersects with numerous secondary sources that 
argue for a psychoanalytic interpretation to be considered as more influential within Laing’s 
thinking.  
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We are so estranged from the inner world that there are many arguing it does not 
exist. (Laing, 1967, p. 46) 
Laing’s application of philosophy quite simply responds to this sorry situation. Arguing that a 
totality of Being involves valuing both inner and outer experience, he provides us with the 
tools, an existential-phenomenological methodology, that enables us to engage with the 
overlooked or dismissed experience of the inner world: an experience forgotten in the default 
medical approach to understanding the self.  
Cautious philosophers might refer to the rise of ‘existential phenomenology’ or even 
‘phenomenological existentialism’ but to the broader public it was simply the vogue of 
‘existentialism’. (Lawlor, 2010, p. 75) 
Laing (1960) clearly designates his methodological approach as ‘existential-
phenomenology'; however, increasingly this is reduced to the singular term of existentialism 
– other than when he references phenomenology in isolation. Whilst this may reflect Lawlor’s 
insight to a certain degree, it is also proposed that this is an acknowledgement of the 
balance of weight invested in existentialism within Laing’s theory. Other than Chapter 5, A 
Laingian Methodology in which the analysis deconstructs each philosophical contribution, 
subsequent references to existentialism are designed to reflect the dominance of this 
approach within his methodology.   
Many people account much of Laing’s success to a 'coincidence of a multitude of factors, 
including the right message at the most opportune time’ (Guy Thompson, 2015, p. 1). 
Laing’s political affiliation was undoubtably well managed, as I will discuss, but to suggest 
that Laing capitalised on nothing more than an open door of convenient timing regarding the 
application of existential-phenomenology within his theory, both undervalues and discredits 
his achievement. Existentialism was far from a fashionable theory when Laing launched onto 
the medical and counterculture scene (Sedgewick, 1982). Peaks and troughs of interest had 
occurred since the Second World War but by 1960, it had already been cast aside and was 
certainly not hip at the time when Laing re-introduced it (Lawlor, 2010). Laing’s ability to 
justify attention toward this already dusty theory warrants more credit than simply 
convenience; its success was testament to his capability as a theorist to make it relevant 
again (and one could also say the charisma of his person to deliver it). 
Whilst the centrality of existentialist theory (including phenomenology) is declared from the 
outset in Laing’s theory, there is a constant echo or shadow within his theory that people 
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account to psychoanalysis, often stating that it is more prominent and influential than Laing 
himself would admit. This influence will be addressed specifically at several junctures within 
this thesis; however, considering the constancy for the claim of psychoanalysis to be 
considered a significant influence within Laing’s theory, and the disruptive impact this has 
upon the value of Laing’s declared existential-phenomenological methodology, consideration 
of the broader context of psychoanalysis within Laing’s theory is discussed next. 
This association with psychoanalytic thought, in part, must be attributed to Laing’s 
involvement with the Tavistock Clinic, a psychoanalytic institute where he began 
employment and psychoanalytic training in 1956, leaving in 1962 (Clay, 1996). Appreciating 
both Laing’s relationship with this institution and its theoretical basis provides a grounding to 
establish the influence of more specific concepts as we progress. Laing’s psychoanalytic 
training here was blighted with questions regarding the stability of ‘Ronnie’s’ personality and 
his unconventional approach to psychoanalysis. However, following the written support of 
Rycroft, Milner and Winnicott, the establishment eventually approved his qualification (Laing, 
A. 2006; Burston, 1996; Beveridge, 2011) and in 1960 he was ‘enrolled as a qualified 
psychoanalyst with the Institute of Psychoanalysis’ (rdlaingofficial.com). This support 
evidenced how Laing was highly versed and knowledgeable in psychoanalysis although the 
reluctance of some to approve his qualification was also an early indicator of his penchant to 
resist authority and question its validity.  
We see his most overt engagement with psychoanalytic theory in the Self and Others (1961) 
but even so, this is primarily used to outline and contrast his own unique theoretical 
approach. Footnotes throughout Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), are also peppered 
with additional psychoanalytic concepts51; however, rather than engage with their assertions, 
he includes them to reinforce the claim that this is not the direction of his study, seemingly a 
nod to his capacity to use or discard them. His affiliation with the Tavistock during the writing 
of these titles specifically could be argued as something of a bias, his involvement requiring 
an acknowledgement from the establishment (Guy Thompson, 2000): a point discussed 
further as we address Laing’s relationship to Freud. But it appears more likely that Laing 
realised the symbolic capital associated with his ability to wield this theory, more so due to 
the status he was afforded by identifying personally as a ‘psychoanalyst’. Several of his book 
 
51 Highlighting the potential for psychoanalytic theory to expound the case of Maya Abbot, Laing and Esterson 
add the footnote: 
Although it is beyond the self-imposed limitation of our particular focus in this book to discuss these 
aspects, the reader should not suppose that we wish to minimise the person’s action on himself (what 
psychoanalysts usually call defence mechanisms), particularly in respect of sexual feelings aroused 
towards family members, that is, in respect of incest. (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 42)  
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jackets proudly declare this qualification and we see its value to him most poignantly in the 
1989 documentary Did you used to be R.D. Laing. His playful persona being used to 
proclaim superior parental knowledge in opposition to that of the education system, Laing 
punctuates his authority by stating ‘if I was a psychoanalyst – which I am’.52 The inference 
here being that this qualification trumped any other.  
Psychoanalytic theory, whether he liked it or not, was a significant theoretical benchmark 
within psychiatry during this era, heavily influential within the American psychiatric scene. 
Thus the development of the DSM I and DSM II (Regier et al., 2013; Fulford and Sartorius, 
2009) and, by proxy, cross fertilisation between the DSM / ICD (Tryer, 2014) (although it was 
the ICD which was more prevalent in the UK) as well as the disproportionate global influence 
wielded by America within all western medicine (Watters, 2010), not ignoring the status of 
the Tavistock, meant that this was a theory that required acknowledgement. I suggest that 
Laing used this theory as a contextual backdrop by which to locate his unique existential-
phenomenological methodology and he also clearly used the status it afforded to imbue his 
own alternative approach with greater symbolic capital. 
There was also a strategic element to Laing’s involvement with psychoanalysis and this 
becomes most evident with his approach to Freud.  
The greatest psychopathologist was Freud. Freud was a hero. He descended to the 
‘Underworld’ and met there stark terrors …We who follow Freud have the benefit of 
the knowledge he brought back with him and conveyed to us. (Laing, 1960, p. 25) 
Laing reinforces a positive status for psychoanalytic theory, elevating the reputation of its 
forefather. However, in contrast to this one-dimensional public praise written in The Divided 
Self, we see a more complicated relationship toward Freud’s theory in intimate and private 
notes written between 1952– 53:  
Freud is still the great man but more and more ‘the imbecile of genius’ to me. Those 
ghostly hydraulics of the psyche! Mechanism. 19th [century] materialism translated 
into ‘mental’ terms. (Laing 1952/1953 cited in Beveridge, 2011, p. 71)  
This criticism alone does not usurp the respect shown for Freud but it places a question 
mark against the unequivocal praise previously stated. Within the context of the further 
 
52 Located 1hr 12mins 20 seconds. 
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criticisms, a level of disdain becomes apparent, rumbling beneath the surface toward Freud 
himself. In an interview with David Lunt, toward the end of his life, this undercurrent bubbles 
over:  
Certainly Freud has achieved more than I have so far, it seems. At a certain level 
there’s a limitation in Freud’s overall vision, however finely he’s filled out the edges of 
his vision with his own sensibility, in a form that will flow on to the twenty-first century. 
He’s got a limitation of vision that I feel I’ve got an edge on. (Laing cited in Lund, 
1990, p. 103) 
In contrast to Freud, the target by which this is reasoned, Laing asserts his own theory to 
hold more potential than is acknowledged. As this sentiment becomes increasingly apparent, 
so too does the rigour with which he cuts out the influence of psychoanalysis within his 
theory. With a broad sweep of the sword, when reflecting on his entire career, Laing 
summarised: 
I was never imbued with any Tavistock concepts. I never started using, in their 
manner, their idea of it [theory]. I was never a convert. (Mullan, 1995, p. 318)  
Laing’s relationship to Freud, the Tavistock and psychoanalysis, is complex and ascertaining 
a definitive stance beyond the detail available is hard. However, we can say that there was 
an advantage to positioning his theory within the established context, possibly a need to 
acknowledge his employer within these earlier publications, and it is difficult to avoid the 
proposition that his public praise and private condemnation of Freud was a calculated 
strategy, designed to extract maximal symbolic capital – a strategy in which, as Adrian Laing 
(1995) in the biography of his father states, he was more than proficient. With consideration 
of all these factors, the statement offered by Kirsner is imbued with far more than a brief 
compliment:    
Laing did for the psychotic what Freud did for the neurotic. (Kirsner, 2015, p. 70) 
Experience is the concept that separates and justifies Laing’s methodology as distinct from 
psychoanalysis, and the importance of this concept is realised in the following chapters. His 
entire existential-phenomenological approach is geared to ascertain intelligibility of 
experience, universally: a proclamation that suggested a victory over Freud (Guy Thompson, 
2000). Until Laing, arguably a general consensus was that those suffering from psychosis 
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were beyond therapeutic help53 and not even Freud could decipher its condition – a position 
shared by Martin Buber and Carl Rogers. The basis for this rejection was the ‘lack of 
capacity for transference, and, by implication, for relatedness to others’ (Burston, 1996, p. 
201). 
Kirsner (1976. p. 124) makes an insightful observation that Laing’s theory was ‘no crusade 
against psychoanalysis ’,  continuing that The Divided Self abounds with psychoanalytic 
insights deriving from the ‘English School’. I agree that Laing makes no seismic gesture 
against psychoanalysis in his publications but quite the opposite as his work is respectful 
albeit presented as a contrast. But this respectful gesture has inadvertently invited 
psychoanalytic connections to his theory, specifically where vagueness remains. The 
suggestion that his theory is ‘bound with psychoanalytic insights’ I find more problematic. 
Aspects of Laing’s theory can be interpreted within a psychoanalytic lens, sometimes 
offering a wider context and assisting in analytic depth and, where relevant, these will be 
highlighted. Laing (1967, p. 44) himself takes this stance in The Politics of Experience, 
stating that object-relations theories ‘go some way’ to explaining certain aspects of his 
approach (Chapter 7, An Empirical Concept). But most importantly, he qualifies this inclusion 
further by reinforcing the unrestricted capability of existentialism.  
As will be discussed, Laing’s methodology is unique; it was through his embracing a 
philosophical concept of persons that he was able to achieve this elusive relatedness with 
the sufferer and thus discover value within a previously deemed incoherent world of 
psychotic experience.  
Undoubtedly, psychoanalytic elements can be overlaid upon Laing’s theory, assisting with 
context and even offering some influence; where applicable, this will be highlighted. 
However, when you are holding a hammer, everything looks like a nail – the world was 
already holding Freud, the Tavistock and psychoanalysis; its influence was always going be 
felt, especially where vagueness exists. What this early overview demonstrates is the 
necessity for caution when filling theoretic voids with an unquestioned application of 
psychoanalysis. In the following two chapters, I examine Laing’s theory, exposing where 
gaps and vagueness remain, but rather than seeking support from a more prominent 
 
53 Writing at the same time as Laing, Rosenfeld was also developing Kleinian concepts to offer inroads into 
understanding the psychotic experience. A collection of written essays by Rosenfeld between 1946 – 1964 was 
published in 1965 under the title Psychotic States: A Psychoanalytic Approach. 
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discourse (as psychoanalysis has historically), I attend to the finer detail of his wider theory 




5. A Laingian Methodology 
One of the most difficult philosophies was brought to bear on one of the most baffling 
of mental conditions, in a manner which, somewhat surprisingly, helped to clarify 
both. (Sedgwick, 1982, p. 74)  
Reinforcing the significance of this statement, Peter Sedgwick, one of Laing’s staunchest 
critics, commends Laing’s philosophic understanding and application within the 1960 
publication The Divided Self. Throughout his career, Laing produced a medical theory 
grounded in philosophy which stood in stark contrast to the prevalent scientific discourse. 
The Divided Self is the best-known of his works in articulating this philosophic grounding; 
however, themes of an existential-phenomenological nature are evident throughout his 
career, even preceding this most seminal piece. In the infancy of his career, 1953, Laing 
wrote a vignette titled ‘Nan’, named after a patient within a poignant case study. In this piece, 
Laing highlights the importance of embracing the entire experience of a young woman’s 
(Nan) arduous recovery from a prolonged coma and hypothesises how interactions helped 
shape the significant change in personality from her ‘premorbid personality’ (Burston, 1996). 
This early article was a sign of things to come, embodying all the philosophic components 
that structured the methodological framework for The Divided Self. This unorthodox 
approach to a philosophical application to psychiatry is rooted in the humanities-centred 
grammar school education he received (Clay, 1996; Laing, 1985) and although this 
schooling made ‘acquiring the scientific habitus of the medical profession’ more difficult 
(Crossley, 1998, p. 881), it provided Laing with a unique set of skills to assert his identity and 
ensure his human focussed theory could be translated into this well-established domain. 
These were also skills that combined and complemented the political and cultural 
environment of that time which are concepts discussed later.  
The Divided Self provides the most rigorous description of his methodology and existential-
phenomenological position (Sedgwick, 1982; Kotowicz, 1997; Crossley, 1998). In this book, 
Laing (1960) rejected the medical framework of the 1950s that was increasingly taking hold 
in the 1960s. Echoing the Cartesian model of dualism, he produced a unique and ground-
breaking approach, discrediting an unnatural mind/body division and instead advocating a 
theory to accept and address the individual as an entire organism.  
[A]n inhuman theory will inevitably lead to inhuman consequences. (Laing, 1967, p. 
45) 
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He referred to psychiatry and the medical profession as a ‘science of alienated ‘normality’’ 
(Kotowicz, 1997, p. 67). Divorced from the essence of Being, these professions and the 
knowledge frameworks they applied were not only incapable of bringing about true 
knowledge of self but enacted a form of violence and damage to the individual.54 The 
centrality of this component throughout Laingian theory is supported through the quotation 
above extracted from Politics of Experience (1967). Laing (1960, p. 20) stated conclusively 
that to gain true knowledge and understanding of the mind, we must embrace it within its 
totality: to look at the person as a unitary whole, a ‘being-in-the-world’. This perspective 
would, in turn, drastically change and enhance the levels of understanding previously 
acquired through the medicalised model. 
Only this approach would bring about true knowledge of the self and uncover the 
‘intelligibility’ (as stated by Howarth-Williams, 1977) of experience too often attributed to a 
reductionist allocation of the mind, psyche, or worse still – brain. To undertake this revision, 
to embrace the being-in-the-world and to achieve intelligibility, would require a methodology 
that turned to the philosophy of existential-phenomenology. 
Existential phenomenology attempts to characterise the nature of a person’s 
experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe 
particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the 
context of his whole being-in-his world. (Laing, 1960, p. 17)  
Phenomenology and existentialism are bracketed within the continental philosophy tradition, 
a movement conceived in the late eighteenth century. Originating from within the European 
boundary, continental philosophy tasked itself with being more ‘attentive to the world of 
experience and less focussed on a rigorous analysis of concepts or linguistic usage’ (Lawlor, 
2010, p. vii).55 Frequently, existentialism is qualified as a product of phenomenological 
enquiry, hence the cross fertilisation from notable thinkers such as Sartre, Heidegger, etc., 
philosophers who associated with both traditions (Lawlor, 2010). Even though this is not a 
universal position, as illustrated through the work of Husserl who applied phenomenological 
enquiry without arriving at existentialist thought (Collier, 1977),56 this direct and 
 
54 This is discussed later 
55 Within some circles the parameters defining continental philosophy are contested (Lawlor, 2010).  
56 To complicate matters further, the term ‘existentialism’ is frequently used to include phenomenology (Lawlor, 
2010). This research will use the characters assigned to each in the subsections to differentiate when the 
umbrella term of ‘existentialism’ is used in this fashion.   
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uncomplicated relationship held between phenomenology and existentialism helps to ground 
Laing’s unique approach.   
The fundamental tenet of Laing’s existential-phenomenological approach is that it promotes 
an engagement with the ‘experiential-gestalts’ of the person: to view, in their connection, the 
arrangement of parts within a given moment, to set all particular experiences within the 
context of his whole being-in-the-world. Importantly, this does not prioritise or reduce a 
conception of self to either/or, inner/outer, in any capacity, it embraces the totality of 
experience. Laing summarised this as ‘seeing the world through another person’s eye’s’ 
(Laing cited in Collier, 1977, p. 23). Laing draws on established philosophers operating in 
both philosophic fields, all of whom hold common and/or complementary theoretical 
characteristics; he clearly advocates the insightfulness of both named philosophies and their 
adopted collective methodology but his own application includes adaptations which create a 
unique methodological approach (Collier, 1977).  
Laing’s application of philosophical influences, although widely received as positive (see 
Sedgwick, 1982), is in no way classical or traditionalist and, as a result, incurs limitations and 
critical reviews from those situated more firmly within the philosophy world (Collier, 1977; 
Howarth-Williams, 1977; Deurzen, 2010). This has an impact on how to define and therefore 
understand Laing’s methodology. Laing’s focus was first and foremost toward the experience 
and behaviours associated with schizophrenia and therefore his niche application involved 
selecting relevant philosophical components to build a methodology which would aid the 
pursuit of intelligibility within this previously incoherent world (Guy Thompson, 2000). Laing 
was always clear that it was not his aim to produce a philosophically pure body of work and 
we must remember that he is selecting tools and concepts which facilitate the greatest 
insight to his focus of enquiry.57 This undoubtedly incurred significant limitations but it is the 
purpose of this chapter to identify the conceptual aspects that provide a solid foundation and 
fill in any gaps (gaps which invite confusion or a misapplication of convenient theories rather 
than accurate theories) in order to substantiate a methodology that can confront and answer 
these criticisms and ultimately bear the strain of application in the contemporary setting.  
The following sub-sections will explore the philosophical disciplines, existentialism and 
phenomenology, and analyse how they influence Laing’s theory. It will look collectively at the 
totality of Laing’s theory within the first phase of publication (1960 – 70) and identify the 
primary components which can be drawn together to illustrate Laing’s existential-
 
57 This is discussed in more depth later. 
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phenomenological methodology. This will not be an exhaustive account of existentialism, 
phenomenology, or existential-phenomenology. Nor will it be a theoretical history of each 
philosopher Laing involves. The focus will be a history of the ideas which informed Laing’s 
existential-phenomenological methodology, identifying the primary components that 
constitute his methodology. Although not restricted to The Divided Self, this book provides 
the most sizeable and significant proportion of the material for this framework.  
Existentialism 
Only existential thought has attempted to match the original experience of oneself in 
relationship to others in one’s world by a term that reflects this totality. Thus, 
existentially, the concretum is seen as man’s existence, his being-in-the-world. 
(Laing, 1960, p. 19) 
Laing’s reverence for the existential tradition is consistent throughout his career, evident in 
his first solo publication in 1960 and reaffirmed in one of his final interviews in 1988 (Mullan, 
1995).58 In the above quotation taken from The Divided Self, Laing outlines the overarching 
influence of existentialism within his existential-phenomenological methodology: the totality 
of experience.59 He states that the essence of a person’s existence is no different from their 
full experience of that existence. Essentially, and crucially, the totality of experience is 
everything; it is the fact of our being-in-the-world.  
As Laing continues, he gives us further insight into what he means by the ‘totality of 
experience’: 
we should be able to think of the individual man as well as to experience him neither 
as a thing nor as an organism but as a person. (Laing, 1960, p. 22) 
Illustrated against the prevalent medical model, a model continuing to this day, Laing stated 
that it is through embracing the individual’s experience of the world, the ‘experiential 
gestalts’, that we gain true knowledge of their person. This was presented in stark contrast to 
 
58 This unwavering respect toward the existential, and phenomenological, philosophers, none more so than 
Sartre, is somewhat unusual for Laing. Laing frequently and brazenly dismisses the status of his peers (see 
Beveridge, 2010; Clay, 1996), and this becomes particularly apparent in his reflective interviews with Mullan 
(1995) as he critically discusses previous colleagues and influences throughout his career. Existential philosophy 
and the theorists within it remain held in high regard. 
59 There is the additional aspect of ‘experience of oneself in relationship to others’; it will be addressed in the 
subsequent chapter, Self Formation.  
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the scientific model forcefully trying to fit the individual to an objective model which insists on 
reducing the person to an organism, a collection of isolated components.  
Highlighting the influence of Sartre,60 we can see where the aspect of totality combines with 
experience to ensure Laing’s ambitions for a more complete knowledge of the person are 
achieved.  
If we admit that the person is a totality, we cannot hope to reconstruct him by an 
addition or by an organisation of the diverse tendencies which we have empirically 
discovered in him. (Sartre, 1953, p. 33)  
Laing all but paraphrases this exact example in The Divided Self. Without dismissing the 
types of specific knowledge gained through empirical, objective research on isolated 
components, Laing uses the example of ‘Humpty Dumpty’ to communicate that no matter 
which scientific discipline we use to focus upon shattered parts, in isolation they provide no 
intelligible knowledge of the person.  
There is some controversy as to whether, at this early stage, Laing’s simplistic engagement 
with the totality of experience warrants acceptance as being structurally existential (Collier, 
1977); however, as has been shown, this bears a strong connection already with Sartre’s 
existential advocacy for a totality of experiences. Laing, throughout his first book, develops a 
foundation which embodies the existential tenets which Mullan (1995, p. 85) summarises as 
‘hostility to abstract theory for obscuring the roughness and untidiness of actual life’. At no 
point does Laing further deconstruct the totality of experience but retains this simple format 
which arguably translates to a wider, non-expert audience; perhaps, at this early point, this 
was part of his objective in wanting to emphasise the importance of experience and totality 
without sacrificing clarity. Although broad and potentially reductive, most accept this 
existential premise as constituting a large structural element in the entirety of Laing’s work 
(Kirsner, 1976; Collier, 1977; Crossley, 1998; Kotowicz, 2005).  
Collier (1977) penetrates further with his philosophic analysis of Laing’s theory and identifies 
a solid existential basis that underpins and precedes the totality of experience. Focusing on 
the primary philosophical influences named by Laing – Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre – 
 
60 A number of secondary reviews and Laing himself place Sartre at the forefront of a Laingian theoretical 
framework (see Kotowicz, 1997; Mullan, 1995; Collier, 1977), however this is refuted at length by Howarth-
Williams (1977). Analysing the contribution of Sartre, Howarth-Williams states that Sartre is used to illustrate 
rather than develop his theory.  
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he offers three existential commonalities that resonate within Laing’s methodology and thus 
can be offered as supporting a foundation by which to appreciate the totality of experience.  
[1] man is free, in the sense of being compelled to choose between infinite 
possibilities… [2] he experiences his freedom in anguish… [3] the unpleasantness of 
this state motivates man to hide the fact of his freedom from himself by absorption in 
the conventional practices of everyday life (‘inauthenticity’). (Collier, 1977, p. 17) 
Collectively, the interaction of these three base experiences is described as defining the 
human condition. With such a bold aim as to define the human condition itself, it is little 
wonder that a question is raised about what can now be suggested as Laing’s brief, perhaps 
even overly simplistic model. However, as we overlay this three-part structure, Laing may 
not directly have detailed each individual component but his body of work rests on a 
presupposition of their structural presence. 
The three parts to this collective existential framework for experience establish two universal 
constants: [1] a potentially free self and [2] anguish, present in the basis of this potential as 
well as a third variable component [3] to seek comfort, refuge and stability in the 
conventional practices of everyday life. At its simplest, to engage and accept one’s [1] 
potential free self involves an awareness of our most raw and essential self: the freedom to 
exist without constraint, restriction or the perceived necessity to adhere to social norms. As 
we increase this awareness for the freedom to live without restraint, by default we 
conversely become aware of our nonbeing, our mortality, the imminence and unavoidability 
of our death; to live is to die. It is the [2] awareness of freedom (conversely an equal 
awareness of death) that causes us anguish, introducing a constant anxiety into our 
existence. In avoidance of this anxiety, like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand to avoid 
danger, we [3] immerse ourselves in the ‘absorption in the conventional practices of 
everyday life’. The notion of an ‘absorption in the conventional practices of everyday life’, as 
outlined by Collier, plays a pivotal role as we develop Laing’s theory and this quotation will 
be used through this thesis. 
This importance of this three-stage meta-analysis of the existential human condition gains 
more grounding as we direct attention to Heidegger. Contradicting the earlier focus of 
Sartrean input (Kirsner, 2015), Howarth-Williams (1977) states that the actual theoretical 
substance, particularly within The Divided Self, has more significant traits of Heideggerian 
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philosophy61 (this supporting Laing’s statement in his later life that, when writing The Divided 
Self, it was Heidegger who played the most influential role in its development – Mullan, 
1995).62 Although Heidegger’s term of ‘Dasein’ is unused by Laing, this concept is intricately 
bound with the term ‘being-in-the-world’. When we consider Laing’s methodology with 
relation to the wider context of Dasein, a more substantial footing is gained.  
(the ‘fundamental structure’) about a human being’s existence (Dasein) is the nature 
of his being-in-the-world. (Howarth-Williams, 1977, p. 143) 
Dasein, the being-in-the-world, is a pillar within Heidegger’s entire body of work and 
although beyond any capacity here to describe comprehensively, Howarth-Williams provides 
a brief understanding with reference to Laingian theory that can also be overlaid with the 
three-part meta-analysis provided by Collier. [1] Being is the term given to the free self 
(denoted with a capital ‘B’), [2] Being experiences dread/anguish because death is the only 
discernible anchor in existence and in avoiding this [3] Being seamlessly immerses itself 
within existence (being-in-the-world) and becomes the realisation of Dasein. Howarth-
Williams provides a strong argument for the greater influence of Heidegger and this works in 
tandem with the separate acknowledgement for Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in Collier’s 
meta-analysis.63 
Collier stated that experience ultimately involves an ‘absorption in the conventional practices 
of everyday life’; Howarth-Williams refined and emphasised this final point further explaining 
that ‘(the ‘fundamental structure’) about a human being’s existence (Dasein) is the nature of 
his being-in-the-world’. These influences illuminate different aspects of the self within Laing 
but it is Heidegger who consistently occupies a central role. This central influence is 
compounded further with reference to Heidegger’s seminal text: 
 
61 Howarth-Williams (1977, p. 143) states a second reason for acknowledging Heidegger’s role: ‘this being-in-
the-world resolves into being-with, and being-one’s self: that is, to understand the former involves grasping the 
impact and relevance of other people’s existence for him’. This draws on the function of the ‘other’ and self-
formation. Although this component is present within Heideggerian philosophy and a significant aspect of 
existential influence within Laingian theory, it will be through a Sartrean lens that the role of the other will be 
focussed upon more heavily in the subsequent chapter, Self-Formation. 
62 This declaration also continues to support his own belief that his theoretical standing belonged within the 
realms of the prestigious philosophical minds Sartre, Heidegger etc., rather than those of his Tavistock peers: a 
theme which ran throughout the transcripts with Mullan (1995).  
63 In addition, Howarth-Williams (1977) emphasises the responsibility for the ‘other’ in the becoming of Dasein, 
a concept which will be attended to in the subsequent chapter Self-Formation. This falls beyond the existential-
phenomenological focus here. 
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Dasein grows into a customary interpretation of itself and grows up in that 
interpretation. It understands itself and grows up in that interpretation. It understands 
itself in terms of this interpretation at first, and within a certain range, constantly. This 
understanding discloses the possibility of its Being and regulates them. (Heidegger, 
2011, p. 23)  
Extracted from the English translation of Being and Time (1927), this single quotation 
emphasises that the possibility of Being, the free self, is always regulated by the 
interpretation and immersion of the world Dasein exists within. Herein lies the key to 
punctuating Heideggerian theory within a Laingian existential-phenomenological 
methodology: it is our interpretation of the totality of experiences which determines our 
being-in-the-world. It is not only the unique experiences we encounter, it is our unique 
interpretation of the totality of those unique experiences which determine our being-in-the-
world and constitutes Dasein. In denying potential freedom, Dasein remains an ‘inauthentic’ 
position; however, Heidegger states that our aim is to find moments of ‘authenticity’ that 
allow us to gain perspective, realise our potential and acknowledge our participation in 
reductive processes. 
This is the base existential state that underpins the human condition, the experience that 
unites all humanity. But it is not the human condition, the dilemma of existing in the 
awareness of Being and nonbeing, the definition of Dasein, the being-in-the world, that 
occupies Laing’s theory. It is what Dasein encounters that Laing’s theory is trained upon. 
Without jumping the gun to Part 3. Ontological Insecurity, Laing positions the focus of his 
theory, with reference to the human condition, using Tillich’s notion of ‘ontological insecurity’. 
Tillich distinguishes three forms of anxiety: the anxiety of fate and death, the anxiety 
of guilt, and the anxiety of meaningless. This three-fold anxiety is viewed by Tillich, 
as no mere neurotic superficiality: it stems from the very nature of the human being, 
which is perched, so to speak, ‘on the boundary’ of being and non-being. (Howarth-
Williams, 1977, p. 150)  
Although Laing’s theory does not necessitate application of religious content that completes 
Tillich’s approach,64 he was influenced significantly by the notion that to exist with anxiety is 
 
64 Religion, spirituality, and mysticism played a big role in Laing’s life, emphasised by his decision to undertake a 
spiritual retreat during his 1970-71 sabbatical in Ceylon and India, an experience recalled with great importance 
in his life reflections with Mullan, in the biographical Mad to be Normal (1995). We see numerous occasions 
throughout all his publications where he makes subtle gestures toward this interest. This subtlety becomes 
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to exist in a state of ‘ontological insecurity’, to exist without anxiety is to exist in a state of 
‘ontological security’ (Collier, 1977; Kotowicz, 1997), albeit with his own adaptation and 
interpretation.         
The ontological insecurity described in The Divided Self is a fourth possibility. (Laing, 
1961, p. 51)  
Without veering further into the concept of ontological insecurity, which will be addressed 
later, the illumination of a ‘fourth possibility’ is of paramount importance with regard to 
understanding the uniqueness of Laing’s existential basis – an aspect seemingly constantly 
overlooked. 
Despite the philosophical use of ‘ontology’ (by Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich), I have used 
the term in its present empirical sense because it appears to be the best adverbial or 
adjective derivative of ‘being’. (Laing, 1960, p. 39) 
Returning full circle to the primary source of Laing’s methodology, The Divided Self, the 
footnotes denote three philosophers we have organically utilised to underpin Laing’s 
existential credentials; it is within the context of this recognition with the identification of the 
fourth possibility that we reach the kernel of his unique application. The term ‘fourth 
possibility’ is made in direct relation to Tillich’s three-fold anxieties, not in relation to the 
three-stage meta-analysis of the existential human condition that unites the previously 
named influences underpinning Laing although it complements this platform equally as well.  
Laing’s fourth possibility concerns the multitude of experiences that incur anxieties upon this 
human condition. It is a focus for the empirical, observable causes of experienced 
ontological insecurity. The human condition is the base experience that underpins Dasein, 
 
direct and explicit with The Politics of Experience, where he made his most radical propositions with the belief 
that a breakdown could well be a breakthrough to a higher and lost dimension of experience (this theoretic 
aspect falls outside the parameters of cause of psychic suffering and therefore receives minimal attention in this 
thesis). However, even if considering this aspect, he provides little in the way of structural theory regarding 
these elements and this negates their consideration and inclusion in this thesis. Supporting this decision, Laing 
states:  
 Existential thinking offers no security, no home for the homeless. (Laing, 1967, p. 47) 
Laing’s personal interest and commitment undoubtably permeates into his writing but it fails to occupy any 
structural presence within his theoretical framework, being vague or visible in the gaps that remain 
unexamined. Either way, too little is offered to justify its inclusion without deviating from the focus of this 
research. My suggestion is that Laing’s lack of definitive religious, spiritual, or mystical contribution was due to 
his ongoing pursuit of enquiry, a personal interest with which he had not yet found peace. What he did know, 
and could articulate with absolute clarity, was existentialism and existentialism destabilised the naive 
assumptions of our worldly context, making us ‘homeless’. 
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an experience defined by a counterbalance of awareness for nonbeing and Being; it is this 
awareness that generates angst and motivates solace to be sought in the absorption of the 
everyday: the being-in-the-world. With greater and lesser degrees of awareness and the 
consequential angst, we all immerse ourselves within worldliness; however, the experiences 
we encounter are specific to each one of us. It is the experiences of the everyday, 
experiences that compound the human condition, which occupy Laing’s thoughts and theory.  
This final point provides the focus to ask why only a certain few experience ontological 
insecurity to a debilitating degree. Furthermore, it stimulates thought towards consistencies 
of experience which exist on a political scale and may correlate with the increasing incidence 
of psychic suffering in all its guises. Laing is essentially saying that ontological insecurity, 
and the angst this state of existence incurs, is a perfectly natural reactionary experience; it is 
not ‘illness’ or ‘disease’. The question located in the fourth possibility is: what has occurred 
within the solace sought in worldliness that has caused Being to lose its positionality in-the-
world? Guy Thompson (2000, p. 489) approaches this from a different angle but nonetheless 
locates a context for fourth possibility anxieties as being rooted in our experience, 
experience being the ‘totality of everything we believe… and this emphasises the “political” 
nature of psychical suffering’. Again, I start to veer into what will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
Laing’s methodology was attuning us as to what to look for when attempting to gain 
knowledge of the person; existentialism within this context therefore concerns the ontological 
focus and application. Through unpacking the statements and influences included within his 
work, it is offered that the use of existential theory rests most thoroughly within a 
Heideggerian foundation, with support from Sartre and Tillich. To embrace, study and 
understand the being-in-the-world, we must direct our focus to the totality of experiences as 
interpreted by the person, inclusive of the precarity of the human condition and the multitude 
of fourth possibilities: aspects that fall far beyond any psychiatric means of understanding 
the self. As we progress and explore the application of a Laingian methodology, focus for the 
fourth possibility will be expanded from individual experience to the wider experience of the 
person within the family nexus and furthermore to the political realm. As this focus expands 
from the micro to the macro, the individual moves increasingly from the specific to the 
universal.  
An existential framing for psychic suffering draws into focus how angst, also referred to as 
anxiety, fear, etc, is a base constituent of existence; it always exists within us all. But our 
awareness of this negative, daunting, and potentially crippling emotion in its most acute form 
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is managed through our immersion within the everyday. It is the relationship between this 
immersion and awareness that Laing brings to the table and develops beyond a traditional 
existential framework: the notion of ontological insecurity incurred from the fourth possibility. 
Laing states that when our immersion within worldliness is compromised, our ability to 
manage this base existential angst is compromised thus heightening our awareness of its 
presence. This often becomes recognised through experiences associable with psychic 
suffering. This will be discussed at length in Part 3. Ontological Insecurity.  
It was previously stated that, encompassing the interpretation of the totality of experiences, 
existentialism is fundamentally hostile towards theories which declare scientific knowledge of 
the subject and attempt to nullify the rough edges of existence. It is pertinent to be reminded 
of this broad argument as we step from existentialism to phenomenology.  
Phenomenology 
The phenomenological aspect of Laing’s methodology provides an epistemological 
framework to complement and enquire into complexities previously established within 
existentialism’s ontological theory; essentially, it provides the strategy by which to focus on 
the interpretation of the totality of experience, a means to encounter another person without 
reducing them to an organism. Defining this epistemological approach, Laing employs the 
following formulation: 
Man’s being…can be seen from different points of view and one or other aspect can 
be made the focus of study. In particular, man can be seen as person or thing. Now, 
even the same thing, seen from different points of view, give rise to two entirely 
different theories, and the theories result in two entirely different sets of action. The 
initial way we see a thing determines all our subsequent dealings with it. (Laing, 
1960, p. 20) 
Under the primary phenomenological aim to acquire pre-scientific knowledge (Lawlor, 2010), 
Laing emphasises that if you approach an object of study through the lens of a preconceived 
framework – a scientific framework – the assessment process will induce a bias which 
honours and reproduces the inherent value authenticity already structured within that 
framework. Placed within a practical context, Laing stressed that the contact point between 
the medical professional and the person suffering was mediated through a pre-existing 
medical (scientific) framework authoritatively applied by the medical professional. As a result 
 101 
of this scientifically structured medical lens, only empirical experiences came into focus and 
the sufferer is therefore reduced to an organism, made up of isolated and fragmented 
components.65 With reference to his earlier example, the practitioner is attending to the 
shattered parts of Humpty Dumpty without gaining any real knowledge of the totality of the 
person.  
Laing’s phenomenological approach to the person is a staple part of his work and 
consistently demonstrated to evidence the efficacy of his approach to understanding the 
experience of psychic suffering. Sanity, Madness, and the Family (1964) was worked on by 
Laing in collaboration with Esterson as a means of testing the theoretical hypothesis detailed 
within The Divided Self:66 that schizophrenia can be made intelligible. A clear example of 
Laing’s phenomenological approach can be demonstrated through the case study of Claire 
Church, Family 3. Claire was institutionalised with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, in part due 
to her delusion ‘that she had an atomic bomb inside of her’ (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 
75). Within the existing scientific, medical framework, the impossibility of this statement was 
further proof of the severity of her ‘mental illness’. Laing’s methodological approach 
attempted to understand Claire’s language within the context of her existence (including and 
beyond her ‘social milieu’) rather than against the rigidity of the medical framework. Laing 
argued that Claire was not being literal but rather metaphorical with her choice of language 
(the validity of this assertion and the incorporation of existentialism will be picked up later as 
we consider the entirety of the existential-phenomenological approach). Laing stated that her 
words were expressing the anger she felt inside, stemming from the situation she found 
herself in; she felt she could explode with rage, hence the metaphor of the bomb inside her. 
The language she is using is not evidence of a defective organism (medical diagnosis) but 
the language is hiding the problem in plain view. This example, among many others, was 
used by Laing to highlight the unforgiving nature and drastic limitations incurred when the 
subject’s experience is approached with a pre-conceived objectively driven, scientific 
framework; it misses what is in plain view. 
Collier’s (1977) deconstruction of Laing’s phenomenological application identifies an 
additional layer of theoretical detail resonating throughout Laing’s work and application, 
stating that this methodology rests upon two primary and structural phenomenological 
premises: 
 
65 See Chapter 13, Ontological Discontinuity.  
66 Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964) will be used throughout this research to concretise Laing’s theory and 
provide a bridge as we explore its application within a political terrain. 
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(a) ‘pure’ (presuppositionless) description of conscious phenomena as we experience 
them, not as we believe they might be in the light of common sense or scientific 
knowledge; (b) analysis of these phenomena in terms of intentionality, i.e. 
directedness towards ‘objects ’,  which is said to be a feature of all phenomena. Thus 
a belief is a belief that…, a desire is a desire to…a sensation is a sensation of...The 
‘object’ is that which fills the gaps in each case. It need not be real; e.g. ghosts are 
the object of fear of ghosts. (Collier, 1977, p. 17) 
The temptation is to see Laing’s work as an attack on science and extracting this quotation 
from context does little to soften that view; however, this would be an unjust interpretation. 
Laing is at pains to stress the necessity to reconsider what defines scientific value within 
medicine, to reconsider the authority given to the existing scientific objective paradigm and 
encourage embracing the qualities inherent within the flexibility of subjective value authority. 
Laing was not alone in this argument; others, such as Thomas Kuhn, were questioning the 
notion of absolute ‘truths’ within science more generally (see Kuhn, 1962) but Laing was 
focussed on the science of psychiatry. Within this domain, he reinforced the idea that 
understanding should not provide a framework by which forcibly to interpret a selection of 
specific symptoms but rather to accept that the ‘experiences themselves’ as the totality and 
the basis for scientific enquiry. It is in response to this that he advocates his ‘science of 
persons’. 
Identifying scientism as a major contributor responsible for enacting an existential 
degradation of the sufferer invites a connection to the philosophy of Kierkegaard, a theorist 
Laing declares second to nobody and perhaps his only superior (Lund, 1990; Mullan, 1995). 
Although overt reference to Kierkegaard’s work is minimal (Howarth-Williams, 1977) 
subtleties reside that reflect a significant influence upon Laing’s theory.  
The nineteenth-century paper Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), written under the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus,67 illustrates the distaste Climacus held toward scientific 
paradigms being applied to the human subject and this thought runs deep within Laing’s 
theory. Kierkegaard’s body of work is couched within a religious context, inclusive of 
Climacus68. However, when we refine attention to Section 2: The subjective problem, or how 
subjectivity must be for the problem to appear to it, Climacus provides a passionate plea 
 
67 Respecting Kierkegaard’s instruction outlined in Fear and Trembling (2006), where appropriate, further 
quotations from Kierkegaard will be attributed to the authorship of the pseudonym. 
68 Laing himself was a Presbyterian by upbringing and a religious aspect to his work is often ruminating within 
the background (Burston, 1996) but this undercurrent within his theory is not addressed here.  
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which extends beyond Laing’s initial assertion that subjectivity enables greater knowledge, 
by stating that without embracing subjectivity, we lose the pathway to inwardness, 
knowledge of the self and therefore others; we lose a connection to the essence of existence 
(of which contact with God is a part). Existentialism does not require a religious context, 
demonstrated by Sartre’s complete rejection of God (Detmar, 2013) and it is without explicit 
affirmation or rejection that Laing’s application is focussed in this research. Nonetheless, this 
brief input from Kierkegaard has lasting implications as we extrapolate Laing’s findings from 
within the clinical to the political context 
This trajectory of thought also overlaps with Buber’s theory of relatedness and the notion of 
I-Thou and I-It qualities. Buber’s insight, although afforded little more than a fleeting 
acknowledgement in The Divided Self, is developed more in Self and Others and 
Interpersonal Perception. Belonging more within the existential rather than 
phenomenological bracket, this distinction reveals a structural component to Laing’s 
methodological framework that enables it to resonate throughout the entirety of Laing’s 
theory and his application.  
The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one’s whole being. 
The basic word I-It can never be spoken with one’s whole being. (Buber, 1970, p. 54) 
Laing’s phenomenological process of enquiry, discussed most vividly within the self/other 
psychiatric encounter, is designed to embrace the totality of experience: a prerequisite to 
prevent a violence to the patient that reduces them to an object, organism, or It. Buber 
(1970, p. 96) applies his focus beyond the clinical context and gestures more broadly to the 
’economy and the state’ for creating a dominant discourse described as ‘great objective 
fabrics' that are responsible for I-It relatedness. Extended to society at large, the premise 
remains fully compatible with Laing; the application of an objective correlate upon the self, 
regardless of domain, is a desperately reductive process that occurs to the detriment of the 
individual.  
And in all the seriousness of truth, listen: without It a human being cannot live. But 
whoever lives only with that is not human. (Buber, 1970, p. 85) 
Neither Buber nor Laing dismiss the value of qualities associated with I-It relatedness or the 
medical necessity for an individual to be examined in organismic terms but both agree that 
for the self to be defined completely within this realm occurs to the detriment, damage and 
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even dehumanisation of the person. Buber and Laing are also in agreement that society is 
increasingly moving toward discourses that resonate with I-It relatedness much to our 
detriment. The phenomenological component to Laing’s methodology is designed to create 
the conditions required to promote relatedness between persons and achieve a truly 
experienced and shared encounter: an encounter between Beings, an I-Thou relatedness.69 
Laing describes this most prolifically within the psychiatric encounter of the clinical context 
and Buber’s influence shows us how necessary this is for social relations without 
discrimination. The extension of this idea beyond the psychiatric encounter is not beyond 
Laing’s theoretic capacity and revealing this application as we continue is instrumental to 
developing a totalising approach to Laing.  
Phenomenology reverberates throughout Laing’s work, not only in his proposed 
methodology but also his own application. In the progression and evolution from The Divided 
Self (1960) to his final publication within this first phase Knots (1970), Laing develops an 
approach which increasingly adopts poetic verse to illustrate his research findings.70 It is this 
form, rather than the content, of Knots which is important. Laing’s choice of a poetic format is 
operating on a frequency which disrupts the typical objective, scientific focus used to 
describe interpersonal communication and perceptions. As a result, it unsettles our approach 
to the more typical structures of knowledge and therefore the potential limitations they incur. 
Sartre called poetic representation ‘comprehension’ and the aim and potential within this 
form was more accurately to ‘relive’ the project of the other (Howarth-Williams, 1977; Suhl, 
1999). Laing’s broader connection with the arts runs throughout his entire career as seen in 
the poetic representation shown above, encouraging Kingsley Hall residents to express 
themselves creatively71 and his own cathartic involvement with music and the piano most 
significantly. Without committing to a further analysis which would prove a tangent to this 
research, this investment in the arts, placed within the context of these philosophical 
influences, would also fit with the Heideggerian notion that art was the most direct medium 
for expressing and gaining insight into matters of existence (Lawlor, 2010): a means of 
withholding focus on Thou and not It.  
 
69 Buber and Laing’s use of the term ‘experience’ does deviate. Buber states that I-Thou relatedness is a 
transcendence of the I-It experience: relatedness surpassing experience.   
70 This increasingly poetic format remains visible within Interpersonal Perception (1966), but this particular 
publication also develops a code-like representation for his theory which arguably falls in complete contrast to 
the former.    
71 Mary Barnes (Barnes and Berke, 1970) is the most famous resident of the Kingsley Hall experimental 
community, in-part due to the painting she completed whilst following her psychotic voyage.  
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Laing’s phenomenological application focuses on the influence it bears on epistemological 
framing. He demonstrates throughout his body of works, including beyond the first phase of 
publishing, the necessity to suspend the belief in absolute and objective truths if we are to 
gain any real insight or knowledge into matters of existence and the person. With this 
phenomenological foundation, Sartre’s words can be re-inserted and the compatibility of 
both disciplines becomes even more apparent:  
If we admit that the person is a totality, we cannot hope to reconstruct him by an 
addition or by an organisation of the diverse tendencies which we have empirically 
discovered in him. (Sartre, 1953. p. 33) 
Existential-Phenomenology 
The term ‘existential-phenomenology’ I take to mean, not the use of the 
phenomenological method to arrive at existentialist conclusions, but a 
phenomenology which, rather than simply describing and classifying ‘intentional 
phenomena’, seeks to understand these as forming, in the case of each individual, a 
structured whole – his way of being-in-the-world. (Collier, 1977, p. 17) 
Notwithstanding his acceptance of Laing’s phenomenological method, Collier raises 
questions about the existential qualification. However, this concern is dependent on what we 
understand existentialism to be and the publication parameters by which we seek to define 
Laing’s methodology. Through the theoretical foundation focussing on Heidegger’s work and 
the notion of Dasein, it is proposed that existentialism within this context does not warrant 
the cleavage separating ‘existentialist conclusions’ from ‘being-in-the-world’ as Collier 
outlines. Using Heidegger, being-in-the-world has been demonstrated as an existentialist 
conclusion. It is neither limited to ‘intentional phenomena’ or avoidant but rather 
encapsulates it within the totality of theory. Through the foundation developed in this 
chapter, it is suggested that Laing’s phenomenological method not only arrives at 
existentialist conclusions; it offers insight into the totality of experiences that define being-in-
the-world. This argues the case for its ability to offer insight into the predisposition and 
precarity of the human condition when acted upon through Laing’s description of empirical 
events occurring within the ‘fourth possibility’. 
It is the task of existential phenomenology to articulate what the other’s ‘world’ is and 
his way of being in it. (Laing, 1960, p. 25) 
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Laing outlines his existential-phenomenological methodology with the greatest focus and 
detail in The Divided Self. However, by his own admission, The Divided Self lacked the 
evidential support to give credence to the claim that his methodological approach would 
provide intelligibility for the schizophrenic experience of sufferers. This was the impetus for 
the publication of Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964). In collaboration with Esterson, 
they applied an existential-phenomenological methodology to 11 case studies. A number of 
strict inclusion criteria are noted in the introduction; of greatest significance here, each of the 
case studies was assessed and diagnosed by two independent psychiatrists and, as per the 
medical-scientific model of illness, deemed to be schizophrenic as a matter of ‘biochemical, 
neurophysiological, psychological fact’ (terms clarified more directly by Laing and Esterson 
in the preface to the second edition, 1964, p. 12).  
The following example is selected and extracted from the case study of Maya Abbotts.72 It is 
used to highlight the stability of the existential-phenomenological methodology developed 
throughout this chapter. It also serves to illustrate how Laing’s approach contrasted with the 
medical discourse of its time.   
Maya’s ‘illness’ was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia (p. 31) … 
…An idea of reference that she had was something she could not fathom was going 
on between her parents, seemingly about her.  
Indeed there was. When they were all interviewed together her mother and father 
kept exchanging with each other a constant series of nods, winks, gestures, knowing 
smiles, so obvious to the observer that he commented on them after twenty minutes 
of the first interview. They continued however, unabated and denied… 
…Another consequence was that she could not easily discriminate between actions 
not usually intended or regarded as communications, e.g. taking off spectacles, 
blinking, rubbing nose, frowning and so on, and those that are – another aspect of 
her paranoia. It was just those actions however, that were used as signals between 
her parents as ‘tests’. (Laing and Esterson, 1964. p. 40) 
 
72 The Abbott family case study will be a consistent point of reference throughout this thesis, providing 
continuity for numerous concepts that are developed.  
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Kendler (2016) gives an historic account of the presence of paranoia within medical texts, 
tracing its modern Kraepelin understanding to 1899. As discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis, since 1952 the standard of diagnosis used to universalise the practice of medicine 
was outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). It was only 
in DSM-V, published in 2013, that paranoia was removed from the diagnostic assessment of 
schizophrenia (Tandon et al., 2013) although importantly it remains a significant symptom for 
the diagnosis of other ‘mental health’ issues (Kendler, 2016). The point being emphasised is 
that, during Laing’s career, paranoia was a buzz word within the psychiatric field and a key 
point for diagnosis (and arguably still is). When Maya’s (‘sane’) parents described symptoms 
befitting paranoia, it is little wonder that the psychiatrists, armed with their medical scientific 
knowledge framework, concluded a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenic; the tick-box existed 
and the pen was trained to be purposely poised over the check-list looking for criteria to 
confirm. A tick that confirmed Maya with her ‘abnormal’ behaviour created an ‘It’ in some 
capacity.  
Avoiding this immediate and luring pitfall which satisfied a structured medical training, Laing 
and Esterson accepted this behaviour for what it was: isolated data but not conclusive 
information. Even within the context of the interview (Maya misreading innocent actions as 
clandestine communications), unusual or out of context behaviour was again treated as 
further data but inconclusive. They sought to understand what this behaviour was for Maya, 
to link the behaviour to Maya’s knowledge framework and not that of the prescribed objective 
system of diagnosis. They maintained an overall question, asking what knowledge was 
created when the entirety of experiential-gestalts presented a picture of her being-in-the-
world. Over a period of 5 years, Laing and Esterson tried to assemble Maya’s worldview, 
listening without judgement or adherence to a rigid ‘scientific’ paradigm and attempting to 
situate her experiences within her most influential social milieu: the family. They fostered an 
approach that enabled an encounter that promoted I-Thou relatedness, an encounter that 
kept Maya’s qualities of Being alive. In applying an existential-phenomenological 
methodology, they stated that Maya’s interpretations were not wide of the mark; her 
paranoia was based on sound observation but, crucially, it was discredited observation.  
There is something of a contradiction when considering that Maya’s interpretation of 
communicative actions required the external validation of the interviewers’ recognition to 
gain value qualification. The catch 22 being that without external qualification, the 
intelligibility of these interpretations could not be anchored within experience. However, 
herein lies the overarching political engagement of Laing’s theory. The value of Maya’s 
subjective experience was discredited firstly by her family and secondly by the medical 
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authority. The frame of reference employed by Laing is an emancipatory one, empowering 
the previously downtrodden, dismissed, and diagnosed. Inverting the value authority 
relationship, Maya’s disjointed, disconnected language and behaviour were empowered and 
as a result, Laing and Esterson were able to reveal the intelligibility of her previously deemed 
incoherent experience. This opened new avenues for thinking about suffering.  
To summarise Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology: without enforcing a 
theoretical framework over the individual to interpret their experience (phenomenology), the 
individual will be accepted as a being-in-the-world, a being perched upon the precarity of 
being and non-being and resisting objective classification (existentialism). The scientistic 
principles of psychiatry, structured by logical empiricism, are selective in the experiences 
they reveal – hence the self, through this lens, becomes an organism, located in the outer 
world only. Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology showed no such prejudice, 
reattuning an understanding of self that engaged with the totality of experience, the inner is 
given space to exist with the outer. There is no doubt that Laing’s adaptive use of these 
traditional philosophical fields incurs limitations; however, the argument presented and 
tested within Sanity, Madness, and the Family is that it gave new insight, clarity and 
intelligibility to causes of psychic suffering residing in the murky depths of madness, 
schizophrenia, and psychosis. It also prevented further damage being inflicted upon the 
individual by reducing them to an It as defined by a medical standard.  
Laing identified a need within psychiatric discourse to better understand the self and he 
proposed a solution with a return to philosophy. This underpinned his encouragement of the 
development of a ‘science of persons’ but, as recognised by Mitchell, this proposed 
framework never materialised. What he did provide was a clearly identified philosophical 
direction by which to pursue such a theory: existential-phenomenology. Once again, we find 
certain elements wanting with his application, namely vagueness in certain aspects. This 
vagueness, as we will see, has invited subsequent theories (specifically psychoanalytic 
thought) to be inserted as a means of shoring up its structural integrity However, I believe 
that through this chapter, we have identified philosophical influences, both declared and 
resonating beneath the surface, highlighting the reverberation specifically for Heidegger, 
Sartre, Tillich, and Buber, thus revealing a wide basis for the qualification of a structurally 
sound existential-phenomenological methodological structure.  
This exploration and further support does not change or alter the framework outlined by 
Laing but the initial building blocks for Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology 
have been analysed, clarified and its structural properties identified. As we develop his 
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theory in subsequent chapters, increasing the stress placed upon this theory, the additional 
support developed here strengthens Laing’s theoretical base which enables potential 
shortfalls incurred due to the fragilities of his theoretical structure to be negotiated. 
Perhaps a key element to the existential-phenomenological methodology Laing produced 
was that it gave a reason to approach understanding persons with wonder. Laing was not 
simply stating that psychiatry and the scientific principles it was founded upon were 
reductive; he was providing an alternative methodology to substitute into the self/other 
dynamic. Even to use the word ‘methodology’ as a means to describe the meeting of 
persons seems counterproductive at this point. It suggests a scientific context as well as a 
power imbalance and therefore a knowledge hierarchy. Laing’s existential-phenomenology 
was therefore more an example of an anti-methodology: a means of resisting the cultural pull 
toward scientific authority as a way of understanding the self and a theory to undo the 
cultural ‘knot’ that the authority of psychiatric science has planted within western society. A 




This chapter establishes a theory of self-formation from within Laing’s theory, providing a 
conceptual framework for the person by which we can map the ‘interpretation for the totality 
of experiences’. 
Although the construction of an independent theory of self is a deviation from Laing’s original 
theory, maintaining a concept analysis allows me to honour the core ideas. Through this 
analysis, I address important critical aspects that have previously caused problems for 
consideration of Laing’s writings and this continues to help develop a strong structural base. 
One term sums up the terrain on which we are to search for the meaning of the self 
and all interpersonal relationships. This term is Laing’s far reaching conception of 
‘experience’. (Mitchell, 1974, p. 236 – italics added) 
Experience is the fundamental focus for Laing; his methodology sought to ascertain 
intelligibility of experience and now, in part response to that intelligibility, we consider how 
experience maps onto a theory of self. Identifying a definitive theory of self within Laing’s 
work is difficult; in a truly existential manner, this aspect remains woven within the more 
prominent and primary concept of experience. It is proposed that a difficulty in distinguishing 
a clearly defined theory of self is encountered in part because of Laing’s reluctance to 
deconstruct or isolate components for explanation,73 a proposition exemplified by his 
approach to defining ‘unconscious experience’. 
I am aware that this difficulty could possibly be resolved by a careful definition of 
unconscious and experience, but in resolving the difficulty one seems to lose the 
baby with the bathwater. (Laing, 1961, p. 30) 
Contravening Laing’s advice, this chapter will do exactly what he warns against by 
deconstructing aspects of experience but recognising that they remain intertwined within a 
totality. This chapter will be approached in two sections: Ego, and Other. There is no 
intention with these sections to enforce a division between either aspect but rather to 
indicate the preference of focus each utilises. Ego examines the internal framework of the 
 
73 An additional perspective could be suggested that Laing’s reluctance to deconstruct or provide a thorough 
framework of self was a deliberate and intentional act by Laing to ensure his work did not contribute further to 
the reductionist and dogmatic theories dominating the scientific understanding of existence. 
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psyche; Other will be concerned with all external objects implicated with the ego. When I 
refer to the term ‘self’, it will be in a manner that embodies the existential singular totality of 
ego/other.  
Relying primarily on the highly explanatory text Self and Others (1961) – a title alone that 
embodies the primary aspects of this chapter – complemented with the support of additional 
texts, a structured and focussed theory of self will be produced. As always, altering Laing’s 
original format risks losing the simplicity and clarity respected so widely in his writing. 
However, Laing’s theory of self is heavily dependent on a pre-existing existential knowledge; 
it adopts existential positions without context or definition, expecting the reader to possess a 
base understanding of existential tenets – in stark contrast to the detailed descriptive 
foundation underpinning his existential-phenomenological methodology. Without this 
foundational knowledge, his concepts and theory are more susceptible to engulfment within 
more dominant theories of self, with psychoanalytic structures possessing the most 
established influence to overpower what was a new and unique theory. For this reason, in 
this chapter more than any other (specifically as we examine what can be deemed the inner 
structure of self: the ego), we consider the complex relationship psychoanalytic theory plays 
and untangle this influence from Laing’s intended existential framework. 
Each component addressed will contribute to a foundation that is mindful of an intended 
totality, developing a clear and structurally sound Laingian framework of self. It is hoped that 
this approach will mitigate the requirement for a pre-existing existential foundation to 
understand many of his texts discussing the self.  
Ego  
As previously noted, psychoanalytic theory was a strong influence in psychiatry during 
Laing’s training and first phase of publication (heavily influential in the development of the 
DSM I and DSM II and by proxy, the ICD equivalent: manuals of significant power and 
influence during this period). The psychoanalytic construction of the psyche (a tripartite 
framework of the id, ego, and superego) plays a constant, if not always obvious, role in the 
construction of ‘mental disorders’ that structure psychology and psychiatry, even to this day 
(Tryer, 2014; Watters, 2010: Blashfield et al., 2014). The Freudian concept of a dynamic 
unconscious, to which this framework is intricately bound, holds an even greater structural 
influence and this permeates through to social discourse and beyond (Rajamanickam, 
2008). It is not uncommon to hear the lay person discuss occasions of unforeseen personal 
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actions and/or behaviours occurring because their unconscious thoughts are being acted 
out, supporting the underlying notion of a psychoanalytically compatible unknowable and 
independent unconscious mental structure that operates beyond their own awareness. 
Therefore, when Laing uses terms such as ‘unconscious’ and ‘ego’, it is not without risk of 
being (mis)understood within this more prominent framework.74 He confronts this potential 
(mis)understanding from the outset, declaring a complete separation from the psychoanalytic 
model and positioning his theory in a different theoretical space: 
[W]e take a single man in isolation and conceptualise his various aspects into ‘the 
ego ’,  ‘the super ego ’,  and ‘the id’… How, even, can one say what it means to hide 
something from oneself or to deceive oneself in terms of barriers between one part of 
a mental apparatus and another? (Laing, 1960, p. 19) 
Reinforcing his existential-phenomenological approach, this statement outlines rejection of 
any theoretical framework which attempts to reduce or isolate the self to individual 
components, including psychoanalysis. Laing does, however, retain use of the term ‘ego’, 
albeit seldomly, as a synonym for the mind which he presents as the totality of mental 
processes. Using the term ‘ego’ carries significant psychoanalytic connotations and Laing’s 
deliberate choice to continue with this phrase provides valuable insight into his theory of self. 
The Freudian understanding states that the ego ‘is the central structure containing the 
systems Cs – consciousness’ (Frosh, 2012, p. 71). Through Laing’s rebuttal of the tripartite 
psychoanalytic perspective, yet continuation of the use of the notion of the ego, he is making 
a clear statement that the ego is the totality of mental functioning. More accurately, he is 
asserting that the ego is a conscious totality of mental functioning. In dismissing the notion of 
an id, super ego and the unconscious, Laing is asserting a complete departure from 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Complicating this position, however, Laing acknowledges several psychoanalytic theorists in 
footnotes of The Divided Self as informing aspects of his theory of self,75 the most prominent 
being Fairbairn, Guntrip and Winnicott coupled with later acknowledgement in The Politics of 
Experience of Bion and Klein. Collectively, these names represent major players associated 
with the Object Relations School (ORS), and although psychoanalytic and developing from 
 
74 Made all the more complicated by the knowledge of Laing’s psychoanalytic training and his frequent 
reference to his qualification in this discipline.  
75 They are acknowledged in specific respect to the ‘false self’ concept. This will be discussed in Part 3, 
Ontological Insecurity.  
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the foundation of Freud, their notion of the ego is significantly different from its Freudian 
roots, extending to their concept of the unconscious; these differences help to illuminate 
aspects of Laing’s theory. 
Focussing on Guntrip and Fairbairn’s theory, they both support a notion of the ego being 
primarily and initially whole, a complementary base structure to Laing. But they differ 
significantly in the perception of the ego’s division or separation into fragmented objects. 
Whereas Laing states that the self splits in response to adversity having a detrimental impact 
on being-in-the-world, for Guntrip and Fairbairn and arguably the ORS generally, 
fragmentation is a necessary outcome to manage the frustration of the ego’s needs and 
desire. Against Laing, a certain degree of splitting is a necessary management strategy for 
existence and it is through this splitting process that the unconscious comes into being 
(Frosh, 1987).  
The ORS contrast with Freud in that the unconscious is a reactive development within the 
self, as opposed to an existing element. But, whether formed or elemental, the constitution of 
an unconscious structure is universal – and Laing’s theory is a steadfast rejection and denial 
of this notion of an unconscious structure. The unconscious in this capacity universally 
complies as a place of psychic activity that contains repressed drives; it is a mental process 
responsible for primary momentum to our psychic lives and therefore our existence, a 
process described by Frosh (2011, p. 29) as being ‘alien’, hidden, and ‘[operating] outside 
the control of the “I” or “ego”’. For Laing (1960 and 1961), the ego is the totality of mental 
functioning; therefore, an unconscious in the Freudian, psychoanalytic sense, could not exist 
in addition, outside, beyond, or independent of it.  
It is necessary to expand on this detail because, somewhat problematically on a first 
reading, Laing continues to use the term ‘unconscious’ through his collected works within a 
variety of contexts: ‘unconscious phantasy’ (Laing, 1960, p. 57), ‘unconscious experience’ 
(Laing, 1961, p. 30) and ‘unconscious’ (Laing, 1965, p. 27). This poses the question: how 
can Laing’s theory and definition of the ego withhold use of the term unconscious? 
Answering this question requires an understanding of a term that overlaps once again with 
psychoanalytic theory, specifically Kleinian theory.  
The foundation of the ego as a totality of mental functioning is grounded in Laing’s theory of 
‘phantasy’ constructs (Laing, 1961; Laing, 1966). The term ‘phantasy constructs’ again 
draws ORS comparisons. Echoing Klein’s application, phantasy constructs are described as 
the content of the ego, akin to an internalised framework of information; phantasies are units 
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of knowledge which establish themselves as a referential source of subjective guidance. 
Phantasy systems intersect, overlap, and congeal with other phantasies and, through the 
influence they exert (including imagination, memory, and perception, etc.), they become our 
life-story: the internalised knowledge framework which informs and guides all aspects of our 
existence.  
The normal state of affairs is to be so immersed in one’s immersion in social 
phantasy systems that one takes them to be real. (Laing, 1961, p. 38) 
Laing’s state of normality76 [or commonality] is detailed as an immersion in one’s social 
phantasy system. Using Kleinian terminology but arguably in a manner that is designed to 
reflect and articulate existential theory, Laing’s ‘social phantasy system’ is a crucial element 
in his theory, establishing a framework by which the absorption in worldliness (as outlined in 
the previous chapter) is mapped into the ego. Social phantasy constructs play a primary 
structural role in Laing’s theory of self-formation; they create the web of discourse 
(knowledge) that connects our interpersonal relationships, expanding from the intimate to the 
political and collectively underpin the ‘conventional practices of everyday life’ (Collier, 1977, 
p. 17). Our ability to engage with these social phantasy constructs allows our inner and outer 
worlds to interact in relatively peaceful coexistence. 
Laing provides a wealth of detail in Self and Others and Interpersonal Perceptions for the 
process of phantasy construction through the interpersonal experience of ego/other.77 It 
must always be remembered that phantasy constructs cannot be isolated and contained 
purely within the ego but exist in the experience between individuals, ego and other; they 
construct the self. Burston (2000, p. 105) unpacks this further, contending that although 
Laing never explicitly details them in this way, his theory suggests that phantasies operate 
on a social macro/micro scale, collectively uniting society under ‘religious creeds, political 
ideologies, and dull, unreflective scientism…And on the micro social level, social phantasy 
systems include a startlingly diverse range of family mythologies and organizational myths 
and metaphors’. Social phantasy systems, whether micro or macro, are therefore absorbed 
by the self and subsequently participated with and reinvested into both domains, ego and 
 
76 ‘The [common] state of affairs’ is perhaps a more accurate term in this context. Normality within ‘mental 
health’ is explored in Chapter 8, As a Totality. 
77 Phantasy constructs are not purely a part of the inner-world of the self. Due to informing and influencing 
behaviours and knowledge toward the outer-world, other and self, they underpin the basis and qualification for 
being-in-the-world. Phantasies are the pathways facilitating the self-forming experience between self and other, 
creating, maintaining and continually evolving through shared experience with the other and it is only through 
this ego/other worldly experience that their development is understood. 
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other: a cyclic and continuously evolving process.78 This aspect is picked up in detail in the 
following section; however, it serves two initial functions being raised here: firstly, to consider 
the role of phantasy constructs through a lens trained on the ego, facilitating a further 
development of Laing’s concept of the unconscious and secondly, that the social phantasy 
construct, although dominated with talk of a dyadic context, extends into the multiplicities of 
macro relationships. 
It is important to remember that the internalisation of experiences that constitute our social 
phantasy construct are not universal; they do not operate in a singular, linear, direction, 
depositing in the self (the shared experience of ego/other). Hence the reality that only certain 
members within a family nexus develop ‘schizophrenia’ and furthermore that, although 
‘mental illness’ disproportionately affects certain groups within society i.e., those of lower 
socioeconomic status (class), it does not affect every member. Experience is always 
dependent upon perception and interpretation. Interpretation is highly infused with our 
understanding of that experience; therefore, our prior existing phantasy constructs will 
influence our interpretation of any given experience. Perception affects the selection and 
reception of experiences and this helps determine which experiences are given priority or 
disregarded. Interpretation affects perception and perception affects interpretation. Whilst 
dominant themes of experience will be internalised within the social phantasy construct, this 
will not be without the influence of interpretation and perception. Whether dominant in the 
macro or micro, they will be influenced by the very substance of the phantasy construct and 
also play an important role in in the construction of phantasy. Ideology influences the 
interpretation of the family nexus, whilst the perception of the family nexus influences the 
interpretation of political ideology as a continuing and cyclic process. This process maps 
onto Laing’s existential fourth possibility, affecting the interpretation of the totality of 
experiences, our worldliness, and substantiating a non-concrete, personalised reality of the 
ego, albeit with commonalities and consistent themes (Laing et al., 1966). Although Laing 
never declares as such, it could be offered that the only fundamental phantasy construct is 
the awareness of Being and nonbeing; however, interpretation of the totality of experiences 
has a significant impact on how this affects our experience of angst and subsequent 
immersion in the everyday. This leads us neatly onto the concept of consciousness and our 
awareness of social phantasy constructs.  
 
78 This providing a direct link to the influence that Dasein and interpretation plays in our self make-up (see 
Chapter 5, A Laingian Methodology) 
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Laing (1961) builds on this initial foundation, developing the complexity of phantasy to 
operate beyond our immediate awareness but crucially to remain experienced by the ego. 
Developing this concept to highlight his distance from the Freudian notion of ‘unconscious 
experience ’,  he states that in the established psychoanalytic understanding the terms 
‘unconscious’ and ‘experience’ were diametrically opposed; conjoined they form an 
oxymoronic statement.79 It is impossible, he argues, for a psychic event to be contained 
within a separate and unknowable compartment of the mind (id/super-ego – the 
unconscious) and to retain a definition of ‘experienced’– a quality only capable within 
consciousness, therefore the ego.  
Laing retained the term ‘unconscious experience’ and applied it to qualify the same psychic 
events that psychoanalysis placed within an unknowable and separate unconscious mental 
process; however, his existential basis made a seismic change to its definition. Unconscious 
experiences were deemed as uncommunicated psychic acts; we do not contemplate or 
acknowledge their presence and process, but we act upon them.  
The ‘unconscious’ is what we do not communicate, to ourselves or to one another. 
(Laing, 1961, p. 32) 
With the description of being ‘uncommunicated’, traits of Lacan’s notion of an unconscious 
structured by language come to the fore: a psychic system developed and constituted by the 
repression of signifiers protecting us from unbearable thoughts (the repression of signifieds 
rarer and more synonymous with psychopathology – Baily, 2009; Lemaire, 1970). Lacan, 
being a prominent player in the psychoanalytic field before, during and since Laing, was 
acknowledged briefly in The Politics of Experience and Burston (2000) states that Laing saw 
potential in Lacan’s thinking, even if he ultimately disregarded its influence. Post Laing, we 
also see other psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic theorists proposing variants of the 
unconscious that relate highly to this ‘uncommunicated’ aspect – for instance, the social 
psychologist Billig (1999) produces a ‘discursive unconscious’, stating that everyday 
language has the capacity to be both ‘expressive and repressive’, creative of our states of 
consciousness. However, whilst we can be drawn to the similarity of language and 
communication to embed Laing’s theory in prominent and established existing 
psychoanalytic / psychological theory, it is what constitutes the unconscious that separates 
Laing.   
 
79 See Laing (1961) Self and Others, p. 22 
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The unconscious for Laing defines psychic acts undertaken with a type of autonomy, without 
consideration, reflection, or recognition. The caveat to this definition was that in extreme 
cases, where an individual was unaware or unable to register the phantasy constructs 
influencing this unconscious experience, Laing stated that the individual was ‘split’ and 
psychosis may result.80  
Emphasising the role of experience within the ego, a logical question arises as to why 
anyone would continue or maintain processes detrimental to health, happiness, or wellbeing, 
or even truth. If unconsciously experienced (Laing states that our phantasy constructs 
remain accessible), then why not revalue and realign negative psychic acts? It is these 
problems that lead Collier81 to question the qualification of Laing’s theoretical framework of 
self, specifically regarding his interpretation of the unconscious.  
No argument is presented by Laing to show that the Freudian explanation in terms of 
the unconscious is inapplicable. Rather it is seen as unnecessary because there is 
an explanation ready to hand. (Collier, 1977, p. 35)  
Collier suggests that although Laing employs different terminology (a suggestion that the 
above analysis would question), the Freudian premise of an unconscious and the mental 
components connected with it – the id, the super ego – remain compatible with Laingian 
theory, particularly from a theoretical vantage of repression. However, the second sentence 
of this quotation reveals more than a flippant remark underscoring the lack of substance in 
Laing’s rejection of the psychoanalytic unconscious. It asserts a loyalty within Laing’s theory 
to existentialism as a pre-existing theoretical framework encompassing the self. It also 
suggests an adherence to a more scientific view (in the Laingian sense) that the simplest 
possible explanation of a phenomenon is always preferable. Why assume an invisible 
unconscious when you can see what is happening ‘on the surface’? 
This identification is key to unpacking Laing’s theory of self, specifically how we can 
conceive of an ego totality and its incorporation of unconscious experience within it.  
 
80 This split is focussed on at length in his first publication The Divided Self (1960). However, in Self and Others 
(1961), he suggests that splitting is common to all persons, it is only when the disjuncture between inner and 
outer (therefore self and other) becomes too severe, an absolute cleavage, that this split incurs psychosis. This 
will be addressed in Part 3. Ontological Insecurity. 
81 Collier’s text is openly supportive of psychoanalytic theory. 
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Following The Divided Self (1960), Laing shows an increasing tendency in subsequent texts 
not to invest as thoroughly in an explanation of the foundation or context of theory he 
utilises. This is particularly pertinent with Self and Others (1961) and the existential tenets it 
employs – this being the book most concerned with providing a theory of self (his use of ‘Bad 
Faith’: a Sartrean component, being indicative of this). Laing’s reduced foundational 
development of theory is particularly evident with his sparse discussion of what constitutes 
unconscious experience.  
Describing a simple interpersonal dynamic involving a two-person dyadic relationship, Laing 
(1961) explains that there are three primary modes of experience involved: imagination, 
memory, and perception. Perception (hearing, seeing, etc) is the priority experience which 
keeps us grounded and connected to the other but this encounter is dually informed by 
imagination and/or memory. On occasion, imagination and/or perception may become the 
dominant mode of experience and this has the capacity to compromise the communication 
between the individual and their other. Crucially, Laing states that although unaware that 
memory and imagination have become dominant, they are nonetheless experienced.    
Peter is split. He is unconscious of his imagination [and/or memory], at that moment. 
(Laing, 1961, p. 31) 
Peter’s experience for a partial and momentary split is therefore described in the context of 
being a natural and acceptable ontological experience. As we will see in the following 
chapter, more substantial splits are the cause of significant psychic suffering. Returning to 
the point in question, this is the most substantial and vivid acknowledgement as well as 
description of the unconscious within Laing. For myself, this descriptive example is too brief 
when considered in isolation to substantiate a claim for Laing’s use of the unconscious as 
distinct from the more prominent psychoanalytic understanding, providing support for 
Collier’s (1977) assertion that Laing’s theory can be defined within a psychoanalytical 
framework.  
It is the surrounding discussion of the self which offers a more illuminating account of the 
unconscious. Laing (1961) continues to voice his respect for, and influence by, Sartre; he 
draws extensively on Sartre’s theory to illustrate his own theoretical concepts. Sartre proves 
a useful and complementary theorist to support such brief explanations and develop a more 
substantial Laingian theory of self, particularly with reference to the unconscious. 
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Existential psychoanalysis82 rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious; it makes the 
psychic act coextensive with consciousness. (Sartre, 1953, p. 49) 
Predating Laing, yet consistent with his theory, Sartre states that all psychic acts are 
experienced, not only by the individual but within the shared context of ego/other (at this 
stage, we will stay focussed on the individual). To be experienced, the psychic act must be 
within consciousness; it cannot be buried within a hidden, unknowable, separate functioning 
aspect of the mind – as per the psychoanalytic notion of an unconscious and specifically the 
driving impetus associated with the id.  
[E]ach time that the observed consciousnesses are given as unreflected, a reflective 
structure is superimposed on them – a structure that is thoughtlessly claimed to be 
unconscious. (Sartre, 1937, p. 18) 
Within the totality of a single consciousness, Sartre provides a differentiation between 
unreflected83 and reflected84 experience, providing two types of consciousness. Unreflected 
experience is synonymous with autonomy; it is my reactive experience to the other/world 
beyond, incurring the annihilation and disappearance of awareness for the ego and I am 
positioned seamlessly within the objects of the world which surround me. Through reflective 
experience, I make my own consciousness the object of awareness; ‘I am watching myself 
acting’ (Sartre, 1937, p. 20) and it is through this act that the (object that is the) ego is 
created.85 In a purely unreflective state, the ego is (defined by) action.  
Complementing this Sartrean infusion, Laing (1961) tells us that thoughts associated with 
phantasy constructs remain experienced but not always in awareness. Using the theory of 
unreflected consciousness, phantasy constructs are experienced as instantaneous; we are 
the thought. Therefore, no awareness or consciousness is registered toward engaging with 
the content and construct of our phantasy system– most importantly, thought remains 
experienced, hence guiding our existence. However, when we question or consider those 
thoughts, our awareness is directed toward the ego. This reflective experience upon 
consciousness opens awareness to the phantasy system, allowing us insight into the 
rationale guiding our actions, states and qualities of mind. Importantly, Sartre outlines how 
 
82 Existential psychoanalysis being the application of existentialism to matters of the psyche (see Sartre’s 1953 
book of the same name for further details). 
83 Sometimes referred to as pre-reflective (Sartre, 1957). 
84 Sometimes referred to as reflective (Sartre, 1957) 
85 Reflective thought creates, not discovers, the ego/self. 
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reflective experience does not guarantee a transparent or mirror-like insight into the ego but 
rather has the potential to distort and refract the knowledge contained within (this offers 
some explanation as to why we maintain potentially detrimental phantasy constructs). 
At no point within Self and Others (1961) does Laing refer to an unreflective or reflective 
conscious process and as a proud Sartrean scholar, evident through his extensive use of 
Sartrean theory throughout this publication, a question could be asked as to why? He was 
no doubt aware of these terms; therefore, his omission could be indicative of him not wanting 
his theory to be fully defined within this framework. However, I propose that Laing’s theory is 
built upon the presupposition of existing knowledge of this Sartrean foundation. This is no 
more evident than when Laing (1961, p. 112) qualifies an example by stating ‘[e]ach cannot 
sustain his ‘bad faith’’ without any explanation, definition or context. ‘Bad faith’ is a staple 
concept of Sartrean theory and a pivotal component confronting the question as to why we 
maintain and continue to be guided by phantasy constructs detrimental to health, happiness, 
wellbeing and even truth, even when accessed through reflective consciousness. 
[T]he one who practises bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a 
pleasing untruth. (Sartre, 1957, p. 72) 
Very simply, ‘bad faith’ is the act of lying to oneself. It is a vital component which Sartre uses 
to underpin the three stages of existentialism defining the human condition discussed in the 
previous chapter. Bad faith is the reason for living inauthentically; it justifies how we live at 
one and the same time with the awareness of potential freedom but willingly remain 
immersed within the estrangement of worldliness. This existential human condition is 
concretised by bad faith.  
Inserted within Laingian theory, bad faith extends and provides a valuable understanding of 
the self (supported by Laing’s singular use of the term). Phantasy constructs are specific to 
each individual, constructed and shaped by the ego/other experience. This places significant 
emphasis on the personalised qualification of interpretation woven within the totality (of 
experience). Individual experience constructed and maintained through the interpersonal 
relationships between ego and other creates a unique referential web of phantasy 
constructs; negative constructs are secured by bad faith. The critical question surrounding 
bad faith, however, (whether unique to the individual, applied to societal norms, or the 
existential crisis encompassing the human condition) is: why we adhere to it?  
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The goal of bad faith … is to put oneself out of reach; it is an escape. (Sartre, 1957, 
p. 89) 
Sartre (1957) states that bad faith is practised because bad faith is faith. We place our faith 
in the socially constituted object we perceive our ego to be (being-in-itself) rather than the 
potentially free ego it is capable of realising (being-for-itself). The solidifying factor to this 
faith is in the omnipotent and ever-present anguish experienced by the individual in the 
realisation that a choice exists to ignore or refute this lie: a choice that triggers an experience 
of the daunting prospect of potential freedom and with that the human condition, drawing 
awareness of Being and nonbeing into the reflective state of consciousness. It is the fear of 
the unknowable potential of freedom which binds our faith to the lie; better the devil we 
know.  
Returning this to Laingian theory, if the individual acknowledges the choice to readjust and 
amend a specific phantasy construct, they are opening consideration of the wider prospect 
of a potentially free self. The act of questioning is all encompassing, therefore immediately 
incurring anguish in the face of the unknowable terrain of unanchored freedom. Faith in the 
phantasy construct, whether detrimental or not, reaffirms faith in the object of the ego (being-
in-itself).86 
Bad faith … implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness … [dissolving the 
notion of a duality existing as] … deceiver and deceived, the essential condition of 
the lie, by that of the “id” and the “ego”. (Sartre, 1957, pp. 72 – 74)  
The ego must be acutely aware of the lie to experience anguish. Therefore, the thought must 
be a pre-reflective experience, or unconscious experience in Laing’s redeveloped use. The 
thought, the anguish and bad faith are all enacted as one within the pre-reflective experience 
of the conscious ego. If different aspects of consciousness and the psyche existed (as per 
the tripartite construction of the Freudian psyche or the fractured objects of the ORS), the 
instantaneous investment in the lie would falter; without experiencing the lie (the Freudian 
derivative of an unconscious), we would not flee the choice of potential freedom and remain 
immersed within the ‘conventional practices of everyday life’ (Collier, 1977, p. 17). Be it 
positive or negative, true or untrue, the lie is experienced as reality.  
 
86 This can be overcome without an all-consuming existential crisis being experienced if the detrimental 
phantasy is countered with sufficient contrary experience and accompanying oppositional phantasy constructs 
or, in the most severe cases, guided existential psychoanalysis (see Sartre, 1953).  
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We undertake psychic acts that may be detrimental or even destructive as a process of bad 
faith; we [unconsciously] pre-reflectively experience the displeasing truth and anguish and 
we pre-reflectively accept the experience of the untruth contained within the phantasy 
construct. Even with reflective consideration, we may accept the lie based on two premises: 
firstly, the bad faith invested in the lie maintains the faith we have in the existential position in 
which humankind is immersed; secondly, even if we access the specific phantasy construct, 
there is no guarantee that our reflective experience will not corrupt the data present.87 
Ultimately, through disconfirming the truth of a single phantasy, we risk exposing the fragility 
of the entire phantasy system of the ego and therefore our existential stability in-the-world.  
Using a Sartrean underpinning establishes a more complete platform to build a Laingian 
theory of self. Always emphasising the centrality of experience, the collaboration of 
Sartre/Laing reveals a solid theoretical framework for how all psychic acts can be 
unconscious experience and yet remain within the consciousness of the ego.  
The mind is what the ego is unconscious of. We are unconscious of our minds. Our 
minds are not unconscious. Our minds are conscious of us. (Laing, 1965, p. 11)  
Put very simply, ‘we’ are the ego. The acknowledged limitation to this isolation of ego is the 
necessity to embrace its inseparability from the other which we reach in a moment, 
explaining how experience unites ego and others as a being-in-the-world: the self.  
This deconstructive analysis of Laing’s concept of a non-unconscious (or indeed non-
conscious) mind that operates with two levels of awareness (reflective and pre-reflective) is 
important in that it prevents the common tendency for this aspect of his theory to be drawn 
into a psychoanalytic structure – serving to undermine his instruction to be read within an 
existential-phenomenological context and destabilising the entirety of the theory built upon 
this aspect. Laing’s use of an unconscious is significantly different to the more prominent 
psychoanalytic notion of the ‘two minds’ and, appreciating this difference, draws a critical 
component into the equation that refutes Collier’s suggestion that Laing’s theory remains 
compatible with a Freudian framework. Embedded within Laing’s rejection of the 
unconscious is the rejection of determinism. The unconscious, whether innate (Freudian) or 
constructed (Lacanian/ORS), houses repressed drives and desires that provide the impetus 
for our psychic lives: the momentum to our existence. When conveyed in ‘terms of linkages 
 
87 Locating the origin of detrimental phantasy constructs is highly complex as we will discuss in the following 
section. 
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between conscious experience and their underlying unconscious determinants’ (Guy 
Thompson, 2000, p. 487), the broad collective of psychoanalytic disciplines always arrive at 
a form of deterministic theory of self. The self is a predetermined product of unconscious 
desires and thoughts. This remains equally true of the psychopharmacological approach to 
the mental disorder and illness also; the illness is determined by chemical imbalances within 
the brain.  
As stated from the outset, the existential foundation within Laing’s theory of a potentially free 
self is vitally important. His concept of the ego provides a theory of differing levels of 
experiential awareness within the non-unconscious self and, as a result, the existential 
premise of a potentially free self becomes more defined. Acknowledging the similarities and 
contrast with varying members of ORS which deviate from a more traditional psychoanalytic 
construct of the unconscious helps to reinforce the theory’s existential location and, 
importantly, removes any suggestion of an overlap with deterministic conclusions. Optimism 
and hope are present in the agentic fundaments of the existential condition, a key element of 
Laing’s theory and a clear distinction from psychoanalytic theory with which it is often 
blurred.  
The Other 
Laing’s concept of free will was presented with recognition of the importance of the other. It 
is Laing’s ability to bridge both of these areas that makes his theory so important at this time. 
This section analyses concepts that reveal how the other is an inseparable component of 
experience and therefore an inseparable compositional part of the self. It is from this 
framework that we will develop a political application in the subsequent chapters.  
Other people become a sort of identity kit, whereby one can piece together a picture 
of oneself. (Laing, 1961, p. 87) 
Ego exists for alter.88 (Laing et al., 1966, p. 6) 
Building on the existentially informed, non-deterministic, conscious ego, framework of the 
psyche, we must now consider its inseparability from the other: the inner, ego, individual 
being intricately bound within a bi-directional relationship with the outer, other, persons and 
world beyond – ego influencing other, other influencing ego. This relationship has been 
 
88 ‘ego (self) and alter (other)’ (Laing et al., 1966, p. 6).  
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hinted at in the section above in the context of being responsible for the forming process of 
social phantasy systems and now we draw our attention to it fully. Essentially, the ego 
cannot exist in isolation therefore the self is a constituent of the world it inhabits and the 
people around them: a being-in-the-world.  
Unlike the situation with the ego, Laing provides an extensive account of the process of self-
formation in the context of others; the texts Self and Others (1961) and Interpersonal 
Perception (1966) are instrumental in this focus. Through these books, and supported by 
other writings, Laing provides a detailed explanation as to how phantasy systems are 
created within the ego/other dyad; however, he extends the dyadic relationship by building 
the interpersonal dynamics of the family nexus and extending them to the political. This is a 
development that becomes most apparent in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964) and 
The Politics of Experience (1967). The base premise remains the same in all permutations: 
the ego and other(s) are intricately bound in the formation of the self.  
In Freud’s theory, for instance, one has the “I” (ego), the “over-me” (super-ego) and 
“it” (id), but no you. (Laing et al., 1966, p. 3) 
Acknowledging several philosophers that precede him, Laing states that too much emphasis 
is placed on the I, the individual and there is too little recognition for the other, you, for a 
means of understanding the self. Whilst pointing the finger at established theories from this 
era that commit this short-sightedness, ‘classical psychoanalytic theories, object relations, 
transactional analysis, and […] games theory’ (Laing et al., 1966, p. 8), there is also 
recognition for what they bring to the table, particularly the notion of introjection and 
projection, overlapping within the classical psychoanalytic and object relation field.  
Consistent with the theoretical basis established thus far, existentialist theory plays the 
pivotal role in establishing the parameters of Laing’s theory, allowing other theories to 
contribute to Laing’s ideas without consuming his conceptual framework. 
It is doubly “I”: it is the world revealing itself to me and it is “I” in relation to others, I 
forming my thought with the mind of others. (Sartre, 1953, p. 66) 
As illustrated by Sartre (1953), the I (or ego) is informed by the others occupying the world 
beyond it and the ego thus influences the world beyond it. Ego and other are mutually 
dependent and their influence flows in both directions. Heidegger emphasised the idea of an 
individual embedded within a worldly context to an even greater extent than Sartre as is 
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particularly evident in the descriptive language Heidegger employs in the latter stage of his 
career; he avoids individual qualities such as intentionality and consciousness but rather 
focusses completely on the inclusiveness of being-in-the-world (Guy Thompson, 2004). This 
shift in language and collective focus is also evident within Laing and, whilst he retains terms 
such as unconscious experience (in the Sartrean context discussed previously), the balance 
of his terminology and therefore theory resides with worldly experience. Although this 
character of writing echoes certain Heideggerian traits, Howarth-Williams (1977) downplays 
the structural role of Heidegger here, contending that Laing’s theory of self begins with 
Sartre as the primary source of influence.89 
[E]ach a self to himself each an other for the other, together, in relation. (Laing, 1966, 
p. 7) 
This basic illustrative dyad emphasises the mutual implication of ego and other with each 
existing for, and informing of, the other. But, as described in the previous section, phantasy 
systems are social contexts and therefore their development incorporates the polarities of 
the intimate direct relationships within the micro social formation of the family unit and the 
macro social formation of political ideology.  
Placing the ego within its worldly context is the central component of existential theory 
woven into Laing’s framework of self and it is this aspect which also introduces 
psychoanalytic theory, albeit initially from a negative position. 
Psychoanalytic theory has […] no way of placing the single person in any social 
context. (Laing et al., 1966, p. 8)  
This critiquing of social capability, by omission, is used to highlight the value existentialism 
brings to the table: a theory embracing the further mechanisms which impact on ego 
formation. We see the compatibility of existentialism and the social context realised by 
Sartre, specifically a Marxist infusion consolidated and most apparent in the 1960 publication 
Critique of Dialectical Reason. The resonance of existentialism with the social/political 
context is reinforced by Laing and Cooper’s (1964) analysis of Sartre’s Marxist Existentialism 
in Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy 1950-1960: a demonstration I    
 
89 Sartre’s emphasis has been explained throughout the first section, Ego. The continuing importance becomes 
more qualified during the third phase of Laing’s theory which Howarth-Williams states as his Sartrean-Marxism 
stage. The continuity of Sartre is vital as we aim to develop towards the ultimate goal of applying Laing within a 
political, cultural context. 
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argue that supports a general political connection rather than an advocation of Marxism 
specifically (in Laing’s eyes, perhaps less so for the fervent Marxist David Cooper).  
The critique of the lack of social capability within psychoanalytic theory lies in the limitation of 
the concepts of projection and introjection: ‘projection, a shift of inner to outer; introjection a 
shift from outer to inner’ (Laing, 1961, p. 24). Laing questions the ability of these 
mechanisms ‘as explanations of experience’ (1961, p. 26) and later, in Interpersonal 
Perceptions, (1966, p. 6) states that as concepts they lack the capacity sufficiently to ‘bridge 
the gap between persons’. But this was not a complete refutation of the ability of 
psychoanalytic theory to offer any insight into the role of shared experience. Whilst 
addressed to the concept of projection in isolation, the context of the following quotation 
equally envelops introjection. 
It is to the credit of psychoanalysis that it has bought to light actions of this kind. 
(Laing et al., 1966, p. 20) 
Heidegger and Boss in their Zollikon Seminars (2001) stated that the insights of 
psychoanalysis, rather than being incorrect, were more accurately insufficiently evaluated 
and as such prematurely concluded and consolidated. Laing takes a similar position. 
Discussing shared experience within psychoanalysis, one that loosely overlaps contextually 
with both concepts of introjection and projection, Laing states: 
I am not saying that psychoanalysis ends at this level of inference. I am saying that 
unless it begins from there it will never get started at all. (Laing, 1961, p. 30)  
I suggest that to understand Laing’s theory of self-formation and to fully appreciate the 
inseparability of ‘I’ and ‘you’, ego and alter, in the formation of the self, we benefit from 
beginning from the insights already established in psychoanalysis although we must not be 
limited by where these concepts at their simplest are supposed to end.  
Phantasies in which parts of others are taken into the self (introjection). (Segal, 1992, 
p. 35) 
Approached through this Kleinian definition, a valuable theoretical junction is introduced 
which allows the merger of previously separated components: introjection and phantasy. 
Introjection in this capacity describes the process of making the outer inner, how we take the 
interpretations of experience and transcribe them (no matter how in/accurately) into the 
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phantasy constructs that compose the ego. This understanding, although not outlined by 
Laing, offers a solid foundation to envisage how the social environment, macro or micro, 
political or familial, and experience are mapped onto our ego and construct the phantasy 
system. With this concept of how the outer becomes inner, a greater appreciation of 
projection90 can be gained. 
Projection refers to a mode of experiencing the other in which one experiences one’s 
outer world in terms of one’s inner world. (Laing et al., 1966, p. 22) 
Projection reverses this process; it is the means of inserting our phantasy constructs into the 
world outside. Much like a self-fulfilling-fantasy (or rather self-fulfilling-phantasy), our internal 
beliefs will impact on our behaviour towards an experience (or other) and this subsequently 
will shape to certain degrees their experience and behaviour. Essentially, introjection is the 
internalisation mechanism creating phantasy systems. Projection is our use of these 
phantasy constructs in determining our experiences of the other. Each concept, projection 
and introjection, impacts on the other and is continually evolving (and highly influenced by 
the values of perception and interpretation).  
Embracing more existentially inclined terminology, Self and Others (1961) starts to advance 
this psychoanalytic concept and Guy Thompson (2004) offers an overview of this 
development. 
[Laing is] providing a conceptual vocabulary that could help explain how human 
beings, in their everyday interactions with each other, are able to distort truth so 
effectively that they are able to affect other’s reality, and their sanity as well. (Guy 
Thompson, 2004, p. 20) 
Building on research he conducted with Esterson in the 1958 journal publication Collusion 
Function of Pairing in Analytic Groups, Laing (1961) turned his attention to patterns of 
behaviour beyond the therapeutic context and this simple bi-directional relationship. He 
identified several processes which can be grouped under two headings: two-person (or 
more) operations and individual operations. Two-person operations involve two or more 
persons acting to support the instigator’s positive or negative introjections/phantasy 
constructs. These include: Complementary Identity; Confirmation and Disconfirmation; 
Collusion; False and Untenable Positions; Attributions and Injunctions. The individual 
 
90 Projection also being prioritised within Kleinian and object relations theory.  
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operation is a single process containing two actions: Pretence and Elusion. The processes 
are described as follows. 
Complementary Identity 
[W]e cannot give an undistorted account of a ‘person’ without giving an account of his 
relation with others [‘imaginary, dreamed, phantasied, or ‘real ’’ ]…each person is 
always acting upon and acted upon by others…No one acts or experiences in a 
vacuum. (pp. 81 – 82) 
The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to discard, the way 
others have defined one. (pp. 94 – 95)  
Confirmation and Disconfirmation 
A confirmatory act response is relevant to the evocative action, it accords recognition 
to the evocatory act, and accepts its significance for the evoker, if not for the 
respondent … Rejection can be confirmatory if direct. (p. 99)  
A succinct definition of disconfirmation is less apparent. Laing speaks about confirmation 
essentially being any response that respects a common ‘wavelength’ of communication, both 
players responding to the rules of the same worldly context whether in agreement (positive) 
or rejection (negative). In contrast, disconfirmation can be seen as an out-of-sync, 
disharmonious response as deemed by the rules of a common worldly context. The two 
players are misaligned in communication – this being highly relevant within the double-bind 
scenario.91  
Collusion 
It is a ‘game’ played by two or more people whereby they deceive themselves. The 
game is the game of mutual self-deception. (p. 108)  
 
91 see Part 3, Ontological Insecurity 
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False and Untenable Positions 
[A] person can put himself into a false or untenable position and be put in a false or 
untenable position by others. Position here used in an existential sense … to what 
extent and in what ways the agent is disclosed or concealed, wittingly or unwittingly, 
intentionally or unintentionally, in and through action. (pp. 125 – 126) 
Attributions and Injunctions92 
The ‘victim’ is caught in a tangle of paradoxical injunctions, or of attributions having 
the force of injunctions, in which he cannot do the right thing. (p. 144) 
Pretence and Elusion 
Elusion is a relation in which one pretends oneself away from one’s original self; then 
pretends oneself back from this pretence so as to appear to have arrived back at the 
starting-point. A double pretence simulates no pretence … there is no end to this 
series of possible pretences. I am. I pretend I am not. I pretend I am. I pretend I am 
not pretending to be pretending … (p. 45)  
Each of these examples, which bleed into each other and blur the boundaries of isolated 
performance, demonstrates an extension to the introjection/projection framework beyond a 
direct, single stage process, ego – other (projection) or other – ego (introjection). Laing’s 
examples create specific models of cyclic or continual relational patterns: introjection 
affecting projection, projection affecting introjection, etc. This reinforces the idea that these 
communicative processes shape the shared experience between ego and other thereby 
defining the perceptions and interpretations of experience and the social phantasy 
constructs that form between and within individuals.   
However, these examples still fail to fully appreciate Laing’s thinking on this mutual and 
cyclic relational pattern. In the appendix to Self and Others, we see early signs of his 
intended development of this model with a brief introduction to the framework that underpins 
all these models: Dyadic Perspectives. 
 
92 An in-depth analysis of this concept is addressed in Chapter 12, Interpersonal World. 
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[O]ne has phantasies not only about what the other himself experiences and intends, 
but also about his phantasies about one’s own experiences and intentions, and about 
his phantasies about one’s phantasies about his phantasies about one’s experience, 
etc. (Laing, 1961, p. 174)  
This brief explanation illuminates a characteristic way people express themselves, which 
turns into knots – a multiplication of processes that permeate through to phantasy systems, 
affecting experiences, each compounding the other and resulting in a representation of 
reality. Whilst minimal at this stage, this proposal for a universal process underpinning all 
these two-person and one-person operations becomes the focus of Laing’s 1966 publication 
Interpersonal Perceptions. This became Laing’s means of establishing a dynamic model of 
the ego/other relationship, demonstrating how complex processes embed within, and 
maintain, phantasy constructs, created through meta(-meta(x)) perspectives and explaining 
how truth can be distorted and consolidated as reality.93 
My field of experience is, however, filled not only by my direct view of myself (ego) 
and of the other (alter), but of what we shall call metaperspectives – my view of the 
other’s (your, his, her, their) view of me. (Laing et al., 1966, p. 5) 
Using Laing et al.’s (1966) examples covered in Interpersonal Perception (see pp. 64 – 76), 
the basic principles of this Dyadic Perspectives theory are demonstrated. This is a ‘two-
person, two direction’ model. Laing et al.’s coding examples are included for demonstrative 
purposes. 
Direct Perspective  
Eg. Husband’s (H) perspective of his feelings toward his wife (W)    
Coding:  H(HW) 
Means of attaining direct perspective of the husband: 
i) Do you love her? 
ii) Would you say ‘I love her?’ 
 
93 Laing’s emphasis rather being directed toward shared experience – a clear philosophical turn and more in-
keeping with Heideggerian terminology (Guy Thompson, 2004). This also supports criticism voiced that Laing will 




E.g. Wife’s perspective of her husband’s perspective of his feelings toward her 
Coding   WH(HW) 
Means of attaining metaperspective of the wife: 
i) Do you think he thinks he loves you?  
ii) How would he answer the question ‘she loves me? ’ 
Meta-metalevel Perspective 
E.g. Husband’s perspective of the wife’s perspective of her husband’s perspective of his 
feelings toward her 
Coding   HWH(HW) 
Means of attaining meta-metaperspective of the husband: 
i) Do you think that you wife thinks that you love her? 
ii) How will he think you have answered the question ‘I love him? ’ 
Resonating with the Milan group’s later development of family therapy using ‘circular 
questioning’ theory in the 1980s (a compatibility acknowledged by John Hills, a family 
therapist with the Tavistock Clinic and author of Introduction to Systemic and Family 
Therapy, 2013), Laing’s model moves beyond the broad and blurred situational examples of 
two person and individual operations, now outlining the series of ego/other communications. 
Regardless of context, he is proposing that our interaction with the other is based on a series 
of ever deepening ‘second-guesses’ or meta-communications; the more consistent matches 
appear in shared responses, the more secure the relationship and the more we can invest 
confidence and trust in our own perspectives (ontological security). Conversely, the more 
disjunctions occur throughout these layers, the greater the insecurity towards others and 
eventually ourselves (ontological insecurity). When levels increase beyond third stage (meta-
meta) perspectives, and when inconsistencies or disjuncture occur at mismatched and 
varying levels, the impacts become more subtle and therefore severe. Importantly, the 
potential anomalies or ruptures, where mismatched responses occur, are not only 
detrimental to the ego/other relationship but to the ego in isolation (or rather ego within the 
context of others). It is also important to contextualise that the ego/other dynamic mirrors the 
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inner/outer dynamic when conceptualised within the self as a being-in-the-world. Disjuncture 
with the other(s), if sufficiently significant, poses a threat to the inner/outer world relation. 
Whether positive or negative subjective value is impregnated by the other or ego, at any 
stage (Meta(x) = meta, meta-meta, meta-meta-meta level perspectives…) the cyclic process 
of interpersonal relationships and perceptions, increasingly alter either position. Each stage 
creates experiences which contaminate the phantasy constructs held individually and 
collectively; this is then reintroduced into the interpersonal relationship. The culmination of 
these ever-increasing levels is determined within this interpersonal perception as a meta-
identity. However, this meta-identity is simply a deepening complexity of the individual (ego) 
and shared social phantasy systems.94  
Laing’s examples are most clearly depicted in the two-person dyadic relationship but he 
makes clear that the intricacies within these interpersonal models increase exponentially 
when we move from a two-person dyad to group dyads and beyond. This is evidenced 
profoundly in the group or nexus of the family in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964) and, 
although vaguer, it also applies to the macro collective of the political context. The term 
‘dyadic’ refers to a two-person dynamic and is therefore accurate of Laing’s focus upon the 
ego/other relationship; however, this can also be limiting toward the social application of 
Laing’s theory. The ego is always in relation to the other but it must be remembered that the 
other is infinite; every person with whom I engage and share experience is another and this 
experience overlaps and extends infinitely. It is more accurate in this context to think of 
Laing’s theory as interpersonal communications or Interpersonal Perceptions, reflecting his 
later book title.   
Once again, we see where Laing’s turn to philosophy, applied to interpersonal 
communications, provides a highly psychosocial process by which the ego is saturated with 
experiences that encapsulate it. The manner in which these external dynamics become 
internalised within phantasy constructs, and therefore the ego, illustrates further how 
displeasing truths or an untruth presented as a pleasing truth (to borrow the previous 
Sartrean phrase) become part of our identity. The complexity, diversity and compounding 
 
94 Whilst no mention of Lacanian influence is made within Interpersonal Perception, similarities regarding the 
relationship between the self and other, operating through interpersonal behaviour and knowledge, can be 
identified within Lacan’s theory of the big ‘Other’ (Bailly, 2009) and ‘Prisoner Dilemma’ (Hook, 2013). This is one 
of the few theoretical connections between Laing and Lacan who otherwise operate with highly contrasting 
frameworks (see Guy Thompson, 2005). 
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nature of ego/other dynamics involved in this process also highlight the difficulty one would 
have in locating the point of origin to enable the addressing of a root cause.  
The human race is a myriad of refractive surfaces staining the white radiance of 
eternity. Each surface refracts the refraction of refraction of refractions. Each self 
refracts the refractions of others’ refractions of self refractions of others’ refractions… 
(Laing et al., 1966. p. 3) 
When we draw this together as a theory of self, reality for the individual is shaped by the 
experiences held between the ego and the other, the other being any single player but 
crucially connected within a social network of relationships from the intimate to the political. 
Laing’s focus is trained on the construction process of our (meta)identity: an identity 
comprised of phantasy, unique to an individual, but always and constantly impacting on and 
by the continually refracting multiplicity of ego/other experiences. Extending beyond a 
psychoanalytic theory of introjection and projection, characteristics of these concepts provide 
an inroad and foundation for Laing to develop a compounding theory of shared experience 
beyond a single stage operation to appreciate the complexities of meta(x) perspectives. 
Approaching Laing’s theory of self, specifically the inseparability of ego/other within, through 
a Sartrean lens, the internal stability of phantasy constructs is galvanised, particularly 
through unpacking the notion of bad faith and considering the impact of pre-reflective and 
reflective consciousness on Laing’s use of unconscious experience.   
It is important to note the language Laing employs throughout his theory of self, specifically 
with regard to phantasy systems. At no point does he refer to phantasy as instructing our life 
story but always as influencing our life story. This subtlety complements the existential-
phenomenological methodology outlined previously. Laing’s language tells us that the self is 
not constituted by otherness but rather is intricately bound with otherness. A concept of true 
or original self remains part of the ego: a concept of Being and therefore a free and 
autonomous self always present. As summarised by Guy Thompson (2004), the other may 
influence but I choose to be the individual I am. 
Summary 
Part 2 has created the two structural columns that provide the foundation to support the 
entirety of theory moving forward. Both columns have been established through a concept 
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analysis of Laing’s existential-phenological theory and, as represented by each chapter, 
produce a methodological framework and a theory of self-formation.  
Laing’s theory highlights the damage inflicted upon the person when perceived solely 
through the lens of scientific psychiatric discourse. The scientific methodology of psychiatry 
and medicine remains at a distance from the self, and its language and discourse enforce an 
organismic definition upon the self. In only engaging with the outer world of the individual, 
psychiatric frameworks perform a split upon their target of enquiry, receptive to select 
experiences from within the totality. Without engaging the full gamut of experiential gestalts, 
this approach fails to grasp true knowledge of persons. In contrast, Laing’s existential-
phenomenological methodology provides no such limitation or filter in its application to the 
person. The person in its entirety, inner and outer experiences, is engaged, their being-in-
the-world is embraced. Laing provided reason to distrust the dominance of the psychiatry, 
and a rationale to justify following his theory, whilst this was initially intended as a guidance 
for clinicians to inform their understanding of persons, the premise extents to all encounters 
between persons. Laing’s theory enables us to (re)connect as persons, I-Thou relatedness, 
and not as organisms, I-It relatedness.   
The theory of self-formation is a deconstruction from within this existential-phenomenology 
methodology. The self is revealed as a totality of experiences, inner/outer, ego/other 
dynamic, experiences that are mapped onto the construct of phantasy. In a never-ending 
loop, the phantasy construct plays a major role in the interpretation for the totality of 
experiences which then affects how experiences are incorporated into the phantasy 
construct. But this is not purely a social constructivist theory of self, beneath this phantasy 
construct is the constant presence of our Being and nonbeing, the potential realisation of our 
free self and resignation over our inevitable death. We retain the ability to choose and act 
upon the events within our social context, although to enact this freedom can be a more 
daunting existential prospect than maintaining the conditions of our ontological insecurity, 
hence we endure and maintain the status quo through bad faith. This final point being of 
paramount importance as we move into the Part 3, Ontological Insecurity, and focus upon 
this detrimental experience.  
Laing’s theory is founded on the premise that part of the human condition is to immerse 
ourselves in everyday life in an effort to seek refuge from the existential angst caused by the 
presence of Being and nonbeing. Reversing this focus, Laing states that if we experience an 
un-nurturing environment, affecting the development of phantasy constructs, the ability to 
align experience between the ego and other is compromised which results in a disruption to 
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our worldly immersion and a resultant awareness of our base existential angst is awakened. 






Part 3. Ontological Insecurity  
In the previous section, Return to Philosophy, I described how Laing establishes a toolkit by 
which to gain truer knowledge of persons. His development and application of existential-
phenomenology provided a contrasting methodology to the dominant model of medical 
psychiatry. Investing value in the authority of the sufferer’s experience, the totality of 
experience, this methodology brought psychic and social elements back into the fold, 
socially adverse conditions having the potential to disrupt the precarity of the human 
condition. Underpinning this is a theory of self-formation, as summarised by Guy Thompson 
(2000, p. 489) as the ‘totality of everything we believe is rooted in our experience’; what we 
believe constitutes who we are, and how our experience is a product of multitudinous 
interpersonal communications with the other. This methodological basis provides the terrain 
to map how psychic suffering is experienced.   
The key concept in Laing’s understanding of schizoid experience is ‘ontological 
insecurity’. (Collier, 1977, p. 2) 
Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity is widely regarded as his defining theoretical 
concept, an opinion shared by many supporters and critics alike (Collier, Lidz, Sedgwick and 
several others in subsequent sources). In full agreement with this premise, this concept is 
developed further in this chapter, enabling it to be placed centrally as we consider Laing’s 
potential to offer a political theory of value within the current ‘mental health’ crisis. It is my 
belief that the concept of ontological insecurity is where the true potential of Laing is 
revealed. It was this concept that allowed the lay-public, psychiatric professionals, diagnosed 
and undiagnosed sufferers to relate, in differing capacities, to his description of the 
processes and therefore causes of psychic suffering – hence the reception and popularity of 
his books.  
Ontological insecurity occupied its most prominent position in Laing’s first book, The Divided 
Self (1960), where Part 1, Chapter 3 was named after and dedicated to it. Remembering the 
critical acclaim many held (and hold) for the entirety of this seminal text, this chapter, the 
largest in the book, is its heart, containing vivid theoretical description and definition 
(Howarth-Williams, 1977). Steeped in existential-phenomenology, the influence and impact 
achieved by this uniquely Laingian concept, ontological insecurity, should not be 
underestimated, a position that will be argued throughout this thesis. That is not to say that 
the concept is not without controversy. An issue of inconsistency is often highlighted with 
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Laing’s application in the family seemingly differing from that in the political context, the 
repercussions of this perceived contradictory application ultimately affecting the entirety of 
Laing’s theory.  
Part 3 examines Laing’s description of ontological insecurity in detail, strengthening other 
ideas that appear with it and are often overlooked or missed in secondary representations, 
with the aim of establishing a theory that intersects with all the varying contexts that Laing 
addresses (clinical, familial, and political),95 addressing the matter of consistency, and 
providing a means to connect with a notion of psychic suffering. This discussion builds 
heavily on the theory developed in the previous chapters; it was through Laing’s existential-
phenomenological approach to the individual that he was able to gain truer knowledge of the 
self, and through this, an understanding of the experiences that cause psychic suffering and 
how they confer social intelligibility upon it.  
  
 
95 These contexts will be discussed later in Part 3.  
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7. An Empirical Concept 
[The] ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, 
spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm centre of his own and other people’s reality 
and identity. (Laing, 1960, p. 39) 
The concept of ontological insecurity logically stands in opposition to, and in the absence of, 
its positive twin, ontological security. Laing describes the ontologically secure individual as a 
person with a rooted belief in their own and others’ resilience allowing them to immerse 
themselves within, and navigate, ordinary life; very simply, a person with the capacity to 
cope with whatever life throws at them. At the outset, the presentation of ontological security 
was as a ‘normal’ state of being (Laing, 1960); a highly contentious premise within the 
existential field (Deurzen, 2010). Adding to this unstable position, Laing declared at a 
subsequent time period that the normal state of being was ontologically insecure – a 
seemingly diametrically opposed claim. This is a significant point that needs our attention 
and will be addressed as we continue. But let us not be drawn too heavily into the concept of 
the ‘secure self’ as this was not Laing’s interest,96 a statement in part supported by the 
brevity of his writing on this matter – almost entirely encapsulated within the quote above. 
Laing wanted to know, understand, and ultimately help those in need and so focussed upon 
the ontologically insecure individual, the person experiencing a disruption within their being-
in-the-world. 
The ontological insecurity described in The Divided Self is a fourth possibility. Here, 
man, as a person, encounters non-being, in a preliminary form, as a partial loss of 
the synthetic unity of self, concurrently with partial loss of relatedness with the other, 
and in an ultimate form, in the hypothetical end-state of chaotic nonentity, total loss of 
relatedness with self and other. (Laing, 1961, p. 51) 
Although broached in the earlier chapters, we now analyse ontological insecurity with 
attention to detail. Tillich, an existential-theologist, is responsible for coining the term 
‘ontological security’ (Collier, 1977; Kotowicz, 1997). Adapting the being/nonbeing dichotomy 
underpinning the human condition, Tillich’s theory encompassed three anxieties: death, guilt 
and purposelessness (Howarth-Williams, 1977). Nonetheless, Tillich agrees that in the 
 
96 Having completed the research of families with a diagnosed member as ‘schizophrenic’ in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family, Laing and Esterson were planning to provide a comparison with a research study with ‘normal’ 
families. This did not develop due to Laing’s lack of interest in non-diagnosed families (Mullan, 1995).   
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avoidance of base anxieties (whether two or threefold), the individual exchanges their 
potential freedom for worldly servitude. Laing’s description of the ‘fourth possibility’ (he could 
equally as well have stated it was the third possibility if referenced to Sartre, Heidegger or 
Kierkegaard), positions his focus for ontological insecurity beyond the three base anxieties 
directly associated with the human condition (again, two anxieties if we addressed this to 
other existential thinkers). The fourth possibility is the location where anxieties occur within 
our empirical experiences, within our everyday existence, these are anxieties produced as a 
consequence of socially adverse conditions (whether macro or micro). Moving forward the 
term ‘fourth possibility anxieties’ is adopted to emphasise this fuller involvement within our 
everyday life.  
Situating fourth possibility anxieties is the defining and qualifying feature of Laing’s 
application of ontological insecurity and the component seemingly overlooked by Deurzen. 
With explicit reference to the earlier work of Laing, a period in which Laing focused on the 
family, Deurzen states that ontological security is anything but the normal state of being in 
an existential sense, and that Laing, in stating this, makes a fundamental mistake.  
[Laing] missed the point that ontological insecurity is the very foundation of the 
human condition. (Deurzen, 2010, p. 219) 
Deurzen’s issue with Laing is that he confused ‘ontic’ security, security within one’s everyday 
environment, with ontological security, embracing one’s potential freedom and individual 
authenticity.  
Laing confused the ontic with the ontological […] since he equated ontological 
insecurity with a pathological state of mind generated by negative family dynamics. 
(Deurzen, 2010, p. 219) 
In Laing’s defence, he missed nothing in this respect.97 Deurzen’s reproach of Laing is 
rooted in semantics and whilst philosophically she is correct, she is imposing a theoretical 
definition onto Laing’s work that he had already addressed. Laing clearly advocates a non-
traditional or rigid approach to existentialism, furthermore he specifically adds a caveat to his 
concept and use of the term ontological insecurity by stating that it applies to empirical 
 
97 True ontological security within the existential understanding, is only gestured toward in The Politics of 
Experience, but this is not his pressing concern. 
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experiences that are placed beyond the base elements of the human condition, hence 
located in the fourth possibility or worldliness.    
I have used the term [ontology] in its present empirical sense. (Laing, 1960, p. 39) 
From Laing’s position, the ontic-ontological distinction used by philosophers and highlighted 
by Deurzen, is seemingly collapsed, or perhaps even, seen as irrelevant. In Laing’s theory 
ontological security requires ontic security; the necessity for safe refuge in worldliness is a 
prerequisite to manage the human condition. This premise also extends to its negative 
inversion, but with greater complexity. The ontologically insecure individual is either, a) 
caused by ontic insecurity; fourth possibility anxieties have disrupted the balance for being-
in-the-world. Or, b) the ontologically insecure individual will be unable to attain ontic security; 
unable manage being-in-the-world, the cohesion for the totality is lost. Where more 
traditional existentialism typically follows the logic of b); the existential angst of Being 
preventing the capacity to immerse itself in-the-world, Laing’s empirical focus upon fourth 
possibility anxieties turns this notion on its head. Laing pursues the opposite causal 
relationship a) without an existentially nurturing social environment, Being is left without an 
‘in-the-world’ within which to immerse itself and seek refuge from the human condition. 
Regardless of the direction of the casual relationship, Deurzen’s critique is a moot point, 
Laing clearly defines his intentional adaptation of traditional theory and his application of this 
concept holds true to this definition. This critique does however serve to emphasise the 
specifically Laingian quality that underpins Laing’s notion of ontological insecurity. 
Experience is ‘not ‘inner’ rather than ‘outer ’'  (Laing, 1967, p. 17), equally as much it is not 
ontological rather than ontic, or vice versa. To have a sense of ontologically security we 
embrace the full gamut of experiential-gestalts; further support for the psychosocial capacity 
within Laing’s theory   
Using the reference point of the diagnosed schizophrenic, those whom Laing deemed to be 
experiencing the most extreme form of ontological insecurity, he illustrated how anxieties 
stimulated in each of various contexts (clinical, family, political) have the capacity to heighten 
the individual’s acute awareness of the precarity of their own existence and death, inducing 
existential angst.   
This aspect of ontological insecurity, its development within the fourth possibility and its 
subsequent awakening of existing base existential angst, is either glanced at within 
secondary sources or bypassed in its entirety, focus being channelled to the split, or divided 
experience, that defines the most severe ontologically insecure existences. As we move into 
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the experience of the split self, I want to emphasise the importance for the ability of fourth 
possibility anxieties located within our empirical worldly existence, to retain the capacity to 
unsettle the human condition as a major aspect of Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity.   
Locating the source of threat in the outer world, Laing stated that an individual takes 
protective measures to preserve the life of the inner world. The (coping) strategy employed 
is to disconnect the inner from the outer, placing the ‘true’ self out of danger by breaking the 
totality of the being-in-the-world, nullifying the threat by becoming more synonymous with a 
being-and-the-world. 
[T]he ontologically insecure person is preoccupied with preserving rather than 
gratifying himself: the ordinary circumstances of living threaten his low threshold of 
security. (Laing, 1960, p. 42) 
The ‘preservation’ Laing was talking about was the effort invested to sever all links from the 
perceived or actual threat located in the outer world. The outcome of this is a separation of 
their inner ‘true’ self from the outer world relation,98 a rupture performed to protect their inner 
self from existential death, ultimately creating a structural split of the ego.  
It is important to recall that momentary, fleeting, splits in the self can occur with relation to 
awareness of modes of experience (perception, memory, imagination), and this remains 
within the parameters of what Laing discussed within a normal, or secure, context. But it is 
the structural quality and extent of this rupture that determines ontological insecurity and its 
severity. Laing demonstrated this most profoundly within the context of schizophrenia, or 
rather the splitting of the self,99 where he showed that such is the magnitude of ontological 
insecurity that a complete inner/outer split is experienced (Laing, 1960). Enacted in an effort 
to safeguard the integrity of the inner world and to protect the true self, unfortunately, this 
fractured totality creates a false self position, displacing problems and increasing the 
 
98 Laing adopts interchangeable terminology to differentiate between these two binaries, with inner and 
subjective mostly used to describe the individual’s own thoughts and experiences within the psyche. This inner 
world is also frequently referred to as the perceived ‘true-self’, their essence of being. Outer and objective are 
the most prominent terms used to describe experiences that occur in the world beyond their own psyche, 
including being the source of interpersonal relationships with others.  
By ‘inner’ I mean our way of seeing the external world and all those realities that have no ‘external’, 
‘objective’ presence. (Laing, 1967, p. 115) 
A different theoretical interpretation using these alternative (epistemological) terms will be developed later in 
this thesis, but Laing’s application and all subsequent secondary texts, retain all terms within the binary 
inner/outer, thus keeping a direct and simple framework.  
99 This aspect also resonates with Klein’s Paranoid-Schizoid theory. Any direct connection with Klein is more 
tenuous than with Winnicott, but needs be acknowledged. 
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difficulty of managing the totality.100 The full negative consequences of this splitting is 
addressed later but it is enough to understand at this point that although performed with the 
intention of preservation, in actuality it causes significant psychic suffering.  
The example of the (mis)diagnosed schizophrenic, or rather the most severe cases of 
ontological insecurity, evidenced the propensity for psychiatry to treat this experience as an 
indication (symptom) of ‘illness’ or ‘disease’, when in actuality it is a true form of existential 
crisis. The worldly context of these patients, the environment of their existence, was no 
longer providing a suitably habitable home for Being to immerse itself and escape the angst 
of the human condition surfacing within daily life.   
A pivotal moment in the claim for ontological insecurity to be considered a viable component 
within Laing’s theory was the evidential support he garnered through empirical observation. 
These observations encouraged Laing (1960, p. 43) to conclude that ‘three primary forms of 
anxiety [are] encountered by the ontologically insecure person: engulfment, implosion, 
petrification’. 
Engulfment 
[B]asic security is so low that practically any relationship with another person, 
however tenuous or however apparently ‘harmless ’,  threatens to overwhelm him. (p. 
44)  
Often the manoeuvre employed by the individual fearful of engulfment is isolation. However, 
this brings another form of engulfment, the fear of a void incurring complete aloneness. 
Without any safe third space, the individual is left in the untenable position that another’s 
actions may destroy his autonomy, and with it his true self.  
Implosion101 
The individual feels that, like the vacuum, he is empty. But this emptiness is him. (p. 
45) 
 
100 There is a strong Winnicottian similarity here, this will be discussed below. 
101 Laing (1960, p. 44) relates this to an ‘extreme form of what Winnicott terms the impingement of reality’. 
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Much like the threat of engulfment, the individual fears being overwhelmed, but rather than 
specific to inter-personal contact, reality is the persecutor of implosion. The individual fears 
reality being uncontrollably sucked into the void of their subjectivity. Laing gives the violent 
illustration of gas rushing in and obliterating the vacuum. 
Petrification 
A particular form of terror, whereby one is petrified, i.e. turned to stone. (p. 46) 
The fear is that one may be petrified, or petrify another; to be turned into stone, or turn 
someone else to stone. Laing implicates this directly with depersonalisation. He describes 
depersonalisation as a technique used to deal with ‘tiresome or disturbing’ individuals, a 
process of refusing to acknowledge their feelings thus regarding them as having no feelings. 
Whilst Laing does not describe it in this fashion, this would appear to be akin to denying the 
other’s human qualities and treating them as an inanimate object – a stone. Thereby the 
ontologically insecure individual may fear petrifying another through depersonalisation, 
and/or being petrified through colonisation by another.  
Mullan (1995) suggests that the three anxieties – engulfment, implosion and petrification – 
are the kernel of Laingian theory, and to a certain extent they are. They provide an empirical 
grounding beyond philosophical speculative theory (Burston, 1996). They show us 
consistencies within the experience of ontological insecurity: the individual is terrified that the 
actions of another will saturate and destroy their autonomy and sense of self, and a resultant 
disturbance in the inner/outer world ruptures the totality of experiences for their being-in-the-
world.  
Laing did not describe it as such but this could equally be presented as compromising a 
Buberian capacity for relatedness with others and the outer world, or as if a Heideggerian 
insurmountable split of the ego totality ensues. Laing wasn’t finished here though. Having 
justified the experience of ontological insecurity, he furthered his research, applying his 
methodology more thoroughly, and gained more intelligible data for analysis. Delving further 
into the experience of ontological insecurity (which surfaced in these three anxieties), Laing 
explored how these anxieties occur, revealing how ontological insecurity can develop. This is 
where Laing’s theory becomes concerned with the family, this being the context of his 
research which extracted further social intelligibility from the experience of ontological 
insecurity. However, as I will argue, this theory is also relevant within his political application.  
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The term ontological insecurity stems from Tillich, but the main influence must be attributed 
to Heidegger (Mullan, 1995). Through wider reference to the pre-established discourse of 
Heidegger, addressed specifically in Chapter 5, A Laingian Methodology, Laing’s concept of 
ontological insecurity gains a more substantial theoretical anchor to clarify and articulate the 
notion of a disharmonious link of inner and outer worlds, an experienced rupture within the 
totality of Dasein, an event that prevents the necessary relatedness to the achievement of 
being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s influence will continue to be important as we develop this 
concept and consider its application within the family and political context.  
At this point Heidegger strengthens the structural description for ontological insecurity as a 
rupture for the totality of self, a split within the being-in-the-world, Being separated from the 
in-the-world. Relating this further with reference to Buber, this split is the cause of a 
subsequent breakdown in relatedness with oneself and with others, this equally constituting 
a loss of reciprocal and bidirectional relatedness of inner and outer worlds. Creating an 
untenable situation for the self, the threat of annihilation – as evidenced in the three primary 
forms of anxiety – and the experience of ontological insecurity, is a more than justifiable 
cause of psychic suffering.  
Exploring the experience of the split self as a means to describe a loss of relatedness with 
one’s context, tends to be the focus for most secondary sources that invest in Laing’s theory. 
This is an important aspect however, I will concentrate on its connection to psychic suffering, 
and how a split self, how ontological insecurity may be caused.   
Object Relations, Presence and Absence 
Laing clearly saw his theory as an existential one, distancing it from the established 
psychoanalytic schools. However, with specific regard to ontological in/security, the 
discussion of a ‘split totality’, and connotations of a schizoid position, this terminology and 
elements within certain concepts resonate with existing object-relations theory and several 
psychoanalytic thinkers within, or in close proximity to, it (Beveridge, 2011; Mullan, 1995). 
This continuing link requires attention as we look to develop a clearly defined theory of 
ontological insecurity.  
Laing’s involvement with the Tavistock, coincided with a significant debate in the 
psychoanalytic field. Melanie Klein was pushing the boundaries antagonistically toward and 
against the traditionalist Freudian school, strengthening the position of the Object Relations 
School (ORS). Klein also applied her theory toward the shared interest of psychosis. As 
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Beveridge (2010, p. 84) notes, the influence of this debate was always going to permeate 
Laing’s thinking, given that Laing ‘drew on object relations theory to construct his account of 
the self’. Although Laing disputes this suggestion, stating in The Politics of Experience that 
ORS offers only limited insight into his theory, and contesting any notable influence in his 
interviews with Mullan (1995), his use of terminology such as splitting, true self, false self 
which echo Klein, Fairbairn and Winnicott, keeps a connection alive in his work. 
‘Splitting’ is a key element of Klein’s theory, a necessary process in the development of a 
healthy functioning adult. Splitting others and oneself into fragmented objects enables 
powerful emotions, originating within innate libido drives, to be compartmentalised and 
regulated. It is through this splitting within the ego, that is also a splitting of one’s ego, and 
the management of these resultant objects that self-formation can be managed as a whole, 
regulating the individual and allowing the self to successfully participate in relationships with 
others (Segal, 1979; Segal; 1992). Splitting and unconscious phantasy (another major 
Kleinian term) are both terms adopted by Laing but differences in application are present.  
Laing makes only one direct reference to Klein,102 but whilst the terminology employed is 
similar, the idea of the ego being formed and structured by ‘object-relations’ is a framework 
that he distances himself from with reference to his existentially grounded theory of a total 
self. The premise of a split ego, a structural split i.e., a permanent aspect of the ego, is 
discussed by Laing as an action that ruptures the synchronicity/cohesion of the being-in-the-
world, therefore a highly detrimental event that defines ontological insecurity. However, 
whilst the volume of Laing’s attention is directed toward the consequence of a structural split 
of the ego and how this constitutes ontological insecurity, in contrast to the more Kleinian 
understanding for the necessity of ego splitting for psychic health, Laing doesn’t 
unequivocally write-off splitting.  
Let us return to the example previously discussed in Chapter 6, Self-Formation. Laing (1961) 
states that Peter becomes distracted during his interaction with another, thus causing him to 
lose track of the conversation (the primary mode of experience; perception, has been 
dominated by the alternate modes of experience; imagination and/or memory). Laing states 
clearly that Peter is ‘split’ but unlike all his other theory, the context of a split in this 
encounter does not fall within the parameters of ontological insecurity. Whilst very little 
theory is offered with this brief example for an ontologically ‘acceptable’ split, it is my reading 
that the difference is located in the fact that this is a momentary and partial split. Rather than 
 
102 A brief note in Self and Others (1961) but this adds no structural influence or value. 
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illuminating a structural, therefore permanent, split of the ego, it demonstrates a changing 
awareness of different modes of experience. The experience may not be located within the 
locked vault of an unconscious structure, a compartmentalised element of the psyche 
created by a split, as per the Kleinian school; nonetheless, a split is still recognised by Laing 
within a non-detrimental ontological context.   
Fairbairn (1952), operating from a basis compatible with Klein, provides us with a more 
socially guided concept of ORS and this brings Laing closer. The innate drives (libido) 
remain a powerful force but for Fairbairn their energies push us to form relational bonds with 
others. It is the disturbance in these bonds, particularly in the mother-child relationship, that 
result in excessive compartmentalising and fragmentation of the ego. Excessive splitting is a 
cause of ‘mental illness’. Without dismissing an element of personal accountability, the 
individual is more a product of their environment, specifically the relationship formed with the 
mother. With Fairbairn, the recognition that relationships are the root component responsible 
for (ontological) security of the ego (self) – and in the negative they manifest in excessive 
compartmentalisation or splitting – bears more compatibility with Laing’s extreme ontological 
insecurity as the foundation of a divided self (an excessive and compulsive inner split from 
outer). Nevertheless, the ORS broader assertion that some form of structural splitting of the 
ego is necessary and therefore healthy, holds a distance from Laing’s overall stance.  
Fairbairn’s emphasis on the drive to achieve social relatedness being instrumental in the 
development of a healthy, secure, ego is an opening that will be further developed as we 
consider Buber and self-consciousness. 
Several other theorists of this ilk are acknowledged fleetingly in the footnotes of The Divided 
Self, recognised for influencing the notion of a ‘false self’. One particular name, Donald 
Winnicott, a theorist occupying a position in the aptly named ‘Middle School’ (situated 
between Freud and Klein but leaning toward further ORS influence) requires particular 
attention (Burston, 1995). The term ‘false self’ is a Winnicottian term and Laing’s use of this 
places it firmly within this influence.  
The True Self is the theoretical position from which comes the spontaneous gesture 
and personal idea. The spontaneous gesture is the True Self in action. Only the True 
Self can be creative and feel real. Whereas a True Self feels real, the existence of a 
False Self results in feeling unreal or a sense of futility.  
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The False Self, if successful in its function, hides the True Self, or else finds a way of 
enabling the True Self to start to live. (Winnicott, 1965, p. 148) 
Kirsner (2015) states that the manner in which Laing’s true self remains hidden behind the 
mask of the false self when developed within an unnurtured or threatened environment owes 
a lot to Winnicottian object relations theory. Winnicott voiced this directly to Laing when 
reading an early draft of The Divided Self (Mullan, 1995; Laing, A. 1994); however, Laing 
rejected the suggestion that Winnicott was instrumental in the development of any aspect of 
his theory. In his interviews with Mullan (1995, p. 119) he belittled Winnicott’s capacity to 
have any such influence, calling him ‘intellectually stultified’ and in the biography written by 
Adrian Laing (1994) arguing that he was unaware of Winnicott’s theory at the time of 
developing and writing this concept. Unfortunately, this is clearly untrue. Laing 
acknowledges Winnicott in the footnotes of page 44 of The Divided Self, recognising the 
similarities between engulfment and Winnicott’s impingement theory – this acknowledgment 
could be an inclusion made following Winnicott’s reading of an early draft and prior to its 
completion/publication, therefore not conclusive of his influence during the process of 
writing. However, in a letter sent to Winnicott, dated in 1958, Laing asks Winnicott to read an 
early draft of The Divided Self and in this request, he confesses:  
 It draws its inspiration very largely from your writing. (Rodman, 2003, p. 243) 
The source of animosity toward Winnicott is unclear, but, in contrast to Laing’s 
proclamations, the evidence points to the false self having significant indebtedness to 
Winnicott. A true self, an ontologically secure self, is the product of a nurturing and balanced 
environment, and in the absence of such conditions, a false self, an ontologically insecure 
self, is developed. Kotowicz (1997) adds an interesting perspective to this argument, stating 
that Laing’s true self/false self dichotomy ultimately leads to an unresolved cul-de-sac, 
whereby no common resolution can be found in this all or nothing approach to existence – 
inner/outer, emancipation/alienation. However, Winnicott’s object relations model provides a 
more advanced theory by providing a ‘third space’, a place of interaction and playing 
between these binary positions – therefore a less drastic and more socially representable 
theory. I address this perceived limitation with specific use of Laing’s concept of ‘self-
consciousness’ and develop it further as this thesis continues, suggesting that a more 
nuanced interpretation of Laing’s theory is available that operates beyond the limitations of a 
polemical binary: mad or sane, secure or insecure, schizoid or ‘normal’ dichotomy that 
dominates the current application of his work.  
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Whether intentionally or not, and with or without explicit recognition, aspects of Winnicott’s 
false self/true self theory (and Fairbairn and Klein’s theory) are undeniably compatible with 
Laing’s ontological insecurity model. ORS was a prominent discussion within psychiatric 
theory, and especially so within the Tavistock, at that time, so its terminology is likely to have 
permeated and influenced his own theory. However, the compatibility in the empirical 
manifestation and terminology adopted does not exclude the possibility that Laing reached 
this conclusion primarily through an alternative existential pathway. What we must also 
consider, as demonstrated with the conflicting evidence and statements about Winnicott, is 
that Laing’s words might be more indicative of his desire to be considered separate than the 
reality of influence.  
In his most direct statement on this, Laing (1967, p. 44) acknowledges object-relations 
theory’s ‘concepts of internal and external objects, of closed and open systems, go some 
way’ toward explaining how interpersonal dynamics manifest in pathology. This seems a 
better resting point to conclude the influence of ORS than simply dismissing or writing it off. 
Using the example of Maya’s story, we can ‘go some way toward’ speculating an analysis 
using object relations theory by highlighting an overlap or shared theoretical territory. During 
Maya’s infancy (unfavourable) family dynamics have compromised her ability to identify 
‘objects’ as independent of herself, with specific relation to the primary care givers, the 
mother and her constituent parts (good breast / bad breast) – each presented as objects in 
their own right. This developmental impediment has significant implications with regard to 
Maya’s identification of the location of experience, particularly emotion etc; suggesting she 
might be asking herself, ‘whose feeling is this?’ This has a strong Winnicottian echo, 
acknowledged by Laing within his chapter on self-consciousness:  
[A] necessary component in the development of the self is the experience of oneself 
as a person under the loving eye of the mother. (Laing, 1960, p. 116) 
Although speculative, this analysis feeds further into later references noted in The Politics of 
Experience, where Laing briefly mentions the infant’s relationship to the breast object and 
mother, attributing the origin of this notion to Freud whilst also acknowledging Winnicott and 
Bion by name, within a context that reverberates with a Kleinian influence. With a simplistic 
application of object-relations theory, that with ‘good enough’ management of object 
relations throughout the infant’s life, the individual can identify and organise the plenitude of 
objects from inner and outer worlds which enables them to form a whole self and become a 
healthy functioning adult, an equally simplistic interpretation of Laing’s theory can be drawn: 
Laing analysed the family specifically, his studies often revealed prolonged exposure to 
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adverse conditions during critical developmental periods (infant, child); and the parent (often 
the mother) undertook the primary role.103 Maya’s experience therefore created a social 
phantasy construct with an inability to locate herself as an independent object from her 
parents. 
The complexity of Laing’s relationship with psychoanalytic theory, particularly Winnicott, 
remains just that, complex. There is an undeniable compatibility of terminology, and 
components stemming from ORS, or those in close proximity, offer initial insight into certain 
Laingian ideas. But we must not allow this compatibility to consume or dominate Laing’s 
theory otherwise the significant and sizeable departures in their frameworks will be lost 
(perhaps this is why Laing is at pains to create distance from these aspects of compatibility, 
to ensure its differences are not missed). 
In clear contrast to ORS, Laing (1967, p. 44) states: ‘[o]bjects are the what and not the 
whereby of experience’. This criticism is the platform he uses to contextualise and justify his 
own methodological approach– not least of all, in objection to ORS insistence on reducing 
the self into component parts, the structural splitting of the ego, and the psychoanalytic 
compartmentalisation of a separately functioning unconscious system.  
With an object-to-be-changed, rather than a person-to-be-accepted, simply 
perpetuates the disease it purports to cure. (Laing, 1967, p. 45) 
Using this statement to consolidate his existential basis, more specifically a Sartrean 
influence, Laing (1967) states the process of relating to the object is more accurately an 
emphasis of presence and absence within existence. The identification of an object such as 
the mother’s breast raises our awareness of its presence as a good breast and this 
conversely alerts us to its potential absence, thus deemed a bad breast, and vice versa. He 
juxtaposes the experience of absence and presence with a key component of existentialism, 
nonbeing, and by its inversion, Being. In ORS it is through the family conditions, primarily the 
relationship with the mother, that the self (child) is able to organise the disarray of objects, 
internal and external, and form a cohesive whole, a healthy, functioning self. In contrast, 
Laing states that it is not the organisation of objects that brings us into Being, Being is our 
original state. It is only through the process of being made aware of the presence of these 
objects, that we become aware of their potential absence. And, with absence comes an 
awareness of the possibility of nonbeing and this provokes awareness of our Being. We 
 
103 A critical evaluation of Laing’s research in the family will be addressed in Chapter 12, Interpersonal World. 
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enter back into the existential realm with this concept, as with Heidegger at the outset. But 
this is not without the potential to add value to the experienced everyday. It is by forming a 
self-concept capable of being deconstructed into objects, that our potential death or 
nonbeing is introduced and affirmed. However, through this realisation, we conversely 
become conscious of our Being. The awareness of Being and nonbeing is the ‘[t]he ultimate 
reassurance, and the ultimate terror’ (Laing, 1967, p. 33); the existential crisis we wrestle 
with throughout existence, a crisis that becomes more acute when disturbed by fourth 
possibility anxieties.  
We don’t need ORS to build or understand Laing’s theory, but it does offer a wider context 
as to what was happening at that time of Laing’s writing and potentially how/why he was 
situated in these areas of thought. More importantly, it leads to this highly important 
additional layer of existentialist theory within ontological insecurity: the characteristics and 
interplay of presence and absence, or rather Being and nonbeing, which when brought into 
conversation with the subsequent focus of self-consciousness, reveal the potential of 
ontological security as a consistent concept within Laing’s theory. Before we delve into self-
consciousness, I want to re-establish the primary influence of Heidegger as underpinning 
ontological insecurity and use this to introduce more fully the criticism levelled toward Laing’s 
consistency of application of ontological insecurity. This criticism of inconsistency, a criticism 
of contradiction even, has implications toward the entirety of Laing’s theory being considered 
as a totality.  
The Changing Application of Ontological Insecurity  
Heidegger is arguably the bedrock on which to ground this concept, unsurprisingly 
considering the indebtedness of ontological insecurity to the existential-phenomenological 
methodology which has already positioned Heidegger so prominently in its structure.  
As we move forward, the most important aspects to take from Heidegger’s influence are 
those which Laing directly articulates. He states that the rupture of an inner and outer world 
totality, their Being has lost relatedness in-the-world. It is the structural splitting of the self, 
creating a fault-line and division that separates the experiences associated with the inner 
world and the outer world that Laing states compromises the existential refuge sought in the 
everyday. Reproductions of Laing’s theory frequently rest with the splitting of the self causing 
an inability to function within the social environment. However, delving further into Laing’s 
theory and his influences, the cumulative effect of this spitting and the consequential loss of 
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existential refuge is also recognised as destabilising the precarious stability of the human 
condition, awakening our awareness to existential angst. This further angst giving more 
cause to the experience of psychic suffering endured in response to this splitting of the self 
that constitutes ontological insecurity.  
Collier (1977) adds to this foundational influence stating that within the original Heideggerian 
context, Dasein – and therefore Laing’s concept of the self - functions as an individually 
inauthentic position and conversely a position of authentic commonality; an absolute 
immersion within worldliness (authentic commonality) occurring to the cost of potential 
existential freedom (individual authenticity). This is the fundamental dilemma underpinning 
the human condition and therefore of being-in-the-world. This logically implies that Laing’s 
use of ontological insecurity applies to a loss of authentic commonality. Semantics aside, 
Deurzen (2010) also agrees with the premise of this argument. Laing’s description of 
ontological insecurity identified those whose adverse social environment was preventing 
solace in authentic commonality. This makes sense when applied within the family context: 
authentic commonality (and therefore ontic security) is the measure for ontological 
insecurity. However, turning his attention to the political, ontological insecurity suddenly and 
abruptly places no value on the measurement of authentic commonality and thus ontic 
security, implying instead that our worldly context is no longer a sufficiently nurturing 
existential environment that provides refuge for the human condition.  
This changing dynamic within the application of ontological insecurity is illustrated best using 
the later metaphor in The Politics of Experience for plane formations. In the familial context, 
madness is presented as abnormal and contained within the bracket of ontological 
insecurity; the rogue plane is out of formation but crucially the formation itself is on a correct 
bearing. Those holding formation are presented as ontologically secure. In the political 
context, madness is potentially normal but confusingly now retains a qualification of 
ontological insecurity; the rogue plane is out formation but considering that the formation 
itself has lost its bearing, this is no guarantee of the rogue plane being off course. In fact, 
knowing that the formation has lost its way, this increases the likelihood of the rogue plane 
being on the correct course, or at the very least, being in a suitably distant position from the 
pack to enable greater insight into their deviation. In contrast to the previous model, the 
formation is now also recognised as ontologically insecure – whereas previously it was 
deemed ontologically secure. 
There is no question that the dynamic of ontological insecurity shifts between the family and 
political context, and this event has plagued Laing with accusations of theoretical 
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inconsistency. The question that needs to be answered is whether this shift constitutes a 
contradiction, thus preventing Laing’s theory from being considered within a single, totalising 
framework. The presentation of this shift or change in dynamic as contradictory relies heavily 
on the reductive assumption that Laing’s theory is an atomised collection of components, 
that the contexts of the family and the political, are isolated from one another, producing a 
structure for a family model that is distinct and disconnected from a political model. To 
consider the changing dynamic of ontological insecurity we must address the wider question 
of atomisation.  
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8. As a Totality 
To think of Laing’s theory in the modern era, for most, is to think about an atomised theory, a 
fragmented collection of isolated and independent models. The simplest, most common and 
often repeated structure is the proposition that Laing’s theory contains a familial and, 
separately, a political element, a separation intricately bound with the changing application of 
theory and/or definition of ontological in/security. Furthermore, the family is perceived as the 
strongest element, its place in the theory supported by rigorous empirical research, and this 
stands in direct contrast to a political element which fails against this benchmark (Sedgwick, 
1982; Clare, 1973). In addition, my own analysis noted a significant clinical context, an 
aspect which in this simple format is typically subsumed within the period mostly dealing with 
the family. Each of the three identifiable contexts contributes sufficient content to warrant 
independent recognition and reflects what could be deemed the original and most influential 
analysis of Laing’s theory to encourage a modular format, Siegler et al.’s (1969) Laing’s 
Models of Madness.  
Siegler and Osmond (1966, p. 85) developed an analytical framework consisting of seven 
models for universal application in the understanding of schizophrenia/madness:104 ‘medical, 
moral, psychoanalytic, family interaction, social, conspiratorial and impaired’. They deployed 
this framework as a template during the analysis of numerous theorists’ work, and argued 
that most, if not all, theorists employ one or more models in their application to 
schizophrenia. In 1969, Siegler et al., applied this framework to Laing’s publishing to date (a 
period encapsulating all the developments within his first phase of publishing), concluding 
that Laing’s work presented three models of madness: conspiratorial, psychoanalytic, and 
psychedelic, all of which were operating to a certain degree within the theory of The Politics 
of Experience (1967).105 A highly significant aspect to this research is that it was published 
with the assistance of a NIMH General Research Support Grant and support from the 
American Schizophrenia Foundation, Inc. This places research allegiance, and a potential 
for bias, firmly within the medical council (which Laing was so vehemently opposing), and as 
such medical discourse permeates through the entirety of its modulated structure. This 
influence must be kept in mind when reviewing their opposition and critique of Laing, 
 
104 Siegler and Osmond expanded this framework to eight models in the later publication, Models of Madness, 
Models of Medicine (1974). 
105 Prior to this stage, Siegler et al., (1969) state that only two were present in Laing’s theory, conspiratorial and 
psychoanalytic.  
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however it is equally as important not to be discarded simply due to its often-polemical 
position.  
Howarth-Williams (1977) produced a more complex seven stage framework directly and only 
applied to Laing’s theory. This framework incorporates greater fluidity between all stages, a 
quality distinctly lacking in Siegler et al.’s rigid and boundaried approach; even so, the family 
and political remain the most prominent aspects. Siegler et al.’s Models of Madness was the 
most influential, reprinted as a chapter in the edited book, Laing and Antipsychiatry (1972), 
and instrumental in the family/political distinction referenced in several publications (see 
Crossley, 1998; Crossley, 2005, Laing, A, 1994; Good, 2002; Carpentier, 2002), the clinical 
context seemingly encapsulated within the familial analysis of subsequent studies.   
The momentum behind these modulated and atomised interpretations, influenced 
significantly how I came to understand and define the rupture occurring at the structural 
juncture between the family and the political. 
Siegler et al., identify the rupture as a consequence of Laing’s transition from a 
psychoanalytic model to a psychedelic model, these models translating to the familial and 
political contexts, respectively. Having already outlined Laing’s intent to distance his own 
theory from a psychoanalytic framework, I was further troubled by Seigler et al.’s insistence 
on using the sensationalised term ‘psychedelic’ to address Laing’s Transcendental 
Experience and theory of Metanoia, both more apt names that accurately reflect the 
language and terminology within Laing’s approach. By opting for ‘psychedelic’ Siegler et al., 
are making what is seemingly a deliberately contentious reference that gestures toward 
Laing’s synonymity with LSD during this period but garners only the very briefest of 
acknowledgement in his written theory.106 The content that substantiates the ‘Psychedelic 
Model’ is a major structural component of Laing’s theory, the proposition that schizophrenia 
could be perceived as an existential retreat, a regenerative ‘breakdown’ capable of bringing 
about a breakthrough.  
Schizophrenia is ‘…itself a natural way of healing our own appalling state of 
alienation called normality’. (Laing, 1967, cited in Siegler et al., 1969, p. 953) 
 
106 Laing makes his most direct reference to the compatibility of LSD within the Transcendental Experience in 
Metanoia: Some Experiences at Kingsley Hall (1972). This was not published until after Siegler et al., had chosen 
this model name, and even then, this name deliberately leans toward a very scandalous aspect.  
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But it is folklore and not writing which suffuses the sensationalism of LSD use and treatment, 
within this model (which does not negate its accuracy entirely). Either way, Siegler et al.’s 
Psychedelic Model falls beyond the parameters of this research due to its focus on treatment 
and ‘cure’ as opposed to the process of causation, and they seemingly bypass the wider 
context for the political that this model sits firmly within.  
Howarth-Williams, even with a more dynamic and fluid structure, identifies this same break 
in theoretical continuity occurring between the familial and the political, accounting this 
failure to an inadequately justified progression towards a Marxist application within Laing’s 
theory.107 The point to emphasise is that Howarth-Williams, Seigler et al., and many others, 
identify a family and political dimension to Laing’s theory, albeit with a brief detour into 
Transcendental Experience, structuring each as separate entities and agreeing that Laing’s 
political transition causes difficulty for considering his theory within a singular, cohesive and 
totalising framework, a problem widely reflected in secondary accounts (see Chapman, 
2018; Burston, 1996; Burston, 2000; Sedgwick, 1982; Mullan, 1995; Clare, 1973).  
All the evidence repeated in secondary texts points toward the family-politics split being a 
theoretical anomaly, a conflict Laing seemingly was uninterested in acknowledging or 
responding to. This is a major criticism continually levelled his way, and thus frequently used 
as evidence to disqualify the stability of his entire theory (contributing further to criticisms of 
a lack of theoretical integrity, as found in the political furore discussed later). 
Changing the definition of Normality  
Acknowledging this changing dynamic within Laing’s work, Burston (2000) opens discussion 
about the different concepts of normality that are employed at different stages, coinciding 
with a changing application of ontological insecurity. 
[T]he psychopathological concept of normality posits universal norms of 
psychological functioning and/or relatedness to others according to which any 
individual may be judged disturbed, disordered or well. (Burston, 2000, p. 101) 
 
107 Howarth-Williams places this occurrence between Series and Nexus in the Family, 1962, and Sanity Madness 
and the Family, 1964, far earlier that Siegler et al., who locate it firmly with The Politics of Experience, 1967, the 
reason for this ambiguity is discussed later.  
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Normality within psychiatry, both then and now, is defined by the psychopathological 
concept. Originating with the medical concept of normality, ergo health, the 
psychopathological approach to normality identifies deviance through two theoretical pillars: 
statistical and cultural qualification.  
Laing’s engagement with these concepts of normality (as with his definition of ontological 
insecurity) within the family and political context interact with these pillars differently, but 
Burston (2000) states that they universally oppose the standard definition that is 
psychopathological normality. I agree with certain elements of this argument but question 
others. In addressing Laing’s engagement with each concept of normality, we develop more 
insight into why a change of application occurs with ontological insecurity.  
The Normality Concept Applied in the Family  
Burston’s (2000, p. 98) definition of the statistical aspect states that it is descriptive in format 
and qualifies ‘the norm’ by outlining the ‘central tendency or prevailing trend’. He states that 
statistical qualification of normality is consistently applied throughout The Divided Self and I 
would argue that this corresponds fully with the family context: statistical normality highlights 
the prevailing status quo as a positive state of societal ‘mental health’, with madness 
represented most profoundly by the diagnosed schizophrenic. Using Laing’s later figures in 
1967, 1 in every 100 are schizophrenic; within the family context statistically the mad are 
therefore abnormal.  
Laing’s (1960) feelings toward the cultural concept of normality are more complicated and 
this is evident within the family context. This concept is significantly different to the previous, 
being highly dependent on a prescriptive format: it measures abnormality by deviance from 
moral or political standards etc.108 As the name suggests, cultural normality varies 
dramatically geographically and historically, and these variants have significant implications 
as to whether something is deemed mad or bad, understood as medical or criminal, and 
ultimately determined as a legal or psychiatric case (Burston, 2000). This was touched upon 
earlier as we discussed the increasing dominance of the DSM in determining definitions (and 
treatment) of ‘mental disorders’ on a global scale, a move that is homogenising the cultural 
approach to madness – and not necessarily for the better. Laing discusses the cultural 
 
108 This overlaps significantly with Becker’s Labelling theory as discussed in Chapter 13, Ontological 
Discontinuity. The qualification of deviance being culturally manufactured.  
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concept at the beginning of The Divided Self highlighting epistemological value authority to 
illustrate cultural difference. 
In contrast to the reputable ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ we have the disreputable 
‘subjective ’,  ‘intuitive ’,  or, worse of all, ‘mystical’. (Laing, 1960, p. 25) 
In this quotation, ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ are firmly located as western values, ‘subjective’, 
‘intuitive’ and ‘mystical’ being regarded dismissively from this perspective. Whether Laing 
would still be able to contrast the west versus the rest dichotomy in light of the increasing 
expansion and influence held by the DSM, is questionable, but even without this clear 
cultural contrast, Laing’s statement serves to highlight the western cultural claim109 to be the 
omnipotent and absolute authority on determining norms for the mind, supporting their moral 
and political prescriptions. Laing therefore relied on the statistical notion of normality and 
voiced criticism of the cultural aspect. Burston presents this as justification for Laing’s 
opposition to the psychopathological concept of normality within The Divided Self, which we 
extend here to include the family context.  
At this time, Laing was not alone in questioning the premise of psychopathological normality 
from a cultural perspective, Sedgwick and Szasz providing two associates in this argument, 
albeit for distinct and opposing reasons. Sedgwick’s (1982) activism and writing during the 
1960s highlighted that ‘mental illness’ is not anomalous within any culture. Its constant 
presence across all cultures, regardless of frequency, meant that it cannot be dismissed as 
statistically ‘abnormal’. Szasz’s (1961) approach did not disagree with this but emphasised 
the role of societal frameworks in ostracising those diagnosed as ‘mentally ill’. He stated that 
if our societal arrangement, our cultural approach, was inclusive to their differing needs, they 
would not incur diagnostic labels that subsequently result in detrimental experiences that 
othered them from the outset.  
Although approached from different positions, Szasz and Sedgwick both opposed the 
culturally qualified concept of abnormality; for both, ‘mental health’ issues needed to be re-
considered as a form of normality. Laing’s analysis of the family context also opposed this 
cultural concept but remained distinct from the analyses of Szasz and eventually Sedgwick. 
Sedgwick ultimately lost confidence in Laing for several reasons that I suggest were 
primarily political. Szasz consistently criticised Laing from the outset for maintaining the 
binary of identifying individuals as normal/abnormal with a thinly veiled attempt to disguise 
 
109 and therefore its ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ basis. 
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these sentiments within his own terminology of ontologically insecure/secure and as such, 
Laing did not refute the cultural qualification sufficiently to declare ‘mental health’ issues as a 
form of normality (Kotowicz, 1997).110  
From this basis, I would support Burston’s (2000) assertion that Laing structured his family 
context using a statistical qualification of normality. However, regardless of whether the 
causation of illness was socially intelligible or not, or whether he termed it schizophrenia or 
ontological insecurity, Laing still retained a cultural qualification for what is deemed normal. 
He argued the limitation of the western cultural bias, but this was still the standard (an 
identification of individuals who demonstrated symptoms fitting cultural deviance) that 
denoted the individual as a member of the statistical minority; therefore, he may have 
opposed this concept of normality, but he still adhered to it. I would argue that in Laing’s 
focus upon the family, he questioned and was critical of psychopathological normality, but 
unlike Szasz and Sedgwick his practice was not actively opposed. 
The Normality Concept Applied in the Political  
Moving onto the political context, Laing’s approach and opposition to psychopathological 
normality was argued with far greater effect. For Burston, the start of this shift towards a 
changed understanding of normality is evident from the very next publication of Self and 
Others (1961) and this places it closer, arguably within, the parameters of the family context 
for many. This is discussed further in subsequent chapters, but independent of exact date, it 
represents an obvious shift, with the inversion of statistical normality; it was now the 99% 
undiagnosed that were deemed abnormal, ipso facto the 1% diagnosed as mad constituted 
potential normality. This change in the application of statistical normality, or rather what 
constituted statistical normality within the political context, placed Laing’s theory in full 
opposition to psychopathological normality (which was qualified heavily on the statistical 
qualification of normality). However, it was the role of the cultural concept of normality within 
this statistical inversion that took centre stage with this context. As highlighted above, 
Laing’s criticism of the exclusive cultural authority held by the western view, was present 
from the beginning of The Divided Self. With a political framing Laing no longer simply 
criticised its qualification whilst accepting of its method of identifying deviance; he now 
turned the entire notion of western cultural diagnosis on its head. 
 
110 Laing’s argument against this accusation plays an important role in Chapter 13, Ontological Discontinuity. 
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[L]et us call schizophrenia a successful attempt not to adapt to pseudo social 
realities. (Laing, 1967, p. 57)  
The condition of alienation of being asleep, of being unconscious, of being out of 
one’s mind, is the condition of the normal man. (Laing, 1967, p. 24) 
The plane formation itself is now trapped in a pseudo-sanity caused by, and maintained by, 
social phantasy constructs. When we bring the cultural concept into focus with the political 
framing, it draws existentialism back into the fold; peaceful existence within the cultural 
sphere is experienced only with the disavowal of our true potential for existential freedom. 
When involved and absorbed within pseudo-sanity, the statistically qualified ‘normal’ cannot 
see the wood for the trees. The medical profession unifies doctors, nurses and especially 
psychiatrists; such is their situatedness within the formation, they have lost the capacity for 
perspective and the scientific basis of this has instilled a false sense of superiority, qualifying 
the western cultural perspective itself as the absolute and only authority to grant normality. 
The outcome of this is that collectively we are fully entrenched in bad faith, living a life 
convinced of its authenticity but instead complicit in the conventional practices of everyday 
existence and ignorant of our lack of existential freedom.  
At a glance, this statistical inversion and cultural re-qualification could be misconstrued as a 
movement toward Deurzen’s (2010) definition of a traditional existential understanding of 
ontological insecurity; a recognition that the human condition exists as a constant state of 
ontological insecurity. However, the human condition, is never a direct or the foremost focus 
within Laing’s theory.  
Laing’s new cultural concept illuminates the increasing toll our political existence places 
upon our ability to seek refuge from our base existential anxieties. Without the ability to 
immerse ourselves within worldliness, a requirement for the human condition, ontological 
insecurity is realised. Whereas it was previously certain families that were identified as a 
location of ontological insecurity, Laing was now stating that society itself was accountable 
for its onset; the political conditions no longer provide sufficient security for us to contain and 
exist within our bad faith, thus existential angst is increasingly part of our experience – and 
ontological insecurity ensues. Equally, we could phrase this as ontic security has now been 
lost. Laing’s reasoning is that it was now impossible for Being to harmoniously integrate in-
the-world; complicity in the social-phantasy-constructs was a pseudo-sanity, a madness. The 
psychotic on the other hand, with their disrupted social phantasy system are non-complicit in 
pseudo-sanity and are facilitated an outsider (potentially privileged) perspective.  
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Laing’s political focus now challenged both pillars of the psychopathological concept of 
normality: the statistical aspect was completely inverted, and the western cultural 
perspective that he previously critiqued within the family setting was challenged. Essentially, 
the pendulum had swung too far; by the time he came to analyse our position within the 
political, his increasingly existential focus could no longer allow him to accept a culturally 
produced pseudo-sanity as ontological security. The status quo no longer determined 
normality or sanity; as the saying goes, it was now mad to be normal.   
A temptation could well be to mediate the conflict of the political with the family as a matter 
of simply accepting a change to Laing’s definition of normality. Burston (2000) appears to 
leave breadcrumbs leading to this destination but falls short of asserting this conclusion, 
possibly because whilst it may offer a perspective into this conflict, it does not resolve it. 
What must be said therefore is that Laing changes the qualification of normality in his 
approach at junctures that coincide with the family and political analyses.  
As we identify and accept Laing’s changing view of the cultural concept of normality, the role 
of existentialism is again reinforced – it was Laing’s increasing commitment to, and 
investment in, his existentialist foundation that prevented him from accepting the political and 
moral qualities that sustained the conventional practices of everyday existence. The bad 
faith required to live in these conditions were no longer misdemeanours, they needed to be 
recognised as madness, causes of ontological insecurity. Laing’s writings at this political 
transition were designed to wake us from a toxic slumber.  
The definition of normality employed provides a wider context to changing dynamics and 
focus within Laing’s theory between the family and the political contexts but fails to directly 
address ontological in/security. Within the family context, normality, as deemed by a 
statistical and cultural definition, constituted ontological security. By these same standards of 
normality, within the political context, the statistical and cultural concepts of normality now 
constituted ontological insecurity.  
Laing himself never rejected them111 explicitly, even though he apparently felt that he 
outgrew them. (Burston, 2000, p. 136)  
Burston’s analysis of the different normality concepts used within Laing’s theory gives more 
context to the changes that unfolded during this timeframe. It acknowledges a significant 
 
111 ‘Them’ in this context refers to the normality concepts. 
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shift and expands upon why it developed, locating this with Laing’s initial critical acceptance 
and subsequent absolute rejection for the cultural concept of normality. But in stating that the 
changing applications of normality coexist within a universal framework,112 although this 
encourages flexibility for the application of normality, it fails to offer movement toward 
resolution with the perceived conflictual definition of ontological insecurity between the family 
and the political, reflecting the same time markers.  
Burston (2000, p. 138) ultimately qualifies the coexistence of normality concepts within the 
family and political context as ‘logically antagonistic’. This position detrimentally impacts on 
the pursuit of a totalising theory within this thesis. Firstly, it confirms the idea of a modular 
structure within Laing’s theory; a family model that is distinct and isolated from a political 
model. And secondly, it confirms the accusation levelled for a major theoretic conflict; both 
applications of ontological insecurity ‘coexist’ within the same theoretic framework, but with a 
changing definition of what constitutes normality (ontological security) their application is 
both ‘logically antagonistic’ and remains conflictual.  
Although analysing the specific aspect of normality concepts, the flexibility Burston achieves 
between the family and the political context, gives reason to further consider the perceived 
absolute conflict for ontological insecurity in these same contexts. The context Burston 
identifies which is accepting of change within Laing’s theory, helps to build a pathway with 
regard ontological insecurity.  
Atomisation or Totality  
Such is the influence and presence of the modular interpretation in secondary sources, it 
precedes and dominates any other, arguably even Laing’s own. Three contexts invariably 
surface in the application of Laing’s theory: family, clinical, and political. However, I do not 
believe it was Laing’s intention for these contexts to be perceived as anything other than 
residing within a totality. 
 
112 Burston (2000, p. 138) justifies ‘their peaceful coexistence under the umbrella of a pluralistic pragmatism’ and 
this is an unusual direction to take to accommodate both models within a single framework. Pragmatism is not 
outlined in Laing’s primary texts and has not presented any viable benefit to contravene the existential basis 
employed thus far. But Burston’s bold, and all too brief, statement that a peaceful coexistence can be identified 
within pluralistic pragmatism, is worth considering. Through delving further, a certain, albeit limited, resonance 
can also be formed with existentialism: firstly, the notion that ‘existence is prior to essence’ (p. 159) and 
secondly, that ‘man is a problematic creature’ (Hook, 1959, p. 160). These features fit with the three stages of 
existentialism underpinning Laing’s work. 
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The initial way we see a thing determines all our subsequent dealings with it. (Laing, 
1960, p. 20) 
Although not intended for application in confronting the issue of a theoretical conflict, this 
pivotal quote again comes to the fore. Laing (1960) clearly advises us against studying the 
individual organs of the person and reducing them to a system of ‘it-processes’. Using the 
example of Humpty Dumpty to illustrate his point, studying the shattered parts tells us 
nothing of his Being. Whether in the context of being-in-the-world, or his theoretical 
structure, I suggest the same ethos applies. Unfortunately, following the insistence on 
defining Laing’s theory in this now familiar atomised form, a failure to perceive an 
interconnection of the theoretical components and contexts within the whole occurs. The key 
to addressing this conflict, therefore, cannot simply be an attempt to build bridges between 
the shattered parts of ‘it-processes’ or rather atomised modules; we must re-contextualise 
these concepts within a totality.  
As Laing’s prominence within 1960s culture was building, the preface to the second edition 
of The Divided Self was written in 1964 (the importance of this year will become clear 
shortly), with Laing writing: 
One cannot say everything at once … But let it stand. This was the work of an old 
young man. If I am older, I am now also younger. (Laing, 1960 / 1964, pp. 11 – 12)  
In the knowledge that subsequent publications were already in print and more in the pipeline, 
his warning was clear: this book and its theory are not a stand-alone, it must be appreciated 
within the wider context of his other writings, after all – one cannot say everything all at once. 
Individual concepts and characteristics are present within any theory; however, this 
comment alone encourages his interpretation to be withheld and framed within a totality. 
Laing cautions the reader not to be captivated by his youthful confidence that underpins this 
early writing, stating this was the work of an old young man. It is only now that he realises 
his misplaced confidence in its presentation: if I am older, I am now also younger. For all that 
said, the essence of the book remains true: let it stand but retain its context within the 
totality. 
Working from this premise, there is enough encouragement to readdress his theory within 
the context of the whole, and this draws less conspicuous aspects of theory into focus. This 
is particularly apparent with regard to the perceived conflict incurred regarding the definition 
of ontological insecurity and feeds directly into the topic of atomisation.   
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In the same year as he wrote the preface to The Divided Self, 1964, The Politics of 
Experience, was also under construction.113 When read with conscious effort to embrace the 
totality as he advises above, he produces something that reads as acknowledgment of 
inconsistency surrounding the definition of ontological insecurity: 
This identity-anchored, space-and-time-bound experience…gives us a sense of 
ontological security, whose validity we experience as self-validating, although 
metaphysically-historically-ontologically-socio-economically-culturally we know its 
apparent absolute validity as an illusion. (Laing, 1967, p. 113 – emphasis added)  
This is important, yet so easily missed when read segmented. With something akin to a 
dialectic methodology his response is not one that admits a negation between the first and 
second proposition, however their mediation, requires a third superior action; Laing applies a 
retrospective amendment to his terminology. Our successful immersion within the 
conventional practices of everyday existence provides us with ‘a sense of ontological 
security’ and this is very different to stating that we actually achieve ontological security.  
As discussed earlier, Deurzen (2010) is a fierce critic of Laing’s concept and application of 
ontological insecurity, offering a critique that lost much of its value when we considered 
Laing’s intended focus upon fourth possibility anxieties originating outside the human 
condition itself, and now, with the inclusion of ‘a sense of’ her criticism loses what little 
footing remained.  
‘A sense of’ ontological security distances itself again from the necessary existential 
characteristics of freedom and authenticity of self, but instead refers to the ability to achieve 
peaceful coexistence between ego/other, inner and outer worlds, whether that denies 
freedom and authenticity (existing with bad faith) or not. We must always remember that 
Laing’s (1960, p. 9) declared focus for all his philosophical application was ‘to make 
madness, and the process of going mad, comprehensible’ and he warns the studious reader 
that his study was ‘not a direct application of any established existential philosophy’. 
Existential and phenomenological theory, including the concept of ontological insecurity, 
were selectively employed and assembled in the service of developing an understanding of 
’madness’. It may not have been a theoretically traditional application, but his interpretation 
 
113 With the exception of three chapters: Chapter 4: Us and Them (1962) and Chapter 7: A Ten-Day Voyage. 
Chapter 1 is undated but contained within the broader description 1964 - 1967.  
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shone much needed light onto the experience of psychic suffering and developed a more 
humane understanding of it. 
The prefix of ‘a sense of’ plays a vital role. It continues to reinforce the necessity for flexibility 
in Laing’s application, but more importantly, indirectly and subtly, it addresses the conflict 
between the changing application of ontological insecurity, blurring the boundary of the ontic 
and ontological, security in one’s context and security within oneself. 
Heeding Laing’s advice in the preface to the Pelican edition of The Divided Self, for the 
precursor of ‘a sense of’ as qualification of his definition of ontological security and recalling 
the fourth possibility, creates a bridge for its usage between and within the family and 
political contexts, and this has positive implications for the continuity of theory. This 
loosening of the absolute binaries created at the outset gains even more impact as we re-
inject part of the preface statement from the second edition of The Divided Self once again.  
I was already falling into the trap I was seeking to avoid. I am still writing too much 
about Them, and too little of Us. (Laing, 1960 / 1964, p. 11) 
The family context was distinctly an Us and Them structure, the ontologically secure and the 
insecure, the sane and the mad. By using ‘a sense of’ to pre-qualify and loosen the absolute 
status within The Divided Self, if we are not fully secure, by definition we are to some extent 
insecure. Us – anyone not in receipt of a diagnosis, therefore, find ourselves situated within 
the ontologically insecure realm of existence. This subtle but significant after effect imbues 
the totality of both models with a more existentially informed continuity. 
Even with this addition included in the preface to subsequent editions, the repetition of the 
atomised and modulated framework, particularly that deriving from Siegler et al.’s influence, 
continues. And repetition appears to evidence its compatibility and authority to interpret and 
define Laing’s theory, specifically reinforcing this perception of an absolute rupture. The 
qualities of being peer reviewed, medically presented, and the convenience of a predefined 
analytical framework are seductive qualities that I suggest entice many a reader to agree to 
accept its claims. Furthermore, its scientific form adds to its authority, lending itself to a 
perceived simplicity and facticity for our increasingly medicalised understanding of the self 
and psychic suffering. This gravitational pull toward the scientific classification stands in 
contrast to Howarth-Williams’ philosophically inclined analysis, a point to consider regarding 
its lesser impact than that of Siegler et al., and even more worryingly, maybe even a reason 
for overshadowing Laing’s own philosophically structured framework. Ultimately, Siegler et 
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al., present a concoction of authority moves that appease what Laing (1967) termed a desire 
to translate and frame subjective experience within objective scientistic discourse. 
As such it is easy to lose sight of how an atomised structure which holds such influence, 
presenting three distinct models, and asserting the familial/political dichotomy as 
diametrically opposed, did not originate with Laing. But that is not to discredit the value of 
such research, rather we need to reconsider and contextualise the priority it is given. Siegler 
et al.’s research, and all others of this ilk, provide a useful tool to help in analysing Laing’s 
theory, enabling a depth and detail to be acquired, but accepted as a literal and accurate 
representation, these frameworks incur significant limitations.  
The task, then, is to locate all of his statements which fit any of our dimensions, to 
put together all the dimensions which are compatible with each other, to see how 
many models result from this process. (Siegler et al., 1969, p. 947) 
The drive to forcibly fit Laing’s theory to accommodate their standard theoretic dimensions, 
produces strains and distortions that significantly impact upon the integrity and 
representation of Laing’s theory; namely, a structure composed of three isolated, distinct, 
separate and disconnected models, which Laing himself never proposed or endorsed. 
Furthermore, attention is then directed toward appraising each module with differing value, 
identifying the familial module as the standard by which to contrast and measure the others, 
thus imbuing this framework with the greatest authority and dismissing the political (Clare, 
1973; Sedgwick, 1982).  
The question is how do we explore what I agree are three locational contexts whereby the 
mechanics of Laing’s theory reside without becoming trapped in the preformed grooves that 
have served to steer interpretations of Laing’s theory arguably to its distortion, detriment and 
seeming irrelevance? The answer lies in addressing it through a Laingian lens, and not, as 
has become the norm, to address Laing through a modular lens – perhaps another 
continuing consequence of the vagueness critiqued within Laing’s methodology, inviting 
other theoretical frameworks to be applied to structurally support its application.  
The additional information that Laing provides in the preface to the second edition of The 
Divided Self, and the quote extracted from The Politics of Experience, are geared toward 
clarifying his concept of ontological insecurity and its intricate engagement with empirical 
experiences. The necessity to include this further clarification implies Laing was aware of a 
need to clarify his theory. Before we refine our focus through this Laingian lens however, I 
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suggest that we must also consider the differences that surrounded Laing’s publishing status 
and how this may have affected the representation of his theory.  
Although critically acclaimed once published, The Divided Self (1960), encountered several 
rejections before ‘Tavistock Publications (1959) Ltd’ eventually took the book into hardback 
production in 1960 (Mullan, 1995). Laing was working within a psychoanalytic community 
and targeting his book for a contrasting medical market, he wanted to revolutionise the 
methodology underpinning psychiatric treatment – his theory already required persuasion to 
get it into print, perhaps simplicity was part of the compromise that aided that process. I find 
it hard to believe that Laing, with his extensive philosophical grounding, would mis-apply 
something as simple, yet important, as ontic and ontological, or switch the definition of 
ontological insecurity from a relatedness with one’s context to oneself, indiscriminately. But 
maybe the trap for writing too much about Them, and too little of Us, was necessary to 
appease an audience structured so heavily on the understanding of a single binary, those 
with ‘mental health’, and those with ‘mental illness’. Presenting his theory in a manner that 
enabled a direct translation of ontologically secure/insecure, respectively, was a necessary 
compromise that allowed him to keep his attention on those who were actually suffering 
rather than prioritise theoretical purity. My final suggestion would be that by 1964, when he 
wrote both quotes, he realised the damage a literal understanding was doing to his 
increasing existential focus, so he sought to clarify his position. This postscript addition 
within the preface by Laing and its interpretation here, does not provide a seamless 
resolution to the conflict, the ontic/ontological confusion remaining troublesome, but I believe 
the caveat Laing offered establishes an understanding that reinforces his focus on empirical 
fourth possibility anxieties that is far more consistent within the totality of his theory. Laing 
uses the term ‘[a sense of] ontological security’ as indicating a peaceful coexistence 
between ego and other, a peaceful integration of inner and outer worlds, an experience of 
living with ontological security. This could equally be determined ontic security with 
‘ontological insecurity’ – the individually is living peacefully within their worldly existence at 
the expense of existential freedom.  
Or, to introduce the next section, it could describe an achieved balance of relatedness with 
one’s world and oneself, two separate components that exist within the single framework of 
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is an underappreciated concept within Laing’s 
theory and one that develops more continuity for the application of ontological insecurity.  
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9. Self-consciousness  
The concept of ontological insecurity developed in this section is a culmination of the theory 
analysed in the two methodological chapters. We see how Laing’s existential-
phenomenological methodology argued a truer understanding of the self and this revealed a 
structure by which to consider a theory of self-formation, both elements combining to form a 
unique methodology illuminating how psychic suffering, as experienced by some of most 
marginalised members within western society, (mis)diagnosed schizophrenics, can be 
described as an experience of a split or divided self, a ruptured ego which inhibits cohesion 
for being-in-the-world. The centrality of this concept is now reworked with greater emphasis 
directed toward the dual operation of self-consciousness, this being paramount as we start 
to reanalyse the intelligibility of research findings Laing evidenced within the family and 
speculated within the political context, drawing out components which resonate further within 
contemporary western society.   
This interpretation reflects Laing’s guidance to address his theory as a totality and develop 
concepts that promote continuity throughout the entirety of Laing’s theory (first phase of 
publishing), including the application of ontological insecurity.   
Reframing Laing’s concept of ontological in/security with reference to self-consciousness 
was a key moment in my appreciation for the potential of this concept, and more widely, the 
value of Laing’s theory. With both aspects residing within The Divided Self, their compatibility 
to co-operate effortlessly, adds valuable structural detail to the concept of ontological 
in/security. Within ontological in/security, self-consciousness develops a more nuanced 
relationship for the inner and outer world, ego/other dynamic, showing how both domains 
should work hand-in-hand. However, as will become apparent, one-sidedness related 
directly to this structure of ontological insecurity can be seen both within Laing’s case studies 
and contemporary culture.  
Considering self-consciousness is given its own dedicated chapter in The Divided Self,114 yet 
gains little attention in applications to the family and less again to the political, its potential is 
woefully undervalued. This pivotal, yet often overlooked, aspect is directly related to 
ontological in/security, and exploring it enables a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
relating to ontological insecurity and thus strengthens its potential for a consistent application 
 
114 The Divided Self (1960); Chapter 7; Self-consciousness; pp. 106 - 119. 
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in a contemporary context. Refocussing ontological insecurity through a lens of self-
consciousness, a unique and new dimension of thought toward Laing’s theory is created, a 
means capable of flowing through all contexts and bridging models without conflict or 
deviation from his written theory, and a method of constructing a totality that withholds 
structural integrity and consistency in all social contexts – importantly, providing stability in 
the application of ontological insecurity. 
Self-consciousness, as the term is ordinarily used, implies two things: [1] an 
awareness of oneself by oneself, and [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of 
somebody else’s observation. (Laing, 1960, p. 106) 
Self-consciousness is the basis for knowledge of oneself within the world. It is structured by 
the development of two components of awareness [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself 
and [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s observation, relating 
directly to the experiential domains of the inner and the outer world, respectively. The ability 
to utilise this knowledge, self-consciousness, enables the being-in-the-world to function with 
a sense of ontological security.  
Whilst we focus on the components of self-consciousness in detail moving forward, we 
cannot fall into the trap of enforcing a separation of either component. Throughout Laing’s 
theory, the self is emphasised as the totality of experiences, demonstrated mostly as an 
enmeshing of inner and outer world experiences. It is through this dynamic, flowing, flexible, 
relatedness with both domains that being-in-the-world functions with a ‘sense of’ ontological 
security, a person with the capacity to cope with whatever life throws at them. The 
importance for the totality and fluidity within self-conscious is equally as vital for our 
ontological security. Anticipating what lies ahead, a greater focus to the detrimental impact 
for the dominance of one aspect, [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody 
else’s observation is realised within Laing’s theory and subsequently reflected in 
contemporary culture. In turning focus to this aspect, I am not suggesting that this aspect in 
itself is negative but emphasising the affect of its disproportionality within our existence. Self-
consciousness, as with the self, is not reductive to one or the other component or world. 
When we reside too heavily in any one domain, we live a divided or split existence, this 
being the essence of ontological insecurity. 
Analysing the case study of Maya Abbot once again, the value of the self-consciousness 
framework becomes apparent.  
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The Abbotts and Self-Consciousness 
In the wake of a subtle communicative behaviour exchanged between the parents, identified 
by Maya and denied by her parents, Maya either does right by her own experience which 
involves refuting her parents’ opinion, or she follows her parents’ opinion and refutes her 
own experience. Damned either way.  
The consequence […] was that Maya could not know when she was perceiving or 
when she was imagining things to be going on between her parents. (Laing and 
Esterson, 1964, p. 40) 
In established Laingian theory, the inability to distinguish different modes of experience, in 
this case perception from imagination, is a clear symptom of ontological insecurity, a 
proposition wholly supported in this thesis. In the reanalysis that follows, I delve further into 
the finer detail of how and why this blurring of inner (imagination) and outer (perception) 
develops and its impact on the self. No reference to self-consciousness is made in the 
description given by Laing and Esterson of Maya’s predicament; however, the proposition 
here is that this event and several other consistent examples that surround and compound it, 
reveal a conflict between the domains of awareness within self-consciousness, two domains 
of awareness that complement the applications found within the political context as within 
the family context. 
Considering the two aspects of self-consciousness within this scenario, Maya either invests 
confidence in her own opinion, heightening [1] an awareness of herself by herself, prioritising 
the value of her inner experience; or, she invests confidence in her parents’ opinion, 
heightening [2] an awareness of herself as an object of her parents’ observation, prioritising 
the value of outer experience. It is because these options stand in complete contrast, a 
classic double-bind scenario, that strain is placed upon the calibration of self-consciousness. 
Making such a choice would already have significant implications for Maya’s ontological 
security. However, adding self-consciousness into this equation, an additional layer of depth 
is uncovered.   
[W]ithin the phantasy of the nexus, to leave is an act of ingratitude, or cruelty, or 
suicide, or murder. (Laing, 1961, p. 43)   
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To invest and place confidence in her own opinion, although reaffirming [1] an awareness of 
herself by herself, would be an act of familial desertion that refutes the phantasy of the 
family-nexus. Even if this option is the sensible, healthy, action to take, Laing (1961) 
emphasises how big a responsibility this is to shoulder, a decision that requires extensive 
preparation prior to and beyond the rules of her family experience. In avoidance of this 
burden and aware that the ‘game’ is favoured with bias for her parents’ authority, agreeing 
with their opinion and thus reinforcing [2] an awareness of herself as an object of her 
parents’ observation115 (devaluing her own opinion and thus weakening [1] an awareness of 
herself by herself), can appear less challenging for her ontological security:  
 They are playing a game. They are playing at not 
 playing a game. If I show them I see they are, I 
 shall break the rules and they will punish me. 
 I must play their game, of not seeing I see the game.  
      (Laing, 1970, p. 1) 
Being the vulnerable member of the family-nexus, i.e., financially dependent, younger, 
outnumbered, female etc., the odds are stacked in favour of accepting her part in the game 
and maintaining the homeostasis of existing interpersonal dynamics that constitute the 
phantasy of the family-nexus. The by-product of this agreement is not only that she remains 
immersed, trapped even, within an existentially incongruent environment but this also incurs 
an amplified [2] awareness of herself as an object of her parents’ observation.  
Isolated and spurious situations unfold that present such double-bind situations for us all, 
however, as Maya’s story typifies, it is the consistent, voluminous and intense recurrence of 
double-bind scenarios that has significant implications upon the self. Playing their game, of 
not seeing I see the game ultimately creates a knotted phantasy construct, and as the 
consciousness of not seeing I see the game deteriorates, we internalise acceptance of the 
game, consolidating its rules in bad faith. Maya complains that she has been consistently 
prevented from ‘[u]sing one’s own mind [and] experiencing for oneself’ and from the 
experiences that form her social phantasy construct, we see how this justifies her inability to 
experience ontological security (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 35). With the addition of self-
consciousness interwoven within this scenario, and its application to her life story more 
generally, situations are created whereby [2] an awareness of herself as an object of her 
 
115 This is only an issue because of the (denigrating) contradiction with her self-reflection. The value of accurate 
recognition is addressed in subsequent chapters. 
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parents’ observation takes priority; knowledge of herself within the world is increasingly 
framed through her parents’ gaze, and as such, her experience, herself, is subjected to the 
dreadful realisation of the becoming of an object rather than a person.  
Self-consciousness develops a more nuanced relationship of the inner and outer domain 
within ontological insecurity, offering a spectrum rather than the more typical binary structure 
presented within Laing’s theory. This framework only requires minor amendment to work 
with greater continuity with Lidz’s (1972, p. 154) statement; ‘we’ll know a hell of a lot about 
all the others [‘mental disorders’] when we understand [schizophrenia]’. The inference 
underpinning Lidz’s statement is that other experiences of psychic suffering, those 
diagnosed as less severe ‘mental disorders’ within psychiatry, still benefit from Laing’s 
theory. However, with ontological insecurity playing the pivotal role in Laing’s theory, its 
representation so far is a binary structure, a dichotomy of secure/insecure, 
normal/‘schizophrenic ’,  healthy/illness etc – a criticism recognised earlier by Kotowicz (1997) 
as an unresolved theoretic cul-de-sac.116 
Self-consciousness on the other hand, responds to this criticism by developing a symbiotic 
relationship for an awareness of [1] inner and [2] outer experiences, opening up this 
dichotomy into a continuum. Either domain remains at the extremity, but now the space in-
between is brought into focus and given value. Ontological security through self-
consciousness is depicted as holding a balance of awareness of each domain. Social 
conditions for their part – highlighted as (dysfunctional) interpersonal dynamics – have the 
potential to instil turbulence into this balance. Each domain is capable of being pulled apart, 
outer from inner, inner from outer, a gulf between them created and increasingly widened. 
Ontological insecurity within self-consciousness reveals itself as a disrupted balance of both 
aspects of awareness, no longer necessitating a seismic structural splitting of the self in 
dramatic and conclusive fashion but embracing the disharmony and space between.   
The key to opening up the more nuanced relationship is the term awareness. When 
awareness is disrupted, the calibration of self-consciousness is corrupted, and the self is 
unable to regulate its worldly existence. In examining how the calibration of awareness 
within self-consciousness is disrupted, we now gain a vantage into the development or 
cause of ontological insecurity and therefore into a cause of psychic suffering. 
 
116 See Chapter 7, An Empirical Concept.  
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Although calibration is universally presented as compromised within the double-bind 
scenario, the mechanism responsible for this disturbance (the source of the double-bind) 
always resides in the outer, fourth possibility of empirical experiences. Overlaid on a 
framework of self-consciousness, highlights a series of events that promote the sufferer to 
excessively engage with [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s 
observation. Ontological insecurity is not however the acceptance of becoming of the object, 
but the disharmony caused by this domination of awareness within self-consciousness.  
[I]n the schizoid individual both are enhanced and assume a somewhat compulsive 
nature. (Laing, 1960. p. 106)  
Although Maya’s being-in-the-world is dominated by the representational act of her parents, 
thus encouraging her to prioritise [2] an awareness of herself as an object of their 
observation, the effect on her self-consciousness and behaviour demonstrates an enhanced 
and compulsive relationship to both aspects. These continual double-bind events, always 
acting on one aspect [2], destabilises the entirety of self-consciousness, setting [1] and [2] in 
flux much like a pendulum swinging to and from either extreme. Maya desperately immerses 
herself in her books and own world at one moment, indulging an [1] awareness of herself 
only by herself; and, in the next moment, swings to a counterpoint, unsure of the value of her 
own experience and memory, thus requiring total faith in the other’s consciousness to 
position her reality, her existence subject completely to [2] an awareness of herself as an 
object of somebody else’s observation. Maya is unable to regulate either aspect of self-
consciousness, the very definition of ontological insecurity. Without this harmony, Maya 
cannot apply self-consciousness, a knowledge base that enables her being-in-the-world, to 
function with ontological security. Without this capacity to appraise her worldly experience, 
individual double-bind situations are bound to cause an existential crisis.  
The Necessity of the Gaze 
Although presented so far as a negative event, the necessity of [2] an awareness of oneself 
as an object of somebody else’s observation is a staple ingredient within self-consciousness 
and thus the achievement of a sense of ontological security. Laing illustrates the value and 
necessity of this aspect of awareness using Kafka’s ‘Conversation with the Suppliant’.117 
 
117 Laing’s translation is different from all other publications which title Kafka’s essay as ‘Conversation with the 
Supplicant’. This thesis retains Laing’s terminology for consistency. Introducing this short story, Laing (1960, p. 
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He needs other people to look at him […] He needs other people to experience him 
as a real live person because he has never been convinced from within himself that 
he was alive. (Laing, 1960. p. 109) 
Complementing a wider theoretical perspective from the Hegelian to Winnicottian, the 
essentialness of recognition for all subjects is depicted through its absence in the Suppliant’s 
situation. The Suppliant does not begin in a place of ontological security, he occupies a 
schizoid position from the outset demonstrating an enhanced and somewhat compulsive 
relationship with both counterparts of self-consciousness. In the first instance the Suppliant 
starts with an extreme [1] awareness of himself by himself, he resides so heavily within his 
inner world that he has lost existential footing and a sense of belonging to, and attachment 
in, the ‘real’ world, a world that involves inner and outer experience. In response to this 
anxious position, he subsequently seeks recognition by others, this in turn activating [2] an 
awareness of himself as an object of somebody else’s observation. By extension of existing 
in their observation, he exists in their world. The qualification of being seen embeds his 
Being in-the-world. In contrast to the unilateral negative previously discussed with the 
prospect of becoming an object, this quality suddenly becomes a paramount ingredient for 
ontological security but crucially, not in isolation or when dominant.   
The Suppliant’s extreme situation and initial ontological insecurity involves an absolute 
divorce from the outer and any involvement with the other. However, within Laing’s case 
studies, this increased [1] awareness of oneself by oneself plays no part. The closest we 
may come to a realisation of this extreme situation is through the experience of prisoners in 
long-term solitary confinement. Studies of consistent, voluminous and intense periods of 
absolute isolation in this environment report notable and extreme ‘mental health’ issues 
(Haney, 2003). A less extreme but still disproportionate [1] awareness of oneself by oneself 
could be offered as a consequence of ‘loneliness’, also reported to have a significant impact 
on ‘mental health’ (Rose, 2019). Laing’s emphasis is not to detract from the potential of this 
aspect to disrupt self-consciousness, but rather it highlights that [2] awareness of ourselves 
as an object of somebody else’s observation, poses the most established threat to 
ontological insecurity.  
 
109) states ‘Kafka’s suppliant makes it the aim of his life to get people to look at him, since thereby he mitigates 
his state of depersonalization and derealization and inner deadness’. 
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Self-Consciousness and Authentic Merging 
It is here that Sartre’s influence of presence and absence, a concept discussed by Laing in 
contrast to object-relations theory, becomes important. It is not just a harmony of each 
aspect of self-consciousness that establishes ontological security; each aspect brings about 
an intensified engagement with the other aspect. The increasing [2] awareness of oneself as 
an object of somebody else’s observation heightens our [1] awareness of oneself by oneself. 
In the process of becoming the object, we conversely become more aware of our thingness 
– the fragility of Being is awakened by the conditioning of nonbeing. And vice versa. Once 
the balance of self-consciousness is disrupted, the pendulum is set in motion.  
We see this demonstrated in Laing’s analysis of the family: double-bind situations promote 
an environmental condition for the individual to prioritise [2] an awareness of oneself as an 
object of somebody else’s observation. The consequence of this is not that the individual 
assumes, accepts, or adopts an awareness of experience through the gaze of another, thus 
becoming an object, but as demonstrated in each of the family studies and theory, 
disharmony of self-consciousness ensues. This disharmony results in instability, an 
enhanced and somewhat compulsive engagement with either aspect; the victim/sufferer 
becomes lost in a self-referential abyss of the [1] awareness of oneself by oneself, or defined 
and contained within the reductive representational act of the other consolidating [2] an 
awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s observation. As illustrated in Maya’s 
experience, dominated by existing within the representational act of her parents, this 
ultimately provides a hyperawareness of [2] herself as an object of her parents’ observation 
– but this is far from a stable or fixed position, we see her swinging between either pole.  
Without balance within self-consciousness, the ability to organically draw on either resource, 
Maya’s knowledge basis to position herself within the world is corrupted and she is unable to 
navigate the hazards associated with the conventional practices of everyday life, and unable 
to ascertain ontological security.   
Laing attributed the development of ontological insecurity to three theorists of primary 
importance: Heidegger, Sartre and Tillich. A minimal input is accounted to Buber; however, 
contrasting with this fleeting acknowledgment by Laing, Buber’s compatibility at this juncture 
can be developed to add additional support to his notion of ontological insecurity. Buber’s 
notion of ‘authentic merging’, is offered here as a chockstone to help consolidate self-
consciousness as the means to stabilise a bridge between the changing application of 
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ontological insecurity, enabling a single concept, comprising of two components, to logically 
and cohesively coexist withing the family and political context.  
Burston (1996) makes a brief statement that characteristics within ontological security are 
taken from Buber’s Distance and Relation (1950),118 specifically that a sense of autonomy 
and separateness is connected to the capability of authentic merging. Building on this limited 
reference, an immediate contrast with the simplistic interpretation of an either/or 
Heideggerian concept, either individual authenticity or authentic commonality, is developed. 
Delving into Buber’s original text (respecting Laing’s tendency towards extracting only the 
detail that contributes directly to his intended structure), qualities that resonate with 
individual authenticity, autonomy and separateness, are also deemed qualities that facilitate 
authentic merging, which overlap significantly with authentic commonality. Interestingly 
however, Buber’s theory is not placed in one or the other domain; authentic merging requires 
relatedness with oneself and relatedness with one’s place of existence, whilst individual 
authenticity is necessary to engage with authentic commonality – and ipso facto, authentic 
commonality is a necessity to embrace individual authenticity. This extends to all aspects of 
Laing’s theory, essentially embracing the totality of experiences as a means of realising 
oneself, a being-in-the-world. Staying with the focus of this chapter, Buber’s notion of 
authentic merging could equally translate to [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself, is 
required to acquire [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s 
observation, and vice versa. 
The Buberian concept of authentic merging, a notion of relatedness to oneself and one’s 
worldly context, reinforces the interconnection between the domains of awareness within 
self-consciousness, revealing a connection between the differing applications of ontological 
insecurity in the contexts of the family and the political. The relevance of this gains support 
from the subsequent publication, Self and Others: 
[O]ntological insecurity … encounters non-being, in a preliminary form, as a partial 
loss of the synthetic unity of self, concurrently with partial loss of relatedness with the 
other, and in an ultimate form, in the hypothetical end-state of chaotic nonentity, total 
loss of relatedness with self and other. (Laing, 1961, p. 51) 
 
118 Burston dates this essay 1951. Biemann’s (2000) translation of several essays, The Martin Buber Reader: 
Essential Writings, dates this essay in 1950.  
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What is more important here than the observation that ontologically insecure individuals 
encounter an inhibited capacity for I-Thou relatedness, the consequence of which is already 
explained within Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology, is that the location of 
this affects a total loss of relatedness with self and other. Buber’s theory is no stranger within 
discussions of ‘mental health’; the contribution of relatedness and its promotion of an I-Thou 
relationship a positive talking point within psychotherapeutic circles (see Garcia, 2015; Buck 
et al., 2015, Amari, 2019). However, rather than this reactive application employed by 
therapists to re-establish the qualities for relatedness, the involvement of Buber’s theory 
within ontological insecurity allows us to consider how the absence of relatedness affects the 
ontological experience, possibly how its absence causes ontological insecurity. This will be a 
focus as we re-examine the contexts of Laing’s theory, and re-analyse the notion of 
intelligibility to see if any greater potential is available than is typically associated with his 
body of work.  
In summary, ontological insecurity is a very simple and yet profound concept, grounded in 
Heidegger’s theory; in response to a perceived or real existential threat, a rupture to being-
in-the-world ensues. There is a split between outer and inner, ego and other – a divided self. 
Without existential refuge in everyday worldliness, the individual is unable to retain a sense 
of both domains within the self. This inability to relate with the outer-world and others that 
constitute it causes psychic suffering in itself, compounding further the base anxieties of the 
human condition, existential angst, that become awakened. If the world we exist in 
generates anxieties too intensely (fourth possibility anxieties), the human condition itself is 
destabilised. We should avoid resting heavily on technical existential terminology, thereby 
sidestepping Deurzen’s critique, concentrating instead on the essence of what Laing is 
saying: if a person’s environment is not conducive to the base needs of being human 
(Being), any sense of security within the world is lost and psychic suffering is experienced. 
Laing evidenced this firstly in those (mis)diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’, a statistical minority, 
who were shown to exist within an unconducive existential micro-environment (family-
nexus). He subsequently theorised that this extended to western society: the statistical 
majority were experiencing sufficient fourth possibility anxieties to destabilise the cohesion of 
being-in-the-world.  
If we retain Heidegger’s theoretical influence and deem authentic commonality (and a 
disavowal of individual authenticity) a prerequisite of a sense of ontological security, it only 
applies within the family context and this presents a conflictual terrain with application to a 
political context. Trying to mediate this conflict by analysing the changing concepts of 
normality within Laing’s theory, moving from a criticism of the cultural concept of normality to 
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an absolute rejection – which subsequently inverts the qualification of a statistically 
determined definition of normality – provides a description of the evolution of Laing’s theory. 
However, this does not find a resolution; at best it rests on a conclusion for an antagonistic 
coexistence of two concepts of normality, and this only informs the basis for a change in 
application of ontological security.  
In drawing attention to the operation of self-consciousness within ontological insecurity, 
emphasising its dual components softens the perceived absolute polarity, and enables this 
shift or contradiction between the family and the political to be considered as a 
reprioritisation: relatedness to oneself over a relatedness to one's environment, [1] an 
awareness of oneself by oneself, rather than a prioritisation of [2] an awareness of oneself 
as an object of somebody else’s observation. Although this development does not resolve 
the issue of continuity of the application of ontological insecurity, it brings us a step closer to 
realising this. As we start to apply a concept of ontological insecurity within a political 
framing, the development of self-consciousness plays a greater role in considering their 
mutual presence within a singular framework.  
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10. Psychic Suffering   
Before we analyse the operation of ontological insecurity within Laing’s theory and develop 
these findings as a means of contributing insight into the current ‘mental health’ ‘epidemic’, 
there are two ancillary factors of this concept that are worth clarifying. Firstly, the proposition 
that ontological insecurity operates beyond the limitation of DSM diagnosis, and secondly, 
the notion that this framework enables insight into causation. Both are highly contentious 
suggestions but suggestions that nonetheless warrant attention and, I believe, contain 
significant value as we consider the potential within Laing’s theory.  
Beyond DSM Diagnosis     
Schizophrenia is really the essence, the essential mental disorder, and we’ll know a 
hell of a lot about all the others when we understand it. (Lidz, 1972, p. 154) 
The premise outlined by Lidz (1972), is that Laing’s framework of ontological insecurity, 
located at the extreme limit of ‘mental disorders’ with schizophrenia, offers insight into all 
other forms of ‘mental illness’, regardless of the definition, classification or label given within 
an ever-densifying psychiatric model. This sentiment is stated differently but agreed with by 
Sedgwick: 
‘Ontological insecurity’… is said to lie at the heart of serious mental illnesses. 
(Sedgwick, 1972, p. 15) 
Within the recognition of the broad and inclusive potential of a theory of ontological 
insecurity, the problem with Lidz and Sedgwick is that with their terminology they remain 
embedded and therefore invested in the psychiatric frame of reference. As we have 
discussed previously, Laing held major issue with psychiatric words, insisting that through 
pathologising experiences they perform reductively upon how we understand the person.  
To illuminate the unrestricted potential of Laing’s theory, I want to take a different tack by 
starting with an etymological investigation, a valued process by Laing.119 I want to suggest 
that rather than refuting the process of ‘pathologising’, in actuality Laing was returning this 
 
119 ‘Perhaps we can still retain the now old name, and read into its etymological meaning: Schiz – ‘broken’; 
Phrenos – ‘soul or heart’.’ (Laing, 1967, p. 107) 
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back to its etymological roots. From this basis we start realising the wider potential for the 
application of Laing’s theory.  
Pathologising: to view or characterise as medically or psychologically abnormal 
(Merriam-Webster – A definition circulating since 1649) 
Laing commits significant energy from the outset of The Divided Self (1960) to encourage a 
move away from (psycho)pathologising. By the time he writes and publishes The Politics of 
Experience (1967), pathologising, in diagnosis and therefore treatment, is unequivocally 
portrayed as a detriment to the patient, an act that introduces further suffering into their 
experience and prevents the possibility of self-healing occurring.  
We can no longer assume that such a voyage [madness, often (mis)diagnosed as 
schizophrenia] is an illness that has to be treated. Yet the padded cell is now 
outdated by the ‘improved’ methods of treatment now in use. (Laing, 1967, p. 136)  
The trajectory of pathologising has continued along a psychopharmacological path 
compounded and accelerated from the 1950s and 1960s with the development and 
prescription of anti-psychotic drugs. We saw how this has become concretised in 
contemporary culture in Chapter 2, Why Now? Laing’s statement is clear: it is better to do 
nothing and allow the process of ‘illness’, the voyage, to be experienced than to force it 
through a detrimental method that prevents any self-healing potential, a method underpinned 
by pathologising. This could be translated into Laing objecting to a pathologising of the 
human condition, a trend of thought increasingly relevant in contemporary culture, albeit he 
accepts these behaviours and experiences as occurring toward the outer spectrum of 
perceived normality. The current relevance of this line of thought is illustrated in an 
interesting article published by The Guardian, titled, ‘Medicalising everyday life doesn’t help 
anyone’s mental health’:  
mental health is talked about using the language of epidemics, and has been 
commoditised into something to be ordered over the counter: professionals, pills and 
a side of talking therapy. (Massey, 2019) 
Such is the pervasiveness of the current medical paradigm, even the term ‘mental health’ 
which freely circulates in western culture and is often used with a positive connotation (as it 
is in this article), still inserts oneself within the discourse of psychiatric, medical discourse 
and brings with it inadvertent consequences. 
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We need to be aware of the ways in which an individual’s own perceptions and 
reports of their mental distress are shaped by the increasing availability and 
acceptability of the language of mental disorder. (Rose, 2019, p. 65) 
‘Psychiatric words' as Laing (1960, p. 18) refers to them, now mark the beginning of entry 
into the psychiatric system, commodification, privatisation – and an individualisation of 
experience. Personal responsibility ensues; maybe that is in the form of taking medication, 
or perhaps it is following the current self-help zeitgeist to change your thought patterns. 
Either way, through psycho-pathologising, a process that can begin with nothing more that 
the use of seemingly innocuous language which in reality, is loaded with psychiatric 
meaning, an ‘existential degradation’120 is committed upon the individual. Our experience 
becomes defined within the psychiatric domain, Being contained within the limitations of its 
discourse.   
However, to pathologise the human condition, which means in this context to diagnose and 
medicalise the experiences and behaviours associated with existence, betrays the 
etymological underpinning of the word. The roots of pathologising lie in ‘pathos’ and ‘logos’.  
Pathos:  1: an element in experience or in artistic representation evoking pity or 
compassion 
2: an emotion of sympathetic pity  (Merriam-Webster) 
The English use of ‘pathos’ predates ‘pathologising’ by more than a century, but although 
etymologically connected, is almost unrecognisable from the form it has become. To enact 
pathos is to experience compassion and pity for someone or something. This seems a far 
cry from the pathologising of the human condition, the diagnostic process, the reduction of 
self to a medical categorisation. Laing is not abandoning pathologising, he is advocating 
embracing a true logos of pathos.  
Logos:  1: the divine wisdom manifest in the creation, government, and 
redemption of the world and often identified with the second person of 
the Trinity. 
 
120 This term will gain major attention in Chapter 13, Ontological Discontinuity. It suffices at this point to 
acknowledge this as a detrimental experience. 
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2: reason that in ancient Greek philosophy is the controlling principle 
in the universe .   (Merriam-Webster) 
Logos is to gain true knowledge, to pursue the absolute universal principle. Pathologising, 
through its etymological meaning, pathos, and logos, is the exact point that Laing starts his 
journey within The Divided Self. 
If it is held that to be unbiased one should be ‘objective’ in the sense of 
depersonalising the person who is the ‘object’ of our study, any temptation to do this 
under the impression that one is thereby being scientific must be rigorously 
resisted…Although conducted in the name of science, such reifications yield false 
‘knowledge’. (Laing, 1960, p. 24)  
Laing is here not disregarding science, but stating that science, the process of achieving true 
knowledge, needs to negate its present form that insists on logical positivism or empiricist 
values being the ‘controlling principle in the universe’ (Merriam-Webster). Laing states that 
we need to find a different way of understanding the self, a more truthful way of appreciating 
the value and insight of subjective epistemology, this was the reasoning for his unique 
existential-phenomenological methodology. Only through respecting this difference will 
science gain any true understanding of the personalised essence of pathos, suffering.  
[J]ust as Kierkegaard remarked that one will never find consciousness by looking 
down a microscope at brain cells or anything else, so one will never find persons by 
studying persons as though they were only objects. (Laing, 1967, p. 20)  
Logical positivism and empiricism has an important place within medicine, but Laing wants to 
emphasise that this is not to be extended to all matters of the self. Within his methodology, 
Laing attempts to free himself from a multitude of detrimental effects that psychiatric words 
perform upon the self and one of these ways was through adopting terminology beyond the 
increasingly familiar scientific paradigm. This was a means to retune the focus to the 
experience of suffering and therefore gain real knowledge rather than to utilise existing 
psychiatric discourse that appeased and prioritised the meaningless pursuit of 
depersonalised nosology.  
Although never categorised in this manner, we see three groupings of terms used in this 
pursuit: medical, normal, and philosophical.   
 182 
Medical: schizoid (personality disorder), schizophrenic, psychosis.  
Schizoid and schizophrenic represent separate recognised ‘disorders’ within the DSM-5; 
301.20 (F60.1), and 295.90 (F20.9), respectively (DSM-V, 2013). They fall under the 
umbrella of ‘psychotic disorders’, mild and severe, respectively. Even though gaining more 
independent recognition since the DSM-III, published in 1980 (Klaus et al., 1997), they 
continue to be grouped under the symptom description of psychosis due to their 
phenomenological similarities. This explains their interchangeability throughout Laing’s 
writing. 
With specific reference to schizoid and schizophrenia, Laing (1960, p. 17) acknowledges 
using existing medical terms but states ‘I shall not, of course, be using these terms in their 
usual clinical psychiatric frame of reference’. They are not acknowledgment or qualification 
of ‘disease’ and are used in what is an existential and phenomenological context. I find it 
useful to accept that any medical terminology used by Laing, is done so to identify 
individuals culturally grouped under diagnostic labels, but more accurately individuals 
experiencing ‘a psychotic way of being-in-the-world’ (Laing, 1960, p. 17), terms that place 
Them beyond the comfort of what is deemed normal for Us.  
Normality: insanity, madness, alienation. 
There is a long history of the usage of these terms, but as Morrall (2017, p. 3) tells us ‘there 
is no shortage of viewpoints of madness … [and] … there is no one position which is 
uncontroversial and irrefutable’. Laing’s application of these terms describes a form of 
deviance evidenced in behaviour whereby the individual is detached from their worldly 
context and thus acts in a manner beyond the socially (statistically) prescribed and accepted 
qualification of normality. This usage overlaps significantly with the medical terminology, 
hence some compatibility in these terms initially. This definition and compatibility become 
more complicated as his theory progresses and statistics are no guarantee of identifying the 
inverse, sanity/normality – this message coming to the forefront in The Politics of 
Experience, where the claim that it is now mad to be normal is floated. With a political focus, 
and incorporation of the Marxist term ‘alienation’ alongside insanity, madness, Laing 
strengthens the premise that we are all immersed within a context of madness but unable or 
unwilling to see this. It could be offered that insanity, madness, alienation, are more 
acceptable Laingian terms for differentiating between individuals who fall outside a common 
ideal of social normality rather than terms of medical discourse that enforce a diagnosis and 
thus qualify certain experiences as evidence of ‘disease’.  
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Philosophical: divided self, split self, ontologically insecure.  
These terms are argued by Laing as descriptive, rather than medically labelling (Collier, 
1977), thus preventing immediate absorption into the existing psychiatric paradigm and the 
associated reductive and damaging consequences. Instead, they illuminate and inform; they 
are referencing a divided or split existence, insecure in its nature of Being (ontology). As 
descriptive terms, they are not complicit in the medicalised approach to pathologising. Laing 
states that they attune to the sufferer’s experience, and therefore it is offered that they 
promote a truer logos of pathos.  
It is with respect to the intended aim of these descriptive terms, qualities that I believe re-
engage with the etymological essence of pathologising (pathos and logos), that this thesis 
centres on the term ontological insecurity and introduces a further term of ‘psychic suffering’. 
Ontological insecurity holds firm as the central concept of Laing’s theory, and the inclusion of 
psychic suffering is more than an arbitrary choice. Psychic suffering is strategically employed 
to distance this research from a medicalised, psychiatric, epistemology of the psyche, even 
more so with Rose’s (2019, p. 65) warning that medical language structures the lay-person’s 
‘perceptions and reports of their mental distress’.  
The concept of ontological insecurity was not directly related to psychic suffering but as a 
disruption of an individual’s ability to integrate their being-in-the-world; nonetheless, psychic 
suffering indirectly enters the equation. The divided self, an ontological split, is enacted as a 
coping strategy; however, divorcing one’s inner from outer world leads to a self-referential 
existence, behaviours that lose contextual understanding that cement our position within 
worldliness, distancing the individual from the perceived ‘norms’ of the social context, 
highlighted previously with the behaviour of ‘schizophrenese babble’. Laing discusses the 
suffering caused within this ruptured experience as a consequence of a deterioration in 
relatedness – it is the ontological distance, incurred as a result of falling beyond the ‘norm’ 
that causes divided selves to be treated differently, as existentially lesser. In this respect, 
what becomes increasingly apparent is that the levels of psychic suffering endured are an 
experience that could be avoided if their environment (the multitude of ego/other 
relationships, from the family to the clinical and beyond) embraced a phenomenologically 
guided approach to their experience. Essentially, this would mean that sufferers’ experience 
were not forcibly fitted to a rigid protocol of societal norms, which by their very essence deny 
them their unique and individual experience. It is not therefore the rupture in itself that is held 
primarily accountable for the experience of suffering, but rather the impact this has upon the 
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ability to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships – a key element facilitating 
relatedness.  
We must also include the impact of this rupture on the stability of the human condition. In 
losing relatedness to others and by proxy one’s worldly existence, Being has lost the 
capacity to immerse itself in-the-world. With the conditions necessary for being-in-the-world 
disrupted, the base elements of existential anxiety surface within our empirical existence. 
Laing ultimately proposed the transcendental experience model, whereby if interpersonal 
dynamics did not contribute further to the rupture, a self-healing, potentially enlightening 
process could ensue. The link may not have been direct; nonetheless, a connection between 
ontological insecurity and psychic suffering existed. 
With respect to the focus of this thesis, the most pertinent proposition ascertained from 
Laing’s research was that ‘illness’ or ‘disease’, as demonstrated in those (mis)diagnosed, 
was nullified; schizophrenia, arguably the furthest and most severe end of the ‘mental illness’ 
spectrum, was deemed as an experience rooted within, and caused by, the social milieu. At 
its simplest, ontological insecurity is therefore not ‘mental illness’. 
This could lead to a suggestion that Laing outright rejected the biomedical model of ‘mental 
illness’, but this would be inaccurate (a contributing factor to his friction with Szasz). What 
Laing said was that symptoms of ontological insecurity, ‘a psychotic way of being-in-the-
world’, are too frequently misconstrued, misdiagnosed, as evidence of a ‘disease’ – this 
contributing further to the increasing dominance of the psychiatric discourse and the 
necessity to appease its diagnostic process and recognise its authority. But this does not 
dismiss the notion that mental disorders exist, a position declared most vividly in Self and 
Others (1961, p. 104) by differentiating ‘real card-carrying schizophrenics’ from the subjects 
of his research. Laing is simply saying that the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ is woefully over-
represented within psychiatry, and we could extend this premise to the entirety of ‘mental 
illness’.  
In no way did this detract from the psychic suffering experienced by the individual but 
instead by discrediting its belonging within a diagnostic framework (DSM etc); rather, it 
illuminated that treating it as an ‘illness’ would provide no treatment. When you are holding a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail – anything to do with psychic suffering, is focussed 
through a medical lens (we could argue that using a hammer in certain cases would be no 
less damaging!). The ‘mental disorder’ diagnostic process, psychiatry, was therefore 
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consuming an experience, a human experience, that did not require medicalising, and did 
not belong within its jurisdiction. 
The caveat to this differentiation, is that those suffering ontological insecurity are not 
mentally ill, but those that are mentally ill are incredibly likely to be ontologically insecure. 
We will discuss this more in the clinical encounter and the Conspiratorial Model, but 
essentially the medical treatment of ‘mental illness’ is a process that creates the perfect 
conditions for ontological insecurity to develop; a necessary existential split of inner from 
outer, self from other, in an effort to preserve one’s existence.  
This reinforces the universality and potential of Laing’s application in addressing all forms of 
psychic suffering, including the capability as Lidz states to help in understanding all the other 
‘mental disorders’. Laing’s theory is not bound by diagnostic specificity, it targets ontological 
insecurity, a concept that resides within and beyond diagnostic classification. Therefore, at a 
time when incidence levels of ‘mental health’ diagnosis are increasing significantly, with very 
real questions being asked about the representation of this as illness per se, in approaching 
ontological insecurity, we are more likely to help those suffering and not ‘mentally ill’, and 
those ‘mentally ill’ who are suffering also. Ontological insecurity offers a window to envelop 
‘mental health’ disorders and embrace psychic suffering without being prejudicial toward 
disorder types or even whether a diagnosis has occurred or is warranted. 
Although the term psychic suffering reflects the descriptive qualities associated with 
ontological insecurity, this was not a term Laing employed. It is used in this thesis to both 
reflect this compatibility and establish a distance from Laing’s original works and theory. This 
distance becomes important as we develop the next section, presenting a highly contentious 
proposition, certainly within classically Laingian circles, that Laing presents a framework by 
which to understand a significant cause of psychic suffering, a cause that runs from the 
intimate to the political.   
A Theory of Causation? 
Laing has become notorious as the man who blamed schizophrenia on families. 
(Shariatmadari, 2013) 
Taken from a mainstream newspaper, The Guardian, this quote succinctly highlights a 
common (mis)understanding that impacts upon the entirety of Laing’s theory: that ‘blame’ 
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was apportioned within Laing’s theory. Placing this blame within the family plays into a 
further misconception about the limitation of Laing’s theory to the family in isolation; this is 
addressed in the following chapters but let us first confront the issue of blame. 
To be capable of directing blame it must logically follow that Laing identified and implied a 
source of causation. A counterargument quickly adopted amongst many Laingian scholars to 
this much-repeated accusation is that a grave misunderstanding of the research hypothesis 
of Sanity, Madness and the Family (the publication typically held accountable for instilling or 
justifying such a claim) has been made. The argument is that Laing and Esterson are 
questioning the notion of ‘schizophrenia’ as an illness and in no part are attributing blame in 
any direction, to the family or otherwise.  
We have tried in each single instance to answer the question: to what extent is the 
experience and behaviour of that person, who has already begun a career as a 
diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’ patient, intelligible in the light of the praxis and process of 
his or her family nexus. (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 27) 
The inference is that Laing (and Esterson) were questioning the notion of ‘schizophrenia’ as 
disease. And, having presented a viable argument that ‘experience and behaviour’ of a 
person diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’ is more socially intelligible than previously thought, their 
research hypothesis achieved its aim. Reiterating the basis of his entire theory and research 
in his interviews with Mullan, Laing makes this point absolutely clear, 
I’m not talking about aetiology of schizophrenia, I’ve always said that. (Laing, 1987, 
cited in Mullan, 1995, p. 379) 
The necessity to respond to this accusation at the latter stages of his career (and life), 
reaffirms the bluntness with which he felt the need to defend his theory. On initial glance it 
seems a concise dismissal of any and all consideration of causation. However, in specifying 
‘aetiology’ and ‘schizophrenia’, Laing’s refutation only addresses illnesses and diseases 
which fall within the psychiatric paradigm. By omission, Laing’s defence does not negate the 
proposition that he is talking about a cause of ontological insecurity and therefore psychic 
suffering. 
We could return to the hypothesis above once again, as many Laingian scholars do, 
asserting that intelligibility of ‘experiences and behaviours’ was Laing’s research aim and 
use this as a further basis to dismiss any notion of causation. But this defence relies on the 
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premise that intentionality nullifies the outcome, that blame, and by default causation, was 
not intended and therefore blame and causation is not relevant within the findings. Writing in 
The Guardian newspaper, Hillary Mantel (2008), a novelist and advocate of Laingian theory, 
no stranger to the finer details of this hypothesis, states, the outcome of the research 
findings implicate a level of culpability:  
[Laing] and his co-workers suggested that the way some families worked could 
generate psychotic behaviour in one member, who was selected, more or less 
unconsciously, to bear the brunt of family dysfunction. 
When we consider the hypothesis of Sanity, Madness and the Family alongside The Divided 
Self as a pair,121 we start to unpack the relevance and suitability of causation within the 
definition of his theory.  
[The theory’s] basic purpose was to make madness, and the process of going mad, 
comprehensible. (Laing, 1960, p. 9)  
Howarth-Williams (1977) emphasised intelligibility as the key component of Laing’s theory, a 
direct product responsible for making the experience of madness (ontological insecurity) 
comprehensible. Reanalysing the intelligibility that Laing achieved, this thesis looks to focus 
on the subsequent component of process also present within the hypothesis. By the very 
definition and inclusion of process, Laing is declaring an intention to reveal ‘a series of 
actions or operations conducing to an end’ (Merriam-Webster). To comprehend process, a 
location of cause is required to complete the operations that end in ontological insecurity. 
The aim in the following chapters is to re-examine the intelligibility gained from within several 
contexts, namely the clinical, the family, and the political and to reveal and reprioritise the 
concept of process, specifically identifying a causal point of origin.  
Summary 
Part 3: commits to a single concept, Ontological Insecurity, this being widely regarded as the 
pinnacle of Laing’s theory, a premise that is echoed in this thesis. However, the concept that 
is frequently reflected in secondary sources, implements a narrow appreciation of the 
theoretical complexity of Laing’s idea. This limited appreciation plays a significant role in 
 
121 Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964) conducted 11 empirical case studies to test the hypothesis proposed 
in The Divided Self (1960), binding both publications under the same theoretical umbrella. 
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sustaining the proposition of a conflictual application for ontological insecurity as 
representative of either being abnormal or normal and is instrumental in the demarcation of 
two distinct and isolated models within Laing’s theory, the family and the political. In 
deconstructing this concept, drawing further support from theory already intertwined but 
overlooked, the possibility of considering ontological insecurity to be a constant and stable 
concept is presented. This is key for its potential application in contemporary culture.  
Building on its earlier introduction, ontological insecurity as an empirical concept, focussing 
on fourth possibility anxieties, was fully analysed. At its simplest, Laing was stating that 
experiences located in our environment possessed the potential to disrupt our immersion 
within the everyday and this in turn destabilised the base anxieties of the human condition. 
Experiences of existential angst are not indicative of ‘illness’, but an awakening of a base 
element of the human condition, caused in this instance by a failure of our social context to 
provide safe refuge.  
The description of ontological insecurity as a divided or split self, gained a more nuanced 
understanding by emphasising the two-pronged framework of self-consciousness. This 
framework also enabled both applications of ontological insecurity, typically perceived as 
conflictual, to reside within a single framework. The family and the political context both 
present examples of an environment which are instilling [2] an awareness of oneself as an 
object of somebody else’s observation, and thus displacing [1] an awareness of oneself by 
oneself. The outcome of this experience is that the balance of awareness that constitute self-
consciousness is set in flux, initiating a slippery descent into ontological insecurity.  
In the final instance it was outlined how ontological insecurity causes psychic suffering in two 
ways; it inhibits the ability to establish authentic merging and establish relatedness with 
others, and secondly it disturbs the base existential anxieties, and this bring angst back into 
our experience. And as contentious as this statement is, collectively Part 3 has enabled a 
cause for ontological insecurity to be proposed within the process of disruption of self-
consciousness.   
The concepts developed within a Laingian methodology and a theory of self-formation, 
provide the two primary pillars, which provide the support for the concept of ontological 
insecurity to be assembled. Reintegrating the primary component of self-consciousness into 
this upper level, and weaving in further indirect Laingian elements, enables a further level of 
support to establish a clear and structurally sound Laingian theoretic framework has been 
built.  
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Until this point, the contemporary context has remained at a distance, but with the structure 
of a Laingian framework now developed, an application to consider the potential of Laing 
contrapuntally is ready. In Part 4, I reconsider the intelligibility Laing gleamed from his 
research in three contexts, the clinical, family and political. Rather than approach each 
individually, I weave each context together with an ultimate focus toward a political theory of 
ontological insecurity, a means of considering the increasing incidence of ‘mental health’ 














122 When I consider cause, I am not suggesting a single element, an absolute point of origin responsible for the 
onset of ontological insecurity, I am looking for a consistent factor that occurs within the experience of 
ontological insecurity that plays a significant and tangible role in onset.  
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PART 4. A Political Process 
In reaching Part 4, the Laingian framework developed in the previous chapters provides a 
lens by which we can now identify and analyse further components from within Laing’s 
theory. Applied with a focus to develop insight into the political causation of ontological 
insecurity, the theory analysed through this lens is reinvested into this theoretical framework, 
adding further detail and support to its structure.  
Due to a less typical application of the term ‘political’, Laing’s qualification for producing a 
political theory is analysed, leading directly into the question as to whether a political theory 
of integrity is evident within his work. Both of these elements are discussed at the outset. 
Responding to a critique of a lack of theoretical structure within the political aspect of Laing’s 
theory, interpersonal communications, a primary experience of the ego/other dynamic that 
construct phantasy systems, are drawn into focus. The concern is particularly with a 
negative process of interpersonal communications contained within the theory of the ‘double 
bind’, this being mapped onto the process of ontological insecurity. In what might appear a 
deviation, Part 4 also addresses critiques directed at Laing’s research within the family. 
These criticisms are addressed with the aim of identifying whether Laing’s theory of 
interpersonal communication is limited to the family or can be extended to the political 
domain. 
Based on the premise that interpersonal dynamics operate equally as effectively in the 
construction of phantasy within the political domain as in the family, the implications of 
scientism structuring the political landscape and western society as a whole is explored. 
Extrapolating Laing’s findings identified within the clinical context onto a macro scale, 
scientism is revealed as a primary source of ontological discontinuity, inhibiting relatedness 
between self and others. Mapping this onto self-consciousness, it is offered that this 
influence within the structure and discourse of society devalues and lowers our resilience to 
the hazards associated with everyday life. Collectively affecting ontological in/security – it 
provides a direct link to the increasing incidence of ‘mental illness’ diagnosis within 
contemporary culture.  
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11. The Political  
As we concentrate on a political focus within Laing’s theory, it is necessary to revisit an 
aspect that would be equally placed within Chapter 3. Laing’s political activities bleed into his 
theory and it is from within this merged framing that the qualities of Laing’s political theory 
become more apparent and defined. However, when Ronnie is brought into the mix, 
controversy is never far behind. It was Peter Sedgwick (1982), a fully-fledged member of the 
new-Left and directly involved in the New Left Review, who was perhaps the first and 
remains the most vocal (posthumously) to declare Laing an imposter within the political 
realm. Considering the active and committed political position Laing was perceived to 
occupy, particularly through his association with the counterculture movement, this 
accusation was shocking, and the reverberations from it have permeated beyond the 
political, generating questions about the integrity of all aspects of his work, theory and 
character.  
Addressing the question of political integrity, the basis of Sedgwick’s attack, is fundamental 
for ascertaining whether a politically productive content is embedded within Laing’s theory. 
Before we confront integrity however, we must consider what constitutes the political within 
Laing.  
A political theme was evident, albeit subtly, from the outset of The Divided Self. Developing 
from a central questioning of the authority of the medical infrastructure in its treatment of 
‘mental health’, it enabled readers to extrapolate these same questions toward the entirety of 
the political system. Laing’s publications continued along this trajectory and with The Politics 
of Experience he took a more direct and explicit political stance, an intent clearly indicated in 
the book title. Between The Divided Self and The Politics of Experience (1960 and 1967), a 
more prominent political identity was assumed by associating with Left-wing organisations, 
punctuated with a marked shift in his writing, notably publishing three journal articles in the 
New Left Review (NLR): Series and Nexus in the Family (1962); What is Schizophrenia? 
(1964), and One-Dimensional Man [Review] (1964). What may have been a vague political 
affiliation at the beginning, was seemingly solidified through this involvement with the NLR, 
as recognised by its editor (Perry Anderson at this time): 
RD Laing is one of us. (Sedgwick, 1982, p. 113)  
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For those outside of this closed and specific community, 1967 was the pivotal moment 
Laing’s political identity was confirmed to a wider audience. In addition to witnessing the 
release of a major publication with ‘politics’ in the title (The Politics of Experience) it also 
marked Laing’s involvement with the Dialectics of Liberation Conference (DLC), events that 
coincided with the peak activity of the counterculture movement.  
The Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation …was a bold attempt to ‘demystify 
human violence in all its forms, and the social systems from which it emanates, and 
to explore new forms of action’. (Dialectics of Liberation, 2017)  
The DLC brought together a vast of array of political thinkers – Huxley, Marcuse, Ginsberg, 
Carmichael – each a major player in their own respective field – anthropology, critical theory, 
poetry, and civil rights (Kotowicz, 1997; Dialectics of Liberation, 2017). Uniting them all was 
their desire for social change and as Nuttall (1970) alludes to in his attendance and writing 
around this event, each were figures that politically engaged groups and individuals were 
holding onto in the hope of learning a new and better method of living. The list extends far 
beyond these thinkers and, of course, the ‘antipsychiatrists’ were also out in force. The 
organisers of the entire event, Joseph Berke, and his associates Cooper, Redler, and Laing, 
all used this platform to air their views (one could also say, perhaps cynically, to promote 
and enhance their stock in front of a passionate, committed and politically active crowd). 
The DLC was one moment when Laing came together with the radical political movements 
that were happening during his time, though not always with his recognition. Anti-war, the 
CND, Women’s Liberation Movement, Sexual Freedom, and Civil Rights were no longer 
slogans for the minorities, but figures like Malcolm-X, Martin Luther King, Che Guevara, 
Betty Friedan, gave them purpose in everyday life. 
A cohesive cultural theme, a political consciousness, was emerging through the 1960s; 
movements to confront power bases of inequality within society were forming. It was one 
thing to have a theory, a purpose, a justifiable claim to challenge the political status quo, 
however, as with all the figures above, every movement needed a talisman (Nuttall, 1970). 
With a presence and strength to carry such responsibility, Laing was the talisman to mobilise 
his theory.  
Given Ronnie’s character, charisma and charm, this was the perfect setting for him to inspire 
and intoxicate an audience with his thinking (Burston, 1996). Kotowicz (1997) alludes to 
Laing taking a decisive role in both the organisation and running of this politically motivated 
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conference; Laing makes no such claims. Either way, by opening the conference, a rally 
saturated with different factions of the counterculture movement, his influence was front and 
centre, and read by many as an act which cemented his political position within the 
counterculture and also the new-Left. This was the event that justified a political lens to be 
firmly held over all his publications, but Sedgwick illuminated that this political identity was 
only sustained with significant omissions.  
Although initially a supporter of Laing, Sedgwick (1982) ultimately came to vehemently refute 
his past affiliation. He stated Laing’s political connection was a sham, shown to be hollow 
when he opted to take a career hiatus in the formerly named Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1971, a 
time when Ceylon was caught in fierce political turmoil and the rising Marxist rebellion was in 
the process of being suppressed by British, Soviet and Indian government forces. This act 
alone was enough to destroy any personal or professional respect held by Sedgwick and 
such was his disappointment, even anger, that republications of his work post 1972 were re-
edited to remove all hints of his previous positive reception of Laing (Kotowicz, 1997).  
This challenge continues into Szasz’s criticism of Laing also. In Antipsychiatry: Quackery 
Squared (2009), Szasz levels a sustained attack at Laing’s supposedly revolutionary 
commitment to confront and address the abuses of psychiatry. Supported with vivid personal 
examples, Szasz questioned the true intentions of Laing’s authenticity, integrity and morality 
on the basis that his approach was more evident of business acumen than psychiatry, 
politics, or even any true desire to benefit those in need. In scathing attacks which undercut 
the credibility of Laing’s political integrity and continue to do so, his critics accused Laing of 
peddling whichever spiritual, medical, Left-wing commodity he could to support and fuel his 
guru status (Coppock and Hopton, 2000). 
Unquestionably these criticisms raise concerns about Laing’s political integrity, but whether 
they undermine the substance of the political content within his theory is less conclusive. 
Approaching the same crucial events that ground Sedgwick’s (1982) and Szasz’s (2009) 
attack,123 Crossley (1988) offers a very different perspective on Laing’s involvement with 
politics.  
 
123 Szasz’s criticism of Laing has already been discussed in Chapter 8, As a Totality. His theory will continue to 
provide a critique and contrast of Laing’s theory as we progress.  
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A Thematic Fit  
There was a deeper thematic fit between Laing and the counter-culture; the ideas 
that he had been thinking about in relation to psychiatry emerged as major concerns 
in the counter-culture. (Crossley 1988, p. 885) 
Laing’s developing relationship within the political realm is discussed here in a manner that 
emphasises the resonance of his wider theoretical substance, particularly his philosophical 
underpinning, with the counterculture first and foremost; the virtues of his existential-
phenomenological methodology being read to have implications for society as a whole –
embracing Nuttall’s (1970) hope of learning a new and better method of living. As Laing 
sought avenues to navigate the censorship he was encountering within the psychiatric field, 
the political world of the counterculture provided him with a prominent and less inhibited 
platform, and this increased his compatibility with them further. With only a subtle, yet 
effective shift in rhetoric, the psychiatric language that underpinned his previous works was 
increasingly diluted, and his methodology was directed to this new, political audience. 
Unsatisfied with simply being read, Laing wanted action, and involvement with the 
counterculture, and its close bonds with the new-Left provided him with a strategy to achieve 
this.  
Laing championed the ideas of the counter-culture, lending them the symbolic power 
that his cultural and symbolic capital, qua trained medical doctor, generated. 
(Crossley, 1998, p. 885)  
It was through this thematic fit, requiring only slight adjustment, that Laing’s approach 
engaged so pertinently with the counterculture and by proxy, the new-Left. The seemingly 
welcomed by-product of this changing dynamic was Laing’s newly acquired status as 
‘counter-expert’; an attribution he accepted with very little reluctance (Eyerman and Jamison, 
1991). A crucial element to this newly forged political identity was Laing’s knowledge and 
application of Marxist theory (Mullan, 1995), but this is also the source of significant 
confusion. Laing appreciated the ability of Marxist theory to offer an effective critique of 
contemporary culture (Laing and Cooper, 1964), and utilised it throughout his theory to 
achieve this aim – but his guru-like status within the counterculture was achieved without 
being greatly enamoured with Left-politics or Marxism and at no point did he declare such 
allegiance. Laing later reflected that he placed no confidence in the capacity of the new-Left, 
the broader political umbrella that contained and directed much of the counterculture, to offer 
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any conclusive escape route from our collective madness (Mullan, 1995). Nonetheless, 
selective Marxist sentiments (discussed in more depth shortly) contributed significantly to the 
thematic fit between Laing’s philosophical underpinning and the counterculture’s resolve to 
effect change in society.     
The 1960’s counterculture would later be described by sociologist Stuart Hall as 
nothing more than a ‘crisis within the dominant [capitalist] culture ’,  though at the time 
such figures as Marcuse saw in the young hippies, Beats and freaks a fundamental 
challenge to the values of capitalist and state socialist systems. (Owen, 2011, p. 220)   
Sedgwick, and several other like-minded political commentators, interpreted Laing’s initial 
involvement as belonging to the category of political action, akin to Marcuse. And within this 
framing, a laissez-faire attitude towards the political situation of Ceylon, a major factor cited 
for Laing’s deteriorating relationship with the counterculture, was rightfully perceived as a 
complete turn against Left-wing ideals. But in contrast to Sedgwick’s action orientated 
interpretation, arguably the substance within Laing’s theory is more geared toward Stuart 
Hall’s other aspect, positioned by a theoretical rather than practical dynamic with the 
counterculture, and it is here that Crossley’s thematic fit gains a more organic footing. The 
theoretical substance within all of Laing’s publications, the overtly political and the politically 
subtle, remains consistently within the branch of the counterculture, developing a critique of 
the capitalist status quo from an existential-phenomenological position, a position Laing 
continued to reaffirm in some of his final interviews (Mullan, 1995).  
Accuracy of representation however often plays second-fiddle to the scandal and mythology 
that surrounds and follows Laing (Bark, 2009), a perceived political U-turn seamlessly fitting 
this narrative. Avoiding this tempting and established focus, a serious question can be asked 
as to whether Sedgwick and other Left-wing activists allowed themselves to buy into a myth 
which they themselves had constructed or interpreted. Laing had published in the NLR, 
presented at the DLC, and thus held a connection with the counterculture movement, 
grounded in a shared thematic fit of radical politics and existential-phenomenology, and by 
proxy, connecting Laing with Left-wing politics. But, to my knowledge, what he produced was 
theory critical of the political status quo that remained attuned and faithful to his existential-
philosophical foundation and although this established a critical perspective that in many 
parts overlapped with a Left position, nowhere did he overtly proclaim a committed and 
invested belief in the political solutions of the new-Left or indeed Marxism.  
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Laing’s work was politicised and radicalised…but his concern was never with the big 
‘P ’politics that concerned the Left. His concern was with politics in the wider, less 
doctrinal and party-based sense. (Crossley, 1998, p. 885)  
Laing’s actions with the NLR and Dialectics of Liberation Conference undeniably conflict with 
his apparent indifference towards the political situation in Ceylon. But this also clarifies 
Laing’s political substance. There is a disjuncture present between what is being said and 
where it is being said. As stated by Crossley, what is actually being said is consistent but not 
indebted to political affiliation. Where it is being said allows, even encourages, new-Left, 
even Marxist associations to be formed. The where, I would argue, is a calculated decision 
that lends itself to an audience that Laing’s personality craved and thrived upon. The NLR 
and Dialectics of Liberation Conference were political events which provided opportunities to 
further advertise his theory to a wider and motivated audience. But with attention to the 
actual, more philosophically inclined, substance of his theory, the political gains a consistent 
identity.  
Sedgwick’s critique rightfully and helpfully unsettles an absolute affiliation with Marxism and 
the new-Left, an affiliation that is too easily assumed from the interplay of his publications 
with the NLR and participation at the DLC. In response to this, directing focus toward the 
substance of Laing’s theory, a more consistent political definition is evident. Even then, it 
cannot be a reductive approach that is directed purely to The Politics of Experience, 
seemingly the approach taken in many secondary texts. We must explore the full 
implications of the thematic fit, justifying the premise that Laing’s existential-
phenomenological methodology is equally as capable of being a tool to understand the 
political subject as the psychiatric subject. In application to the patient, it reveals the 
mechanisms affecting their experience of psychic suffering. Laing would argue that his 
existential-phenomenological methodology fares no different in application to our political 
‘alienation' (Laing, 1967).  
As we look to develop a Laingian totalising theory, the observation that it was never the big 
‘P’ politics concerning the Left that occupied Laing’s theorising, but rather, how elements 
from within his theory complemented the wider, less doctrinal and party-based sense of 
politics, is of paramount importance. This view does not dismiss the political turbulence 
associated with Laing’s career, but reaffirms the necessity to remain attuned, always, to his 
theoretical, written, content. Very simply, Laing identified similarities in his theory and the 
political which correlated, a thematic fit – and even by focussing on this thematic fit, it does 
not absolve his political theory of limitations and gaps, which will be highlighted. This is 
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where we need to centre our approach to Laing's political theory, continuing the detailed 
methodological framework developed previously and applying it to the intelligibility Laing 
gathered from the breadth of his empirical observations in the family, clinical and political 
realms.  
Establishing Laing’s political potential therefore requires more than purely jumping into The 
Politics of Experience or restricting our attention to the events surrounding 1967, a mistake 
frequently made which echoes the reliance on modular structures. Nevertheless, The Politics 
of Experience is a highly concentrated location of political thought, which isn’t a bad place to 
start.  
Mad to be Normal 
From an ideal vantage point on the ground, a formation of planes may be observed 
from the air. One plane may be out of formation. But the whole formation may be off 
course. The plane that is ‘out of formation’ may be abnormal, bad or ‘mad’ from the 
point of formation. But the formation itself may be bad or mad from the point of the 
ideal observer. (Laing, 1967, p. 98) 
A pivotal component of the political focus is the notion that western society is collectively and 
unknowingly experiencing the effects of madness, alienation, ontological insecurity. Using 
the metaphor of the plane formation to depict society at large, the notion of a statistically 
qualified sanity (a qualification that certainly ran more throughout The Divided Self and the 
family context, and underpins the wider belief of medicine and society) is problematised, 
unsettling the taken for granted idea that the condition of the ordinary person, the person 
occupying the central tendency of society, is normal – and by normal, sane. 
The condition of alienation, of being asleep, of being unconscious, of being out of 
one’s mind, is the condition of the normal man. (Laing, 1967, p. 24) 
An immediate compatibility enabling Marxist comparison becomes evident with Laing’s 
description of the political, or perhaps more aptly cultural, experience sharing more than 
slight similarity with the Marxist notion of ‘alienation’:  
 198 
Human beings create a world through labour relations that dominates and 
dispossesses them … The individuals rationalise their powerlessness and learn to 
accept its inevitability as a positive good. (Freenberg, 2014, p. 39)   
Unlike the Marxist account however, the experience of the ‘normal man’ is not simply 
alienation, a sense of estrangement, powerlessness, and a general loss of human potential; 
the ‘normal man’ for Laing is deteriorating into a state of collective madness. This places the 
political subject firmly within the realms of ontological insecurity, experiencing some form of 
rupture of the totality of inner and outer world.  
I discussed previously the perceived shift in the application of ontological insecurity between 
the family and the political and offered the framework of self-consciousness to mediate this 
often accepted contradiction. I want to draw attention here to the timeline that separates the 
family model from the political, and thus witnesses the sudden shift in the idea of ontological 
insecurity as applied in these two registers.   
As stated before, several theorists place this occurrence in 1967, reflecting the events and 
publication of that year, but this overlooks a significant structural aspect – that each chapter 
in The Politics of Experience is accounted to a collection of previous essays written between 
1964 – 1967 (as detailed in the book’s preface). Even if we account the political turn in 
Laing’s theory to this earlier date of 1964, it continues to support a demarcation with the 
family context that starts with The Divided Self in 1960 and rounded off with Sanity, Madness 
and the Family in 1964. But even this distinction is unsettled when we appreciate that the 
notion of an insane society has been mooted since the early 1960s. 
We are asleep, but think we are awake…We are mad, but have no insight. (Laing, 
1961, p. 38) 
Laing was voicing concern about the common state of existence encapsulating western 
society, in Self and Others (1961), at a time when the focus is usually understood to be on 
the application of ontological insecurity to the family. The conventional practices that 
underpinned participation within the external world, what we deem as normality, were 
already being vividly declared as divorced from all things enriching to the self; it was 
described as an alienated and mad existence. What was a brief comment, easily missed, in 
Self and Others however became a central and explicit notion throughout The Politics of 
Experience, a development that falls within Adrian Laing’s autobiographical suggestion that 
his father employed a calculated strategy to capitalise on the political climate to increase his 
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appeal with the counterculture (Laing, A. 2006). Szasz’s criticism of Laing’s business 
acumen seems to have more than a little justification.  
It seems to be that now we are all ‘divided selves’. (Mitchell, 1974, p. 239) 
As summed up by Mitchell (1974), Laing’s theory was increasingly suggesting that we are all 
split or divided to some degree. This does not result in the detached, incoherent existence 
associated with the total severance of inner/outer in the ‘schizophrenic’, but by necessary 
implication, we are all operating and existing with ontological insecurity and as such, 
returning to Sedgwick (1982), the heart of ‘mental illnesses’ beats within us all. This notion 
seems all the more accurate with the increasing rates of ‘mental health’ diagnosis at this 
time. 
The medical model now lay in ruins. There was little sign of the physician Laing 
making contact with those he as well as others recognised as ill. In its place one 
found banality. (Clare, 1973, p. 20) 
Whether marked with a definitive start date or not, Anthony Clare (1973) captures the mood 
for many professionals engaged with, and inspired by, Laing’s earlier work when they 
encountered Laing’s evolution to the political (and transcendental) period. Speaking with 
respect, even adulation, of The Divided Self (and therefore the concepts within the family 
and clinical context), Clare’s response to the context encapsulated within The Politics of 
Experience was a stark contrast. Clare stated that the highly generic, nihilistic proclamations, 
which lacked the clinical evidential support that punctuated and lifted his earlier work to 
prominence, made this ‘new’ political focus baseless. Howarth-Williams (1977) strengthens 
this line of argument, citing further criticisms by Tyson (1971) and Holbrook (1968).  
 This is going too far! (Howarth-Williams, 1977, p. 123) 
Much of what is written regarding this time is geared toward a criticism of the Transcendental 
Experience model, nonetheless, due to its interrelation with environmental conditions, the 
political aspect within Laing’s theory is dually under attack. Unquestionably Laing draws the 
political more and more into focus, reaching a pinnacle in 1967, but to impose this as its 
originary point is to disregard significant material produced beforehand that admits the 
political premise, on some level, that sanity and statistical normality are not correlated.   
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We are all murderers and prostitutes – no matter to what culture, society, class, 
nation one belongs, no matter how normal, moral or mature one takes oneself to be. 
(Laing, 1967, p. 11) 
With highly charged and dramatic descriptions to emphasise his point, this quote epitomises 
why the political focus is associated with the latter stages of his writing, and it is also easy to 
appreciate why criticisms are directed at Laing that his political theory amounted to little 
more than broad political statements echoing generic insult toward the political hegemony of 
western ideology. As we progress, these statements are shown not to be the extent but 
rather the platform by which to dive into the substance of Laing’s wider theory if we are to 
navigate his political contributions successfully. 
These highly evocative quotes also reveal a limitation that will continue to resonate in his 
political framework. Laing leaps to the collective with sweeping statements of condemnation, 
accusing we, us, society for being asleep, without insight, unconscious – to a madness that 
encapsulates our existence. Although reference to a collective ‘we’ underscores the political 
intentions of his theory, when we consider the context he was writing in, a time of 
monumental political activism that was drawing attention to inequality and injustice on a 
scale rarely seen before, to describe everyone as ‘asleep’ – is not only insulting, but 
inaccurate. Turning this criticism back onto Laing, he demonstrated neither in theory nor in 
practice any wider consideration of the power dynamics that were so vocally being drawn 
into the political environment surrounding him.  
It is one thing to elevate and advocate the value of one’s own theory, but these collective 
statements of condemnation dismissed the value of those around him; furthermore, they 
revealed significant limitations and gaps in his own political framework. However we define 
Laing’s political theory, it does not wholly reflect the sentiments of many political 
commentators from this era (Segal, 2007; Bhambra and Demir, 2009), who have 
documented the liveliness of the radical political scene. Indeed, Segal (personal 
communication) asks scathingly, ‘Who exactly was “asleep”?’ This issue becomes more vivid 
in the following chapters as two of the movements addressing power relations, Marxism and 
Women’s Liberation (feminism), especially the latter, are drawn into focus.   
In relation to this critique of Laing’s politics, it is important to recall that his theory was not 
intended as a general account of society (or at least, not initially), but rather focused on the 
oppression of those most maligned within the psychiatric system, whose cause he always 
championed. This is the foundation from which he built his political theory, developing a 
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framework that revealed constant existential forces within the everyday that collectively 
inhibit our existence, or more accurately, cause ontological insecurity. Two components 
come to the fore as we begin this political exploration: interpersonal dynamics and scientism.  
In the following chapter we cross-fertilise this political backdrop with Laing’s theory of 
interpersonal dynamics, a theory which is typically bracketed within the family and remains 
atomised in this context.  
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12. Interpersonal World 
The confusing relationship Laing holds to Marxist theory marks our entry into analysing the 
political context and it is this that directs our attention toward the interpersonal world.  
Sterilising the very essence of Marxist theory, Laing dismisses its relevance and extends his 
own outlook across all stratifications and sensitivities within a society structured by capitalist 
politico-economic ideology, reinforcing a point that is made clear in a final interview with 
Mullan,   
 How ridiculous to say that it’s due to capitalism. (Mullan, 1995, p. 380)  
The sentiment of this extracted quote continues to reflect the theme unfolding in his thoughts 
throughout his first phase of publishing and reiterated at this later date: a problem exists 
within capitalism, but it is not capitalism itself. A serious question can be posed here as to 
whether any theory unconcerned with an analysis of economic power, could be considered 
Marxist. And Laing never makes such a claim (Mullan, 1995). Characteristically, Laing 
cherry-picks elements of Marxist theory to develop his own theoretical framework. 
Marxism…remains the indepassable philosophy of our time because the 
circumstances which gave rise to it are not depassed. (Laing and Cooper, 1964, p. 
39)   
Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre’s Philosophy 1950 – 1960 (1964), in addition to 
summarising three of Sartre’s seminal texts,124 contextualises the relevance of the Marxist-
existential tenets within Laing’s own methodological approach. More fundamentally, this 
publication also reiterates the premise underpinning the thematic fit; Laing’s political 
consciousness is always refracted through existentialist thought. When extracting quotes 
from this publication, we need to consider the influence of Laing’s co-author, David Cooper, 
a fellow member of the Antipsychiatry Movement, in this exuberant and uncompromisingly 
direct narrative. Cooper was by all accounts the most politically radical and militant of the 
antipsychiatry group. That said, Laing was no shrinking violet and his ability to command 
respect in this domain also warrants recognition. Reinforcing the perspective that Marxist 
 
124 Questions of Method (1960), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) and Saint Genet, Comedian and Martyr 
(1952). 
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theory provides an unsurpassed tool to deconstruct our current circumstance, Laing and 
Cooper, reaffirm its implication for self-formation.   
It is perfectly true, then, that man is the product of his product; the structures of a 
society created by human labour define for each one of us an objective point of 
departure. (Laing and Cooper, 1964, p. 52) 
Through a selective (one may also infer an inconsistent) Marxist lens, Laing now supports 
the notion that ‘man is the product of his product’; seemingly confirming the importance of 
class power relations in the formation of identity, and by continuation, the cause of our 
ontological insecurity. Despite this kind of comment, to view Laing as a Marxist would be to 
over-simplify his position, with its overriding commitment to existentialist-phenomenology. 
Laing stated that capitalist ideology was not the essential problem responsible for our 
collective ontological insecurity. Furthermore, he nullified the power relations involved in the 
‘culture, society, class, nation one belongs [to]’ (Laing, 1967, p. 11) – negating some of the 
core commitments of 1960s political activism.  
Without dismissing these problematic complications, we can extract, with reference to 
Laing’s theory of self, that capitalist existence is a social force responsible for an inhibited 
experience of self (ontological insecurity). But, having removed all notable power relations 
from this quasi-Marxist framing, the theory is emptied of its most exacting elements.  
A significant and perhaps the most importance deviation from Marxist theory opens here, an 
opening that also illuminates the necessity to invest in the theoretical content that is typically 
bypassed through reason of belonging to other, therefore irrelevant, models. This investment 
is vital for the development of the thematic fit, which reveals a Laingian political framework. 
Sanity today appears to rest very largely on a capacity to adapt to the external world, 
the interpersonal world and the realm of human collectivities. (Laing, 1967, p. 116 – 
emphasis added) 
The notion that the self is constructed within social forces unites both Laing and Marxism 
and this process is consistent in the analysis above. Laing however, never employs the term 
or gestures towards a Marxist concept of ‘collective consciousness’. Instead, he uses the 
term ‘human collectivities’ and this instils continuity with his earlier theory of self, specifically 
that collectively we are always united through social phantasy constructs. Social phantasy 
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constructs are a distinct theory of self and thus different from a Marxist understanding of a 
collective consciousness or class consciousness.     
Laing defined normality as a state of unconscious complicity in ‘social phantasy 
systems’. (Burston, 2000, p. 105) 
By placing social phantasy systems within a macro framework, not only is Laing’s theory 
extended beyond the parameters of the family-nexus, but this system of self-formation is 
equally as receptive to the wider ideological conditions that permeate through society. The 
political context is illuminated equally as a ‘realm of human collectivities’ and as accountable 
to the ‘interpersonal world’. The political is thus equally involved in constructing the social 
phantasy system – thus the formation of self.  
Following secondary texts, which are overly reliant on The Politics of Experience, results in a 
vague and broad gesture that capitalism equals madness. This results in a lack of detail and 
the accusation of Laing’s political content being nothing more than philosophical speculation, 
unbefitting of a man imbued with the symbolic power and influence of a psychiatrist (Siegler 
et al., 1969). But the sentiments of Laing’s political statements need to be contextualised 
within his wider theory to gain their full value. We develop a foundation for the thematic fit 
with what may feel like a detour from the political, an analysis of the family. But it is the 
family that gives us the basis to understand the mechanics underpinning Laing’s theory of 
interpersonal dynamics. From a basis of interpersonal dynamics within the family, we can 
start to consider the potential of an interpersonal world connecting human collectives on a 
political scale. 
Inserting the family within the political 
The first empirical building block in Laing’s theory of interpersonal dynamics was observed in 
the playing out of the good-bad-mad scenario, a scenario encountered in the context of the 
family-nexus.  
Julie acted in such a way as to appear to her parents to be everything that was right. 
She was good, healthy, normal. Then her behaviour changed so that she acted in 
terms of what all the other significant others in her world unanimously agreed was 
‘bad’ until, in a short while, she was ‘mad’. (Laing, 1960, pp. 181 – 182)  
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The three stages, good-bad-mad, were outlined by Laing as typical in the process of how an 
individual could find themselves following the well-worn path to inauguration as a career 
psychiatric patient. Relatedness, although not identified as such, plays a consistent role 
throughout.  
The three stage scenario was first included in the final chapter of The Divided Self (1960), 
The Ghost of the Weed Garden, and is continually referenced throughout Laing’s further 
case studies. Kotowicz (1997, p. 24) describes the good-bad-mad scenario in the following 
way; ‘the “good” period is when the child never gives any demands…Then comes the “bad” 
spell…it most often takes the form of a tirade of accusations against the mother, the father, 
or both… [the parents] consult a specialist, a psychiatrist. The diagnosis is made, and the 
child is now recognised as mad’. Applying his existential-phenomenological methodology to 
this scenario, Laing questioned the validity of the established order that accepted the 
attributions as defined by the parent and medical professional [Person 2], instead prioritising 
the perspective of the sufferer [Person 1]. 
With his lens firmly trained upon the sufferer’s experience [Person 1], the intelligibility 
gleamed from this context was indicative of an individual that had ‘failed to achieve 
autonomy’ (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 97). Without autonomy, they were unable to 
immerse themselves within ordinary life – ‘from a centrally firm centre of his own and other 
people’s reality and identity’ (Laing, 1960, p. 39). Autonomy is a prerequisite, intricately 
bound within the structure of ontological security, providing the ability to locate themselves 
within their worldly context. In the first stage, they fail to demand autonomy as a child, 
although without any obvious or externally observable conflict. Laing’s suggestion can be 
understood as a version of the way the child’s ‘true’ self is internally denied facilitating 
complicity with the outer external world, represented as the significant and authoritative 
position of the other, the parental figure. The perceived good stage produces a different 
conflict experienced as inner turmoil for the child. Having failed to establish autonomy at this 
early stage, with a feeling of greater capacity to value their ‘true’ self arising as a teenager (a 
time of cultural and physical empowerment), the attempt to (re)claim this position is met with 
confrontation by the parents. In this instance, by honouring an inner ‘true’ self, turmoil is then 
experienced in contact with the outer world, the parents. This confrontation is met with a new 
attribution of being bad. Sartre proves useful in considering confrontation: 
Conflict is the original meaning for his being-for-others. (Sartre cited in Collier, 1977, 
p. 6) 
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Sartre’s contribution is a complicated and far from consistent influence within Laing’s theory, 
and the suggestion that to understand Laing is to know Sartre, fails to appreciate important 
differences that define their uniqueness. Sartre felt that conflict was instrumental in the 
establishment of consciousness as a property of experience, conflict creating distance 
between oneself and the other. In Laing’s theory, however, conflict is discussed in the 
negative, with an intensified and violent implication contributing to the cause of ontological 
insecurity. Conflict with oneself during the good phase, conflict with others in the bad phase. 
Extreme conflict, conflict beyond the ‘norm’, correlating with the development of ontological 
insecurity.  
Perhaps a more appropriate suggestion to support the issues raised within both the good 
and bad phase would be approached with further reference to Buber’s (1950) essay 
Distance and Relation. Buber states that to establish distance from others is a prerequisite to 
developing relatedness, relatedness being a key element of ontological security.  
[O]ne can enter into a relation only with a being that has been set at a distance or, 
more precisely, has become an independent opposite. (Buber, 1950, p. 207) 
Distance provides the human situation; relation provides man’s becoming in that 
situation. (Buber, 1950, p. 209) 
In the good phase, Person 1 has failed to set a distance between themselves and Person 2, 
to establish the terrain of their existence. Having failed to achieve this in the first instance, 
relatedness between the self [Person 1] and the other [Person 2] is inhibited. Conflict is not 
necessarily the cause as per Sartre, but rather a consequence. Relatedness is the constant 
that supports Laing’s assertion that conflict contributes to the disconnection of the individual 
from their outer context, preventing a pathway between self and other being established. 
This ultimately results in a failure to locate their being-in-the-world and establish ontological 
security.  
Buber’s (1950) essay however was intended for a more collective, worldly context, a context 
that resonates with Laing’s concept of the political, and identifies that an excessive and 
detrimental distance has become the norm, contradicting the natural order of relatedness as 
the primordial and default position. This perspective is supported and seemingly recognised 
as even more prevalent in our current age (see Gerhaart, 2010; Sennet, 1998). Examining 
the first two of the three stage scenario, the good and bad phase, Buber’s insights give these 
empirical observations a firmer basis to consider their impact on ontological insecurity, and 
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invite extension to a broader societal application. Buber and Laing also converge in that 
hope remains present within this tragic circumstance. The freedom to act and manipulate the 
structures that facilitate our relatedness is always retained, whether individually or politically, 
to increase or decrease the distance between relationships or to master the relationship to 
society, enabling the conditions for the I-Thou to flourish, and ontological security to be 
gained. The situation is never terminal.  
Returning to the three-stage scenario, the final stage marks the beginning of the clinical 
context. This encounter is the concretising component, the enrolment of the Conspiratorial 
Model, whereby the micro authority of the parent that has deemed the child ‘bad’ combines 
with the societal application of scientific authority through the psychiatric profession, 
diagnosing this demanding, challenging, and ‘abnormal’ behaviour as illness, madness. 
Caught in the catch 22 of the Conspiratorial Model, the sufferer is no longer a product of 
their environment, they are mad, ill, psychotic. I need to hold off discussing the 
Conspiratorial Model as the analysis of the clinical encounter serves a more important 
function in the following chapter. 
The three-stage good-bad-mad scenario is a descriptive account of the experience of 
ontological insecurity, an early, invaluable tool within Laing’s toolkit that empirically verified 
his theoretical assertions thus evidencing a non-illness status for those (mis)diagnosed as 
schizophrenic. The consequential rupture of inner and outer realms that define ontological 
insecurity is shown through the inability to contain relatedness with oneself and others 
simultaneously. This lack of relatedness contributes significantly to the destabilisation of 
balance within self-consciousness.   
With a short introduction of Buber’s two person dyadic in The Dividing Self, Chapter 8: 
Collusion, further writing was committed in the Appendix: A Notation for Dyadic 
Perspectives, a demonstration of Laing’s (1961) intent to carry out a deepening analysis of 
these empirical observations. The subsequent publication, Self and Others, continued what 
was primarily a reflection of the two-person dynamic, illuminating the inseparability of ego 
and other; however this was extended significantly by the time he reached Interpersonal 
Perceptions, revealing the multiplicity of interconnected relationships. Demonstrated within 
the family-nexus, but by no means indicated as restricted to this environment, the base 
ingredients for the social phantasy construct were illustrated as being performed through 
interpersonal dynamics. As opposed to the role of interpersonal dynamics in self-formation, 
we now consider the role of misaligned interpersonal dynamics and the consequence they 
involve for the individual. This is where we start to piece together a more detailed 
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perspective on ontological insecurity, not simply the experience, but the preceding and 
maintained events that contribute to the cause of the rupture, the cause of ontological 
insecurity. 
Misaligned Communication – The Double Bind 
The framework for ontological insecurity is outlined within The Divided Self (1960), including 
the three-stage scenario. However, a vital component, highly visible in the case studies 
undertaken in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), is taken from the subsequent text of 
Self and Others (1961): Bateson’s double bind situation. The double bind situation 
illuminates how detrimental interpersonal dynamics significantly impact upon the social 
phantasy construct. Through the inclusion of Bateson’s double bind model, we see how 
relatedness is not only involved in the outcome of the ontological process, but from the 
outset. 
The ‘victim’ is caught in a tangle of paradoxical injunctions, or of attributions having 
the force of injunctions, in which he cannot do the right thing. (Laing, 1961, p. 144) 
Summarising the double bind, Laing introduces two components, attributions and 
injunctions. An attribution happens when Person 2 states to Person 1 a characteristic 
ascribed to their Being. In response, it is expected that Person 1 will confirm and conform to 
that attribution. The injunction is the relational pathway created between Person 2 and 
Person 1 (Holtby, 1973). Attributions and injunctions are created and maintained within the 
shared experience of both persons.  
In the case of a double bind situation, a process of misaligned interpersonal dynamics has 
occurred within this shared experience, instigated and amplified by Person 2 who holds an 
authoritative position, typically a parental or significant other, over Person 1, who occupies 
the position of victim. Person 1 is beholden to the power imbalance possessed by the 
authority of Person 2.   
Quoting directly from Bateson’s 1956 thesis, Laing (1960) highlights six necessary 
ingredients for a double bind situation to unfold:  
1. ‘Two or more persons’ are involved 
2. ‘Repeated experience’ 
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3. ‘A primary negative injunction’; Person 1 is expected / required to conform to 
the threat of violence, physical, emotional, etc., from an other. 
4. ‘A second injunction conflicting with the first’; potentially inscribed through a 
different, subtler, means of communication. This will retain the threat of 
violence but convey a contradictory message to the primary negative 
injunction. 
5. ‘A tertiary negative injunction prohibiting the victim from escaping from this 
field’; caught between the necessity of only two options, the victim’s position 
may be further compounded by ‘capricious promises of love, and the like’ 
from the other. 
6. ‘Finally, the complete set of ingredients is no longer necessary when the 
victim has learned to perceive his universe in double bind patterns’; the 
presence of any one or more may induce panic or rage, potentially attempting 
to overcome these injunctions with hallucinatory voices. 
(Laing, 1961, pp. 144 – 145) 
Without using the terms of inner/outer, Bateson’s process of primary, secondary, tertiary 
injunctions provides a theory that complements the binary rupture within Laing’s ontological 
insecurity framework. The inner (Person 1 / victim) is presented with conflictual messages to 
manage the expectations of the outer (others, including, but not limited to, Person 2). In the 
last ingredient Bateson states that the victim may experience hallucinatory voices to 
overcome and manage their predicament, a demonstration that the rupture has become 
complete. The totality is split, and the individual focusses all efforts on preserving the inner 
world (Person 1’s self) and severing connection to the external world (Person 2’s 
dominance).  
The double bind situation is a prime example of irrational interpersonal dynamics, 
demonstrating the capacity to create and maintain knotted social phantasy constructs that 
consume an individual’s experience and detrimentally affecting their engagement with the 
world, and thus their sense of ontological security. In the good / bad scenario at least several 
of the necessary ingredients for the double bind situation are present: two or more persons, 
repeated experience, power indifference, a primary injunction. This may well be 
accompanied by further secondary and tertiary injunctions, but this simple good/bad format 
has created conflict – or rather, disharmony between inner/outer and is contained within the 
violent atmosphere of either inner turmoil or conflict with the outer world of parents. An 
additional, crucial aspect to this process is that this all plays out during a prime development 
age of the individual, all conditions that prevent achievement of autonomy and a successful 
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integration of inner and outer worlds within a totality of experiences. The social conditions 
have created an environment unconducive to relatedness, initially with the other and 
ultimately with oneself. Thus, the calibration of self-consciousness is unsettled, authentic 
merging is inhibited, and ontological insecurity ensues. 
Bateson’s double bind theory reverberates throughout Laing’s publications, evident 
throughout Self and Others and Interpersonal Perceptions, and even when not directly 
declared, the process is actively present and easily identifiable throughout the extended 
case studies (see Sanity, Madness and the Family). Laing (1961 and 1966) outlines how 
interpretations arising from our interpersonal dynamics have the potential to induce spirals of 
(mis)communication patterns, misaligned pathways that compound one another and 
ultimately consolidate as knots, a tangle of disrupted, complex and confused pathways that 
distort information and create unhealthy contexts for relationships to be established and 
managed. A double bind emphasises the amplification of these irrational interpersonal 
dynamics. As highlighted earlier, interpersonal dynamics are building blocks for the social 
phantasy constructs, the basis of the self. Once infiltrating and structuring the social 
phantasy construct, it is not only in the relationship with the other that the individual is 
‘caught in a tangle of paradoxical injunctions, or of attributions having the force of 
injunctions, in which [they] cannot do the right thing’ (Laing, 1961, p. 144), it is also within 
themselves. The very basis of their social phantasy system has been constructed 
misaligned, confused and as such, becomes ontologically insecure. 
Through the illumination of the spirals, knots and the manifestation of the double bind, we 
see how irrational interpersonal dynamics are a source of deteriorating relatedness and act 
as a cause of ontological insecurity, and are also the consequence of ontological insecurity.  
Unfortunately, ontological insecurity and interpersonal dynamics are not the remembered 
feature of this aspect of Laingian theory. It is the family that continually takes centre stage – 
namely Laing’s apparent critique of its function. Importantly, interpersonal dynamics of the 
kind described by Laing are central to some contemporary therapeutic approaches, 
stemming particularly from the Milan Group (Jones, 2002), typically converging under ‘family 
therapy’ or ‘systemic family therapy’. This therapeutic model relies heavily on communication 
theory of the sort Laing uses in Interpersonal Perceptions and Self and Others, echoing 
sentiments of spirals and knots (albeit without acknowledgement of Laing but with 
recognition of Bateson). Circular questioning is employed as a strategy to illuminate 
processes within family therapy (Campbell, 2003). Not forgetting Buber’s continuing 
influence on relatedness, it is frustrating that the substance of Laing’s theory is displaced 
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when these concepts are accepted and respected in alternative quarters. Once again, the 
desire to embellish sensationalism surrounding the mythology of Laing seems to win, the 
argument that ‘Laing blamed the family for schizophrenia’ (Shariatmadari, 2013) continuing 
to dominate the headlines and negatively affecting any potential consideration in the current 
climate.  
Critiques of the Family Context 
Laing’s synonymity with the family is a double-edged sword. No doubt this aspect to his 
research increased his status and respectability as a theorist within the psychiatric domain, 
providing rich theoretical and empirical insights, but its success must also be considered as 
a factor in the reductive misrepresentative of atomisation. Themes from his later works, 
those directly relating to politics never gain the same traction; they are frequently overlooked 
and criticised for lacking the evidential support that grounded the family context in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family (Clare, 1973).  
In the previous section, I argued that Laing’s discussion of a political dimension necessarily 
requires consideration of wider reaching aspects of his theory, specifically the process and 
operation of interpersonal dynamics, concepts typically confined to the family context alone. 
In this section, I look specifically to the family context and identify aspects that address 
whether this area was intended by Laing to be separate or part of a wider framework, a 
discussion that necessarily overlaps with the negative light this shone on the role of the 
family and women. 
The continuing emphasis placed on the family must be accounted in part to the terminology 
that saturates secondary sources: the technically accurate ‘family-nexus’ referred to more 
frequently and conveniently as ‘the family’. This seemingly harmless abbreviation that Laing 
himself employed is implicated with the misconceptions surrounding Laing and the family. 
A group, whose unification is achieved through the reciprocal interiorisation by each 
of each other, in which neither a ‘common object ’,  nor organisational or institutional 
structures, etc. have a primary function as a kind of group ‘cement ’,  I shall call a 
nexus. (Laing, 1962, p. 11) 
Taken from a lesser-known article, Series, Nexus and the Family, Laing’s definition of the 
nexus describes clearly that a family may be, and typically is, a nexus, but a nexus is not 
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limited to a family. The characteristics of a nexus require that it necessarily involves two or 
more players and extends without limitation providing it avoids becoming an organisation or 
institution, centrally cascading rules rather than showing reciprocal influence between 
members. It can also occur in any group whereby the collective of members internalise and 
collude to sustain shared dynamics, rules, qualities etc which have not been centrally 
prescribed. The nexus becomes the contextual in-the-world that Being is immersed within. 
The family was the specific nexus on which Laing’s application of an existential-
phenomenological methodology was focussed, but the idea of the nexus has been lost, 
resulting in a reduction of focus to the family in isolation.  
Focussing on Sanity, Madness and the Family, several important factors are revealed that 
illuminate why this misdirection happens. There is no getting away from the fact that the 
constant within each study, the primary protagonist in each of the interpersonal dynamics, is 
the family itself, often the mother.125 This in itself would not have been as damaging had the 
family retained its contextual position within the framework of a nexus, however even the title 
of the book stops with ‘the family’ instilling a reductive reference point from the outset. This 
change is also apparent in the definition provided in the introduction, contrasting with the 
earlier definition from Series, Nexus and the Family. In this introductory definition, the term 
nexus is less commanding. 
We are interested in what might be called the family nexus, that multiplicity of 
persons drawn from the kinship group, and from others who, though not linked by 
kinship ties, are regarded as members of the family. (Laing and Esterson, 1964, p. 
21)  
The reason that nexus becomes less conspicuous is obvious when Self and Others and 
Interpersonal Perception are considered. The rules that underpin the qualification of a nexus 
and the interpersonal dynamics of the family make it a nexus par excellence, hence Laing 
focussing his empirical observations and research on the family. However, through 
increasingly omitting reference to the nexus within the structure of his theory, particularly 
evident in his book title, a significant detail of Laing’s study becomes vaguer – the impact of 
dysfunctional interpersonal dynamics; the family is simply the richest context to analyse its 
operation. 
 
125 This is addressed in detail below. 
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Cynically, I must also admit that I can’t dismiss the proposition that Laing allowed, possibly 
encouraged, this misunderstanding to circulate for his own publicity, himself contributing to 
the sensationalism and controversy surrounding his antagonism toward the family by 
omission of a correction. On rereading the definition of a nexus provided in the later and 
better-known 1964 book, Sanity, Madness and the Family, in comparison to the fuller 
description present in the 1962, Series, Nexus and Family, I believe sufficient direction is 
present to avoid this misunderstanding. However, without being prepared on my initial 
engagement, I, like others, was drawn to focus on the family itself rather than seeing it as the 
representation of a nexus.  
Laing’s synonymity with the family can also be attributed to how his case studies conclude 
with praxis (this also playing a large part in the presentation of blame). The Sartrean concept 
of praxis and process are briefly discussed in the introduction to Sanity, Madness and the 
Family, explaining how the actions in a family (a nexus more accurately) can be understood 
in one of two ways. Again, a fuller definition is provided in the previous publication, Series 
and Nexus in the Family:126 
When what is going on in a group can be traced to the authorship of its members it 
will be termed praxis... 
[Process is] divorced from the intentions or praxis of any single person, and yet they 
seem to determine, control, condition, individual and group behaviour. Group actions 
appear to be generated without anyone’s express desire and without anyone being 
able to see the possibility of an option, much less to exercise it. (Laing, 1962, p. 8) 
Summarily, praxis traces the actions within the family to an author or authors, and process 
occurs seemingly without authorship. Both impact on our experience, thus shaping our social 
phantasy constructs and therefore the formation of self. Laing acknowledges both at 
numerous junctures indicating that he remained committed to them as ideas throughout his 
career. However, in Sanity, Madness and the Family, and all his case study examples, 
praxis take centre stage and process gains no further empirical attention.  
 
126 Even though Laing and Esterson’s intention for Sanity, Madness and the Family was to focus on the empirical 
observation of family case studies and not theory specifically, considering the importance of these concepts, I 
am at a loss as to why Laing did not include greater detail in this text or direct the reader to the previous article 
Series and Nexus in the Family (1962).  
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Returning to the example of Maya Abbott, we see the emphasis placed on family praxis to 
contextualise the negative experience and behaviour of a person as a diagnosed 
‘schizophrenic’. In addition to illustrating the consequence of the double bind, irrational 
interpersonal dynamics, and the loss of relatedness, it also shows further how the family 
becomes the dominant focus.127 The example of Maya is representative of all the family 
studies in Sanity, Madness and the Family and all other Laingian publications: a universal 
double bind scenario as depicted by the sufferer’s paradoxical inner experience and traced 
to a specific author within the outer experience of the family. This evidences the primary 
premise of Laing’s methodology and theory that is commonly associated with the family, that 
dysfunctional interpersonal dynamics play a significant role in understanding the experience 
associated with psychic suffering.128  
Having a definitive author within each family study, the prerequisite of praxis, as the focal 
point for an irrational context within the family, is favourable for Laing’s empirical 
observations for two scientifically interwoven reasons: 1) it provides a fixed and definitive 
location to qualify intelligibility within the sufferer’s assertions, and 2) attaining this fixed 
location for intelligibility qualifies the overall efficacy of an existential-phenomenological 
methodology. Each component complements the other and concretises the evidential circle 
from hypothesis to outcome.  
We had to stop somewhere and so decided the cut-off was to be the nuclear family. 
(Laing, 1987 cited in Mullan, 1995, p. 274) 
Concluding his research at this cut-off enabled his findings to be specific; intelligibility 
gained, the hypothesis proven, Laing’s theory verified. However, the intelligibility discovered 
within the family-nexus, by resting on the conclusion of praxis, negates the flexibility 
developed by reaffirming the inclusion of nexus, and instead points an even more accusatory 
finger at a specific author residing within the family, the mother. This development arguably 
closes down the application of Laing’s theory rather than opening it up to wider application in 
the political.  
Gender blindness is a criticism that has long dominated a feminist critique of Laing 
(Showalter,1987; Mitchell, 1974) and this directly feeds into the question of whether this 
theory remains within the family. Laing’s research disproportionately affected women, 
 
127 Maya Abbot’s family study will be highlighted within Patemen’s (1972) article in the final chapter.  
128 This is ascertained from the intelligibility revealed with the application of an existential-phenomenological 
methodology.  
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exemplified in the ‘mother-dragon’ (the ironic term used by Segal during the Birkbeck 
conference 2015) frequently being assigned the responsible author of praxis, and 
‘schizophrenic’ patients always being a female member of the family. Laing was not only 
blaming the family; he was blaming women within the family.  
There is unquestionably good reason for these accusations to be made; others including 
Showalter (1987) have continued this criticism, but in approaching Laing’s theory and work 
through the text of Mary Barnes,129 failed to adequately acknowledge the distance between 
this patient and Laing (Kotowicz, 1997). Mary Barnes: Two Accounts of a Journey through 
Madness, by Mary Barnes and Joseph Berke (1972) was neither a book by R.D. Laing nor 
endorsed by him (Mullan, 1995), and as a result, Showalter’s passionate analysis of Laing 
loses credibility (Kotowicz, 1997). Showalter demonstrates again how easy it is to be swept 
up in secondary texts operating with a Laingian theory and assume that these are directly 
associated with Laing himself (a point I am contesting in this thesis). Another feminist 
critique of Laing that comes from a psychoanalytic vantage is Mitchell (1974), stating that 
there is a significant lack of understanding or appreciation of patriarchal culture within his 
analysis of the family, highlighting his lack of oedipal consideration, a societal staple within 
this patriarchal culture, which she states needs to be confronted if his theory is to be taken 
seriously. As highlighted at the outset of this thesis, Laing’s theory is notably short-sighted, 
blind even, to any consideration of identity politics. His interest is in rescuing understanding 
of the self, but this is without any appreciation for the systemic practices that 
disproportionately affect certain groups within the community, in this case women, but it 
extends exponentially to all marginalised and discriminated groups. Essentially, Laing’s lack 
of consideration of gender inequality in his theory, equally reflects his lack of analysis of 
power relations more generally, including structural features of class, race and imperialism. 
The critique levelled from feminist positions illustrates this issue and highlights the difficulty 
in expanding Laing’s theory of interpersonal dynamics into the macro, political realm.  
The common Laingian defence against well-structured feminist arguments by referring to the 
intent underpinning the research hypothesis of Sanity, Madness and the Family (intelligibility 
was the aim and not blame of the family), fails to appreciate the many places where Laing, 
inadvertently or not, allows a focus to fixate on the family and women. At best, such a 
defence offers that when Laing cut-off his research having proved his hypothesis (social 
intelligibility), he abandoned responsibility for the further implications of his findings and in 
doing so, left the family and women firmly in the firing line. At worst, is the inference that he 
 
129 Showalter’s criticism was directed with a considerable lack of empathy, or solidarity, for Mary Barnes herself. 
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did not just stop somewhere, he found a particular, patriarchal place to stop. Thus 
‘schizophrenia’ was the consequence of family praxis and this originated with the mother and 
affected the most vulnerable member, that is the daughter – otherwise he would have had a 
scientific (and ethical) impetus to necessarily continue his investigation and delve into the 
wider political praxis (or ideological process etc), that cascades into the family and impacts 
upon the female members disproportionately (as per Mitchell’s critique). From a feminist 
position, it is this political enquiry that is missed and thus misrepresents women within the 
family, and women within society. As stated by Segal:  
The problem was that Laing just never got to grips with the real power dynamics of 
those nuclear families he studied, or their cultural and political context. (Segal, 2018, 
p. 110) 
Laing didn’t simply fail to get to grips with the power dynamics of the family, he failed to 
appreciate – or at the very least acknowledge – power dynamics residing in virtually all 
social hierarchies, apart from psychiatry’s social power. In the case of the family, Laing's 
inability to confront power inequalities resulted in his theory actively supporting patriarchal 
domination. 
There are numerous caveats in Laing’s writings used in response to this criticism of a 
disproportionate focus on women within the family: he lambasted the ‘schizophrenogenic’ 
mother theory that had gained traction in the previous decade, going as far as to call it a 
‘witch-hunt’ (p. 189); he reminded his readers that fathers and siblings contribute to the 
family dynamic130 (Laing, 1960); and he qualified the reason all diagnosed ‘schizophrenics’ 
in the case studies were female was purely a result of administrative access (Laing and 
Esterson, 1964).131  
A problem I have with each of these defences, is that they were written prior to Sanity, 
Madness and the Family, the text responsible for consolidating the opinion that Laing 
blamed the family. Can they still be considered a viable defence when evidence gathered 
afterwards seemingly contradicts them? This must place a question mark on their validity. 
The by-product of Laing’s achieved intelligibility clearly placed the parent, typically the 
mother, as the primary player within the family context regarding the irrational interpersonal 
 
130 The Divided Self; Chapter 8; ‘The Case of Peter’ is a male patient with the author being his father. Offering 
some balance, albeit woeful in the wealth of female patients and mother authors.  
131 Esterson was professionally involved with both East and West hospitals, female admission wards only (Laing 
and Esterson, 1964). 
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dynamics and this typically manifested with a female sufferer. It is easy to see why Laing 
was accused of blaming the family and worse still, blaming the mother within the family. This 
accusation was not lost on Laing either. Laing did not dispute that the mother plays a 
consistent role within the dysfunctional family dynamics for each of his studies, continuing 
that this appears to reflect wider societal demographics for families with a diagnosed 
schizophrenic member (Kirsner, 1976). However, this was no admission of guilt for blaming 
the family, no-less the mother. 
In an effort to try and re-centre Laing’s intent upon the master structures of existential 
degradation that affect all members of western society, we can balance the attention 
directed toward the female ‘casualties’ which take an unprecedented focus in the reception 
of his research, by highlighting that Laing also discussed the case study of Peter (patient) 
and his father (praxis author) in The Divided Self; two males caught up within an irrational 
and dysfunctional familial praxis, resulting in the same outcome. As stressed in the wider 
context of Laing’s writings, particularly Self and Others and Interpersonal Perceptions, and 
developed above, it is the negative development of knots and spirals within dysfunctional 
interpersonal dynamics that affects experience – no attention is paid to the variable of 
gender (whether determining of author or patient). Essentially, the fact is that the primary 
carer, who is often the mother, occupies a significant role within the interpersonal dynamics 
of all families. Therefore, the primary carer/mother, plays a significant role within the 
[dysfunctional] interpersonal dynamics of the [‘schizophrenic’s’] family.  
Whilst this ameliorates some of the criticism directed at Laing for his ‘attack on women’, it 
does not negate the undeniable reality that the attention directed to the mother, as the main 
intersection and hub within the family, and the daughter, as the most susceptible recipient, is 
disproportionate.  
Laing’s intended focus was ultimately the impact of irrational interpersonal dynamics on 
ontological in/security, but the intent underpinning this focus does not nullify the wider 
implications for its outcome. He aimed to reveal and liberate on the one hand, but whether 
inadvertently or not, Laing actively invested in patterns of interpersonal dynamics that 
contributed to gender inequality within the social hierarchy. It would appear that Laing was 
determined to produce evidence for the interpersonal dynamics theory without thinking 
through all the (political) implications, accepting women within the family as collateral 
damage. Mitchell’s and Segal’s critical insight and that of the wider feminist movement is an 
accurate presentation: Laing’s theory insufficiently acknowledged his role in the political 
oppression of women. This point is as relevant now as it would have been then. 
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Despite this political limitation, Laing’s work evidenced that irrational interpersonal dynamics, 
are a cause and consequence of ontological insecurity, and are capable of unfolding in any 
nexus (therefore beyond the family and the praxis authorship of the mother). Despite the 
problems described above, Laing’s analysis of the family, outlines a theory of interpersonal 
dynamics intended to apply both to ‘the interpersonal world’ and 'the realm of human 
collectivities’ (Laing, 1967, p. 116). This is articulated clearly by Laing in this lesser 
referenced source: The Study of Family and Social Contexts in Relation to the Origin of 
Schizophrenia. 
[W]e may expect that the irrationality of the family will find its rationality when placed 
in its context. And so on … presumably through meta-meta-meta- … contexts, until 
one arrives at the contexts of all social contexts, the Total World System (TWS). 
(Laing, 1967b, p. 141) 
Through the feminist lens we see that Laing failed to highlight master structures of 
interpersonal dynamics that maintain inequality within established social hierarchies; 
furthermore, he did not acknowledge this potential. Perhaps most damagingly, he even 
continued to assume these master structures. This does not invalidate the political potential 
of Laing’s interpersonal theory, but rather it shows its limitations.  
Having highlighted the centrality of interpersonal dynamics and their ability, in the negative, 
to damage relatedness, compromising ontological insecurity (thereby affecting further the 
ability to achieve relatedness), and clarifying their capacity to not be reserved to the family(-
nexus), we now analyse the political meta-meta-meta…context to identify whether Laing’s 
theory provides insight into an interpersonal dynamic occurring on a societal scale 




13. Ontological Discontinuity  
Having illuminated the place of interpersonal dynamics within Laing’s political theory, I now 
introduce the clinical context into the political (in contrast to its more usual encapsulation 
within the family context). Exploring the clinical strengthens numerous aspects of a political 
theory, most significantly the operation of scientism. Scientism will be argued as a consistent 
force within the interpersonal world, then and now, that causes ontological discontinuity. The 
claim scientism holds to authority within contemporary culture stems from the seeds of the 
Enlightenment, and it imbues the psychiatric episteme with a perceived absolute power to 
understand persons. With the ability to define and enforce what is deemed ‘normal’, 
‘acceptable’, and even ‘safe’, scientism is the kernel of psychiatry that provides it with social 
and political power. Scientism also underpins the dominant psychopharmacological 
approach and supporting the rationale of Big Pharma and the neoliberal agenda, ‘mental 
illness’ being an individual problem, a problem rooted in brain chemistry (see Chapter 4, 
Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance). Scientism is the power relation revealed within Laing’s 
theory that justifies a political definition.  
The error fundamentally is the failure to realize that there is an ontological 
discontinuity between human beings and it-beings.  
Human beings relate to each other not simply externally, like two billiard balls, but by 
the relations of the two worlds of experience that come into play when two people 
meet. (Laing, 1967, p. 53 – emphasis added) 
Laing is stating that the politically induced experience of madness, which we know to be 
severe ontological insecurity and thus an experience of psychic suffering is caused through 
‘ontological discontinuity’. This is another example of an overlooked and therefore 
underworked statement relating directly to Laing’s political context, with secondary texts not 
appreciating its importance at all.  
Ontological discontinuity is a concept that although not defined within a Buberian framework, 
resonates with it. The analogy of human relatedness within the capitalist landscape 
mimicking two billiard balls is an apt description of Buber’s I-It qualities, a condition of 
relatedness inhibiting the ability to embrace ‘authentic merging’. Ontological discontinuity as 
a form of I-It relatedness is the thread that when unpicked, and further supported with the 
Laingian framework developed previously, within the political reveals the conditions that 
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promote this detrimental form of relatedness on a societal scale, resulting in ontological 
insecurity. And it is through extrapolation from Laing’s findings within the clinical context that 
the process of ontological discontinuity within the political becomes more apparent and 
relevant within a current context. 
The primary foundation ascertained within the clinical setting fits the definition of Siegler et 
al.’s, Models of Madness as the ‘Conspiratorial Model’ (CM). The CM remains a fertile point 
of debate within psychiatry, usually stemming from the work contained within the bracket of 
antipsychiatry (see Timimi, 2013; Bracken and Thomas, 2001; Bracken et al., 2012). The 
process of labelling or diagnosing continuously circles within the debate about who it serves, 
the sufferer or the system (Robitscher, 1979; Stolzenburg et al., 2017). Laing’s analysis of 
the clinical setting adds an additional layer concerning scientism to the contents of the CM 
and this establishes a specific and uniquely Laingian quality to his work; it is not simply the 
consequence of a label but the scientifically structured ‘mental health’ label or diagnosis and 
its existential consequence. At this time of increasing ‘mental health’ diagnosis, and less 
discriminate use of psychiatric discourse, Laing’s insights from the clinical setting seem more 
vital than ever. 
The analysis of the psychiatric encounter runs consistently, with varying emphasis, 
throughout all publications of the first phase, overlapping within the political and family 
contexts (and most typically acknowledged within the family). Even so, the analysis of the 
clinical setting is not directly situated within either domain. Rather, it runs parallel with both, 
and manages to exist in both without confronting the conflict associated with the contrasting 
application of ontological insecurity. 
The current process of diagnosis (DSM / ICD guided) is a prime example of the 
conspiratorial process, demonstrating the clinical setting’s instrumental capacity to impose a 
significant ontological consequence on the patient (victim), reducing the sufferer to ‘man as a 
machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes’ (Laing, 1960, p. 23).132 It was in 
response to this reductive process that Laing advocated the necessity for his existential-
phenomenological methodology that underpinned his science of persons. The potential to 
consider this was explored at length in Chapter 5, A Laingian Methodology, the sustained 
and detailed analysis undertaken outlined the capacity for Laing’s methodology to be 
considered anti-conspiratorial. 
 
132 See Chapter 4, Laing, Psychiatry and Resistance.  
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This current chapter illuminates how scientism is woven within the fabric of our political 
landscape and how the effects of this mimic traits of the Conspiratorial Model, causing wide 
reaching ontological damage beyond that of the patient / psychiatrist dynamic.  
Siegler et al.’s universalised Conspiratorial Model definition provides a base understanding 
for Laing’s operation of the clinical context; we see their similarity highlighted when we 
contrast their descriptions. 
The person labelled is inaugurated not only into a role, but into a career of patient, by 
the concerted action of a coalition (a ‘conspiracy’) of family, G.P., mental health 
officers, psychiatrists, nurses, psychiatric social workers, and often fellow patients. 
The ‘committed’ person is labelled as a patient, and specifically as ‘schizophrenic ’,  is 
degraded from full existential and legal status as human agent and responsible 
person. (Laing, 1967, pp. 100 – 101) 
Schizophrenia is a label which some people pin on other people, under certain social 
circumstances. It is not an illness, like pneumonia. It is a form of alienation which is 
out of step with the prevailing state of alienation. It is a social fact and a political 
event. (Siegler et al., 1969, p. 948) 
Siegler et al., note that the CM can be seen to varying degrees in several other theorists’ 
work.133 However, the construct of an abstract model with the capacity for universal 
application, with specific reference to Laing, is a major limitation. This model does not 
include, nor adequately consider, the connecting strands of theory that intricately interweave 
within a Laingian approach. Equally it is offered that Siegler et al.’s focus on the 1967 
publication of The Politics of Experience, misses significant building blocks that occur in his 
preceding publications that provide a fuller contextual understanding of the specificity of 
Laing’s analysis of this setting; namely, the interpersonal world developed from the family 
context shown previously, and as will become very apparent in this section, the role of 
scientism and ontological discontinuity. Siegler et al.’s definition, terminology and analysis 
are therefore a springboard to consider the specificity of Laing’s application, but a more 
extensive exploration of wider theory is required to appreciate its full value.  
To develop a specific Laingian version of a CM, a prominent component shared within 
Siegler et al. and Laing, is the concept of labelling: schizophrenia is a label, not an ‘illness’. 
 
133 The Conspiratorial Model is most associated with Thomas Szasz’s theory (Collier, 1977; Kotowicz, 1997).  
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Labelling theory was developed through the 1950s and Becker published a seminal text in 
this area in 1963 titled Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, and it is surprising 
that neither Siegler et al. nor Laing make any reference to this theory when it seems so 
relevant.  
At its most simple, we see the primary thematic element running through each theory and 
theorist:  
deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label. (Becker, 1963, p. 9) 
Schizophrenia is a label which some people pin on other people. (Siegler et al., 1969, 
p. 948) 
the person labelled is inaugurated not only into a role, but into a career of patient. 
(Laing, 1967, p. 100) 
Within this thematic similarity, the CM marks itself as different by applying the concept of 
labelling theory specifically within the medical system, medical labelling, diagnosis. Scheff 
(1966) delved solely into the medical arena, continuing under the auspices of labelling 
theory, and makes several observations that contribute further to our focus. His observations 
centred around the social characteristics that encapsulated the labeller, the labelled, and the 
situation(s) they encounter, outlining the hubris of powerful forces created within this wider 
dynamic and bringing micro-political conditions into consideration, emphasising the true 
extent that a label is ‘a social fact and a political event’ – as per Siegler et al.’s definition. 
Scheff evidenced how wider political perceptions continue to be confirmed, reinforced and 
translated through intimate social interactions; a concept that could equally be described as 
interpersonal dynamics. The example of ‘hearing voices’ illustrates this well. In certain 
cultures, and religions, hearing internal voices, voices within one’s head that are not deemed 
to be one’s own, can (not always) be understood as a privileged, honoured connection to a 
deity. In stark contrast, in the medicalised western world this experience almost certainly is 
defined as indicative of ‘illness’, more specifically, schizophrenia (Watters, 2010). A label is 
therefore given/ascribed when a behaviour is deemed deviant within the context of the 
societal and/or political norms one inhabits. Laing uses this idea within his own theory from 
the outset when he offers a definition for sanity/psychosis. 
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I suggest, therefore, that sanity or psychosis is tested by the degree of conjuncture or 
disjuncture between two persons where the one is sane by common consent. (Laing, 
1960, p. 36) 
The label assigned to the event of hearing voices provides a good example of the political 
and social degree of disjuncture and its effect. Staying with the above, within certain cultures 
there is a desirable conjuncture, therefore it incurs no deviant label, and the individual is not 
outcast as an ‘offender’. In the medicalised west however, the disjuncture is significant and 
as a result, the acquisition of a label inserts the individual into the medicalised system that 
devalues their existential status.134  
What Becker’s insight reaffirms is that the process of being labelled is far from a single hit or 
injury to the self, a process that again complements Laing’s theory of self. Once the label 
enters the interpersonal dynamics of the ego/other dynamic, it increasingly consolidates 
itself within the social phantasy construct, a process that Becker terms ‘deviance 
amplification’.  
What labelling theory helps to emphasise is how diagnosis affects one’s relatedness to 
oneself and relatedness between others (ego/other[s]), encapsulating and saturating being-
in-the-world, generating the required inertia to achieve the master-status of ‘career patient’. 
This introduces a significant obstacle to the achievement of ontological security.  
This consequence of labelling theory becomes even more pronounced should the sufferer 
be detained in a psychiatric ward, one of several ‘total institutions’135 as defined by Goffman 
(1961). Offering a situation whereby labelling theory is amplified through the application of 
authority, control and inflexibility – the components of any total institution – a standardisation 
of the patient happens in tandem with the denial of any individuality, resultingly the person 
assumes the diagnostic label ascribed to them. This is the most drastic implementation of 
the CM possible: the identity/label assigned becomes the only valuable marker existentially 
reinforced for the individual. The individual is their diagnosis. 
When we talk about ‘mental health’ care within ‘total institutions’, it could be easy (or rather, 
morally convenient) to assume their consequences are no longer as valid in 21st century 
England. Events such as the government paper in 1971 titled ‘Hospital Services for the 
 
134 Sanity qualified through common consent, at this stage it highlights the compatibility of disjuncture measured 
by common consent and deviance measured by politically and socially made rules or norms. 
135 Others included; care homes, prisons, military bases, and spiritual retreats. 
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Mentally Ill’, the 1990 legislation ‘National Health Service and Community Care Act ’,  and 
locally nurtured projects such as the ‘Supporting People Initiative’, have contributed 
significantly to ‘mental health’ treatment and care moving within the community setting and 
away from the residential psychiatric wards (Killaspy, 2006) – resulting in ‘committed’ 
patients accounting for only a minority of those diagnosed or experiencing psychic suffering.  
Unfortunately, however, ‘within the community’ is very different to being a ‘part of the 
community’, the lasting negative connotations associated with diagnosis/label – stigma – are 
just as prevalent in today’s culture as they were then, leaving sufferers isolated and 
ostracised and experiencing a disheartening, even damaging, lack of integration. Regardless 
of location, the consequence of diagnosis continues to detrimentally affect qualities of 
relatedness. Their existence, although removed from the ‘mad house’, remains consumed by 
the negative connotations associated with their diagnosis. We must not forget either, that 
psychiatric wards still exist, whether sectioned or not, and the beliefs associated with these 
labels still have perceived validation. 
As a proponent for change within the psychiatric profession, the immediate and naïve 
reaction would be to assume that Thomas Szasz would be supportive of R.D. Laing – but as 
noted previously this could not be further from the truth (Burston, 1996). Szasz (1961), a 
fellow psychiatrist located in the social-constructivist camp, was arguably the firmest 
proponent of the CM (Collier, 1977; Kotowicz, 1997) and a continual advocate for seismic 
changes and revision toward the abuses of psychiatry and the treatment of those identified 
as ‘mentally ill’. Amongst a catalogue of negatives directed toward Laing, Szasz accused 
him of failing to respect the fundamental premise of revisionist thinking through continuing to 
present schizophrenia within a binary format. He argued that calling it schizophrenia or 
ontological insecurity, the outcome remained to label the individual as (negatively) different 
from the rest of society (Kotowicz, 1997). Therefore, Laing was instrumental in maintaining 
the CM. 
Szasz argued that Laing was merely … perpetuating the same hoax as the 
psychiatrists Laing condemned. (Guy Thompson, 2015, p. 25)  
Kotowicz (1997) summarises Mitchell’s (1974) opinion highlighting its complement to Szasz 
and concluding that Laing is not as revolutionary as is often portrayed, with his theory failing 
to collapse the difference between schizophrenia and sanity. This is a common criticism, 
with others including Jan Gordon (1972) reinforcing the contradiction in what Laing is saying 
 225 
and doing. In response to this criticism, Guy Thompson (2015) states that Laing defended 
the use of ‘ontological insecurity’ because it was not a label but a description.  
In speaking of a person this way [ontological insecure] we are not really diagnosing 
him, we are simply describing what it is like to be him. (Guy Thompson, 2015, p. 30) 
There is little argument that Laing maintained a binary, and this raises a serious doubt over 
seeing him as applying the CM, particularly from the perspective of anti-stigma. 
Philosophically inclined terminology or not, a rose by any other name, a diagnosis by any 
other label etc. Laing was employing terminology free of specific connotations i.e., 
schizophrenia, but as Szasz criticises, he still maintained the master connotations, and 
therefore stigma, associated with the essence of the medicalised framework of ‘mental 
health’ – that there are those that are normal, and those that are not. Criticism from within 
the medical profession was consistent and expected, but Szasz’s criticism, at least initially, 
was unexpected and landed with force. Advocating change himself (but certainly not ‘anti’ 
psychiatry136), Szasz levelled a criticism at Laing’s methodological approach from a new, 
politically libertarian vantage point, but more damagingly, from a proximity so close to 
Laing’s own theory it was difficult to dismiss. However, Laing’s defence, albeit not 
responding directly to Szasz, is the key to appreciating the extent of Laing’s theory within the 
clinical context, building upon the foundation of the CM without being restricted by its 
standardised boundaries. An adaptation that I argue is more needed than ever before. 
Laing’s concern is not with generic labelling or the associated stigma primarily, it is with the 
specificity of psychiatric labelling. Almost returning full circle to the development of Laing’s 
methodology, from the beginning of The Divided Self; ‘psychiatric words’ are held 
accountable for placing the patient’s experience at distance and preventing relatedness and 
thus any real knowledge of self being gained. As we will see in the next section, the 
detrimental ingredient of ‘psychiatric words’, which will be outlined as scientism, is far from 
contained within the clinical context of the psychiatric encounter, it runs within the DNA of 
our entire political existence.  
 
136 Szasz is an advocate of psychiatric change that continues to be associated with the term ‘antipsychiatry’ 




Placing scientism firmly within the political crosshairs is a pivotal moment for realising the 
potential within Laing’s theory, as it employs each of the concepts developed throughout 
each chapter and embraces them as part of a totality. To understand the political connection 
with scientism, we must first back track and appreciate the foundational disdain Laing held 
for ‘psychiatric words’, the medical language that dominates our understanding of ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘mental disorders’. Psychiatric words are the product of the prevalent scientific 
discourse of this era, systemised incessantly with its positivistic, objectivist values, and 
empirical methodologies. This scientific system is often critiqued under auspices of the term, 
‘scientism’. Scientism is the basis of the ‘inhuman theory’ that is psychiatry (Laing, 1967, p. 
45), that facilitates the deconstruction of the self into an organismic set of individual 
components. 
[S]cientism entails a metaphysical commitment to naturalist, reductive, or emergent 
materialism and tries to define science in a way that includes not only a commitment 
to empirical methods, but also to this particular metaphysics. (Williams and 
Robinson, 2016, p. 3) 
Williams and Robinson (2016) assert that the question of scientism, or rather its critique, is 
more necessary than ever within western culture and by proxy neoliberal existence, with its 
epistemologically dogmatic and bullish charge unhelpfully permeating and influencing 
research within the humanities, social sciences and even religion at an increasing and 
alarming rate. Loughlin et al. (2013)137 apply the sentiments of this criticism directly within 
the medical framework and argue that this does a great disservice to knowledge acquisition, 
specifically in reference to what is deemed here as the self. This argument becomes ever 
more relevant as we reveal the further existential consequences using Laing’s theory. 
Scientism punctuates Laing’s rejection of the absolute faith placed in what he often refers to 
as an objective (and positivist) authority given to western science at the dismissal of 
anything not contained within that bracket. 
Laing stated, and this is highly important, that by placing the patient’s Being within a world 
structured and dictated by a language and discourse accountable to scientism – the 
psychiatric encounter – not only did this exacerbate the experience of psychic suffering (as 
 
137 Strangely, although several historical figures are associated and implicated with antipsychiatry in Loughlin’s 
research, Laing is a notable omission.  
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per Siegler et al.’s 1969 definition and application of the Conspiratorial Model) but crucially, 
and even more detrimentally, this inflicted an existential degradation upon them; a truly 
Kierkegaardian notion. The importance of Laing’s initial overview of this concept is worthy of 
repeating: 
The ‘committed’ person is labelled as a patient … [and] degraded from full existential 
and legal status as human agent and responsible person. (Laing, 1967, p. 101) 
This is the unique element within Laing’s analysis of the clinical encounter, fusing scientism 
within the CM. The being-in-the-world in the context of this psychiatric system, is reduced to 
a less-than being. A label ring-fences potential, shaping possibilities and the availability of 
choice – but a psychiatric label compounds this. Laing saw the psychiatric label as the killing 
of the thing-in-itself, we are making the patient stand before us as defined by a reductive 
language prescribed by psychiatric words, the patient as an object. By enforcing the 
discourse of objectivist, positivist, logical empiricism as the only authoritative means of 
defining the self, we penetrate no further than the outer shell of experience and suffocate the 
language that gives life-blood to the inner world. Without the means to connect with the inner 
world, the patient is no longer understood and respected as subjective, beautifully complex, 
and a unique Being with full existential status and possibilities. They stand within the gaze of 
medical discourse, they become an object, an It of psychiatric study, chained to an objective, 
positivist, scientific framework. Reduced from all the potential of the unknown and the 
currently unknowable, that the sane are afforded, the individual is the diagnosed disorder. 
This is akin to the self-fulfilling cycle for the development of a self-concept (as per the more 
generic labelling theory aspect that underpins Seigler et al.’s Conspiratorial Model), but with 
Laing’s understanding they are reduced to a lesser person, a person no more than the text 
on a scientific manual. Once ascribed within this scientism they lose the prospect of agency. 
They become determined. 
Iatrogenic: induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment 
or diagnostic procedures (Merriam-Webb definition) 
If we can call psychiatric diagnosis and the acquisition of a psychiatric label a medical 
treatment, Laing’s analysis of the psychiatric encounter accuses it of inducing an iatrogenic 
process, causing symptoms exacerbating the experience of psychic suffering and 
misconstrued as ‘illness’ by the psychiatric profession. This specific aspect of Laing’s theory 
is echoed in the work of the clinical psychologist, David Smail.  
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Not only are psychology’s claims to offer an objectively valid understanding of and a 
therapeutically effective concern with the ills which beset us false, but it is more than 
possible that psychology, far from minimising, actually compounds our difficulties. 
(Smail, 1987, p. 45)  
Smail’s trajectory of thought throughout his theory reverberates with Laingian sentiments but 
gives little more than a courteous nod in recognition of its influence.138 Smail is more overt 
with his fusion of scientism and the CM and this makes the detrimental impact of scientism 
more pronounced, but in my opinion, nothing greater is added to Laing’s, perhaps subtler, 
insights. If anything, Smail’s theory – offering a social constructivist approach to ‘mental 
health’, echoes the one-dimensionality I criticised in the psychiatric paradigm, only this time 
it relies on the social in place of the biological element. Laing, as we now know, 
acknowledges the social environment as the home of fourth possibility anxieties, and this 
then unsettles the existential human condition itself – addressing the missing psychosocial 
aspect of the intended biopsychosocial framework of ‘mental health’.  
With or without acknowledgement and accepting of its limitations, Smail’s theory shows a 
continuation of Laing’s line of thought criticising the application of scientism to the self 
beyond the 1960s. Both remain influential in certain circles of academic thought, as their 
approach to the wider treatment of ‘mental illness’, ‘disorders’ – psychic suffering – stands in 
stark contrast to the belief in objective, empirical, positivist, science that underpins the highly 
influential and powerful DSM, ICD and other related frameworks.  
Laing’s theory coincided with the increasing medical imperialization of 1960s ‘mental health’, 
communicated through the scientistic ethos underpinning the ICD and DSM manuals which 
were gaining a strong hold in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. In the time since, these 
scientistic values have gained further power, underpinning the research trajectory and 
funding applications that inform the most recent DSM-V, ICD-10, and RDoC (Paris, 2015; 
Frances, 2013; Rose, 2019).  
Even more worrying, although intended for application with ‘mental health disorders’, 
contemporary psychiatric discourse is increasingly permeating everyday language and 
allowing a medical codification of the human condition itself. The way we talk about the 
experience of self, regardless of positive or negative states, is guided by this medical and 
 
138 See Taking Care: An Alternate to Therapy (1987), p. 134; Illusion and Reality: The Meaning of Anxiety (1984), 
p. 136; The Origins of Unhappiness: A New Understanding of Personal Distress (1993), pp. 35 – 36.  Always 
referenced with a positive inflection but lacking any recognition of structural influence.  
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therefore scientific terminology (Rose, 2019); terms like depression, bipolar, PTSD, OCD are 
as common within the lay narrative as the professional. This has significant implications for 
the claimed efficacy of the anti-stigma campaigns that evidence UK ‘mental health’ diagnosis 
rates are moving from 1:4 ratio and closer to 1:3 (Lubian et al., 2016). Whether these 
diagnostic figures reflect ‘mental illness’ per se is a pertinent question (Rose, 2019). 
The pressing concern within this Laingian context is that society is ever more willingly 
walking into, and accepting of, ‘mental health’ diagnosis labelling, resulting in the figure 
mentioned above, that almost one in three individuals within British culture are now defined 
by scientism as ‘mentally unhealthy’ (Corker et al., 2013). The buzz phrase developing from 
anti-stigma campaigns,139 benefitting from celebrity and royal endorsements, is that we need 
to talk about ‘mental health’. I’d argue that we also need to think about how we talk about 
‘mental health’. It is unquestionably a benefit to reduce stigma, but we also need to consider 
the implications of normalising and naturalising the psychiatric words that are responsible for 
existential degradation. The very term ‘mental health’ inserts oneself within this predefined 
medicalised, scientistic discourse, from the very outset. 
Laing’s research and theory within the clinical encounter illuminates that scientism structures 
the framework by which we mediate relatedness to the self and form a construct of self-
consciousness, whether directed outwards to others, or internally towards oneself. The 
consequence for all matters of this scientistic transition of self, is an I-It quality of relatedness 
and thus, existential degradation (hence Laing’s advocation of existential-phenomenological 
methodology, a science of persons). When we consider the current approaches to stigma 
reduction and the treatment of ‘mental health’, the existential degradation incurred by the 
application of scientism to the self needs to be considered.  
Extrapolating Scientism into the Political  
The clinical setting, explored to this point with the CM centrally, becomes the place that the 
consequence of scientism is most vividly illustrated; scientism enforcing an existential 
 
139 A current wave of interest in ‘mental health’ stigma began with the World Health organisation (WHO, 1999) 
outlining that ‘prioritising action to reduce stigma is a main concern ’.  That same year the NHS responded to this 
instruction and included it within the National Service Framework for ‘mental health’ Modern Standards and 
Service Models (1999), a document outlining their intentions to confront and address this matter. In 2008, the 
Time to Change organisation (time-to-change.org.uk, 2008) – we could even call it a movement — took hold of 
this torch and ran with it. In collaboration with numerous charities and Kings College, their first and arguably 
foundational campaign, Stigma Shout began. 
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degradation upon self-understanding. However, scientism undertakes a far more extensive 
role within Laing’s theory once we appreciate that the CM is merely one means of its 
mobilisation. As we will now see, scientism is woven within the entirety of our political 
landscape and cultural existence, it may not be a ‘total institution’ in a physical sense, but 
the intensified and all-consuming presence of scientism becomes the inescapable accelerant 
responsible for the ultimate in collective ‘existential degradation’. The pathway to 
inwardness, the key to appreciating the essence of existence, could we also say, the 
necessity for I-Thou relatedness, is being lost and with it, the conditions required for 
ontological security to be formed.   
To paraphrase the quote which introduces this chapter; human beings are relating to each 
other like two billiard balls and thus we are relating to each other as a collection of 
organismic it-processes (to use Laing’s terminology), ignoring the essential qualities of Being 
that defy rationalisation and reification. This is the consequence of our worldliness being 
mediated through politically couched scientism. Our ontological insecurity, our madness, is 
framed within the substance (or lack) of our relatedness. This is the subtle nuance and 
variation within Laing’s political context that once revealed is impossible to ignore and gains 
more traction when we attune our analysis to this framing, re-energising an under-
appreciated intricacy of Laing’s insight into the wider consequence of scientism.  
Natural scientism is the error of turning persons into things by a process of reification 
that is not itself part of the true natural scientific method. (Laing, 1967, p. 53) 
Although scientism is discussed by Laing solely within the clinical setting, the psychiatric 
encounter, a series of links, specifically within The Politics of Experience, highlights that the 
damaging ontological consequence of scientism applies as a political constant that affects 
society at large. Essentially, scientism is woven throughout the fabric of western cultural 
existence, the consequence of existential degradation is exposed to us all.  
Although this aspect is overlooked within Laing, the implications of this idea reappears within 
subsequent theories. Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering his overlap with the CM, this is 
especially visible throughout the 1980s work of David Smail. Approaching Laing’s political 
theory through Smail helps to emphasise the structural component of scientism. 
Thus people may spend a lifetime trying to achieve an objective standard (as human 
being) which in fact does not exist at all, and in so doing by-pass, discount or try to 
invalidate their own subjective experience. (Smail, 1987, p. 91) 
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Our objective culture operates precisely to obscure from our view what goes on in 
our own lives, and hence offers us no help when we start to discover for ourselves 
the nature of our predicament. (Smail, 1984, p. 159) 
Echoing Laingian sentiments, the breadth of Smail’s theory presents a strong thematic 
resemblance; we start to see a clearer path for an extension beyond the ego/other 
relationship of the patient and psychiatrist. 
What becomes apparent is the universal pursuit of certainty, epistemological uncertainty 
being associated with existential distress. Smail (1983, p. 54) comments, ‘[U]ncertainty and 
confusion … gives rise to psychological distress’. The refuge from this anxiety is sought in 
the culturally promulgated, and false, promise of security located in the infusion of culture 
and scientism. The consequence of this immersion is the abandonment of our subjective 
experience for an appeasement of objective value authority. The problem is that instead of 
satisfying our need for epistemological certainty, subjective experience does not translate 
into an objective framework. Therefore, we lose the pathway to our inner experience, which 
is a vital component within our being-in-the-world. The poignant quote that ‘an inhuman 
theory will inevitably lead to inhuman consequences’ (Laing, 1967, p. 45) was previously 
used to build Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology, but the mistake lies in 
limiting its application to the psychiatric encounter alone.  
People feel they have to translate ‘subjective’ events into ‘objective’ terms in order to 
be scientific. (Laing, 1967, p. 102) 
The most obvious application of this quote is to continue its placement within the science of 
persons encouraging the necessity to ‘think of the individual man as well as to experience 
him neither as a thing or as an organism’ (Laing, 1960, p. 22). This ties in almost seamlessly 
within the clinical context, but importantly, Laing and Smail are in agreement that an 
objectivist value-authority reference system, which is pervasive throughout western culture, 
is an incompatible framework for understanding matters of the self. Smail outlines, more 
vividly, the highly influential interrelationship of scientism within western culture and links this 
directly to a detrimental impact on the collective self. In contrast, Laing is typically 
misunderstood as belonging to the clinical context in isolation. But once Laing’s application 
is realised within the political sphere, this link provides an inroad that originates long before 
Smail and extends theoretically beyond with greater consideration for aspects that embrace 
a psychosocial element. Essentially, we see that the internalisation of an objectivist value-
authority framework has inhibited our very ability to understand Being, others and self. The 
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pervasive relationship of self and science, a relationship forged under the influence of 
psychiatry, is the cause of ontological discontinuity within society, and ultimately the source 
of ontological insecurity and thus psychic suffering.  
The point I’m trying to make is that this habit of mind, based on binary distinctions, 
was exactly the habit of mind that Laing was all the time trying to undermine. (Guy 
Thompson, 2015, p. 23) 
Ontological discontinuity bears too much compatibility with Buber’s notion of authentic 
merging and relatedness for this to be ignored. This concept has been discussed at several 
junctures regarding the establishment of Laingian theory. Here again, we return to the 
foundational point that ontological security requires an interpersonal dynamic that promotes 
relatedness. Adding to this foundation, Buber’s (1951) theory of relatedness is highly 
dependent on the social structure; the social structure is capable of manipulating the 
dynamic of relatedness so that it encourages or discourages authentic merging. This again 
links with Laing’s theory of the political. In Laing’s existential-phenomenological thematic fit 
to the political, the undercurrent of Buber’s existential notion of relatedness plays a pivotal 
role – a role far more significant that Laing’s fleeting acknowledgement would suggest.140    
Ontological Discontinuity in the 21st Century  
The importance of ontological discontinuity – relatedness within one’s self within society – 
does not end with Laing’s era either. Although not discussed in Laingian, or Buberian terms, 
we see the underlying sentiments of this framework continuing to garner attention in critiques 
of contemporary culture.  
Short-term capitalism threatens to corrode his character, particularly those qualities 
of character which bind human beings to one another and furnishes each other with a 
sense of sustainable self. (Sennett, 1998, p. 27)  
Sennett’s observation, among many others, is that now more than in any historic period 
before, the working patterns materialising within new-capitalism (hot-desks, short-term 
contracts, no accrued benefits associated with long-term devotion, etc.) are eroding 
significant qualities of self, namely loyalty and commitment, and this is weakening the bonds 
 
140 Howarth-Williams (1977), Collier (1977) and Burston (2000) are in the minority of theorists that recognise 
the influence of Buber with regard to its application.    
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between people and affecting our sense of collective cohesion. The language may be 
different to Laing, but the sentiment is the same; relatedness is deteriorating and ontological 
discontinuity more present in the post Thatcher-Reagan neoliberal climate.  
The relevance of Sennett’s research does not stop with ontological discontinuity and his 
work adds an additional consideration into the mix, namely an analysis of social capital to be 
cross fertilised with Laing’s theory. 
Cultural capital plays a significant role in the experience of a ‘corrosion of character’ – this 
being the individual consequence that runs parallel to reduced societal interconnectedness 
within new-capitalism. Introducing disproportionality into the equation, it follows that 
ontological discontinuity is experienced more acutely by those penalised within the neoliberal 
structure, those lower in cultural/socioeconomic capital.  
Another factor disproportionately distributed within politico-economic ideology is ‘mental 
health’ incidence, lower socioeconomic status correlating with increased ‘mental health’ 
diagnosis.141 Broad statements equating neoliberalism with ‘mental health’ problems 
however conceal the finer details that contribute to this positive correlation. Either way, 
ontological discontinuity is a real presence within contemporary culture, as is ‘mental health’ 
diagnosis – both appear to be increasing as political hegemony increasingly saturates and 
dominates society (Fisher, 2007; Cohen 2016).   
Lyndon West (2016) continues a trajectory of disproportionality with research overlapping 
the notion of ontological discontinuity, but rather than focussing on the corrosion of 
character, he analyses the corrosion of community and relates this directly to a context of 
‘mental health’.142 Identifying the lack of investment in community spaces as a major factor 
associated with the increasing incidence of ‘mental health’ issues, West draws our attention 
to the need for the psychoanalytic notion of ‘recognition’. 
 
141 This picture comes to the fore through numerous publication; Fisher, 2007; Gerhaart, 2010; Watters, 2010; 
Harvey, 2010; James; 2008; Cohen 2016,). Summarised neatly by Marmot et al., (2010), ‘Children and adults 
living in households in the lowest 20% income bracket in Great Britain are two to three times more likely to 
develop “mental health” problems than those in the highest’. Although dated, the relationship only seems to be 
strengthening and increasing.  
142 This is a secondary thread within his research. The primary focus is community relatedness and racism / 
fundamentalism. This in itself could present an interesting means of considering a different offset of behaviours 
associate with ontological insecurity, a breakdown in relatedness, but it remains beyond the scope of this thesis 
to engage with here. 
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Self-esteem is nurtured as individuals feel recognised as making important 
contributions to a group’s well-being, and this in turn enables them to better 
recognise others…processes of self-recognition create the possibility of recognising 
different others and provide a basis for stronger social solidarities. (West, 2016, p. 
14)  
An individual who feels valued or positively recognised is more likely to recognise and value 
others, and community spaces, often relied on most by those of working-class heritage, are 
a vital resource to enhance the cyclic process of recognition; spaces to reduce the 
experience of ontological discontinuity. Contrasting with our current time of austerity (or the 
wake of austerity) with funding cuts and ever greater centralisation, against a more optimistic 
backdrop of the 1960s and 1970s,143 West states that spaces to promote recognition are in 
short supply. The necessity of the gaze is again brought into focus and the consequence 
incurred upon the [2] awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s observation. 
[H]uman flourishing requires sufficient experience of recognition…and from this 
stronger social boundaries can flow. (West, 2016, p. 4)  
Without recognition, we experience anxiety, placing us firmly within the Laingian realms of 
ontological insecurity. In response to this anxiety, he states that ‘mental health’ is 
deteriorating and, of additional concern, xenophobic, racist and fundamentalist attitudes are 
becoming more prevalent. I will return to this additional point very shortly but first want to 
reiterate what both Sennett and West add to this discussion. Essentially, ontological 
discontinuity is increasingly experienced within neoliberal culture, relatedness is 
deteriorating within this ideology, not only throughout the system but disproportionately 
affecting those in ‘lower’ status positions.   
Laing stated that ontological discontinuity is a major factor affecting ontological security and 
thus contributes to the experience of psychic suffering, and we see at this time more than 
any other record diagnosis rates of ‘mental health disorders’. The opportunity for Laing’s 
insights to be further developed and applied in this setting seems important.  
 
143 There is no suggestion that this was an idyllic period – let us not forget that this was a time of Enoch Powell’s 
Rivers of Blood speech (Hewitt, 2005) – but rather the trajectory of multiculturalism was moving in a positive 
direction, albeit gingerly. The basis for this positive direction, of which democratic education programs are 
proposed as playing an important role are grounded in the second aspect to his argument. 
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To this point however, neither Sennet nor West, although drawing relatedness to the fore, 
have stressed the matter of scientism within the political context. Here I want to reintroduce 
what may appear a tangential or unrelated connection to the negative political attitudes that 
West states are becoming increasingly prevalent within post-industrial cities, those 
communities that are the most needing in recognition. This link proves a firm pathway for 
further considering our political and ‘mental health’ situation at present.   
In the absence of recognition and its consequential presence of anxiety, an increased desire 
for a sense of belonging is identified by West. This is illustrated profoundly with relevant 
communities gravitating toward xenophobic, racist, even fundamentalist attitudes that reveal 
themselves with political choice and activity with prohibited and dangerous extremist 
groups.144 The attraction of these groups is that they offer not only recognition, but a fixed 
sense of identity, belonging, and understanding by which to secure oneself. The perceived 
uncertainty within multiculturalism – where no recognition (relatedness) has been 
established, is replaced with absolute certainty for a fixed, absolute and rigid understanding 
of oneself.  
We can be attracted to groups of the like-minded because the issue of not getting it is 
resolved in the abolition of complexity. (West, 2016, p. 174 – Italics added) 
The issue of ‘not getting it’ is defined as ‘feeling confused, misunderstood, or inadequate […] 
in intimate or wider social life’ (West, 2016, pp. 173 – 174), a description not unfamiliar to the 
anxiety laden premise of ontological insecurity. The resolution for West is the ‘abolition of 
complexity’; certainty of self is sought in an effort to mitigate the effects of a lack of 
relatedness.  
With minor adaptation, it could be proposed that ‘the abolition of complexity’ that negates the 
void caused by a lack of recognition (ontological discontinuity) and resultant ontological 
insecurity, is equally appeased by belonging to a narrative defined by scientistic parameters. 
Using West’s observation, scientism is the substance we attach to in an effort to fill the 
emptiness caused by our lack of relatedness and to offer a sense of listless confusion and 
disconnection the means, the discourse, the language, to be understood. Having the 
capacity to understand ourselves is a prerequisite for self-recognition and thus recognition of 
 
144 West uses the example of Stoke-on-Trent, a run-down, post-industrial city, infamous for electing a British 
National Party (BNP) councillor in 2002 and more recently being the ‘Brexit capital’ of the UK, as indicative of 
numerous pockets within UK society. 
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others. This is a good explanation as to how we confront ontological discontinuity and why 
scientism acts so perniciously in this regard.  
However, Laing is not stating that our pursuit of absolute epistemological certainty is a 
reactive measure; we do not react to the loss of relatedness by seeking a scientific reification 
of ontological experience. Scientific reification of ontological experience causes our lack of 
relatedness. Moreover, it is this scientific means of relating to each other that diminishes the 
qualities required for an I-Thou relationship to flourish, and instead replaces them with I-It 
qualities that enforce an existential degradation. Laing’s insights provide an alternate 
interpretation for West’s research, the recognition we seek in a location that ‘abolishes 
complexity’ is a product of the increasing authority we are placing in science (psychiatry) that 
promulgates the belief that the self is capable of finding such certainty.  
The outer divorced from any illumination from the inner is in a state of darkness. We 
are in a state of darkness. The state of outer darkness is a state of sin – i.e. 
alienation or estrangement from the inner light. (Laing, 1967, p. 116)  
In shrouding the inner light from illuminating the outer world, the light of the inner becomes 
invisible too. As scientism becomes the primary means of understanding the outer, it then 
becomes the only available source to illuminate the inner. Stepping back to the theoretical 
framework of the Conspiratorial Model, the interpersonal dynamics we engage with in our 
relationships, not only within the psychiatric encounter, but universally, are couched in a 
discourse that existentially degrades the other and thus shadows them in darkness. 
Scientism underpins the interpersonal dynamics of western neoliberal existence in its 
entirety, this outer discourse is responsible for smothering the light of the inner from our 
experience, and as such is a cause of ontological discontinuity, and our collective ontological 
insecurity.  
We have reified the ideology of capitalism, through science amongst other things, to believe 
this is the absolute qualification of what is right. This plays into the confidence of the DSM, 
ICD, even more so the RDoC, that all proclaim that there is an absolute discourse by which 
to understand existence, and psychiatry is no different. But the qualification of psychiatry no 
longer remains located within medicine (whether it ever did fully). As Rose (2019) has 
stated, psychiatry influences every aspect of living. This has a direct input on culture’s 
reliance on science, and culture’s reliance on science normalises our acceptance of a 
scientific (and not an ontological) approach to the self.  
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Ontological in/security is used as a means of contextualising experience within 
contemporary culture by Anthony Giddens’ (1991) in Modernity and Self-Identity.   
All individuals develop a framework of ontological security of some sort, based on 
routines of various forms. People handle dangers, and the fears associated with 
them, in terms of the emotional and behavioural ‘formulae’ which have come to be 
part of their everyday behaviour and thought. (Giddens, 1991, p. 44) 
Constructing a framework of ontological in/security using an eclectic array of theoretical 
influences - Freud, Sullivan, Erikson, Winnicott, and Laing to name a few - Gidden’s use of 
this concept echoes Laing’s on two significant themes. The first is his presentation of a 
definition of a ‘sense of’ ontological security, as opposed to an actual, traditional existential 
definition. The second is his adoption of Laing’s position that an ontologically secure ‘person 
will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm 
centre of his own and other people’s reality and identity’ (Laing, 1960, p. 39).  
Reinforcing the connection of political conditions with the formation of identity, Giddens 
(1991, p. 32) states that ‘for the first time in human history, ‘self’ and ‘society’ are interrelated 
in a global milieu’. Without romanticising the past as a time of security and absence of 
anxieties, Giddens describes contemporary culture in terms of ‘high modernity’ – a political 
era structured with, and by, absolute faith in technology and science. Rather than directing 
his theory toward a cause of increased sources of anxiety, Giddens suggests that our 
existence within high modernity is failing to provide the conditions (trust, motivation, etc.,) 
required to develop ontological security, and without this quality of identity, we do not 
possess the resilience to navigate the anxieties associated with everyday existence.  
Giddens’ notion that it is not an increased burden of anxieties and stressors that cause 
ontological insecurity but rather the formation of identity within high modernity that prevents 
the acquisition of ontological security has proved highly influential. The clarity with which this 
is illustrated helps to refine an important focus within Laing: we do not reach for scientistic 
certainty of self to appease ontological insecurity, or at least that is not the point of origin. 
The scientistic means of understanding ourselves is the source of ontological insecurity. 
Feeding into further power relations, a quality lacking in Laing’s theory, scientism’s pervasive 
influence upon self-identity, as highlighted through the work of Sennet (1998) and more so 
West (2016), is disproportionately distributed within social hierarchies, illuminated here 
within class, but without reason to suggest it is limited to this aspect.  
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I now consider how we can map this theory through scientism, into Laing’s existing theory of 
the family and politics, preparing the ground for how they complement a framework of self-
consciousness and therefore ontological in/security in both domains. This will highlight how 
Laing’s theory can be considered as a totality and draw further into focus his continuing 
relevance.  
Meta-Context: Epistemology and the Family 
The most prolific research conducted by Laing is unquestionably within the family. It is 
reanalysed here as the embodiment of the nexus-par-excellence, utilising its rich findings 
without being drawn toward familial properties or kinship ties. The focus is instead on the 
interpersonal dynamics that unite the formation of the (family-)nexus, highlighting compatible 
elements which continue to overlay with the development and structure of self-
consciousness. Building from an infrequently cited article by Patemen145 (1972), Sanity, 
Madness and the Problem of Knowledge, a different lens is applied to the analysis of family-
nexus that opens consideration toward the discipline of epistemology. Although not 
designated a ‘meta-context’ by Patemen, the identified epistemological theme establishes a 
deeper level of functioning for the interpersonal dynamics of the family, warranting this ‘meta’ 
description.   
[I]f Maya needs anyone, it is an epistemologist, not a psychiatrist. (Patemen, 1972 p. 
23) 
Patemen’s article is one of the few texts that identifies an epistemological factor within the 
experience of psychic suffering, arguably the only one to do so within the interpersonal 
dynamics of the family. In doing this, Patemen reveals a meta-context, a context that is 
unconfined to the parameters of the family-nexus. With an epistemological framing, 
Patemen’s theory is operating within the same field as scientism and provides further ways 
of arguing how this means of understanding is the cause of existential degradation. Situated 
within the family context, these insights provide further connections to be identified that build 
toward a logical formation within a political domain.   
Patemen’s analysis is a reinterpretation itself of Laing and Esterson’s 1964 research (Sanity, 
Madness and the Family). Although he does not focus upon the double bind scenario to 
 
145 The most notable citation of Patemen’s (1972) Sanity, Madness and the Problem of Knowledge, is briefly 
within Howarth-Williams (1977). 
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inform his analysis, the importance of this concept, as recognised through this thesis, 
warrants its inclusion. Fortunately, with only slight adaptation, a complement to the level of 
detail and insight achieved by Patemen, his research overlays easily to incorporate this 
experience. In doing this, it further emphasises and anchors three of the components he 
discusses; a) the parents disqualify Maya’s epistemological truth claim, b) the parents 
designate themselves in the role of absolute, and only, epistemological authority, and c) the 
parents corrupt Maya’s epistemological appraisal system. (It is important to remember that 
Maya’s relationship with her parents would more accurately be described as an interpersonal 
dynamic consisting of an author(s) and sufferer, reaffirming the qualification of this being a 
nexus within a familial context.) 
Applying Laing’s self-consciousness framework also has significant and insightful bearing as 
we start to develop a connection to the political in the subsequent section: a) Denying 
Maya’s truth claim, Maya’s [1] awareness of herself by herself is devalued and dismissed; b) 
by her parent’s occupying a position of absolute epistemological authority, Maya’s 
experience, Maya’s reality, and thus Maya, exists only within the [2] representation act of the 
parents objectifying gaze; c) Without a functioning epistemological appraisal system, the 
development of a reliable awareness of inner and outer experience, the pre-requisite for 
balanced self-consciousness, is disrupted. All experience, regardless of the domain, 
becomes unpredictable and threatening – ontological insecurity guaranteed.   
Maya's parents consistently deny the truth of her statements and thereby undermine 
any developing mastery of epistemological criteria and/or her perceptions 
themselves. She is thus disabled from achieving a [epistemological]146 mastery of the 
world. (Patemen, 1972, p. 22) 
Consistent within all the interpretations offered so far, a tension is present in two domains. 
On one hand we have the parents, who exist in the outer domain, who present themselves 
as the gatekeepers of epistemological truth. On the other, we have the sufferer looking 
toward the inner world of subjective value-laden authority. The parents have cultivated an 
interpersonal dynamic that reinforces the authority of their own experiential statements within 
the nexus, and this in turn has suffocated and dismissed the sufferer’s experience as 
unfounded, unreliable, untrue. 
 
146   In the original text, Patemen uses the term ‘cognitive’ here. Earlier in the text Patemen also states the 
interchangeability of the term ‘epistemological (‘cognitive' would be a possible alternative)’. Epistemological 
provides better continuity with the context of this piece without deviating from its intent.   
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Maya’s [2] awareness of herself as an object of another person’s observation is galvanised 
within her parents perceived epistemological authority. Maya’s [1] awareness of herself by 
herself is completely dismissed – and the only way of learning how to understand truths and 
qualify her experience (and thus escape this complex maze of knots) is held by the very 
source responsible for this dismissal. The double bind consistently unsettles the harmony of 
self-consciousness, Patemen’s imbued epistemological theme complements and develops 
this further. Through fusing epistemology within the double bind process, a meta-context is 
identified that amplifies the impact within the interpersonal dynamics. Building further upon 
the framework of self-consciousness, Maya has no ability to ascertain what is real, factual, 
true, and thus no capability to calibrate her balance of self-consciousness with regard to the 
two components of awareness, to allocate her experience within a corresponding domain 
and navigate her being-in-the-world. Her perception of experience counts for nothing but 
confusion. Her [1] awareness of herself by herself, has been dismissed and devalued to 
such an extent that it now presents as a void of uncertainty. What Patemen’s theory helps to 
draw into focus is that not only do the double bind experiences contradict within this 
interpretation, they corrupt her epistemological appraisal system. And in doing so, this 
directly allows us to argue that it disables her ability to embrace the totality of experience 
required for self-consciousness.  
The qualities that underpin the ‘epistemological authority’ and qualify the parents as such, 
remain vague within Patemen’s article. If we keep focus to the family in isolation, which I am 
reluctant to do even briefly, his analysis rests on the description that the power imbalance 
resides in the parent-child dynamic, a dynamic that imbues the parent/adult with a structural 
and real authority that transmutes into being the holder of truth and knowledge, an 
epistemological authority, within the family, felt most prominently by the child. However, this 
does little to assist our application to the nexus unrestricted to the familial.  
I suggest a different approach. For the suffer, epistemological truth is confirmed solely in an 
authority located beyond their self, placed instead in the outer world and it is for this reason 
that they discredit, devalue and dismiss the authority of their own subjective, ‘lesser’ 
epistemological system; thus, Maya’s inner world of experience is shunned. Patemen’s 
theory as with Laing and Esterson’s original research, may remain embedded within familial 
praxis but his identification of epistemological meta-context has more potential than his short 
article realised.  
Teasing this epistemological thread, a thread that already resides within Laing’s theory and 
is frequently missed or associated with the CM in isolation, the connection for a consistent 
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application of ontological insecurity as a loss of relatedness with one’s social context 
becomes more apparent, an application that flows through the family and political context.  
Meta-Meta-Context: Politics and Epistemology  
Although Patemen makes no reference to the CM, we can develop his idea that 
epistemology plays a role within the family-nexus and suggest that the parents, much like 
the psychiatrist, occupy a position of epistemological authority. Building on the similarities 
that exist within the dynamic of both relationships, even though conducted in different 
locations, the assumption of the parent’s epistemological authority residing in the adult-child 
power relationship becomes unsettled and simultaneously infused with epistemological 
value-authority.  
Within the psychiatric encounter (CM) we are provided with far greater detail of the 
construct, the qualities, that underpin this epistemological authority, and the impact this has 
on the representational act. The biggest consequence of the psychiatric representational act 
is that a binaried epistemological value system is imposed on the interpersonal dynamics, 
juxtaposing the perceived authority of subjectivity and objectivity truth claims. Applying the 
specific epistemological value authority of objectivity into their encounter, this ‘scientifically’ 
structured appraisal converts the sufferer’s subjective experience into an objective 
framework. Crucially, it is this value authority conversion that enacts existential degradation 
upon the sufferer – amplifying the suffering they were already experiencing (prior to the 
psychiatric encounter) by reducing and dehumanising their experience; a process that insists 
upon a perception of ‘man as a machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes’ 
(Laing, 1960, p. 23). This epistemological consideration within the interpersonal dynamics of 
the CM, dismisses subjective value. Subjective value being the only epistemological 
reference capable of capturing the essence of inner experience, thus any truth claim 
associated with the inner world is therefore deemed worthless and invalidated.  
Patemen’s article draws our attention toward a pre-existing component within Laing and with 
that, opens consideration of the wider operation of epistemological authority within the 
experience of psychic suffering. Uncovering a meta-context within the family highlights that 
the parent, like the psychiatrist, holds epistemological authority over the sufferer. As we 
discuss its presence throughout the entire experience of psychic suffering a new landscape 
is revealed for exploration of Laing’s thought. 
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With varying degrees of opacity, the inner/outer splitting that defined Laing’s ontological 
insecurity is also described with epistemological characteristics. Using interchangeable 
terminology throughout his body of work to differentiate between the inner/outer binary, 
Laing substitutes the terms subject/subjectivity as being relatable to the inner world, and 
objective/objectivity with the outer world. This move blurs the boundary with the 
epistemological tradition, overlapping with positivist theory which presents the external 
world, the world beyond the self, as a singular objective reality, where absolute and finite 
knowledge can be found (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). These subtle variants, even though 
used in a context that do not disrupt or supersede the simplicity of the inner/outer world 
differentiation, implicate an epistemological quality to Laing’s account of the personal 
experience of psychic suffering.  
[E]xperience is not ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective ’,  not ‘inner’ rather than ‘outer’. 
(Laing, 1967, p. 17) 
Being-in-the-world by this definition, consistent throughout Laing’s theory, is constituted not 
only by an interaction of the inner and outer domain, a characteristic that dominated Laing’s 
theory of self but also has subjective and objective qualities. Ontological insecurity and 
psychic suffering can therefore be understood as a rupture along an epistemological fault-
line, equally as much as a worldly divide; the totality no longer experiencing a balance of 
both qualities. In refocussing Laing’s theory through an epistemological lens, the continuity 
of this epistemological fault-line becomes ever more apparent. This is both highly suggestive 
of its significance and also of Laing’s pre-existing attunement to this matter. 
Appreciating the structural value of an epistemological fault-line is a central theme of this 
thesis and the specificity of its theory has remained submerged and largely unacknowledged 
in secondary evaluations of Laing’s work, any recognition being embedded in the clinical 
context. This epistemological fault-line resides far beyond the isolated act of diagnosis 
performed by the psychiatrist on the individual. Schulman and Gans in their chapters in The 
Legacy of R.D. Laing (Guy Thompson, 2015), are good examples of theorists continuing to 
emphasise Laing’s criticism of the violence incurred when ‘objective science’ is imposed 
upon the self, but even though their discussion gestures towards a political and more 
universal context, their assertions remain too easily contained within a context of psychiatric 
appraisal. What is missed is that Laing’s writing increasingly includes an epistemological 
binary within a context that encapsulates the experience of everyday existence, interwoven 
within the politics of interpersonal dynamics, and justified as affecting our ‘sense of’ 
collective ontological security.  
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In contrast to the reputable ‘objective’ or ‘scientific ’,  we have the disreputable 
‘subjective ’,  ‘intuitive’ or worst of all ‘mystical’. (Laing, 1960, p. 25) 
So many people feel they have to translate ‘subjective’ events into ‘objective’ terms in 
order to be scientific. To be genuinely scientific means having valid knowledge of a 
chosen domain of reality. (Laing, 1967, p. 102) 
With a strategic intent I have extracted two quotes that punctuate periods from the family 
and political context, respectively, in a deliberate attempt to illuminate and justify the 
continuity of the subjective/objective presence, the epistemological fault-line, in the totality of 
Laing’s theory regardless of model context. Each quote is equally as insightful when applied 
to either domain.  
Falling outside the parameter of the first phase of publishing but of great assistance to this 
research, the significance of this binary is further emphasised as we briefly acknowledge its 
contribution to Laing’s theory post 1970.147  
To split what is the case into the duality of subjective and objective is to make a 
distinction, very useful, even essential for many purposes. But, believed, the world is 
a broken egg. (Laing, 1982, p. 12) 
This binary gains more descriptive clarity in The Politics of Experience, as its context is 
developed by introducing the epistemological term ‘positivism’, placed in opposition to 
subjectivity and on the same side of the fence as objective value authority within the bracket 
of scientism. 
We must then repudiate a positivism that achieves its ‘reliability’ by a successful 
masking of what is and what is not, by a serialization of the world of the observer by 
turning the truly given into capta which are taken as given, by the denuding of the 
world of being and relegating the ghost of being to a shadow land of subjective 
‘values’. (Laing, 1967, p. 52)  
There are countless excerpts throughout Laing’s body of work that outline the damage 
committed to the person by applying a theory of knowledge, an epistemology, that insists 
 
147 The intrauterine model of psychic suffering, post 1976, is not the focus of this study. Its inclusion at this stage 
is to emphasise the structural importance that criticism of scientism holds in Laing’s thinking.  
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that an absolute, positivist, objectivist value must be attained for it to qualify as scientific. 
However, as each of these quotes highlight, this feature is not reserved for the psychiatric 
encounter, but with the use of increasingly generalised terms, so many people … we … the 
world of the observer, it applies to all of us.    
Laing’s warning concerns more than the presence of an epistemological division and 
awareness of objective value authority being valorised over the discarded position occupied 
by subjective values. Scientifically, this is a well-versed criticism resulting from the structural 
impact of the Age of Enlightenment (Williams, 2016). As detailed within the CM, there is a 
severe and dangerous consequence of interpreting the ‘subjective’ experience of the self 
within an ‘objective’ epistemological value authority framework. Self-understanding through 
this incorrect means is a major cause of existential degradation and intricately implicated in 
the experience of psychic suffering. Only now, the suggestion is that a potential existential 
degradation is encountered on a societal, ‘we’, level and it is not reserved to psychiatry 
alone. 
We all seem to desire to find a common meaning to existence, to find with others a 
shared sense to the world, to maintain fundamentally similar structures of 
experience. (Laing, 1966, p. 157) 
Western culture has become increasingly structured by a perception of logical empirical 
positivism as the only means of value authority; this is the substance of politics (with a small 
‘p’) that Laing was pointing toward, and through psychiatry this framework has permeated 
the interpersonal dynamic that mediates all matters of self-understanding, and thus 
ego/other dynamics. The perception is encouraged that a finite and absolute answer, 
objective value authority, is achievable for all knowledge and this is coming to dominate ‘our 
shared sense to the world’ and uniting us within a ‘common meaning to existence’. Laing is 
weaving his rejection of scientism within the cultural fabric of everyday existence. 
Other theorists were also making similar warnings. Western Marxists exemplified by Herbert 
Marcuse – a fellow speaker at the Dialectics of Liberation Conference – were updating 
Marx’s notion of ‘alienation’ within more psychoanalytic discourse for application within 
1960s culture. Marcuse (1964, p. 110) stated that subjectivity forms in accordance to the 
‘facts of existence’; the self conforming to the dominant societal substance. Reviewing the 
second edition of Marcuse’s seminal text, One-Dimensional Man, Kellner summarised that 
the alienating experience of conformity in 1960s capitalist culture was incurring dire 
consequences to the self: 
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The cognitive costs include the loss of an ability to perceive another dimension of 
possibilities that transcend the one-dimensional thought and society. (Kellner cited in 
Marcuse, 1964, p. xxviii)  
Marcuse may not be speaking about empirically defined epistemology and Laing was not 
speaking about politico-economic ideology per-se, but science and ideology work hand-in-
hand, generating momentum behind each other’s reification process and value authority 
claims within culture. In speaking about culture, even though approached primarily through 
psychiatric discourse, Laing implicates capitalist ideology and gingerly acknowledges this 
within his theory (most notably in The Politics of Experience). Laing and Marcuse were 
noting that culture was becoming ever more singular and one-dimensional in its view of what 
constitutes knowledge and the possibilities that exist within or beyond it, be that capitalism 
as the societal political order or psychiatric discourse as the means for understanding the 
self. For Laing this consequence was not simply a loss of potential as Marcuse stated and 
neither could it be attributed solely to the responsibility of capitalism. The consequence was 
manifesting in the experience of ontological insecurity.  
If there is such a thing as one-dimensional society within a Laingian context, it is the outer 
world being divorced from inner world, objective value authority isolated from subjective 
value. Crucially, the objective and outer is valorised and anything falling outside it – 
specifically, the inherently subjective epistemology of the inner world – is dismissed and 
discarded. Existing within this singular dimension of thought is an ‘enhanced and 
compulsive’ relationship to only one epistemological aspect of awareness: value authority 
residing in the outer, objective realm. This is consequently the only reliable location for 
knowledge acquisition and qualification. Without access to the inner world, a route denied by 
ignoring and devaluing the only language capable of capturing its essence – subjective 
value authority – we are epistemologically alienated from a vital and necessary source of 
self-understanding. One-dimensional society is an epistemologically-induced schizoid 
society. As this is the prevailing state of normality, this is the 1960s state of unconscious 
madness (Laing, 1967).   
Epistemological Fault-line and Ontological Insecurity   
The impact of this epistemological fault-line and its ability to transcend the boundaries of the 
political and the family within Laing’s theory becomes apparent as we consider its ontological 
effect by reintroducing the framework of self-consciousness.  
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Our social phantasy construct is shaped significantly through our immersion within the 
‘conventional practices of everyday life’ (Collier, 1977, p. 17), a conformity to the ‘facts of 
existence’ (Kellner cited in Marcuse, 1964, p. xxviii). This immersion and conformity is 
therefore structured by a divided epistemological culture which substantiates the discourses 
and language that unites us within a ‘shared sense to the [western, capitalist] world’ (Laing, 
1966, p. 157). At its most simple, we exist within a world that isolates the domains of 
epistemological value authority, subjective from objective. Furthermore, it discredits the 
former and valorises the latter. With focus now directed to the self, by dismissing the 
subjective value, we lose the epistemological reference capable of capturing our inner 
experience. This has significant implications with regard to the balance of self-
consciousness and therefore to our capacity for existing with a ‘sense of’ ontological 
security.  
Laing’s warning is that we, the population of the capitalist, western world, are being 
increasingly exposed to a political dynamic that denies the capacity for self-reflection. This is 
a political ideology that structurally devalues the subjective qualities required to engage with 
and trust [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself. Resultingly, self-consciousness invests 
excessively in the perceived authority acquired through [2] an awareness of oneself through 
the representational act of the another’s gaze. This subsequent action for a redirection 
toward the perceived authority located within the outer world and the other, echoes the 
principles within the irrational interpersonal dynamics of Laing’s family studies and CM.  
Whereas originally this impact was witnessed within the context of the family-nexus and as 
an experience within ontological insecurity, Laing increasingly highlights how irrational 
interpersonal dynamics are unfolding within our political experience and thus can be 
considered a cause of ontological insecurity and psychic suffering. Collectively, we are being 
encouraged to believe that epistemological authority in the outer exceeds that of the inner 
and this is displacing confidence in our own experiential authority. Madness is no longer 
reserved to the specificities of certain families. Laing (1967, p. 116) evolves his theory to 
speak more generally to the ‘interpersonal world and the realm of human collectivities’. What 
constitutes sanity and normality is the ability to adapt and conform to this ‘common meaning 
to existence’. We live, and are united, within a [western] world that is increasingly attributing 
all truth claim validity to the outer world and its associated epistemological value authority. In 
seeking knowledge of oneself, only the outer offers any ‘guarantee’ of truth. Hence, self-
consciousness, on a collective scale, and politically induced, is increasingly being 
disharmonised: [1] awareness of oneself by oneself is being suffocated, in response to the 
dominance of [2] awareness of oneself as an object of another’s observation. This being 
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directly relatable to the increasing dismissal of subjective value authority and valorisation of 
objective value authority in the epistemological structuring of western culture. 
This damning verdict of the trajectory of culture builds to a crescendo within The Politics of 
Experience and within this context, one could be forgiven for missing a nugget of information 
that offers major insight into the premise underpinning this entire argument. Fleetingly and 
with the barest detail, Laing (1967, p. 117) states ‘[r]emember Kierkegaard’s objective 
madness’. The source of ‘objective madness’ is most vivid in Kierkegaard’s mid-19th century 
text, written under the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus148, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. This book is lauded by Laing as ‘one of the peak experiences of my life’ (Laing, 
cited in Mullan, 1995, p. 94), even though it is unreferenced anywhere in his first phase of 
publishing. 
My thesis was that subjectivity, inwardness is truth. (Climacus, 1846, p. 251)  
[A]n eternal happiness, exists only for the subjective; or rather, comes to be only for 
the person who becomes subjective. (Climacus, 1846, p. 137) 
The following interpretation selects aspects of Climacus’ work, highlighting where 
Kierkegaard’s thinking that can be related to Laing. It will not discuss a movement toward the 
absurd (a movement of faith toward God) that resides and is achieved through inwardness, 
but it will emphasise the components that unsettle the perceived rationale in our scientistic 
confidence that keeps us from engaging with inwardness – a criticism that is often centred in 
opposition to Hegel’s Science of Logic. Although this is a drastically reductive reflection of 
Kierkegaard’s extensive theory, it is unavoidable to ensure that the aspects directly relatable 
to Laing’s theory are addressed (I am certain that the influence he had on Laing’s person far 
exceeded this summary of his theory. In a conversation with Anthony Lund (1990, p. 103), 
Kierkegaard was the only thinker Laing acknowledged to be his superior; ‘I don’t think I’m in 
the same league [as Kierkegaard]’. This comment is made all the most noteworthy because 
of the other names that provided the backdrop to this statement: Nietzsche, Kafka, Rilke, 
Holderlein, Freud). 
Earlier I stated that Laing’s theory illuminates the inhibitors that prevent our accepting and 
embracing inner experience and related this to psychic suffering. Through the voice of 
 
148 Respecting Kierkegaard’s instruction outlined in Fear and Trembling (2006), each quote will be attributed to 
the authorship of the pseudonym. 
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Climacus, Kierkegaard makes this exact argument but outlines the necessity and process of 
engaging with inwardness and subjectivity149 as two sides of the same coin. Even so, 
beyond Climacus’ primary emphasis, his theory provides an insight into the opposing face 
and factors that fit perfectly with Laing’s theory.  
If man occupies himself throughout his whole life solely with logic, that does not 
make him into logic. (Climacus, 1846, p. 79) 
…in all this knowledge, one has forgotten what it is to exist and what inwardness 
means. (Climacus, 1846, p. 203) 
Absence of inwardness is also a madness. Objective truth as such is by no means 
enough to determine that whoever utters it is sane; on the contrary, it can even 
betray the fact that he is mad although what he says be entirely true and in particular 
objectively true. (Climacus, 1846, p. 163) 
This selection of quotes contain all the structural components necessary to build the primary 
framework of Laing detailed throughout this thesis: we may study the logic of science, apply 
it within medicine, and structure psychiatry under its instruction – but that does not give the 
experience of self an objective epistemological character.  
Drawing together a conclusion for the entirety of Concluding Unscientific Postscript, one that 
addresses each of these quotes and furthermore, complements this epistemological fault-
line within Laing, Maybee (1996) offers the summary; 
[Climacus] suggests that one natural way of internalizing the traditional, objective, 
universalist account of rationality will make you sick. (Maybee, 1996, p. 387) 
Crucially, as Laing saw it during the infancy of his first phase of publishing, these conditions 
were insufficient to unsettle our ‘comfort, refuge and stability’ in worldliness – hence the 
statistical norm continued to exist with a ‘sense of’ ontological security. It was only those 
certain irrational families that heightened these conditions, disrupting the balance of 
 
149 Laing focussed on the negative, solely on the mechanisms of inhibition. In contrast, Climacus focussed mainly 
toward the positive, the striving to engage with inwardness. As was discussed in the previous chapter, and is 
more relevant than ever before, hope is present in Laing’s theory — often in its absence – and if I were to 
suggest a further speculative comment, it would be that Kierkegaard’s optimism, throughout all his publications, 
is the unspoken energy that gives shape to Laing’s theory of hope, an unspoken quality that makes even his dire 
observations bearable. 
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awareness within self-consciousness further, that tipped the individual into experiencing 
ontological insecurity. This dynamic reflects the structure of ontological in/security within the 
family context. 
However, Laing’s evolution to the political can be viewed in either of two ways, both 
complementing the other, and not necessarily distinct. Either, as Laing focussed more 
toward the ‘human collectivities’ and considered the impact of political interpersonal 
dynamics in greater detail, he acknowledged that the cost to self-consciousness had been 
under-appreciated, therefore his later work can be read as trying to resolve this by evolving 
his theory. Or the detrimental impact of the interpersonal dynamics on a political scale had 
intensified; psychiatry gaining more authority over the self, ‘psychiatric words’ gaining more 
influence within culture, scientism increasingly defining western existence etc. (a premise 
outlined in this thesis), therefore his theory now reflected this newly changed (intensified) 
dynamic. Regardless of whether it is one or the other, or both, Laing still states within The 
Politics of Experience that collectively, society is ‘asleep’ to this political damage being done 
to our ‘sense of’ ontological security, therefore at this stage, bad faith is still sufficient to keep 
us invested in the ‘conventional practices of everyday’, providing the ‘comfort, refuge and 
stability’ we seek in negating our potential existential freedom and the anguish this 
realisation causes. Therefore, in the political context, only the minority experiences 
ontological insecurity, but in actuality, we are all ontologically insecure, even if unconscious 
to this reality. It is the difference between ‘experienced’ and ‘actual’ ontological in/security 
that enables Laing’s account of the dynamics of this matter to find a more stable home within 
both models. Through the framework of self-consciousness, we give further proposals to 
remedy this conflict.  
As a final consideration, we have spoken about existing within the representational act of the 
other always in the presence of an other: the political other, the family other, the psychiatrist 
other. Do we need to consider that such is the level of saturation of this epistemological 
fault-line within our existence that we no longer need to be solely concerned with the I-Thou 
relatedness to others and thus one’s social context, but focus more specifically on the 
qualities underpinning the I-I relatedness, relatedness to oneself? Are we ourselves denying 
our own subjective experience, and re-ingesting the scientific framework to understand our 
experience? Essentially, [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself, by its very nature, requires 
acceptance of a subjective value-laden epistemology, therefore an acceptance that a finite, 
absolute and definitive knowledge of the self is beyond our epistemological grasp. But [1], 
the inwardness that should be governed by subjectivity, is not only being devalued, arguably 
it is being replaced with the epistemological basis of [2]. This is an incompatible system of 
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understanding existence – therefore, we are responsible for applying an epistemological 
framing that causes our own existential degradation. The self is always constituted in relation 
to the other – the other is scientifically defining the self. Kierkegaard stated that this 
scientistic logic was enough to make us sick, Laing stated that the fault-line is increasingly 
dominating our politically informed cultural existence, but we are unaware of the experienced 
ontological consequence – we are not experiencing the psychic suffering. Well, 60 years 
have passed, the trajectory of culture has continued along this path – and rates of ‘mental 
illness’ diagnosis are higher than ever. Are we now reaching a point that the epistemological 
fault-line is being experienced by society as a whole?  
There is a poignancy and timeliness to Laing’s chosen focus. The trajectory of modern 
psychiatry had long prior to the 1960s turned away from any prospect of ontological 
understanding of the self and toward a scientific, ‘evidence based’ model. Laing’s publishing 
came about as the ICD-6 (1949) and DSM-I (1952) manuals were anchoring themselves 
within modern psychiatry and culture more widely. Whilst there was no way of knowing the 
influence these manuals were to have in western society (and beyond), with hindsight, it 
would appear Laing was all too aware of the potential influence (damage) they were to wield 
(wreak). Psychiatry shapes ‘the very experience of living’ for us all (Rose, 2019, p. 3). 
Laing’s theory, focussing on the mechanisms of inhibition, came about at a seismic moment 
of cultural and psychiatric change. Laing was responding to a cultural shift, whereby the self 
became an object within the representational act of objectivist science and with it the light of 
the inner world was being snuffed out. The current tag line to addressing the ‘mental health’ 
‘epidemic’ we are experiencing, is the necessity to talk. My argument earlier was we need to 
think about how we are talking about ‘mental health’. We could more accurately say, we 
need to think about how we are talking, even thinking, about the self – lest we be investing 




Hell is other people. (Sartre, 1945, p. 52)150 
Often misunderstood, this quote, taken from Huis Clos (No Exit – English translation), 
provides an interesting means of illustrating the insights generated from this application of 
Laingian theory within a contemporary, neoliberal landscape.  
A simplistic synopsis of Huis Clos might be that three characters are locked in a room, where 
– amongst several plot twists – it becomes apparent that the room is not furnished with a 
mirror or any means to see one’s own reflection. Without this capability, the characters soon 
realise that the only means of perceiving themselves, to achieve any form of self-reflection, 
is through the torturous gaze of other people; hell is (seeing oneself through the eyes, the 
representational act, of) other people. 
The play resonates with Laing’s ideas across his three major registers.  
The clinical: this is perhaps the easiest and most direct application in comparison with the 
situation that unfolds within Huis Clos. As defined within the Conspiratorial Model, psychiatry 
holds the power to enforce a diagnosis, and therefore definition, upon those that are 
suffering. When the sufferer enters the psychiatric encounter, their experience of self 
becomes framed within the dominance and authority of the psychiatric gaze.  
The family: Laing illustrated how in certain nexuses of misaligned interpersonal dynamics an 
individual can lose the capacity to appraise their own worldly experience. The result of this 
process is that the individual becomes overly (completely) reliant on the gaze of another to 
qualify their experience. This is typified by the child / parent dynamic within the family-nexus.  
The political: western culture is increasingly prioritizing a belief that the most authoritative 
and therefore accurate means of self-understanding is gained through the discourse of 
scientistic principles (with psychiatry playing a significant role for instilling this belief). 
Science is the representational act that defines how we see ourselves (and others).  
 
150 Hell is just other people. (Sartre, 1945, p. 52 - Italics added) 
Bowles’ 1972 adaption of this play includes the word ‘just’. This is not reflected in other 
adaptations/translations.  
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Each of Laing’s contexts revealed a social intelligibility underpinning the experience of 
ontological insecurity. And, mimicking the hell of Sartre’s fictionalised situation, the lack of 
something akin to ‘self-reflection’ and the subsequent reliance on seeing oneself through the 
representational act of another, is an instrumental component in this process.  
The resonance of Huis Clos with Laing’s theory gains even more relevance when we 
emphasize the experience of ‘hell’ with reference to Sartre’s seminal theoretical piece, Being 
and Nothingness, and interweave Laing’s theory of self-consciousness.  
I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an 
object that I appear to the Other. (Sartre, 1957, p. 246) 
The mirror within the play is symbolic of an important, necessary quality that must exist 
within all experience, a space for self-reflection. This function within experience undertakes a 
vital role in helping to understand oneself, a function that overlaps completely within a 
framework of self-consciousness. Self-reflection is [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself. In 
Sartre’s play this condition has been inhibited through the manipulation of the environment, 
the characters have been physically prevented from any and all means of seeing oneself by 
oneself. Resultingly, the only available means for understanding oneself is living solely within 
the representational act of another and thus dominated by [2] an awareness of oneself as an 
object of somebody else’s observation. 
This result is equally true for each of Laing’s contexts. Through misaligned interpersonal 
dynamics, the sufferer’s experience has become dominated by [2] an awareness of 
themselves as an object of someone else’s observation. And this experience has devalued 
and displaced their capacity for self-reflection, [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself. Let us 
not forget the necessity of this awareness. To have [2] awareness of oneself as an object of 
somebody else’s observation is a requirement for a sense of ontological security to be 
achieved. It provides a way of anchoring ourselves within worldliness, as demonstrated by 
the conversation with Kafka’s Suppliant, and the structural recognition for its inclusion within 
a framework of self-consciousness. However, as represented in Huis Clos and each of 
Laing’s contexts, our existence is becoming increasingly consumed within the 
representational act of other people, and this ensures we pass judgment on ourselves as on 
an object. In becoming nothing more than ‘objects’ we lose the capacity to relate to others 
(and ourselves) as persons, we exist with ontological discontinuity. This is the kernel of 
Laing’s theory as developed within this thesis – we are relinquishing knowledge of persons 
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(including knowledge of ourselves) to the perceived authority of a scientistic gaze within 
western culture and this is the source of our collective ontological insecurity.   
Framing this experience differently, Laing offers us further perspectives to consider the 
collective experience of ontological insecurity within western culture. 
We seem to live in two worlds, and many people are only aware of the ‘outer’ rump. 
(Laing, 1967, p. 107) 
We are aware of the outer rump of existence, just as each of us is [2] aware of oneself as an 
object of somebody else’s observation. This is a world in which individual persons connect 
through I-It relatedness; empirical, objective interaction, a meeting of objects only – two 
billiard balls colliding. We could frame this slightly differently again, recognising that 
ontological insecurity is affecting us all because we are divorced from the inner world, just as 
we are divorced from [1] awareness of oneself by oneself. The importance of the inner world 
for our ontological security is increasingly coming into focus with self-reflection, [1] 
awareness of oneself by oneself, seemingly providing the pathway to reaching and 
establishing a relatedness with this missing component of existence.  
But, what is an awareness of oneself by oneself? What are we looking at/for in self-
reflection? The suggestion in the previous chapter was that this I-I relationship needs to be 
addressed carefully. We cannot draw [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself with naivety 
and believe this to be an ontologically enriching source of guidance – especially in its current 
form. The self is always constituted by the ego/other experience, and the pervasiveness with 
which scientistic discourse has permeated through the other into the self, is contaminating 
relatedness with ourselves. The return of Laing’s theory to the fold of philosophy is 
paramount for considering the intricacy of the ego/other bond, and reinvigorating 
consideration for the inner and outer world within our psychosocial perspective approach to 
all matters of the self. 
We cannot attempt to reengage with [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself, whilst we 
continue to hold objective scientistic discourse as the perceived greater authority of self. This 
framing will not access the knowledge relating to experiences within the inner world, a 
necessary component within the balance of self-consciousness and for the attainment of a 
sense of ontological security.  
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Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that a current state of collective ontological 
insecurity defines neoliberal, western culture, and this is a consequence of the domination of 
[2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s observation. This is a primary 
product of the psychiatric system. The stronghold that psychiatric words have on all matters 
of self-understanding are shaping ‘the very experience of living’ for us all (Rose, 2019, p. 3). 
As such, existence could be seen to have become mediated through a scientistic lens, and 
the consequence is that people are determined as objects, held accountable to empirical 
objectivist scientistic standards that impose a finite and absolute capacity for the self.  
This has created a knot within our phantasy construct, not only is an existential degradation 
enacted upon us causing the development of ontological insecurity, but I suggest the window 
into our inner world has become tainted, contaminating our entire experience of existence, 
further impacting the I-I relatedness with oneself, and the I-Thou relatedness to others.  
Essentially, we are presented with the imperative to simultaneously navigate, undo and 
untangle ourselves from this scientistic knot which claims an absolute monopoly on all 
matters of self-understanding, and create a space to breathe life back into the voice of the 
inner world, so that [1] an awareness of oneself by oneself can once again be heard. This 
will arrest our continuing existential degradation and lead to further opportunities to achieve 
a sense of ontological security. 
Laing’s theory, reworked through a concept analysis in Chapter 5, A Laingian Methodology, 
Chapter 6, Self-Formation, and the entirety of Part 3, Ontological Insecurity, has given us the 
framework to identify and understand the source of our collective ontological insecurity.  
Laing’s original application of an existential-phenomenological methodology analysed the 
experience of diagnosed ‘schizophrenics’ and sought to find intelligibility within the 
previously considered incoherence of schizophrenic experience. Deciphering language 
termed schizophrenese babble, Laing identified the process within a person’s life that 
explained their erratic behaviours and symptoms. Gaining social intelligibility (as opposed to 
the accepted presumption of a biological/organismic default) negated the medicalised 
qualification of ‘illness’ or ‘disorder’ – and therefore undermined the treatment processes 
which relied on such a qualification as well.  
Applying his thinking to the political arena, Laing stated that social intelligibility was once 
again revealed for our collective ontological insecurity. But, lacking the obvious theoretical 
rigour of his previous focus within the clinical and the family, this assertion faced criticism for 
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being little more than unsubstantiated and speculative proclamations. This thesis has 
meticulously developed Laing’s political application, highlighting concepts overlooked and 
emphasising connections within the other contexts. This has shown that the theory has 
structural integrity and enables further experiences within our cultural existence to be 
deciphered – and ‘the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object’ (Sartre, 1957, 
p. 246), is seen as a prime factor that affects our capacity for an [1] awareness of oneself by 
oneself, thus clouding our ability to self-reflect.  
Only by departing from our current means of defining the self, represented and influenced so 
heavily by psychiatry, can we hope to gain a sense of ontological security. Reverberations of 
this project are already underway within the service user movement, the recognition that a 
new psychiatric episteme is needed, a structure of psychiatric knowledge that resonates 
from within, valuing the insight of those that are experts by virtue of their experience. We 
could even frame this action from within the service user movement as a realisation, a need, 
to hear and value the voices that speak with [1] awareness of oneself by oneself, as 
opposed to being silenced by psychiatry’s beating of the drum. ‘Psychiatric words’ enforcing 
a dominance of [2] an awareness of oneself as an object of somebody else’s observation, a 
reductive definition of self, imposed on those in society most maligned under psychiatry’s 
observation. The framework of Laingian theory developed in this thesis would provide 
support in this existing pursuit of a new psychiatric episteme, a means to offer perspectives 
into the damage inflicted by psychiatry and assist in dismantling its discourse – both in direct 
application to ‘mental illness’ and its subtle cultural influence beyond.  
This analysis of Laing has not shown how and where to re-engage with the inner world (if the 
inner world was ever engaged with previously), but it has shown us clearly how and where it 
will not be achieved – through the eyes of an other, still less the scientistic eyes of 
contemporary, western, neoliberal culture.  
Existential thinking offers no security, no home for the homeless. (Laing, 1967, p. 47) 
Laing’s theory has revealed that the scientific home which has provided existential refuge 
within contemporary culture, is sustained by bad faith. A bad faith that has allowed scientific 
psychiatric language and our sense of ourselves to collapse into the same thing – 
suffocating self-reflection from experience. Bad faith allowing us to continue an existence 
even though it contributes to an ontological insecurity. With the help of Laing, the two have 
been prized apart, allowing us to see the construction as an object not as part of ourselves, 
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but as experienced by ourselves. As such, a gap or space is revealed between the discourse 
and our sense of the need for the [1] awareness of oneself by oneself.  
Laing’s theory has placed doubt in the realm of the outer rump of existence, and the 
objective and scientific qualities that structure our outer world. In contrast, what Laing 
highlighted as too easily dismissed, the ‘‘subjective ’,  ‘intuitive’ or worst of all, ‘mystical’’ 
(Laing, 1960, p. 25) logically occupy the equivalent binary for the qualities of the inner world.    
This thesis has involved consciously avoiding any and all influences of mysticism, spirituality, 
and religion present within Laing’s career. Whilst this was a necessary task to ensure focus 
was not lost, it must also be acknowledged as occurring at a cost. Although subtle, to my 
mind, these components occupy a constant presence within Laing’s theory, and I suggest 
are responsible for the optimism and hope that run through his work. 
Several theorists pursue this line of enquiry (see Lunt, 1990; Heaton, 2015; Pickering, 2015), 
but I stand by the rationale underpinning the parameters of this research; too little is present 
within Laing’s written work to sustain a spiritual justification for a Laingian framework. Many 
of those that focus on this area have a connection to his person, this adding a further 
complication to this alternate direction of theory.  
Nonetheless, as we look to re-engage with an [1] awareness of oneself by oneself, 
reattuning to the inner world is vital if we want to ensure a less contaminated process of self-
reflection.  
Laing has given us a rationale to justify and embrace doubt within our western, neoliberal 
approach to experiencing the self. This in itself is huge. It argues against the most prominent 
authority system (‘psychiatry’ and logical empiricism, more generally) currently applied to the 
self. Where we go from here, I must leave open. This part of my research ends inevitably 
with a fresh new set of questions, new terrain. Once the [1] awareness of oneself by oneself 
becomes an intelligible possibility what we do with it remains as an exciting open question 
and one which I hope to address in my new research. 
Laing recalls the first time he read Concluding Unscientific Postscript as ‘one of the peak 
experiences of my life. I read it through without sleeping’ (Mullan, 1995, p. 94). I propose that 
Kierkegaard’s influence runs beneath all of Laing’s work. In my next encounter with Laing for 
contemporary times I plan to follow this line of thought to explore if it would provide a very 
different reading of Laing’s theory. But, in closing, I will make a final statement: in the 
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process of completing this research a doubt has entered my own existence and this has 
revealed a crack in the conceptions by which I defined my place within the world, how I 
understood myself, and how I understood others. In reaching out to Sartre, Heidegger, even 
Buber as a side project, no solace was found. Yet, in Kierkegaard, something feels right. It 
weaves within my reading and understanding of Laing, and it provides an existential wisdom 
in certain moments of angst. I cannot say that in learning to doubt I have gained faith, but I 
have found a friend in Kierkegaard. And as with all good friends, he gives me strength in 
times of existential need.  
The reading of Laing produced throughout this thesis leaves us with this potentially 
generative gap or fracture between the empirical referent of the self experiencing itself as 
object and the self that is aware of itself by itself. From this position, I now ask myself 
whether Kierkegaard can help us navigate and explore this gap, allowing for the possibility of 
a metaphysics that gives us a different reference that may provide access to different 
encounters that speaks to our existential passions in new as yet unknown ways?  
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Coda: Laing and the COVID-19 Fallout 
The coronavirus crisis poses the greatest threat to mental health since the second 
world war. (Sample, 2020) 
On the 11th March 2020 a specific variant of Coronavirus, COVID-19, was classified a 
worldwide pandemic (Bueno-Notivol et al., 2021), affecting the entirety of life as we know it. 
Due to escalating mortality rates and an unmanageable demand placed upon hospital ICU 
beds, the UK government responded to this pandemic by implementing a series of 
lockdowns of varying intensity, locally and nationally, in an attempt to reduce transmission 
rates and bring the virus under control. As a by-product of these government-enforced 
lockdowns, work and employment for many was compromised and socialising severely 
restricted – often limited to members of one’s own household.151 As I type this chapter in the 
early weeks of 2021, restrictions are once again ramping up in response to a second wave 
of COVID-19 and corresponding fatalities and increasing hospital admissions. Whilst 
government lockdowns have been actioned to address the respiratory virus, an indirect 
impact on mental health is causing significant concern, and as further lockdown restrictions 
have been announced, the concern about impending ‘mental health’ consequences gets 
louder and louder.152 
Mitigating the hazardous effects of COVID-19 on mental health is an international 
public health priority. (Xiong et al., 2020, p. 55) 
The ‘mental health’ consequences of COVID-19 are not expected to peak until after the 
pandemic has subsided and ‘normal’ life resumed, but already we are seeing a surge in 
‘mental health’ diagnosis: diagnosed depression up by 25% (Bueno-Notivol et al., 2021), 
anxiety and stress also reporting significantly higher (Salari et al., 2020). Compounding the 
earlier statement in Chapter 2, Why Now, that ‘mental illness’ was the ‘epidemic’ within 
western society, the concern is that this unforeseen pandemic has amplified this situation. 
 
151 or where a single occupancy adult, forming a ‘support bubble’ with one other household. 
152 The BBC ran an online article which summarises this connection: ‘COVID-19: UK lockdown, school closures 
and mental health tips’ (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-55534081 accessed 05/01/2021). 
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Thinking about how we intend to cope with this greater demand and the necessity to provide 
real help for those who are suffering, as recognised by Xiong et al., requires a concerted 
approach. 
The COVID-19 pandemic reveals existing weaknesses in the mental health system, 
but also presents opportunities for reform. (Magoon et al., 2020) 
In addition to appreciating the severity of the response, an increasing number of researchers 
are also seeing the COVID-19 situation as an opportunity to improve the help given to those 
in need. Although recognising this potential, Magoon et al.’s strategy remains embedded in 
the existing psychiatric paradigm; rather than questioning any notion of efficacy for the 
current system, they look to improve the efficiency of the existing paradigm.  
I suggest that we must be bolder with the opportunity this situation provides.  
Vahia et al. (2020, p. 695) propose a ‘need for new knowledge to bridge science and service’ 
in reference to the imminent ‘mental health’ fallout. Providing indirect support for the value of 
the research conducted in this thesis, Vahia et al. state that we must look to new means of 
understanding what constitutes ‘mental illness’ and use this platform to inform how we 
respond with treatment. Research such as this provides an inroad to consider alternative 
models beyond the current status quo and although the invitation is general, Laing’s 
compatibility is evident from the outset. The relationship between COVID-19 and ‘mental 
health’ presents an opportunity to reconsider an application of Laing’s concept of ontological 
insecurity, reframing the psychic suffering experienced surrounding this pandemic as a 
logical, but painful, response to an event situated in our worldly existence.  
A Laingian Application  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) is arguably the leading global research authority for 
all matters of health, and the importance of their statement addressing the mental health 
concerns arising from the COVID-19 pandemic is not to be underestimated.  
[1] Fear, worry, and stress are normal responses to perceived or real threats, and at 
times when we are faced with uncertainty or the unknown. So it is normal and 
understandable that people are experiencing fear in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 260 
[2] Added to the fear of contracting the virus in a pandemic such as COVID-19 are 
the significant changes to our daily lives as our movements are restricted in support 
of efforts to contain and slow down the spread of the virus. Faced with new realities 
of working from home, temporary unemployment, home-schooling of children, and 
lack of physical contact with other family members, friends and colleagues, it is 
important that we look after our mental, as well as our physical, health.  
(World Health Organisation, 2020)  
The COVID-19 pandemic presents no requirement to decipher an encrypted dialogue, as per 
Laing’s research with ‘schizophrenics’. The suffering experienced is already defined within 
the context of events surrounding the lockdowns, therefore social intelligibility is a given. 
This is highlighted by the WHO, a breadth of primary research, and even recognised on 
social media. The main source of our painful experiences, our psychic suffering, lies in our 
environmental context, the difficult and challenging experiences caused by lockdowns. Yet, 
early indicators are suggesting that the psychic suffering experienced in response to COVID-
19 is already being absorbed within a deficit model of mental illness diagnosis and treated as 
such (hence the increased rates of depression etc., noted above). 
When we focus on the ‘hazardous effects of COVID-19 on mental health’ through a Laingian 
lens, the concept of ontological insecurity is persuasive. More specifically, if we analyse the 
WHO statement through this lens, Laing provides an alternate voice and theory to the 
existing ‘mental health’ framework, a voice that I suggest is both needed and valuable.  
Referring to the individual paragraphs of the WHO statement, ontological insecurity 
embraces each of the dimensions / positions highlighted by the WHO and their 
interconnection. The crucial Laingian contribution is that their ordering is inverted; it is the 
effect of our empirical, worldly, experiences (paragraph [2]) that come first, and this is the 
source responsible for awakening the angst associated with the precarity of Being and 
nonbeing (paragraph [1]). I argue that this inversion is a more accurate reflection of the 
‘mental health’ consequences experienced and anticipated with the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Research concerning mental health and COVID-19153 emphasises the implications and 
limitations which stem from the announcement of lockdowns (sociological – paragraph [2]), 
representing a change to our environmental conditions. This does not dismiss the 
implications resulting from the fear of illness and/or death (psychological – paragraph [1]) as 
 
153 This is not including reports of mental illness associated with contracting the virus (see Taquet et al., 2020). 
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a contributory factor. Rather, empirical experiences within our environment – anxieties that fit 
within Laing’s description as fourth possibility locations – are the primary mental health 
concern.  
Fourth possibility anxieties were detailed as the cause of ontological insecurity; these are 
empirical experiences, which exist within everyday existence – experiences exemplified by 
the effects of lockdown. Laing is not attacking the base existential anxieties directly (Being 
and nonbeing – in a Sartrean / Heideggerian framework, or death, guilt and purposelessness 
– in Tillich’s theory154), and neither is the majority of current research. The WHO, I suggest, 
are correct to acknowledge the involvement of fear which works within both an existential 
and Laingian framework, both including considerations for the base existential anxieties. 
However, I suggest they have put the cart before the horse. Because of COVID-19, the 
environment that provides refuge from our base anxieties has become unsettled and as such 
we have been exposed to the presence of the fear and angst we continually attempt to flee. 
Our existential refuge has been lost. 
When analysing the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, we must also consider the 
possibility that this event is acting upon an existing ontologically insecure position.  
A prime symptom or characteristic of ontological insecurity in a person is that ‘the ordinary 
circumstances of living threaten his low threshold of security’ (Laing, 1960, p. 42). The 
‘ordinary circumstances of living’ have already been challenging our ‘threshold of security’ 
hence the increasing incidence of ‘mental illness’ diagnosis prior to the onset of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Thus, building from this ontologically insecure position, the necessity to adapt 
and manage ‘significant changes to our daily lives’ arising from the COVID-19 lockdowns is 
compromising our ability to look after our ‘mental health’ more and more.  
Even if we approach the COVID-19 pandemic without an awareness of pre-existing 
ontological insecurity, this pandemic has all the ingredients to bring it about. This event is 
sufficient to compromise the conditions required for existential refuge and enough to inhibit 
our ability to immerse within worldliness and realise our being-in-the-world. Angst and fear 
are always rippling beneath our ontological surface, if not fully realised; the ‘mental health’ 
epidemic suggests we are already precariously close to tipping the balance.  
 
154 It is building on Tillich’s 3 base anxieties that Laing qualifies the empirical, worldly anxieties as situated in the 
fourth possibility.  
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Laing’s theory challenges societal norms and encourages a reconceptualization of psychic 
suffering, an understanding that exists outside the perceived scientific authority over self that 
is claim of a psychiatric paradigm. Even though research is starting to highlight this need 
(Vahia et al., being representative of this changing mood), the position of psychiatric science 
is so well established that challenging its authority and choosing a different course of action 
is a monumental ask. 
Laing’s existential-phenomenological methodology and the theory of self-formation this 
outlines, provides a more emancipatory science of persons. From this epistemological basis, 
a refined focus is gained and the Laingian concept of ontological insecurity comes to the 
forefront. Approached from this vantage point, the ‘mental health’ issues stemming from 
COVID-19 are a socially intelligible, coherent, even common-sensical response to the 
psychic suffering being experienced. Treatment has never been the object of this research, 
but from the findings uncovered we now know where we need to begin.  
Looking toward service and treatment, however, no map is provided in this thesis for where 
we need to go. Yet, through reanalysing Laing’s theory, dead-ends and cul-de-sacs are 
illuminated that would have prevented us from reaching any helpful destination. The 
‘hazardous effects of COVID-19’ are not mental illness, they should therefore not be treated 
as such. Laing’s theory contains the potential to break the cycle, to prevent sufferers being 
subjected to a misaligned treatment process, and thus inaugurated as career patients within 
the psychiatric system.  
But the real impact of Laing’s application to this pandemic extends to culture itself.  Through 
addressing the very source of collective ontological insecurity affecting western society, the 
scientistic means with which we define the self that compromises relatedness to oneself and 
others comes into our awareness.    
The actions by which we address the experience of COVID-19, will constitute a new 
psychiatric discourse and will filter through to society as a whole. This is an unrivalled 
opportunity to change how we think of persons and to destabilise the confidence we place in 
‘science’ to understand all matters of self. This is the opportunity to discover ways to re-
engage with a displaced [1] awareness of oneself by oneself beyond a reductive 
contamination of logical empiricism – psychiatric words – which have dominated and turned 
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